George F. Earle

Captain, 87th Mountain Infantry

1945

3 JANUARY 1945 — 14 AUGUST 1945

Digitized and edited by Barbara Imbrie, 2004

CONTENTS

PREFACE: THE 87TH REGIMENT FROM DECEMBER 1941 TO JANUARY 1945................. i - iii

INTRODUCTION TO ITALY .................................................................................................. 1

(4 Jan — 16 Feb)

BELVEDERE OFFENSIVE..................................................................................................... 10

(16 Feb — 28 Feb)

MARCH OFFENSIVE AND CONSOLIDATION..................................................................... 24

(3 Mar — 31 Mar)

SPRING OFFENSIVE TO PO VALLEY................................................................................... 43

(1 Apr — 20 Apr)

Preparation: 1 Apr—13 Apr 43

First day: 14 April 48

Second day: 15 April 61

Third day: 16 April 75

Fourth day: 17 April 86

Fifth day: 18 April 96

Sixth day: 19 April 99

Seventh day: 20 April 113

PO VALLEY TO LAKE GARDA...........................................................................................120

(21 Apr — 2 May)

Eighth day: 21 April 120

Ninth day: 22 April 130

Tenth day: 23 April 132

Eleventh and Twelfth days: 24-25 April 149

Thirteenth day: 26 April 150

Fourteenth day: 27 April 152

Fifteenth day: 28 April 155

Sixteenth day: 29 April 157

End of the Campaign: 30 April-2 May 161

OCCUPATION DUTY AND RETURN TO THE STATES........................................................165

(8 May — 14 August)

COMBAT ORGANIZATION OF THE 87TH REGIMENT.......................................................172

CASUALTIES OF THE 87TH REGIMENT.............................................................................173

ROLL OF HONOR OF THE 87TH REGIMENT......................................................................174

MAPS OF THE CAMPAIGN*

MAP 1. RIVA RIDGE ........................................................................................180

MAP 2. MT. BELVEDERE RIDGE ......................................................................181

MAP 3. MARCH OFFENSIVE............................................................................182

MAP 4. SPRING OFFENSIVE ............................................................................183

MAP 5. BREAKOUT .........................................................................................184

MAP 6. PO VALLEY SOUTH.............................................................................185

MAP 7. PO RIVER CROSSING ..........................................................................186

MAP 8. ADVANCE TO LAKE GARDA..............................................................187

MAP 9. LAKE GARDA: THE FINAL BATTLES..................................................188

BATTLE ROUTE OF THE

10th MOUNTAIN DIVISION CAMPAIGN IN ITALY

December 1944 – May 1945

*Modified by Barbara Imbrie from original battle diagrams published by Armand

Casini in 1945.

PREFACE

THE 87TH REGIMENT

FROM DECEMBER 1941 TO JANUARY 1945

The first element of the 87th Mountain Infantry, now part of the 10th Mountain Division, was

officially formed at Fort Lewis, Washington on 8 December 1941, the day after Pearl Harbor

was attacked. Four days previously, twelve officers and one enlisted man had met and were designated

as the “87th Infantry, Mountain, 1st Battalion, Reinforced.” Lieutenant Colonel ONSLOW

S. ROLFE was in command. Most of the original officers are now within the 10th Mountain

Division, but the identity of the enlisted man is unknown. He was drafted in to stoke the

fires, and was the only non-volunteer in the early days of the outfit.

During the next few days a large number of volunteer cadre arrived from regular army

units—many from the 15th Cavalry, so that by December 8th, there were approximately 75 officers

and enlisted men, all attached to A Company, but forming the nucleus of A, B, C, D, Headquarters,

and Service Companies. This first United States mountain organization was the result

of efforts of army and civilian groups, which prevailed upon the War Department after more

than a year of effort. Most active among civilian groups was the National Ski Patrol Association,

headed by MINOT DOLE, who had been in correspondence with General MARSHALL for several

months. This organization, through a special arrangement with the War Department, supplied

a large proportion of the volunteers. During the previous winter, a ski patrol from the 15th

Infantry Regiment had trained on Mount Rainier, and other army skiing had been done at Lake

Placid and in Wisconsin.

Almost at once, the present communications officer, Captain (then Private) JOSEPH A.

HEARST, caught a communicable disease, quarantining A Company for 21 days over Christmas

and New Year’s Day, thereby becoming the most unpopular private in the new outfit. This

seemed to establish a precedent, for on the following Christmas the outfit was confined because

of maneuvers in California; the one after that found most of them on ships returning from the

Aleutians; and the Christmas of 1944 was spent in the Staging Area getting ready to ship to Italy.

In January of 1942 all manner of ski and winter equipment was issued, and ski calisthenics

were given in the mud of Fort Lewis, Washington. Late in the month, Companies A, B, and C

moved up to Tatoosh and Paradise Lodges on Mount Rainier for ski training. Tests were devised

and a ski school set up. The testing of equipment and mountain techniques were handled by a

section of the unit called the Mountain and Winter Warfare Board. Master Sergeant WILLIAM P.

JONES, then First Sergeant of Company A, and now regimental Sergeant Major, at this time

proved to the satisfaction of Colonel ROLFE and the Board that all soldiers could not be made

into skiers. As advised, Sergeant JONES permanently put away his skis.

Meanwhile, Company D and the Service Company under Captain GEORGE FLETCHER,

now Colonel, G-3 of the 91st Division in Italy, remained down at Fort Lewis, building a corral for

the mules. In the spring, Company D moved up for a brief ski period. The Battalion returned to

Fort Lewis in May, and by this time, the all-volunteer outfit had grown large enough to form a

Second Battalion under the command of Major RICHARD F. READY. Major FLETCHER was

given command of the First.

At this time, the unit was made up of world-famous skiers, mountaineers, forest rangers and

trappers, lumbermen and guides, and a group of cowboys, muleskinners and horsemen, in addition

to the regular army cadre. A riding school was begun at Fort Lewis in July. A detachment

T

spent two summer months in the Columbian Ice Fields in Canada to develop an over-snow vehicle,

the great-granddaddy of the present M-29 “Weasel.” Incredible as it may seem to the Infantry,

another detachment made a movie short in Hollywood, the first of several films featuring ski

troops of the 87th. At a later date, both Warner Brothers and Paramount made pictures on the

Army ski slopes.

Intensive military training began in September at the Main Camp in Fort Lewis with rigorous

conditioning and range work. Colonel JEFFERSON B. WILLIS took command of the regiment

under the over-all command of Colonel ROLFE. On 18 November 1942, the 1st and 2nd Battalions

entrained for maneuvers at Jolon, California, accompanied by the horses and mules. For six

weeks the two battalions maneuvered against a battalion of the First Filipino Regiment. Meanwhile,

a site had been chosen for a brand new camp to house the 87th, on the Continental Divide

in Colorado, at 9,480 feet above sea level. Camp Hale was to be complete with a mile-long ski

tow, several rope tows, stables, and even ski waxing rooms in the barracks. The camp was nearing

completion while the 1st and 2nd Battalions maneuvered, and a skeleton 3rd Battalion,

formed in September, moved and waited at Camp Hale until rejoined by the rest of the regiment

just before the new year.

Many new problems in winter-military training were presented by the extreme high altitude

and weather. Over a hundred types of equipment and vehicles were tested. Units and detachments,

to the size of battalions, bivouacked in the surrounding mountains at 12,000 feet, and ran

problems and tests in the snow and extreme cold. Unusual schools were set up with experienced

men in charge to teach—not only skiing, but snow-shoeing, snow freighting, and trail breaking

on toboggan. Dog teams were attached, and men were trained in their handling. Men were

trained to build snow caves; taught to cook the mountain ration individually; trained in the prevention

of avalanches; and instructed in rescue work. Detachments were sent to teach skiing and

mountaineering at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, and to a mountain-training center at Seneca Falls,

Virginia. Techniques slowly evolved both from winter military operations, and from living successfully

under the extreme conditions.

Various manuals were written. A ”Manual of Skis” for drilling and marching in the snow

was taught. The Mountain Soldier carried his rifle on his back, and his skis at “right shoulder”

while marching. He also gave the “Ski salute,” and learned to stack skis and to mount and dismount

them “by the numbers.” Also, early in the winter, a nucleus of officers and enlisted men

from the 87th formed the cadre for the new 86th Infantry Regiment. Later, in the spring, schools

were set up for rock-climbing, mule packing, and forest fire fighting. Scout and Attack Dog Detachment

joined; and even pigeons, reputedly helpless at the camp altitude, not only flew missions,

but presented the regiment with its first egg late in May. The development of the snow

vehicle was progressing with revisions of the old model, and also rejections of several abortive

experimental contraptions. Civilian Arctic explorers and renowned mountaineers lent technical

advice. Yet the severe conditions caused a high casualty and reclassification rate. The old Regular

Army cadre at times despaired of ever doing any soldiering, considering the experts on detached

service, the many schools, and the reclassifications. Meanwhile, the regular infantry training

struggled on, men often firing on the range at twenty below zero in swirling snow.

On 11 June 1943, the outfit left for amphibious training, conducted by the Marines at Fort

Ord, California. After a two-week training cruise to San Diego, the regiment entrained at Fort

Ord on the night of 27 July, boarded four ships in San Francisco the same night, and sailed for

Adak in the Aleutians on the 29th of July as part of Amphibian Training Force Nine, preparatory

to the occupation of Kiska. The regiment landed on the beach at Adak and bivouacked there

from 9 to 12 August under their new commander, Colonel ROY V. RICKARD.

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In the lee of volcanic Great Sitkin, in Adak’s outer harbor, a great convoy including forty

thousand troops and a large portion of the Pacific Fleet formed up in a rare Aleutian sunset on 13

August. Land-based planes were still returning from Kiska, and paratroopers waited on Amchitka

to support the occupation. Each battalion was to assault a separate landing point, each the

spearhead to one of the three major landings. Through the fog, on the mornings of the 15th and

16th, the regiment hit the beaches, quickly climbed the precipitous cliffs of the north shore, and

obtained their initial objectives. There was no opposition encountered beyond the severe winds,

fog, and occasional mines. On the landing, the 1st Battalion was commanded by one of the organization’s

earliest arrivals, Lieutenant Colonel ROSS J. WILSON, the 2nd by Major EMMETT L.

NATIONS, and the 3rd by Lieutenant Colonel ARTHUR H. HENDERSON.

During the operation and occupation, much of the special equipment proved itself. Especially

notable was the early model of the present M-29, then called the T-15, which gave promise

of its future combat value. At the conclusion of the successful occupation, Colonel RICKARD

and the regiment received commendation from observers of the War and Navy Departments.

Colonel RICKARD moved on to another assignment, leaving the regimental executive officer,

Lieutenant Colonel JOHN F. SCHMELZER, in temporary command. On 5 October, Colonel

JESSE E. GRAHAM assumed command of the regiment, now reassembled as a unit. During November

and December, battalions were withdrawn individually to the States, and by 1 January

1944, the entire regiment was back at Camp Carson, Colorado.

In the middle of February, the 87th replaced the 90th in the 10th Light Division and was

moved up again to Camp Hale, Colorado, coming under the command of Colonel PAUL F.

“Pop” GOODE. The 87th Mountain Infantry Regiment shortly became the 87th Infantry Regiment,

Light. In the Division were the 86th and 85th Regiments, the latter activated at Camp Hale

after the 87th left for Kiska. With the 85th and 86th Regiments, the 87th went into the “D-Series,”

a six-week maneuver in sub-zero weather, down to thirty-eight degrees below zero, conducted in

the mountainous terrain near Camp Hale. In one night alone, over one hundred cases of frostbite

were evacuated, and all men who completed the maneuver were commended.

Colonel DAVID M. FOWLER assumed command of the regiment in early June. In late June,

the regiment moved with the Division to Camp Swift, Texas, into a broiling summer of small-unit

problems, and 25-mile speed marches. A final reorganization took place in the fall. The 10th became

the only Mountain Division in the U.S. Army, and the 87th, at one time the only Mountain

Regiment, now shared that distinction with the 85th and the 86th.

The 87th Mountain Infantry entrained from Camp Swift, Texas on 20 December, for Camp

Patrick Henry, Virginia, and embarked at Newport News on the USS West Point on 3 January

1945. Sailing time: 1100, 4 January 1945; destination: Naples, Italy.

iii

INTRODUCTION TO ITALY

PATROL ACTION

(4 JAN — 16 FEB)

nique in being the first infantry regiment to sail to both the Pacific and European Theaters,

the 87th Mountain Infantry embarked at Newport News, Virginia, on the morning of 3

January 1945, shortly after the start of our country’s fourth year of World War II. Less than onehalf

of the heavily burdened men who struggled up the steep gangplanks of the USS West Point,

and filed down to their compartments, had made the amphibious landing on Kiska Island a year

and a half before. A large percentage had joined the regiment since the conclusion of mountain

training six months previously, when the move from Camp Hale, Colorado, to Camp Swift,

Texas, was accomplished. But a strong nucleus of officers and enlisted men remained who had

followed the Regimental Colors most, or all of the way, from Fort Lewis and Mount Rainier, to

Jolon, to Camp Hale, to Fort Ord on the west coast, to San Francisco, to Adak, and to Kiska; then

back to Camp Carson, to Camp Hale, and finally to Camp Swift and the East Coast Staging Area,

Camp Patrick Henry.

Under the command of Colonel DAVID M. FOWLER, old and new had shaken down into a

well-integrated force. On New Year’s Day, a brief ceremony had been held at Camp Patrick

Henry in which the history of the organization was reviewed, and some of its traditional songs

were sung to pass on to the new men some of the spirit of the regiment.

On the gray morning of 4 January, the West Point slid from the pier, and moved down the

calm harbor past Old Point Comfort, and out into the long Atlantic swells. The 87th Mountain

Infantry had completed one of the longest wartime training periods of any U.S. Army combat

unit, and certainly the most unusual and varied. The morale was of the kind known only to a

unit old enough and rich enough in its own traditions, possessing a colorful individuality, a unit

with songs and stories.

The West Point, formerly the peacetime liner SS America, largest ship ever built in the United

States, made the Atlantic crossing in nine days. Landfall was made in the forenoon of the seventh

day, and the Straits of Gibraltar were passed through that afternoon in a rare spell of sunshine.

Two days later the great ship slipped close by the towering Isle of Capri and docked at Naples on

13 January in a series of cold rainsqualls that all but blotted out snow-spotted Mount Vesuvius.

At an end were the seasickness, and the normal friction of crowded troops on a rough crossing.

The 87th and its sister regiment, the 85th Mountain Infantry, had crossed on the West Point without

convoy escort. Nothing important occurred, except for those men in the compartments beneath

the troop dispensary where, just after daybreak on the sixth day out, heavy seas tore life

rafts loose from the decks above, and smashed them through the port side of the ship, staving in

three plates and pouring tons of sea water into just-vacated bunks. The icy seawater washed duffel

bags and gear against the alarmed men as they waded out of bed. The hold compartment below

had to be evacuated as it filled with several feet of water before the damage could be shored

up.

The arrival of the 87th in Naples brought them some fifteen and one-half degrees beyond

halfway around the world since their departure from Kiska Harbor a little more than a year before.

No sharper contrast could be drawn than between that stark, rain-washed, uninhabited island

jutting out of the North Pacific, and this ancient Italian port, cluttered and teeming with

people, ships, and crowded buildings.

U

Jan 13

2

The 2nd and 3rd Battalions, and Company D, immediately debarked and boarded Italian

four-wheel freight cars for the long overland trip north, through Rome, to Leghorn. The men

slept on the boxcar floors, and cooked C-rations on small open fires kindled on the floors. They

left Naples on the night of 13 January and rode all day and night of the 14th, through scenes of

the previous year’s devastation. Especially marked was the area near Cisterno and Anzio. They

passed through Rome on the second night, and on 15 January, changed to trucks at Leghorn—

reaching the staging area north of Pisa late in the evening.

The 1st Battalion, less Company D, Headquarters Company of the regiment, and Service

Company, were to make the trip north by ship. They remained in Naples Harbor almost three

days until the Italian stevedores could, in the greatest confusion, complete the loading of organizational

equipment on the Italian freighter Sestriere. Short exercise marches within the harbor

area displayed the terrible war damage to the local buildings and to human beings alike. The

stunted, malnourished Neapolitans of the docks appeared degenerate and loathsome to the

American soldier as they clambered around in their rags, and picked little morsels of garbage

from the cracks of the docks. However, the soldiers were very willing to swap American cigarettes

for rings and trinkets.

The dirty little Sestriere seemed dwarfed and was a poor sequel to the West Point; but the trip

up the Tyrrhenian Coast, threading through the historic islands on a calm sea turned out to be

more pleasant than anticipated. On the following day, the 17th, in the afternoon, the ship passed

through Leghorn’s ancient seawall and her recent wall of German-scuttled ships, and the troops

entrucked to join the remainder of the regiment beyond Pisa.

The Peninsular Base Section, Staging Area No. 3, was a conveniently arranged bivouac of pyramidal

and pup tents located on property formerly part of King Victor Emanuel’s Hunting

Grounds; and the rows of stately trees and vistas of distant snowy mountain masses remained fit

for a king.

On 21 January, the regiment moved into a bivouac east of Camaiore, as IV Corps reserve,

with the possible mission of supporting the 92nd Division either in the narrow coastal plain or in

the Serchio Valley. The 3rd Battalion bivouacked and billeted in and around Villa Colli; the 2nd

Battalion bivouacked on a hillside nearby, while the 1st Battalion bivouacked down the road toward

Valpromaro. Except for battalion headquarters, and some other elements of the 3rd Battalion,

the regiment passed up the many possible farmhouse billets in the neighborhood for the

Spartan life in the open; and the tents were surrounded with mud and snow. The bivouac area

near Villa Colli was a good seven airline miles to the rear of the 92nd Division, and the unit’s position

was strategic rather than tactical. From that point, they could be rapidly shifted to either

the coastal plain or to the Serchio Valley—avenues of approach where the Germans had made

alarming penetrations in the past. Directly to the front, however, was a series of jagged mountain

peaks and ridges, and deep roadless valleys that had never seen any action, and were only

scouted by occasional patrols of both sides.

So the statement that there was nothing between the 87th and the enemy, which flashed

around the regiment, was the truth—but not the whole truth. The system of setting up tactically,

with guards, outposts, and gun emplacements further supported the belief that this was more

than a training area. Consequently, the area developed into a hotbed of flashing lights, green and

blue flares, skulking figures on ridges, and assorted rifle, pistol, and machine gun shots. Patrols

discovered houses with candles set by the window so that the shade might be drawn and raised

for the enemy, and finally, a poor suspicious-looking character (a local Italian) was held until ordered

released to the CIC (Counter Intelligence). The nights were exciting, and the only reason

Jan 21

3

the promiscuous shooting by guards didn’t bring more positive results is that some Providence

looked after the drunken American soldier as he staggered back to his tent.

Winter equipment was issued in this area, and various firing ranges were established for

training. Training hikes and patrols were made. Field Order No. 1, dealing with the defense of

the Serchio Valley and the Coastal Sectors was completed and sent to IV Corps headquarters at

Lucca, on 25 January 1945.

Meanwhile, on the narrow coastal plain dotted with resort towns and laced with canals, a

memorable “First” occurred. It was the morning of 27 January that the first shot was fired

against the enemy by the 87th Mountain Infantry. After hundreds of thousands of expended

rounds of ammunition, one round was finally fired against the enemy—in the fourth year of the

unit’s existence. Not the first shot fired in anger—thousands of angry shots had peppered the

Kiska fog—but the first shot against a living and present enemy.

The first bang was a resounding one, fired from one of nine pack howitzers brought up and

dug into position on the coast, in the sector held by the 371st Infantry, supported by the 599th

Field Artillery. Pfc. RAYMOND IWANKOWSKI pulled the lanyard of Gun No. 1, 1st Platoon, 1st

Battalion, under command of Second Lieutenant ROCCO C. SICILIANO. This use of the 92nd

Division front line for the howitzers was the first of several arrangements whereby the 87th

Mountain Infantry “borrowed” a few of the enemy opposing the 92nd Division, to use as targets

for a last-minute “warm-up” before moving up into our own sector of the front. The 92nd Division

was very willing and cooperative in arranging for the mountaineers’ “practice” on their enemy.

The next day, 28 January, eighteen mortars from the weapons companies were emplaced and

fired behind Company E, 371st Infantry. Meanwhile, on the 29th and 30th, sixty riflemen from

the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 87th, went out on sniping missions in the mountainous terrain just inland

from the coast near Seravezza, twenty miles northwest of Lucca, in front of Companies K

and L and the Intelligence and Reconnaissance (I & R) Platoon of the 371st Infantry. Initially, in

these missions, the front line was approached with some misgivings. The observation posts were

selected for the 75s with great caution, but quickly the awe of the front line disappeared and by

nightfall, the situation around the guns seemed almost festive, with the crews bunking in the

houses of the congenial Italian families. Life seemed to prove more comfortable at the front than

it had been at the rear. As they ate breakfast after the second day’s firing, German 88s zeroed in,

bracketing Second Lieutenant EDWIN A. SMITH’s 2nd Battalion gun positions, breaking up

breakfast, and finally striking within two feet of a gun, damaging it slightly. Quick counterbattery

fire from the 599th allowed the guns to be pulled out and saved. The crew, although

without casualty, had one man knocked down by shrapnel and his wind knocked out. Everyone

was shaken up and sobered down. Jerry had taken notice of the first shots of the 87th.

Later, the mortar crews fired their mission without event, and some of the sniper groups, under

Second Lieutenant CHARLES L. PFEIFFER and First Lieutenant MORLAN W. NELSON,

found targets and drew fire, from both automatic weapons and 88-mm artillery which drove a

group of them from a house at noon and struck one man with a flying rock.

On short notice, this training activity and the range firing, marches, and practice patrols in

progress near the bivouac area ended. The regiment reverted back to 10th Mountain Division

control on 29 January, and prepared to relieve the 86th Mountain Infantry in the old Task Force

45 sector, now controlled by 10th Mountain Division. A movement order was received on 1 February.

The 87th was to relieve the 86th, which had been on the line for a month. On the left, the

Jan 28

4

85th would continue as they had for the past two weeks. The 2nd Battalion moved forward on

the early afternoon of 2 February, riding by truck 47 miles, detrucking and then marching eight

miles over a most difficult mud and ice trail, closing at 2245 in Vidiciatico, after five hours of

stumbling and falling in the foggy blackness under full field equipment. Colonel FOWLER called

it a feat of war which only the Infantry is called upon to perform. Every man, he believed, fell

down on the mud-coated ice at least once, and he felt that the march alone, within range of German

artillery, entitled all who made it to the Combat Infantryman’s Badge.

The 3rd Battalion went into regimental reserve, in and around San Marcello, with Battalion

Headquarters at the sanatorium at Colonia Montana. Replacing the 1st Battalion, 86th, the 3rd

Battalion made the fifty-eight mile trip by truck. The regimental command post (CP) opened in a

villa in San Marcello. The 1st Battalion stayed on a few days longer at the rear. Although an advance

CP was opened at Cutigliano on 1 February, the troops did not move up until the 5th.

Seventeen days elapsed between the arrival of the regiment at the front and D-Day. The action

was largely of a patrol nature. The firefights divided themselves into, first, our patrols attacking

enemy positions in the Vidiciatico-Belvedere area, and, second, our 1st and 3rd Battalions

successively defending the Cutigliano-la Lima sector against German patrols. The Vidiciatico-

Belvedere area, occupied continuously by the 2nd Battalion through D-Day, was the more important,

since the eventual battle was fought there. The series of active patrols that felt their way

forward, and eventually confirmed accurately the enemy line on the slopes of Mt. Belvedere,

were important. The patrol work of the whole regiment, while overshadowed by the battle that

followed, and looked back upon as comparatively easy, should be evaluated against several factors.

The men were new to the front, and had never entered no-man’s-land before; not to mention

that probing beyond, into the unknown land of the enemy, can be more nerve-racking to the

individual than the mass movements of battle. There is the long strain of silent movement, the

breathless waits, the inexorable searching out of him who lies in wait to kill. There is the physical

punishment and even torture of alternately sweating up the rough terrain and lying motionless

for hours on the snow—freezing in your own icy sweat. Finally, there is the fast withdrawal,

possibly under fire, with no litter bearers for the casualty, and only the desperate loyalty of a

comrade to drag the wounded in. The 2nd Battalion scheduled a total of 33 patrols prior to DDay.

Its patrols were the most numerous, and some performed brilliantly in their encounters

with the enemy.

VIDICIATICO FRONT

The 2nd Battalion had reached the snow-covered mountain town of Vidiciatico on the night

of 2 February. Outposts were manned around the town, and out on either side of the Mt. Belvedere

road, beyond Querciola. The road through Querciola runs along a ridge top, connecting two

mountain masses and forming sharp watersheds on either side. It is like two domes connected

by a ridgepole and roof. On the lower slopes of Monte Grande (1,531 meters), the larger dome, is

Vidiciatico. Reaching more than halfway along the ridgepole, and on either side of it, to Querciola,

was the 2nd Battalion. Beyond loomed German-held Mt. Belvedere (1,139 meters), the

other dome. Running down on either side of the ridge road are deeply eroded draws, containing

swift and deep streams and with many sheer rock faces and waterfalls. The “ridgepole” runs

more or less to the north from Vidiciatico. At right angles to it, running west from the summit of

Belvedere, is another ridge, appearing on the skyline from along the Vidiciatico-Querciola road.

This ridge was the German front line, starting up on Belvedere and running down to cross the

Querciola road at a little town called Corona, and then on down the slope between deep ravines

to Rocca Corneta, a spectacular rock escarpment with a church atop its walls. Further to the left,

5

the “rock” drops to the river. Across the river the sheer walls of Pizzo di Campiano rise abruptly,

a steep mountain ridge, higher than Belvedere. In the lower valley areas, and in the areas above

the deep draws, irregularly terraced fields are spotted here and there. At this time, from six

inches to four feet or more of snow, depending upon the exposure and height of the slopes, made

patrolling arduous. The science of tracking was added to normal patrol work.

The first shot fired directly at the 87th Mountain Infantry came in the little town of Farne,

down the “ridgepole” to the left, on the bright morning of 5 February. It was fired at the seventh

patrol sent out by the battalion, one officer and ten enlisted men. They were fired at by an undiscovered

sniper, and since T/Sgt. FRED R. FRICK was not seriously wounded in the buttock, it

might be said that our first casualty was a shot in the pants. The shot came at 1100 and was followed

by mortar fire in town, forcing the patrol to withdraw. They were followed by more mortar

fire on this trail. FRICK was able to walk, and all were in by 1330.

Another man, S/Sgt. JOSEPH Z. LA LIBERTY, was wounded southwest of Corona when he

activated a mine on the early morning of the 7th, but he was able to walk back.

The thirteenth patrol from the 2nd Battalion was the first true “Ski Patrol” of the 87th Mountain

Infantry at the front. The one officer and ten enlisted men were on skis and snowshoes when

they left at 1130 for the high ground above Vidiciatico. The patrol was uneventful, but confirmed

the old 87th argument that on steep terrain, snowshoes slide sideways and are no good, while

skis edge in and work well. This fact was noted even at noon when the crust had melted.

On the night of 7 February, a Company G patrol of one officer and fifteen enlisted men left

Roncoravecchia early in the evening. Just after 2300, a machine gun, thirty yards distant, opened

up with two bursts. Pvt. BEN S. JACKSON threw a grenade, and forty rounds of artillery were

adjusted on the position, silencing the gun. From southeast of Pianello, the patrol withdrew under

German flares, without casualty. As they withdrew, a shout in German challenged them

with, “What is going on down there? Who’s there?”

Another patrol from Companies F and G, three officers and six forward observers on skis,

went as far as Corona and discovered mines laid bare by melted snow, under which, buried deep

in the ground, were those other mines which were to give us so much trouble later on.

Probably the most successful patrol of the period left the Company G outpost at Roncoravecchia

the next night, with Lieutenant OSCAR E. DUTTWEILER and fourteen enlisted men. They

climbed the escarpment southeast of Pianello near where they had been fired on by the machine

gun the night before. Here they waited until after 0200, watching three of the enemy move into a

machine gun position. Following two scouts, Sgt. HERBERT E. STECKMAN and Pvt. BEN S.

JACKSON, the patrol leader and the bazooka man, Sgt. LESLIE E. BROWN, had worked along

the edge of the cliff. The first scout was able to inch up to within five feet of the emplacement.

He slowly raised his Tommy gun into position as a Nazi stood up. He squeezed the trigger. One

shot only rang out. The gun jammed. The enemy quickly opened up with four rounds, wounding

the bazooka man, BROWN, in the leg. Sgt. BROWN, in spite of his wound, fired his bazooka

and got a direct hit. The machine gun fire ceased. Sgt. STECKMAN called for the enemy in the

emplacement to surrender. No one appeared from the ruined emplacement. STECKMAN then

dumped two hand grenades into the position, silencing those within. A second machine gun

opened up from beyond and below the first, and was grenaded and silenced. The patrol then

withdrew along the ridge to pick up the wounded bazooka man, and was engaged with machine

pistol fire from the north. A grenade was thrown and the firing ceased. The patrol picked up

their wounded man, lowered him down the cliff and then, on an improvised stretcher, carried

him back to Company G lines—a difficult feat.

Feb 5

6

On the night of 10 February, a patrol near Polla received automatic weapons fire and, at a distance

of fifteen yards, exchanged grenades with the enemy—three each. The enemy grenades

landed within ten feet. The patrol suffered one minor casualty: a fragment entered the calf of Pfc.

ROBERT H. PFOHL. The enemy then withdrew across a draw and set up their light machine

gun against the 87th patrol. After some shots, artillery was adjusted on the machine gun and the

position was hit. Enemy casualties were not determined.

A snowshoe ascent of Mt. Grande was made during the day of 12 February for observation.

The snow was waist deep; the trip was uneventful.

After several days of routine patrolling, Company G patrols again tackled “DUTTWEILER’s

Escarpment” on the 14th. This time it had the strength of a raid, with one officer, thirty-two enlisted

men and one artillery observer, plus twenty enlisted men and two officers with .50-caliber

machine gun support from Company H. An enemy patrol got behind the raiding party, causing

them to lay low until nearly daybreak. Consequently, when at 0550 of the 14th, they met enemy

rifle and machine gun fire at fifteen yards from the scouts, and were concentrated upon by four

machine guns from atop the escarpment, they were in an unfavorable position. They were unable

to score effectively with eight grenades and a bazooka. The enemy positions were wellprotected

emplacements. German grenades began to come down. Artillery fire was called for

and the party withdrew to a creek bed where they were pinned down again by mortar fire.

Counter mortar and machine gun fire were called for, and, with daylight already upon them, the

party withdrew. Thus ended for the time being the series of patrol actions on the escarpment.

Lieutenant DUTTWEILER himself and S/Sgt. ROBERT C. CLUKAY were slightly wounded, but

returned to duty within twenty-four hours.

Not all of the patrols have been mentioned, some of them important for the negative information

they brought back. The I & R Platoon’s patrols should be mentioned here, if only for their

importance in covering the area so that their men could lead the 1st Battalion to their objectives

on D-Day.

The 2nd Battalion had been repeatedly shelled in Vidiciatico. For a long time their luck held.

Finally, on 17 February at 1600, a direct hit on a Company G outpost caused the first deaths of the

regiment in the European Theater. Killed in action were Pvt. BILLY J. THAXTON and Pvt.

WARREN F. MAIN. One officer and four enlisted men had been wounded by artillery up to this

time.

Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, while suffering no casualties, had drawn first blood from the

enemy. By just a few hours, the 2nd Platoon of Company B had beaten DUTTWEILER’s patrol in

hitting their first German.

CUTIGLIANO AREA

As has been noted, the 1st Battalion was delayed in their movement forward. The 3rd Battalion

of the 85th, whom they were to relieve at Cutigliano, had scheduled a raid for the night of 3-4

February that Division was anxious to have them stage. Therefore the 1st Battalion did not complete

their relief until just before midnight on the 5th, after opening an advance CP at Cutigliano

on the 1st. The companies marched at night three or four miles from the detrucking point at la

Lima. The relief was without incident.

The raid of the 85th on Mt. La Serra had been unsuccessful, for the flanking forces found

themselves under flanking fire from still higher mutually supporting and well-dug bunkers. The

85th had suffered casualties. But the enemy seemed to have been stung into action. Two hours

after Company B had occupied the half-dozen stone houses and the outposts of Sestaione, an

eight-man patrol was detected entering the position. Outpost No. 1 of the 2nd Platoon chal-

Feb 10

7

lenged, and when unanswered, opened up with a BAR. At daybreak, a wounded German, hit

three times, still lay in the snow in front of the position and became the first Prisoner of War, and

the first known enemy shot by the regiment. At the PW cage, he quickly revealed to the integrator

his unit: the 2nd Company of the 4th Mountain Battalion. He was part of a thirty-man platoon

at Boscolungo.

Two 1st Battalion daylight patrols made no enemy contact, although one of them traced the

footprints of a wounded man for a half-mile toward Pianosinatico. Partisans were used on these

patrols and proved so valuable that they went with all 1st Battalion patrols from then on.

Company B had at Sestaione a system of four log-and-earth-covered dugouts for the outpost

positions. These could be supported by machine gun and rifle fire from the upper windows of

the defended houses. The lower windows were sandbagged; the upper one screened over with

chicken wire to keep grenades out. The positions were constantly improved with barbed wire,

alarms, and trip flares during the daytime. Jerry tested it regularly at night. All four outposts

were interconnected with sound-powered telephones, controlled from the company CP. Captain

CLARENCE H. SWEDBERG, commanding the company, designed this defense plan to overcome

the difficulty presented by the problem of defending the bottom of a mountain canyon.

On the evening of the 6th and 7th, the night following the capture of the prisoner of war, an

outguard reported movement on the right flank at 2140. A few moments later, Platoon Sergeant

RAY WILSON started small arms fire at a group of enemy in some woods. At the same point as

the attack of the night before, the enemy had infiltrated into town and assaulted the buildings

with machine pistol fire and grenades. When a flare went up, fifteen enemy could be seen on the

ridge to the north. Others were between the buildings, an estimated thirty in all. At 2350, mortar

and artillery fire was brought down upon the front. The enemy retreated at 0045. There were no

American wounded; but the following morning, traces of blood on the road and in the snow indicated

several German casualties.

Positions in the defense were mutually supporting. All outguards were manned before dark.

No man moved from his location once the fight had begun. On their second day of combat, these

men effectively repulsed an attack, inflicting casualties on the enemy at no cost to themselves.

While this action was going on, Company K was closing on Mt. Caligi, just to the south, to relieve

elements of the 85th Infantry. At 0200 Company K had moved up from la Lima to Company

C at Piano d’Ontani whose mortars had assisted in the fight. Company K struggled up the

icy mountain until 0630.

The tenseness of the front line was sometimes rudely shocked by the Italian natives living as

normally as possible right at the elbow of the front-line soldier, and furnishing a comic opera

touch. During the day, after Company B’s defense and Company K’s march, while fighting fervor

was at high pitch, the 1st Battalion got into a difficulty with an Italian woman who was in the

habit of passing through our lines to milk her cow. The excitement can be imagined—the cow

had to be milked—the Italian language had to be coped with—a decision had to be reached. Finally,

Major JOHN B. WOODWARD phoned to Regiment and the message came back, “Woman

going through our lines to milk cow will have to bring cow back to our side.”—end of message.

Darkness came and at 2130, the silence was broken again by the 2nd Platoon of Company B

as they exchanged fire of automatic weapons and rifles with an eight- or ten-man enemy patrol,

driving them off after a half-hour. After midnight, the enemy was back, harassing the company

with fire of burp guns and rifles. Company B remained alert but held their fire. The following

night, on the 8th, a four-man patrol was driven off from the same area just before 1900; and the

platoon was fired upon by a machine gun. Several rounds of artillery were dropped on the en8

emy; but at one time the patrol had been able to get within 60 yards of the outpost. The patrol

came back again just before dawn on the 9th. Late that day, Company C picked up an enemy

Italian deserter at its lines, and moved him down to the PW cage for interrogation. He was a willing

talker, but knew little except that he was a medic in the San Marco Marine Division. He revealed

that he had treated German casualties on 7 February, confirming the belief that casualties

had been inflicted by the 2nd Platoon, Company B, on one of the persistent raiding parties.

Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion was planning a daring raid of battalion strength on Mt. la Serra.

The 3rd Battalion was to occupy the 1st Battalion positions. With this in view, Company K pulled

back from Mt. Caligi, on being relieved by the 85th Infantry, and moved up with the rest of the

battalion during the night of 11-12 February into the Cutigliano-la Lima area, ready to support

the 1st when they took off on the night following. Company K was to relieve B, and L was to relieve

C. Company I would relieve A in Cutigliano.

During the day, before the move, ten shells dropped in Cutigliano and a patrol had three

rounds lobbed at it in the afternoon. The 3rd Battalion CP closed in Cutigliano at 0230, and the

regiment thought of itself as being in its last night of peace and quiet before plunging into its first

battle. So far, brushes with the enemy had been brief and sketchy, but the planned raid up on to

the enemy’s tightly held La Serra would initially commit the entire 1st Battalion and a band of

Partisans, and might well blood a majority of the battalion. The raiding party, in honor of Lieutenant

Colonel WILSON’s hometown in Montana, was called “Task Force Kalispell.” The raid

was to be introduced by a loudspeaker system beaming out an appeal for the enemy to surrender.

Good hot food was promised to be awaiting their arrival in the American lines. Wines and

other pleasures and comforts were touched on lightly.

At 1205 on 12 February, Brigadier General ROBINSON E. DUFF of Division tapped off all the

pressure by informing Regiment that the “Red Plan” was off, by order of Corps. The 1st Battalion

was withdrawn at once to San Marcello; the 3rd remaining in their positions. Then, after a few

nights absence, as though to test the new company, a six- or eight-man German patrol appeared

in the old area of the 2nd Platoon, Company B, now defended by the 2nd Platoon of Company K.

The mortar section lit the area with flares, and Company M and the 616th laid down mortar and

artillery fire. Two enemy were hit, but none captured. The enemy returned at 0315, possibly to

remove their casualties, and another firefight opened. The 3rd Battalion went ahead with the

public address plan and the broadcast bore fruit. The next day three Italian deserters came in

from Pianosinatico and the San Marco Division.

Patrolling continued around Cutigliano until 1 February. On the 13th, a patrol on La Serra

discovered the body of an American soldier, apparently from the last raid of the 85th. On the

14th, a patrol found and led in an RAF sergeant, pilot of a Spitfire shot down behind the lines two

weeks previously. He had bailed out successfully, thereby owing his parachute packer 200 lire.

The Partisan OSS organization had quickly hidden him and arranged for his passage through our

lines. The sergeant was physically exhausted from his three-day trek over the mountainous terrain,

and had great admiration for the tireless Partisan guide who climbed so easily and passed

between lines at will. He told of a well-organized system at work behind the lines, not only for

rescuing Allies, but also for harassing the Germans, and even holding towns for a time. Before a

real German attack, the town would fall and no one would be there. The flyer was not only well

fed and hidden, but was even entertained at a small dance. With typical British restraint, he

spoke disparagingly of his own efforts and escapes, and made it sound rather easy, except for the

walking.

On the 14th, five more Italian deserters passed through Company I, with three OSS agents,

early in the morning. On the 15th, a rescued American flyer, First Lieutenant WILLIAM C.

9

TENCH, Thunderbolt pilot, 57th Fighter Group, was followed shortly through the lines by a

German deserter, four Free French and about fifty-six Italians. This broke down into thirty-two

in civilian clothes, five OSS men, one German prisoner of war and nineteen Italian prisoners of

war. Lieutenant TENCH, who spent the night with the regiment, was, like the British pilot, exhausted.

He had been shot down in November, and hurt his leg in landing with a damaged

parachute. Since then, he had had all kinds of hair-raising close calls under the care of the Partisans.

Much of the time he hid in the attic of a house in which German soldiers were quartered.

At another time he had ridden a bicycle to town to get pictures taken for his faked Italian passport

before the long trip via the “underground railroad” to the American lines. He was overwhelmed

with being back safe.

On the night of the 16th, the 3rd Battalion was relieved in the Cutigliano-la Lima area by the

473rd Infantry, Reinforced, and withdrew to Popiglio and Momigno near San Marcello. The curtain

rang down on the series of minor skirmishes and major enemy encounters in the snowcovered

mountains about Cutigliano.

Feb 15

10

BELVEDERE OFFENSIVE

(16 FEB — 28 FEB)

PREPARATION FOR BATTLE

he focus of attention now shifts from the Cutigliano area to San Marcello where the regimental

staff, in Villa Biche, the former home of an Italian admiral, had been working up their part

in the Divisional Attack Plan. Lieutenant General LUCIAN K. TRUSCOTT, commanding Fifth

Army, accompanied by Major General WILLIS D. CRITTENBERGER, commanding IV Corps,

and Major General GEORGE P. HAYS, commanding the 10th Mountain Division, gave a brief

address to many of the 1st and 3rd Battalion and staff officers on the 9th of February. He spoke

of the coming battle and of his high hopes and confidence in our future.

All kinds of aerial photos and maps of the Mt. Belvedere region were studied and distributed

to the battalions. A wax relief map was built up from the map contours of the vital region, modeled,

and cast in plaster for battalion distribution. The 37th Quartermaster War Dog Platoon,

First Lieutenant ARCHER D. AKERS commanding, arrived one morning and was attached to the

regiment, the platoon closing on the night of 16 February, with both scout and messenger dogs.

The dogs, largely untried in Italy, had been very successful in the China-Burma-India Theater.

The scout dogs worked with patrols at night and “alerted” toward strange patrols or gun positions

while a safe distance away. The dog’s handler could intelligently interpret the “alert” as to

direction and distance. The messenger dogs functioned by carrying messages forward from Battalion

Headquarters to the forward companies during an operation. Unfortunately, the late date

of their attachment caused the misuse of the dogs by one battalion during the coming battle.

Operations Memorandum No. 2, detailing the move of the 1st and 3rd Battalions to Vidiciatico

for the operation, was delivered on 16 February. First Lieutenant WILLIAM C.

MCGUCKIN, liaison officer, was meanwhile making a house-to-house canvass, preparatory for

billeting the two battalions upon their arrival at crowded Vidiciatico. Assisted by an Italianspeaking

sergeant, he went into all the rooms of each building in town, under the pretense of

searching for an escaped soldier. Although the mountain village already overflowed with Italian

families who had fled from the demolished front-line houses, billets were found to include every

last soldier and the dogs. Copies of Field Order No. 5 were distributed on the night and early

morning of 17-18 February, as the 1st Battalion was moving up to Vidiciatico.

The troops of the regiment were to jump off on the night of the 19th, at 2300, from the line of

departure below Querciola. The battalions were to “seize, occupy, and defend” initial objectives

prior to daylight. They were to drive generally north toward the town of Corona and then split

off—the 2nd Battalion turning left toward Rocca Corneta and securing the little towns of Polla

and C. Florio, and the 1st Battalion passing through Corona, turning right, moving up toward the

summit of Mt. Belvedere and being prepared to relieve 3rd Battalion, 85th, after it had seized that

position. The 3rd Battalion, 87th, was to remain in Corps reserve in Vidiciatico.

On the 18th, the night previous to our jump-off, the 1st Battalion, 86th, was to seize the long

steep line of mountains starting west of, and running southwest from Rocca Corneta—the nearest

of which is Pizzo di Campiano, overlooking the whole prospective battlefield.

On our right, the 85th Regiment would attack coincident with and parallel to us, moving to

objectives along the Belvedere ridge to include the highest point, and the summit of Mt. Gorgolesco

to the east.

T

11

The attack was to be supported by the 10th Mountain Division artillery plus some Corps artillery

of 155 howitzers and guns. Tank and Tank Destroyer units would support; and the Air

Corps would fly missions in close support, as close as 600 yards, as directed by “Rover Joe.”

“The ground occupied will be held at all costs.” This direct quote from the field order recalled

the capture of Mt. Belvedere in November 1944 when after three days, an enemy counterattack

drove the Americans back disastrously. Three tanks still remained in Corona’s ruins from

this rout.

Every detail was checked and rechecked for the important movements on succeeding nights

of the two battalions to Vidiciatico. The good road into Vidiciatico came from the east, up the

Silla River valley, from the Reno River and Highway 64. This route ran parallel to the ridgeline

of mountains—all held by the Germans from Mt. Castello to Mt. Belvedere. The whole road

could be watched by the enemy from Silla to Vidiciatico, except when screened by the artificial

smoke machine sending fog drifting up on the wind. Sometimes, by afternoon, the fog would

reach all the way to Vidiciatico. Because of this exposure, troops could not be moved along this

road. While jeeps might draw an occasional round or two from Jerry, a 2 1/2 - ton truck would

bring a concentration. A convoy or a column of troops would have brought his full fury. So the

troops must, of necessity, move in on foot over eight miles of back roads that were impassable for

2 1/2 - ton trucks.

The staff officers made the trip by jeep, up from the artificially smoked end of the valley for

the final time, and opened the forward regimental CP at Vidiciatico at 1645 on 18 February. During

the many jeep trips necessary for planning the operation, occasional shell bursts had been

observed, but much more alarming were the seemingly stark-mad Brazilian drivers, careening

through their fog-shrouded Brazilian Expeditionary Force area around Porretta Terme. The fog

seemed more of a menace than the German artillery.

The night of 17-18 February, the 1st Battalion made the grueling march in heavy, natural fog

from the truckhead to Vidiciatico, over the mud and ice of the back trail, closing five hours after

detrucking, and well before daylight of the 18th. That day, artillery fell in Vidiciatico and in

Querciola. The 1st Battalion had its initial casualties in each company, with one death: S/Sgt,

WILLIAM C. MERRILL, Company D; and one wounded from Company B, four from Headquarters,

the Company C commander, Captain ALFRED C. EDWARDS, and Second Lieutenant

GEORGE J. HAYS, son of the division commander, from Company B. Both of the officers returned

to duty the same day.

Before daylight on the morning of the 19th, the 3rd Battalion made the long march over the

rough trail into Vidiciatico. Pfc. JOE I. RAMIREZ became the first casualty of the 3rd Battalion as

more shellfire greeted the battalion.

On the night of the 18th, just north of Querciola, Company C had relieved Company C of the

85th, who had temporarily manned our right outposts to become familiar with the ground over

which they must attack. Company E was in position on the left, just south of Case Buio.

Forward reconnaissance was made. In the evening, a party of 2nd Battalion scouts and officers

were led by Cpl. BENNETT L. BOGGESS of the I & R Platoon, to a point just below Corona.

BOGGESS returned and led a party forward to lay wire. T/5 ROBERT W. PARKER led similar

parties out from the 1st Battalion to a point above Corona. The scout dogs, too, had made brief

reconnaissance patrols of both sectors.

The 86th Mountain Infantry had begun its advance about 2000 on the 18th, and before dawn

had accomplished the remarkable feat of climbing, storming, and occupying the precipitous

mountain wall on the left of the 87th with only one man wounded. Ropes and rock climbers had

Feb 18

12

been used in places, so steep was the ascent. The surprise was complete, and a number of prisoners

of war were taken before they had time to offer resistance. This capture, by the 86th, 18

hours prior to the attack by the remainder of the Division, denied vital observation to the Germans,

and raised the hopes of the regiment tremendously.

All during the 19th of February, Querciola and Vidiciatico were bursting with troops of the

87th and supporting units, and both towns were shelled lightly. Attached or in support, in addition

to the War Dog Platoon, were the 1st Platoon, Company B, 84th Chemical Battalion; the

616th Field Artillery Battalion; Company C, 126th Engineers; the 751st Tank Battalion; the Interrogators

of Prisoners of War Team; the Air Corps Rover Joe outfit to give direct air support; and

several parties of Partisans.

BATTLE BAPTISM (19 FEB – 20 FEB)

The night of D-Day was clear and cold with both friendly and enemy artillery sounding off at

a slightly increased tempo. Company C was already in the assembly area. Company B left Vidiciatico

at 2000, marching the three miles to Querciola in column of twos. Company A followed,

remaining in reserve in Querciola. By this time, Companies F and G were already in their assembly

areas before Case Buio, where Company E was to remain in reserve. The weapons companies,

D and H, had attached their machine gun platoons to the two leading rifle companies of respective

battalions, and kept the mortars and .50-caliber machine guns under battalion control.

All companies crossed the line of departure on time, 2300, and moved off into the cold, clear

night, flashing with frequent artillery bursts. The moon was about to rise, and the long bands of

blue light overhead reached sharper and sharper back to the searchlights far to the southeast

across the Silla Valley.

By midnight, the 1st Battalion had moved out into some places as far as 700 yards from the

line of departure, while the 2nd was 300 yards out. As yet there had been no enemy contact.

Five minutes later, Company B was fired upon, 800 yards out. Two burp guns opened up.

Hand grenades were thrown in response, but the company was pinned down by machine gun

fire and artillery bursts until after 0300. T/5 ROBERT W. PARKER of the I & R Platoon, who was

to guide Company B through the minefields, moved back and forth between the leading scouts

while the company was stopped, exposing himself to the fire. Excited bazooka men were neglecting

to pull firing pins, and sent back the message through 1st Battalion at 0038 that the ammunition

was no good. One of the two scout dogs, which were unadvisedly being used in the actual

attack, became too excited while the company was stopped, and whined and barked. Both dogs

had to be withdrawn at 0030 while under fire. Meanwhile, Company C, at 0030, was being fired

upon while moving slowly through minefields. They were led by Cpl. BENNETT L. BOGGESS,

of the I & R Platoon, and Pfc. EDWARD D. STACKWICK, Company C scout. The terrain had

been patrolled previously by the I & R Platoon, and also by another pair of scout dogs and their

handlers. One dog, Tarzan, handled by T/5 CLIFFORD W. MORTENSEN, had definitely located

two gun positions the night before. Both dogs worked successfully with the company on the

night of the attack until the first contact with the enemy.

At about 0045, while still in the minefield, BOGGESS and STACKWICK crawled forward,

under fire from six burp guns on the company, from the right flank near Corona, and cut the

barbed wire entanglements. At 0114, they were still cutting through the barbed wire and could

hear company G on their left. The enemy flares from Corona and Belvedere made the progress

slow. At about 0200, the 1st Platoon and part of the 2nd, following BOGGESS and STACKWICK,

became separated from the rest of the company, and moving over a ridge, spotted four men. A

Feb 19

13

flare lit up the area, and two Germans could be seen running toward them. Each of the scouts,

BOGGESS and STACKWICK, nailed a Nazi before he could get far enough away to reveal the

American position. They then threw grenades over the ridge and moved forward. From the

brush, a German surrendered to this advance element and told one of the men, who spoke German,

of a dugout with five other Germans who wanted to surrender. STACKWICK made over to

the bunker, jammed his gun through the port, and three men and a lieutenant came out—hands

in the air. The lieutenant requested permission to retrieve his helmet, and the foursome was

herded to the rear. BOGGESS moved with his group back 75 yards below the crest of the ridge,

from where they held off a small counterattack from the right flank. They fired steadily at a machine

pistol until the rest of the company could work up to the ridge and drive the Germans back.

Captain ALRED C. EDWARDS, the company commander, had led Company C into the attack

although wounded in the hand earlier in the day while making a reconnaissance. Near Corona,

he was struck in the leg by small arms fire, and had to be evacuated from the fight. First

Lieutenant JAMES H. PENROSE had also been wounded and evacuated earlier.

At 0300, Company C had reached Corona, but B was still taking casualties from grazing fire

from Mt. Belvedere. Artillery fire was planned for the area between Corona and Belvedere. This

was called off, for at 0320, Company C was past Corona, and going on up, and B was finally able

to move forward. A few minutes later, B and C had gained contact beyond Corona, moving up

the slope. Word came in at this point that 3rd Battalion, 85th, on the right, were also advancing

and were only 300 yards short of the summit of Belvedere.

By 0430, Companies B and C were on their objectives on Belvedere. Company A was given

the task of mopping up Corona, bypassed by C. They reached Corona at 0615 and, engaging at

once in a firefight, overcame the resistance—killing seven (counted) Germans and capturing

twenty, while suffering one dead and four wounded. Pfc. LEE H. CHEW, of Chinese descent,

was shot and killed while leading forward an element of the 2nd Platoon. By dawn, the 1st Battalion

estimated thirty-five prisoners of war and twelve or fifteen casualties. Both figures had to

be revised upward. Company B, up to the following nightfall, had suffered eleven wounded.

Company C—three killed, Pfc. MARVIN E. HINER, Pvt. HERBERT W. DILKES, and Pvt. CHARLES

YUPA, and ten wounded. Company D—two dead, Sgt. WILLIAM F. MURPHY and Pfc.

FRED FLOYD, and two wounded. Company A—one dead and five wounded.

After daybreak, Company C, up on Belvedere, still had a fight on its hands to secure the

ridge above Valpiana. The 2nd Platoon was repelled on its first attempt by heavy fire with some

casualties. A small patrol from the 1st Platoon assaulted and neutralized the positions. Several

prisoners emerged, hands in the air, and Sgt. WILLIAM F. MURPHY and some others went forward

to make them prisoners of war. Then the Nazis pulled their common trick—they suddenly

hit the ground and other Nazis behind them began firing. Sgt. MURPHY of Company D was

shot and killed—others were wounded. The enemy soldiers were eliminated to a man. Company

C took no further prisoners of war.

Company B was counterattacked after daybreak at 0730, and at 0930. They took two prisoners,

one wounded, and the attack was over. The 1st Battalion started to receive considerable artillery

fire on Belvedere the first morning, but it was neutralized effectively by Rover Joe. Company

A stopped some sniping near Corona.

On the left, shortly after midnight, the 1st Platoon of Company G veered right to attack enemy

positions. East of their objective, the area to the right of Polla, they struck a minefield

shortly after midnight. Ten men were wounded from the 1st and 2nd Squads. The platoon con-

Feb 19

14

tinued forward, overrunning a mortar position between Polla and Corona. By this time, the

whole of Company G was under automatic weapons fire from Polla. Here the platoon dug in.

Communication with the company had been lost at 0100. At dawn they knocked out a machine

gun and four snipers. They remained all day in dug-in positions north of the line Polla-Corona.

On their left, the 2nd and 3rd Platoons were also held up by minefields. Four of the company’s

Partisans were killed by mines. The company was unable to secure Polla until after daybreak.

Two squads reached the 2nd Platoon objective, but had to withdraw until dawn because

of exposure to friendly fire. At 0330, the 126th Engineers started up to help the company clear a

path through minefields before dawn. After daylight, Company G’s left elements were hit by

enemy reinforcements, but dispersed them and took two prisoners. It wasn’t until 1035 that

Company G’s position, 200 yards west of Polla, was finally confirmed and reported to Regiment.

Company F, on G’s left, had had rough going, too. Their first enemy contact came at twenty

minutes after midnight, and at 0220, they were pinned down before C. Florio, while Company G

floundered in the minefields. At 0324, Company F was still pinned down by mortar fire, but the

right platoon was flanking around on C. Florio from which heavy fire was coming. C. Florio was

under friendly artillery fire by this time. It was during this flanking movement that First Lieutenant

JOHN P. BENSON, JR., directing his platoon under sustained fire across a field to support

the flanking unit, was shot and killed.

By 0400, Company F was in position for assault. At daybreak, C. Florio and all objectives

were stormed and taken. Company F killed three (counted) Germans and captured fifty-five,

losing three killed and nineteen wounded. Those killed were: Pvt. CLARENCE E. CAMPBELL,

Sgt. WALTER R. STRUBEL, and Lieutenant BENSON. At 0615, the company was reorganized.

Mopping up went on throughout the morning.

For some time after 0400, 2nd Battalion was out of communication with both forward companies.

The dog team of Cpl. WILLIAM D. DAVIS and T/5 HERBERT SPENCER, with Rex and

Mack, reestablished communications to Company F.

The 2nd Battalion, running into very stiff resistance, had to call on artillery support from the

rear, and from the 86th positions up on Pizzo di Campiano to the left, as well as air support, after

daylight, on Valle and Marne, just behind their objectives. One diving Thunderbolt dropped its

bomb squarely on one of the buildings in Polla, apparently mistaking the village for Marne, about

one kilometer to the north. Some Company G men were occupying the very building and were

badly battered. Prisoners came in after daybreak in batches of twelve, sixteen, and thirtyfive—

and finally, the battalion reported fifty-seven prisoners of war coming up from near Rocca

Corneta. These prisoners arrived at the regimental CP just as Generals TRUSCOTT, CRITTENBERGER,

and HAYS arrived to get first-hand information of the attack. The impression on them

was very favorable. Late in the morning Company E, supported by artillery and air, took Pianello

and finally captured well-patrolled “DUTTWEILER’s Escarpment,” swarming all over it without

casualty.

Company G had suffered the heaviest of any company in the regiment. By nightfall, seven

had been killed: Pfc. LEONARD C. CRISP, Pfc. CAMILLE J. DESCHAINE, Pfc. FRANCIS E.

LOWERY, Pfc. FORREST M. MUELLER, Pfc. BURTON E. PIERCE, Pfc. WILBUR D. REDDING,

and Pfc. EDWIN G. VAN AUKEN. Twenty-nine had been wounded. Company H had one man

killed, Cpl. JOHN HOLLINGSWORTH, and one wounded.

THE BATTLE’S GAIN

From the morning of the 20th until the unit was relieved a week later, there were no major

developments. The positions were steadily improved tactically. The balance of the casualties

15

occurred during the attack and the day of the 20th. By midnight of the 20th, there had been

eighteen deaths and ninety-one wounded in the regiment during the 24-hour period. Shellfire

took its toll during the following eight days, killing sixteen and wounding forty-four. Only when

our planes were in the air were the men sure of a respite from artillery or mortar fire. Counterattacks

occurred with decreasing frequency. All were easily beaten back with heavy losses to the

enemy and at little cost to ourselves.

Shortly after daybreak, the success of the 87th Mountain Infantry’s first battle was becoming

as clear as the close-at-hand outline of Mt. Belvedere. All companies had attained their objectives.

Over one hundred enemy dead lay among our positions. During the day, 115 prisoners of

war moved through our cage. These prisoners, talking freely, revealed the enemy’s side of the

story to S/Sgt. LEO A. HANDEL of the Interrogators of Prisoners of War Team.

The first prisoners, shaking with cold and shock, came from the 1st Battalion zone, and had

no idea what had hit them—so swiftly had the battle swept over them. The enemy main line of

resistance, running from Mt. Belvedere to Rocca Corneta, had been manned from east to west by

the 6th Company, the 8th Company, the 5th Company, and the 7th Company—all part of the

1044th Regiment, 232nd Division, and reinforced by elements of the 14th Anti-tank Company,

also of the 1044th, which had constructed strong points and had set up specially-trained antitank

squads equipped with antitank close combat weapons. The companies averaged eighty to a

hundred men on 19 February.

The 5th and 6th Companies were virtually wiped out by the first impact of our attack. Most

of the men not killed were regrouped—at the Prisoner of War cage. Forty men of the 5th Company

and 43 men of the 6th Company were all present and accounted for less than twelve hours

after the 87th Mountain Infantry made first battle with the supermen.

The enemy, it was revealed, had committed its first tactical reserves at 0400 of the 20th. One

platoon of the 1st Company, 232nd Reconnaissance Battalion, was ordered to counterattack west

of Mt. Belvedere. The counterattack was broken up before it got started, and 14 prisoners of war

were taken by the 2nd Battalion.

The capture of the company commander of the 6th Company, Lieutenant Kaeser, facilitated

the compilation of intelligence. This was the lieutenant captured by the Company C scouts. The

lieutenant at first was one of the few captives reluctant to talk, but he talked willingly and gladly

when his Red Cross card was about to be marked “deserted.” By such a method is the Nazi’s

own inhuman cruelty turned against itself. Lest the Gestapo punish his family at home for his

being declared a deserter, the lieutenant talked eagerly.

It was noticed that all prisoners of war talked freely when questioned. They often asked

when first questioned, “Do I have to tell you?” When answered in the affirmative, their qualms

vanished. They obeyed blindly as they had been taught to obey. A few general conclusions were

gathered from these prisoners of war, captured in February 1945, five and a half years after Germany’s

sweep into Poland. First, they didn’t expect mistreatment as prisoners of war. Most of

them did expect Germany to be sterilized or enslaved at the war’s end. Some of them, therefore,

believed it best to die, for the conviction was general that the war was lost. Still, seventy per cent

of the enemy troops are said to be potential deserters who can’t desert lest they be either shot by

us, shot by a German officer or NCO (all of whom are authorized to shoot on mere suspicion), or

finally lest their families be punished. They are all concerned about the danger of recapture and

anxious to get safely to America. Many ask at once about citizenship. All prisoners of war seem

to be well informed about current war developments, and to have read avidly our propaganda

sheet, “Front Post.”

Feb 20

16

However, in spite of this, the German was still an excellent soldier; his equipment and gear

was of the best, and while he ate but once a day, his food kept him going. It made no difference

to him that his resistance was senseless. When asked what he thought about the war, he answered

dully, “I am not supposed to think. I am a soldier.” Most of his responses were dull.

About the only conviction frequently expressed was that Americans don’t take war seriously—

that for the American, “war is a sport.”

Unfortunately, it was quite evident that a hopeless German remains just as deadly behind a

weapon as one looking forward to victory, for nothing dismays him as he doggedly kills and

waits with resignation to be killed or given a chance to surrender.

HOLDING THE GAIN

Rover Joe started operating on the morning of 20 February. At about 0730, the first mission

was run against Ca Valle, a village northwest of Polla. He bombed, strafed, and dropped rockets,

but the results could not be seen. At 0920, he hit artillery positions at Marne and returned to finish

up fifteen minutes later when his bombs dropped too far north. During this first day, two or

three bombs were dropped by mistake on Polla.

The front line troops came to love Rover Joe, who operated under the direction of the aerial

observation plane called “Horsefly.” Jerry was forced to keep his weapons silent while planes

were in the air. Typical Rover Joe reports were like this one at 1100: “One bomb near

hit—building demolished, remainder of bombs within target area; five or six Germans fleeing

from buildings; three or four killed; observed flashes from mortar in another area; will bomb at

once.” The sight of the diving plane, the falling bombs, or flash of rockets, and the following

sound of strafing or the tremendous bomb blast, was a heartening one to the soldier lying in his

hole, harassed by artillery. Many a mountain trooper, in a poignant instant, forgave the Air

Corps for years of feuding in Denver.

TANKS AND MINES

All during the first morning on Belvedere, the men dug in, consolidated their positions and

made readjustments. Occasionally, there was sniper fire, and a few rounds of artillery. Usually it

was quiet. At noon, one platoon of medium tanks and one platoon of tank destroyers were on our

right flank at Calcinara, ready to move forward to the close defense of front lines against the expected

counterattacks. Later, the tank platoon tried to move up the trail on to the high shoulder

of Belvedere. The lead tank hit a mine and blew up. The assistant driver was blown clear, and

the tank commander was heroically rescued from the burning tank by First Lieutenant MELVIN

S. BARRETT of the 126th Engineers (A Company) just before its 75-mm ammunition began exploding.

Three crewmembers were killed inside the tank.

At one o’clock in the afternoon, a platoon of medium tanks was supporting our left flank

with fire from Cse. Buio. A platoon of light tanks was in Querciola. A platoon of mediums was

in reserve.

The engineer company had been sweeping the road for mines up to Corona since early morning,

and had ordered up a Brockway truck with a treadway bridge to a blown-out section of road

just below Corona.

The 3rd Battalion, placed in IV Corps reserve one hour after H-Hour, was released to regiment

at 1230, and moved out of Vidiciatico shortly after 1400 to go into position between Valpiana

(north of Corona) and Polla. As they moved up on either side of the road, the Brockway

truck blew up, 300 yards below the bridge site, killing a passing soldier, but not injuring the

driver. The road was to have been cleared here, but at this point large charges had been buried

17

four feet deep, and the area was covered with buried shrapnel, which threw the mine detectors

off. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion was being shelled as it moved slowly up the road, and suffered

casualties. An American rocket plane, apparently assuming that these were German troops, dove

down and fired his rockets, which just missed the road, but fortunately exploded harmlessly.

Rover Joe quickly called him off.

The tanks were anxious to get to Corona where they could silence the German artillery coming

in from the west. At about 1730, a bulldozer proved that the road was still not free of mines.

As the bulldozer moved past the wrecked Brockway, a terrific blast hurled him into the air and

over to the side, in front of the truck. The driver, thrown thirty feet into the air, was uninjured,

but the dozer was a twisted mass of steel. A deep crater was left in the road. The engineers went

back to their probing.

In the evening the road was pronounced cleared, and a daring tank commander was willing

to risk running his tank through to Corona. The Tank Platoon commander forbade it. IV Corps

then stepped in and ordered two platoons of tanks to Valpiana—beyond Corona—at once. They

were sure of a heavy counterattack in the morning, and wanted tanks there to stop it. It was 2300

when the order went through.

The first tank rumbled up to the ruined truck and dozer. In a few tense moments it was past

them, on up to the bridge site from which scores of mines had been removed, down into the dry

draw and up on to the road again. From there it moved up the road beyond Corona without

mishap. A second tank confidently followed, reached the truck and dozer, and blew up. This

was after midnight. Less than an hour later, a three-quarter ton weapons carrier of the 3rd Battalion

drew up behind the wreckage, found another mine and went up in smoke, injuring its two

occupants. The pile of wreckage at this point in the road was tremendous.

Just before three in the morning, the first tank was reported in position at Valpiana with two

75-mm pack howitzers of the Anti-tank Platoon, and two .50-calibers and three bazookas on the

left flank. Before dawn, however, these tanks too had to be abandoned after striking a mine between

Corona and Valpiana.

The engineers, during the following two days, blasted the road with Bangalore torpedoes,

detonating the remaining mines. Ultimately, one section of tanks took up positions along the Corona

road, south of Valpiana, and another section moved near Cse. Buio where their fire was

most effective. Meanwhile, there were no tanks at Valpiana for the counterattack against Company

I the morning of the 21st. But as will be seen, Company I could scarcely have dealt more

effectively with the counterattack had it been supported by a 45,000-ton battleship.

COUNTERATTACKS

The 3rd Battalion closed in Corona before dark of the 20th. The battalion CP was established

there. Pfc. PIERRE B. ERHARD had been killed and several wounded. Company I moved forward

to positions beyond Corona, near Valpiana, relieving Company A, who in turn moved up

to the right of Company B on Belvedere, plugging the gap between the right flank and the 85th.

Company K moved down to Polla between Corona and Company G, allowing G to form in more

depth. Company F remained out on the left beyond C. Florio.

At 1845, Colonel DAVID M. FOWLER ordered commanding officers of the 1st and 3rd Battalions

to “walk your positions—check final protective lines, select normal barrages of artillery and

primary target areas for mortars, to insure that the fire plan is coordinated and that the defense is

tightly buttoned up.” The line companies settled down in their dark foxholes to await the certain

enemy counterattacks at first light or sooner.

18

On the morning of 21 February, the enemy launched counterattacks against almost every

front-line company. The 1st Battalion, atop Belvedere, was hit first. At about 0610, Company B

was attacked after six enemy had infiltrated into old positions. The enemy hit with a sporadic

barrage of fire from machine pistols, snipers, mortars, and 88s. Company fire pinned them

down, and five came out—hands up. The sixth opened up with an automatic weapon, causing

casualties. By 0730, the action had terminated. Six enemy were killed. Two of our men were

wounded.

Meanwhile, Company C had been hit more decisively. After a few rounds of early morning

artillery, at about 0630, seventy or eighty Germans moved up on to the nose of Belvedere—four

hundred yards above Valpiana. Company C was bitter and determined after being tricked by the

German ruse the morning before. They waited silently in their positions until the enemy was

within a hundred yards. Not a shot was fired as the enemy moved up. They made targets as big

as houses. Suddenly the waiting men opened fire. Eighteen enemy were killed and four

wounded. Some of the bodies were hit by more than one man. The final count reported twentyfive

enemy dead. There were no prisoners taken by Company C.

The 2nd Battalion put artillery on the German advances coming from Polla towards Companies

G and F, and the advances never developed. Later in the day, two prisoners of war, taken by

Company F, confirmed that the attacks had been broken up completely by the artillery. However,

while T/Sgt. NORMAND W. CONNOLLY of Company G was holding back the fire of his

platoon to collect two prisoners of war, a sniper shot and killed him, indoctrinating Company G

in Nazi tactics.

The 3rd Battalion had the most hectic time. First, there was considerable shelling before daybreak,

with casualties. Some of it was friendly, and at least one death resulted from friendly fire.

Then, after dawn, enemy mortar concentrations started falling in—raising difficulty with the

communications. Artillery and mortar support was limited due to the lack of communication.

Meanwhile, Company K was hit in two places. The company OP (observation post) had

been manned all night by S/Sgt. RAYMOND T. SECORD, and S/Sgt. EDMUND D. BENNETT.

They spotted a 12-man patrol working up the hill with a machine gun. Artillery was called for

but the lines were out. The enemy was within 500 yards of the 3rd Platoon positions. Sgt.

BENNETT broke up the spearhead at 0730 by hitting the lead man with a BAR, and the German

patrol took cover in a draw below the open slope. Two more of the enemy were killed by the 3rd

Platoon while trying to escape down the draw back to the German lines. Pfc. VIRGIL CORNETT

patiently waited for the remainder to run the gauntlet—finally getting a shot at two and bringing

one down wounded as they dashed for safety. The other was brought down by other fire, and

the wounded man was captured, totaling four killed and one wounded and captured, plus a machine

gun for the platoon. The 2nd Platoon, too, had gotten into the firefight and added another

prisoner of war.

THE HEIMER INCIDENT

I Company’s counterattack was the strangest and the most brilliant too. Pfc. MALFORD C.

HEIMER, in his foxhole before dawn, heard noises in the pink stucco house behind his position at

Valpiana. Keeping the two blankets wrapped around him, but leaving helmet and rifle on the

parapet, he jumped up to tell the fellows in the house to quiet down. The “fellows” were German,

and meeting him outside his foxhole, they shoved weapons in HEIMER’s face and took him

prisoner back to the house. HEIMER’s buddy, Pvt. JOHN A. O’ROURKE, saw HEIMER being

led away, and reached for his rifle, just as four more enemy opened up on him. The squad

leader, S/Sgt. THEODORE B. REINERO, also made out the captured HEIMER being led away in

the dark. He quickly had the whole squad open fire at a distance of fifty yards, letting HEIMER

Feb 21

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take his chances. HEIMER made a run for it with the Germans. They barricaded themselves,

HEIMER included, in the stone house, HEIMER on the floor in a little hallway. His captors were

good to him, offering him cigarettes and making him comfortable, so he went to sleep there on

the floor. A sharp firefight soon began. Company and supporting units opened up with M-1s,

.50-caliber machine guns, mortars, and 75-mm pack howitzers, pouring everything into the demolished

house. Dawn came. There was a good deal of enemy firing from all sides, especially

down from the ridge to the east in front of Company C. Burp guns, machine pistols, and German

bazookas were coming from several directions. The forward 75-mm was knocked out, injuring

Second Lieutenant ROBERT S. KELLAR.

For a while, HEIMER had slept. The Germans had covered him with a raincoat, but the

house smashing up around him settled that. Waking, he found his captors had had enough.

Two wounded were shouting that they wanted to surrender. Sgt. REINERO killed one enemy

making a break for the house as the light increased. He worked his way forward with S/Sgt.

CHARLES E. ERNST to the pink house. ERNST took three prisoners, and three more surrendered

to him from positions near a haystack. By this time, REINERO had reached the house,

ready to blast the inside. HEIMER was yelling for him to hold his fire, and one Kraut appeared

disarmed at the doorway, followed by seven or eight others.

Down the road, Pfc. ROBERT DUDLEY and Pfc. JOSEPH POLUNCI had worked their way

down to some other houses. With POLUNCI covering, DUDLEY had flushed out somewhere

around a dozen more prisoners from the ruined houses. Altogether, 31 prisoners of war were

taken, three of them wounded. Seven of the enemy were found killed. Three machine guns were

taken, several burp guns, rocket launchers, piles of grenades and ammunition.

All of the 31 prisoners were from the 741st Mountain Infantry. They had marched for seven

continuous days from the Po Valley, and had immediately been sent by truck up into the line.

TANK SCARE

In the late afternoon of the 21st, Company I moved small elements into Valpiana and on to

the ridge above. A troop column had been observed at various times throughout the afternoon

moving south toward Valpiana. This was a column of foot troops with equipment, followed by

vehicles, and accompanied by one armored vehicle. The words “armored vehicle” soon became

“tanks,” and the 3rd Battalion, before long, expected to be hit by a column of tanks. What actually

happened was somewhat different.

The column was first sighted shortly before 1300 and again at 1350. It was mistakenly called

an armored column instead of a column with armor. Rover Joe’s reconnaissance couldn’t spot

any armored column. At 1600, though, he could find, and did take care of, a column of foot

troops, bombing and strafing them. Also at 1605 he destroyed the one armored vehicle in the

column. That was all the armor there was. Reports kept coming in from delayed sources, and at

1700, Rover Joe went back to make sure. At 1710, the battalions were receiving the original alert,

no final result of Rover Joe’s work having come in. By 1725, Rover Joe’s mission was complete.

Fifteen minutes before that, the 85th declared the road clear of living troops and the vehicles destroyed.

The companies, however, had received a final report that the armored column was only 500

yards away at 1700. However, friendly artillery searching out this column was falling on Companies

C and I. The 616th Field Artillery Battalion was notified. The fire was lifted and finally

registered in front of Company I at Valpiana, and the threat was dissipated in excess.

20

ROVER JOE

On the 21st, Rover Joe had been all set to go, but received no target until early afternoon. The

87th targets, numbers 1 and 2, were troop activities and gun positions which were taken care of.

Then at 1600, target number 3 appeared. It was the column of foot troops marching south from

Castelluccio toward Valpiana. Rover Joe dived in. The first report tersely stated: “(1) Area covered.

(2) All bombs on target. (3) Building afire—believe ammunition dump. (4) Strafed enemy

vehicles three times, armored vehicle destroyed. (5) Strafed fleeing personnel five times. (6) Also

strafed gun positions east—no ack-ack.”

Altogether, Rover Joe reported on nine targets during the afternoon of the 21st, all in the area

just forward of our positions. All but one target was well covered by the fighter-bombers with

bombs, rockets, and strafing. Many direct hits were scored on enemy-occupied buildings.

Night settled with the 85th carrying forward the attack on the right. The 3rd Battalion 86th

was passing through 2nd Battalion 85th to attack Mt. della Torraccia at dawn. Torraccia was the

last of the initial objectives. On the left, the 10th Anti-tank Battalion and 10th Reconnaissance

Troop up on the Mt. Serrasiccia-Pizzo di Campiano ridge had relieved the 86th, who in turn had

displaced to the right.

FURTHER CASUALTIES

AT 2200, Major GEORGE A. FELCH was accidentally shot and killed. Major FELCH, commanding

officer of the 3rd Battalion, was checking on outposts, and was fired at by a rifleman

ordered to “shoot at anything moving.” The death of Major FELCH was a shock to all the officers

and enlisted men of the regiment. Major JOHN C. MCKAY, executive officer, assumed temporary

command.

During the twenty-four-hour period, there were a good many casualties largely from artillery.

Those killed were: Sgt. CHARLES W. LEVITT of Company I; S/Sgt. JOSEPH A POIRIER,

JR. of Company K; Sgt. PAUL N. FRYE, JR., Pfc. ROBERT M. POST, and Sgt. GEORGE DAY, JR.

of Company M.

Artillery was active all night, and during the next morning. No counterattacks occurred, although

the 2nd Battalion did allow a two-man, and later, a twelve-man patrol, to advance within

a hundred yards and go away, while holding their fire. The 3rd Battalion killed a single enemy.

At 1220 of the 22nd, the regimental commander, Colonel DAVID M. FOWLER, was wounded

by a shell fragment in the left knee, just in rear of Company B. Colonel FOWLER had been forward

frequently. His orderly, Pvt. NORMAN W. DORSEY, had been wounded on the 20th, and

his driver’s helmet nicked on the 21st. All members of the regiment were greatly relieved to

learn that the colonel’s wound was not serious, and his early return expected. By his order, Lieutenant

Colonel JOHN F. SCHMELZER took command of the 87th Mountain Infantry.

There were other casualties that day from artillery fire; among them Pvt. THEODORE

FRITCHIE of Company G, was killed.

Lieutenant Colonel ROBERT C. WORKS, G-2 of the 10th Mountain Division, took command

of the 3rd Battalion, 87th Mountain Infantry, returning to the regiment after more than a year’s

absence.

BATTLE ACTION CONCLUDED

By February 22, when Colonel FOWLER was wounded, the operation had been concluded in

every sense. The objectives were long since consolidated, and excellent defensive positions built.

Feb 22

21

The strongest and most coordinated counterattack the enemy seemed able to put on—against our

air power and superior observation—was withstood on the morning of the 21st and a great percentage

of the enemy troops that were involved were killed or captured. The enemy was proven

even more unable to counterattack with tanks, for he couldn’t move his armor up into position

under the watchful eye of Rover Joe. The only effective force the enemy seemed able to bring on

our troops was his artillery and mortar fire, and this remained heavy throughout the week.

WIRE MEN

Some mention should be made of the Communications Section for their part in the operation.

The wiremen were the kingpins of the communications phase of the action, since most orders,

reports, and messages went over the phone. Initially, wire was laid to all companies from battalions,

and regiment had two wires to each attacking battalion. Communication between regiment

and battalion was usually very good. There were periods on the morning after the attack when

communication with the 1st Battalion was not continuous between 0400 and 0800. The combined

factors of artillery barrages and a platoon of our tanks kept taking out the lines quicker than the

linemen could repair them. Later, after the 3rd Battalion was put into the line, their wire was

blown out several times by artillery concentrations, shells twice landing within 25 yards of the

switchboard. Sgt. GEORGE DAY, JR. was killed laying wire during this period. Minefield explosions

occasionally blew out one of the double lines laid to the 1st or 3rd Battalion. The work of all

the linemen was exemplary. Particularly outstanding, under heavy fire, were S/Sgt. KARL K.

KIELHOFER and T/5 HERBERT W. STEINGRABER, who were largely responsible for the success

of the wire communication.

The radio section was on “stand by” except for the brief times the lines were out. Message

Center functioned smoothly, delivering overlays and written messages by jeep and foot under

heavy shellfire.

The Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon, in addition to the guide work and patrols mentioned,

manned an OP throughout the operation, searched German dead, and guarded the prisoners

of war.

MEDICS

Heroic work was done by the Medical Detachment during the weeklong operation. They

suffered more than their share of casualties while aiding wounded men. First Lieutenant WILLIAM

H. MILLMAN, while his 3rd Battalion aid station was under heavy shellfire, repeatedly

left his shelter to give medical attention, finally being mortally wounded as he rose to give aid

during a barrage. Many others could be mentioned, but Pfc. JOSEPH P. PRYCE demonstrated

the common spirit of the medics when he insisted on attempting to get to a wounded man even

though two other attempts had failed. After being wounded twice, he kept others from making

any attempt to reach him for two hours, and when he was finally evacuated to the aid station he

demanded that other cases by attended to first.

SITUATION 22 FEBRUARY

During the morning of 22 February, Major General CRITTENBERGER, commanding IV

Corps, and Brigadier General CRANE, artillery officer, visited the front and expressed great admiration

for the mountain troops. Supplies were, by then, going up the mountain by mule rather

than pack board. The enemy dead were being evacuated. That afternoon, Rover Joe had a busy

time knocking out tanks and self-propelled guns in front of Companies C and I. Enemy artillery

had been very quiet all afternoon. The road up to Corona had been declared open for jeeps and

tanks for the final time by the engineers, who had used large quantities of explosives and Bangalore

torpedoes to detonate the remaining mines. Several old demolition men, veterans in the Ital22

ian campaign, declared that the mine condition of the Corona road was the equal of anything

seen in Italy. One of the few problems remaining was the “rock,” as Rocca Corneta was called,

sticking up against the left flank. This had been shelled steadily.

Before 2100 that night, Rocca Corneta was occupied by a party of 27 Partisans and Pfc. EDWARD

PALEY, an intelligence scout. He was the only American soldier in the party. The “rock”

had been abandoned by the enemy, leaving only trip wires and much equipment, including some

American weapons. The church and other buildings atop the fortress-like pile of rock were

empty, battered shells from the constant barrage and bombardment.

The German artillery was very heavy through the 23rd and 24th. Those killed were: Pfc.

MARVIN H. HOFFMAN of Company F, Pfc. HERBERT G. YARNELL of Company C, Pfc. WILLIAM

CAMPBELL, JR. and LOUIE A. ORDAZ of Company I. It wasn’t until the 25th that no artillery

casualties were suffered. There was, from time to time, some friendly artillery dropping

into our area, especially on the 24th, but as far as could be determined, no further casualties were

from friendly fire.

PATROL ACTION

Some patrolling was done at night by both sides and on the afternoon of the 23rd, each battalion

was ordered by Division to send out daylight patrols to gather information on enemy frontline

positions. The patrol from 1st Battalion, led by Second Lieutenant JAMES ANDERSON III,

was an interesting one. One thousand yards forward with the lead scout on the ridge of the nose,

above and north of Valpiana, burp guns opened up from enemy bunkers both east and west of

the nose. One soldier was hit in the shoulder and wounded lightly. The patrol was badly caught

in crossfire, but fire was returned and the German in the left bunker was hit and killed. German

mortar fire was apparently being directed by telephone by an enemy observer, seen off to the

right of an American OP. The patrol was directed by radio to withdraw with the wounded man.

The withdrawal was accomplished by covering fire and movement while under rifle, grenade,

and mortar fire. Rifle grenades were fired back, but friendly mortar fire was not brought on to

the enemy. As the patrol cleared the ridge top, artillery time-fire was called for on the nose. The

enemy automatic weapons on the ridge were thereby silenced. A sniper in support at the OP

picked off the German on the telephone, silencing their mortars. The patrol, while coming down

off the ridge, killed two Germans, and Lieutenant ANDERSON nailed another while he covered

the withdrawal. The patrol had finished its withdrawal down the hill and through a draw into

the area, when machine gun fire cut down three more members of the patrol. No wounds were

serious. All members of the patrol returned. Eight rounds of time-fire brought up the Red Cross

flag which the Germans use when they are evacuating their wounded.

At night on 26 February, Second Lieutenant DONALD DWYER led a patrol from the 1st Platoon

of Company F from Rocca Corneta, going underneath Pizzo di Campiano to the north, to a

point near C. Vigoni. Here, just after a mortar muzzle blast was heard, the second scout, Pvt.

WILLIAM E. CHRISTENSEN, saw a German from behind a tree, ten yards away. The German

had our first scout, Pfc. PETER NASSAU, in his sights. CHRISTENSEN watched him allow the

scout to pass him and then he saw him step out and challenge NASSAU from the rear. The rest

of the patrol had not yet reached the road the two scouts were on. The guard moved around and

pointed his rifle at NASSAU’s chest. CHRISTENSEN circled around behind the German and,

holding his own rifle in his right hand, knocked the German’s rifle out of his hands with his left.

NASSAU, who speaks German, ordered him to raise his hands and keep quiet. In answer to

questions, the German revealed that there were 55 or 60 enemy in the rear. The men were on the

edge of a lawn, sloping down from town to the road—a poor place, tactically. Just as the lieuten-

Feb 23

Feb 26

23

ant was coming up to see what the matter was, two more enemy appeared from above and behind

the German, and called out in German, “What’s up below?”

NASSAU called them over and halted them in German. He told them they were surrounded,

to throw away their weapons and come down. Doubtful, they asked, “Who’s there, Americans?”

NASSAU answered in German in the affirmative and for them to drop their weapons and come

down on the double. One dropped his rifle, but the other dropped back behind his companion

and fired point-blank at NASSAU with an automatic weapon, stunning the scout and bruising his

shoulder. NASSAU fired back with his Tommy gun—the disarmed man was only four or five

feet away and was probably hit. A German grenade landed from behind a hedge giving the two

scouts time to hit the roadside ditch before it exploded, scratching NASSAU’s chin and blowing

off both their helmets.

The scouts covered the withdrawal of the patrol with their Tommy guns. More grenades

were thrown and heavy fire was directed on the retreating patrol. After they forded the deep,

boulder-strewn stream below the “rock,” two machine guns opened on them from a ridge. The

Germans had rushed the guns cross-country to cut them off; but the patrol, after returning part

way for semi-stunned NASSAU, was able to withdraw to friendly lines.

On the night of 26-27 February, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions were relieved by elements of the

Brazilian Expeditionary Force, and withdrew to the town of Vidiciatico for a brief rest and showers.

On 27 February Company C suffered more casualties in position near Valpiana and Pfc.

JUAN BARRIENTOS was killed by shellfire. The 1st Battalion was relieved and moved to Lizzano

that night. Meanwhile, the regimental staff was in Lizzano, preparing the second attack in

the region north of Gaggio Montano on the slopes of Mt. Terminale. The whole unit was making

ready to move forward beyond Abetaia.

On the 27th, with brief rest, the 3rd Battalion entrucked at 1600 for Malandrone. Here it dug

in. Over 1200 rounds of artillery fell during the night, causing some casualties. The men impatiently

awaited the rest of the regiment and the jump-off in the second battle of the 87th Mountain

Infantry.

Feb 27

24

MARCH OFFENSIVE AND CONSOLIDATION

(1 MAR — 31 MAR)

PREPARATION FOR BATTLE

uring early March, the 87th Mountain Infantry engaged in its first full-scale daylight battle.

With the other elements of the 10th Mountain Division, it jumped off on a three-day offensive

on March 3. The smashing success achieved is indicated by the unprecedented bag of prisoners

of war. On the first day alone, more prisoners were taken than had ever been taken before

on a single day by any unit in the Italian Theater. All objectives were taken far ahead of schedule,

and the unit acquitted itself brilliantly.

The Battle of Belvedere in February had been a night attack. All objectives of the 87th were

taken before dawn of the 20th of February. From then until the relief at the end of the month, the

fighting had been defensive. In contrast, the Battle of Castel d’Aiano was a deadly struggle in the

sunlight, from bunker to bunker, hill to hill, objective to objective, for three bloody days. It was

accomplished against prepared positions and heavily mined areas, in the roughest kind of terrain

and under heavy enemy artillery fire. However, this brilliant, full-scale action should not completely

overshadow the unusual accomplishments of Belvedere. Night battle is among the most

difficult of battle maneuvers. Night assaults have always presented the most complex problems

of warfare. That these problems of confusion, of difficult control, and of units losing themselves,

were overcome in February’s action deserves the highest tribute.

The March operation to Castel d’Aiano, although of quite a different caliber, depended on the

earlier effort in an interesting way. The original enemy line ran along high ground from Riva

Ridge, Rocca Corneta, up over Belvedere, and along Gorgolesco Ridge, and continued far back to

the northeast along Mt. della Torraccia and Mt. Terminale. Then it swung to the east again over

Cimon della Piella and along the ridge to Pietra Colora, Mt. della Croce, and beyond to Highway

64. To oversimplify the strategy, and reduce it to football terms, “Belvedere” had resembled a

“quarterback sneak.” The 86th Mountain Infantry had first taken the high ridge on the left out of

the play, and then the 87th and 85th had, under cover of darkness, plunged through and seized

Belvedere. It was planned as a short “line plunge,” not as a “touchdown play.” And as it developed,

successfully penetrating the highly important central position of Belvedere, the enemy expected

further thrusts here and pulled back to get set. However, after the 85th and 86th had hit

“off tackle” on the right, and had taken Mt. della Torraccia, the old “end around” play was called.

The 10th Mountain Division was pulled from the line and swung around the “right end,” the

Brazilian Expeditionary Force (BEF) holding their former positions at Belvedere. It was not a

“power play,” but one of speedy movement and deception. It caught the enemy completely off

balance; and here the football analogy breaks down, for the enemy was hit in the midst of making

a relief.

So large was the hole opened in the enemy line that the proverbial “truck” could have driven

through. But again the “thrust” hadn’t been planned as a touchdown play. It hadn’t been realized

that such rapid movement was possible in mountain terrain. The line had been opened

wide, the ball was in the clear, but there was no one to go through for down-field “blocking.”

The fast play was unexpectedly successful. The effort had been to try merely to gain some

ground; but it looked as though it could have been a touchdown play itself. Instead, the Division

had to be content with the four-mile sweep around the right end to Castel d’Aiano. It was a short

gain, but it was recognized and commended as a brilliant one, and the ground was laid for a long

sweep into enemy territory at a later date.

D

25

The 3rd Battalion bore the brunt of the battle. They led the column of battalions from the line

of departure on the first day. Furthermore, they took three days of pounding from enemy artillery

before the other battalions arrived. The 3rd Battalion had been relieved from Belvedere on

27 February and had rushed up to the new area. Here they took up defensive positions on the

north side of Malandrone Gulch on the southern slopes of the shell-scarred hill, La Serra, after

only a few hours for clean-up in Vidiciatico.

The battalion had hardly closed before S/Sgt. ROBERT SMITH of Company I was wounded

while making a reconnaissance. A few minutes later, Pfc. WARNER F. LAKEWAY of Company

K was killed by artillery in the company area. The attack, originally planned for 1 March, was

postponed until the 2nd, and then to the 3rd. Meanwhile, the battalion remained in position absorbing

the worst shellfire so far experienced by the regiment. During the three days from the

night of the 27th until D-Day, the 3rd Battalion area suffered 25 casualties, nine of whom were

deaths.

Even these casualties do not indicate the severity of the shelling. During the night of 28 February-

1 March, for instance, over a thousand rounds of artillery and mortar fire fell in the small

battalion area. This increased with one-half hour barrages all day of the 1st of March. During

some barrages, fifty rounds were counted around one position in two minutes, over 350 rounds

in fifteen minutes. During the afternoon hours of 1 March, 1500 rounds pounded onto the battered,

stumpy, brown slopes of the 3rd Battalion area. The men could only dig and dig deeper,

and their six-foot deep holes did cut down the casualty rate.

Unfortunately, there is no defense against a direct hit. For some, time seems to run out. The

highly valued regimental intelligence sergeant, LOREN M. FRANK, was blown up in his foxhole

at the regimental OP, along with another man, Pfc. JOHN F. VAN DE PUTTE, at 1600 on the 1st

of March. Duties kept others from the safety of foxholes. Sgt. ELMER A. BERLIN, of Headquarters

Company, 3rd Battalion, was mortally wounded while leading the Italian mule train to the

forward ammunition dump on 28 February. The dead in addition to those mentioned above

were: Sgt. JOHN B. BLANCHARD, Pfc. DALE W. DUNHAM, Pfc. THEODORE E. WALL, and

Pvt. JAMES H. ROGERS, JR. of Company L; and Pfc. THEODORE W. WENDERS of Company I.

Some mention should be made here of the job done by the Corps Engineers in erecting the

Bailey Bridge at Malandrone. The Malandrone River ran just south of the 3rd Battalion position

through a deep, narrow gulch between Mt. Castello and La Serra. Crossing here had been a high

stone bridge. Its remains lay in the stream. The road running north from Gaggio Montano to

Castel d’Aiano was the springboard of attack. It cut through this narrow valley and crossed the

river at the rubble heap called Malandrone. Where this old masonry bridge had been blown out,

a steep bypass dipped down from the old approach to stream’s edge, and crossed on the rubble

of ruined buildings scraped down as a roadbed fill. Before the 3rd Battalion arrived, work had

started on the Bailey Bridge to eliminate the difficult descent and ascent from the high approaches

to the water’s edge and back. On 28 February, stringers were across, but five or six

shells were thundering into the gulch every two or three minutes. They smashed onto the bridge,

bending the stringers and threatening the unfinished bridge. It later developed that the enemy

had observation on one of the approaches, and almost on the bridge itself, from the heights above

Pietra Colora to the east. Al vehicles approaching from Gaggio Montano, seemingly under cover

from the north, were pounded unmercifully. In spite of heavy casualties in the construction, the

bridge was completed on 2 March, and the long gauntlet down into the gulch and up was thus

shortened. The “shorts” of the continual shelling of this bridge were landing in the laps of the

3rd Battalion.

Feb 27

Mar 1

26

Across the stream, the road climbed a series of switchbacks and ran along the valley to the

north and northeast into enemy terrain. The narrow ridge of hills running along parallel to the

road on its right was the initial objective. The hills started at Cimon della Piella and ended at the

side road over to Pietra Colora. These hills, except for one, were in reality one long sharp ridge,

for the hills ran into each other in a string of five peaks with narrow saddles separating them.

They were labeled “Charlie 1, 2, and 3” and “Easy 1 and 2.” The whole ridge was referred to as

Mt. della Vedetta, or “Charlie-Easy Ridge.” To the west of Charlie 1 was a separate hill, Cimon

della Piella, connected by a saddle, but not in line with the ridge. This was called Hill 997. Ideal

defensively, the crest of the steep ridge was wooded and irregular with rock escarpments, stone

walls, and boulder heaps for defensive positions. The approaches to the crest up the steep sides

were open fields broken up with rock outcroppings and walls. Rocky lanes cut into the hillsides

offered some cover. Most of the trees bordering the lanes and fields lay shattered and shredded.

Many of them were large ones, three feet in girth, chewed off at the stump by the heavy German

artillery fire.

The 3rd Battalion 87th, starting northeast, then east, raced right along the German front line

as it faced the Brazilian front, rolling it up from Malandrone to Mt. della Croce. The other two

battalions penetrated northward behind this rolled-up east-west line, and found a little less resistance

as they occupied key hills beyond the side road to Pietra Colora. The 86th on the left side of

the road had to break through only a narrow segment of the front line, and they too were in the

rear moving along beside our 2nd Battalion with the road between them. When the action was

finished, a sizable segment of front line was swept up and a salient was occupied leading north to

Castel d’Aiano.

Originally, the column of battalions was to be the 2nd, 1st, and 3rd, with the 2nd moving to

the attack through the 3rd, but this was changed and the 3rd Battalion was picked to jump off

from the positions they had been occupying for three days. They were to take Hill 997 as the first

objective, and then “Charlie 1, 2, and 3” and “Easy 1 and 2.” They were then to prepare to set a

roadblock north of Pietra Colora on regimental order; and they were also to be prepared to continue

the attack northeast or east.

On the right was the 1st Infantry BEF; on the left, the 86th Mountain Infantry. Company H

relieved Company M on D-1 prepared to support the attack from M’s old positions.

The regiment was supported by the 616th Field Artillery, reinforced by the 175th Field Artillery,

and also by the 84th Chemical Battalion, the 76th Medium Tank Destroyers and Medium

Tank Battalion. Company C of the 126th Engineers cleared mines from roads and checked assembly

areas.

During the night before the attack, the 2nd and 1st Battalions moved up into the assembly areas

south of the gulch on the slopes of Mt. Castello. By 0615 the morning of 3 March, the 87th

was ready to go. Company L was in position on the left of the narrow sector. Company I, the

right flank company of the Division, would follow Company L out at 400 yards. Company K in

the area, rear, would lead the attack, passing through L and jumping off across the line of departure.

To the south across the river were the 2nd and 1st Battalions waiting in the assembly areas.

On the north banks of the stream was the regimental CP, with the OP up on la Serra further to the

north, commanding a direct view of the length of ridge “Charlie-Easy,” and of the town of Pietra

Colora.

Mar 3

27

FIRST DAY—3 MARCH

COMPANY K ATTACK

Company K moved forward to within a hundred yards of a group of houses on the hillside

south of Stancadora. Supporting artillery worked over these houses and the hills beyond for 15

minutes. At 0700, H-Hour, Company K crossed the line of departure and attacked. Seventeen

minutes later, they were followed by Company L. Heavy enemy artillery fire greeted both companies

as they moved forward. Company I waited to follow Company L. In accordance with the

order, Company K moved straight ahead to the steep hill of Cimon della Piella. The 2nd Platoon

was on the left, 3rd on the right. Following them in support was the 1st Platoon of Company M.

Tanks started moving up the road on the left as they crossed the line of departure. The company

met scattered small arms fire seven minutes later, but by 0730 they were approaching the base of

the hill and requested an artillery concentration on it.

Back in the assembly area waited the 3rd Platoon of Company M, ready to move forward

with mules to Hill 997 when it should be taken. They would support the battalion’s progress

along the ridge “Charlie-Easy.” Also back there was a “Special Force” of the 2nd Platoon, Company

M, plus three .50-caliber machine guns and three 37-mm guns with their crews and mules.

This force, under First Lieutenant WILLIAM D. FLOYD, was to move up in support when Hill

997 was taken. The all-important key to the whole attack for the 87th was the initial taking of Hill

997, which all but blocked the narrow regimental zone of attack.

While the 2nd Platoon of Company K moved up along the steep hill along to the road, the

3rd Platoon under Lieutenant CHARLES L. PFEIFFER swung around to the right to flank the hill.

They received rifle fire from the farm in the saddle, but were able to pass to the left between it

and the hill and up onto the upper slopes. Here, they sent word back prematurely that they were

on top. As Captain ROGER EDDY, company commander, reached the open field the platoon was

in, it became pinned down by heavy machine gun fire from this farm below.

Lieutenant PFEIFFER, out in front of his men reconnoitering for his platoon position, was hit

by small arms fire. He lay unable to move in front of his platoon in an exposed position under

machine gun and small arms fire. Pfc. WILLIAM C. MAAS III, and S/Sgt. HARRY SOUTHARD

volunteered to make their way out to the wounded platoon leader. The two men succeeded in

bringing in Lieutenant PFEIFFER, but MAAS was shot and killed by a sniper just as he had apparently

reached safety. Lieutenant PFEIFFER later died of his wounds.

Meanwhile, the 2nd Platoon had gone on up and had nearly reached the summit from the

left, led by T/Sgt. TOIVO RANTA. (Sergeant RANTA received his battlefield commission a few

days later as a result of his actions on Belvedere in February.) The platoon had been halted,

though, on top of the hill just short of the summit. A strongly defended area with open fields of

fire forced the men to take cover. S/Sgt. EDMUND D. BENNETT, a squad leader in the 2nd Platoon,

seeing that flanking action was impossible, crawled along the side of a stone wall to within

thirty yards of the enemy under a barrage of machine gun fire. Three of the enemy, seeing him

closing in on their position, surrendered; the others abandoned their machine gun and ran back

over the hill. BENNETT, a famous cross-country skier, ran, grabbed up the weapon and chased

them. On the crest of the hill, he set up the gun and opened fire, hitting several of the fleeing enemy

and forcing eight more to surrender. Although lightly wounded, BENNETT’s actions were

outstanding throughout the entire attack.

Mar 3

28

The upper slopes, by 0830, were well spotted with dead Germans, and at least thirty prisoners

of war were moving down without escort. In the saddle between Hill 997 and “Charlie 1”

more fire from the cluster of farm buildings was holding up elements of Company L following on

Company K right. Tracer bullets were shot into a haystack from under which Germans were firing.

The haystack flared up, cremating some of the enemy beneath.

Company L was held up at this farmhouse for a considerable time while Company K consolidated

on the top of Hill 997. They finally moved past it to the right after knocking out much

of its resistance and taking some prisoners. Later in the morning, however, Company K discovered

enemy still in the farm buildings, and two squads from the 1st Platoon under First Lieutenant

WILLIAM PHILP moved down into the saddle. They killed two and captured three more,

then continued up the other side of the saddle onto the west slope of “Charlie 1” from where machine

gun and rifle fire was coming across on that part of the company remaining on Hill 997.

Companies L and I had moved fast past the action of Company K, and moved up a lane running

along the east side of “Charlie-Easy Ridge,” bypassing considerable resistance behind the crest on

the west side.

The two squads under Lieutenant PHILP were supported by one platoon of Company M and

their own weapons from Hill 997 as they moved up “Charlie 1” and took nearly fifty prisoners of

war on the hillside. Their casualties were heavy, though. S/Sgt. MAURICE E. AUCOIN, leading

one of the squads, was cut down and killed by machine gun fire as they assaulted. Also S/Sgt.

GEORGE A. WEMPLE and S/Sgt. RALPH TOWNSEND, another outstanding skier, were seriously

wounded during this action. Pfc. RAYMOND E. HATCHMAN distinguished himself in

this encounter. When his platoon was fired on, he continued to advance until he personally was

fired on. Then, from a covered position, he fired into a building and hurled a grenade, killing

three and driving off the rest of the enemy.

T/5 WILLIAM R. CONNER, aid man, supporting these squads, did heroic work. Under the

heavy fire, he moved openly about to get aid quickly to the wounded men. He spotted one man

lying wounded out in front less than fifty yards from an enemy position. The men with him

yelled for him not to go out, but he moved out regardless. Part way out, intense fire drove him to

cover momentarily. Then putting his Red Cross flag on a stick, he dashed to the wounded man’s

side. He stuck the flag in the ground and in full view was giving aid, when he was shot and

killed by a German sniper in cold blood and in utter disregard for the Red Cross flag, which the

German himself depends on so often.

Sgt. HARRY THOMAS, light machine gun squad leader, was killed while directing his

squad’s fire from an exposed position during the attack. Also, Pfc. DAN M. WILSON, Pfc. FRED

M. PALMER, and Pfc. HAROLD J. PERDUE had been hit fatally as they moved up the rocky

slopes. Lieutenant PHILP, moving forward under heavy mortar and small arms fire to reconnoiter,

rescued a wounded man under difficult circumstances. Later, Lieutenant PHILP was killed

by artillery fire.

Company K finally established contact late in the day with Company L over the ridge. The

command post that night was established in the farmhouse between Hill 997 and “Charlie 1.”

COMPANY L ATTACK

To go back to the line of departure: the elements of Company L had moved out after Company

K under heavy artillery fire. They hit resistance before they reached the slopes of “Charlie,”

and two men were hit by a burp gun near Stancadora just below the farmhouse in the saddle.

They were held up here for nearly an hour, from some time after 0800. It was here they set fire to

the haystack with tracers. T/5 JOSEPH W. CARTER displayed great courage when he moved

29

through mortar and machine gun fire to aid a wounded man lying close to the flaming haystack

in front of the platoon. Shortly after 0900, the German Red Cross flag appeared to protect their

aid men, but the company still was pinned down by machine gun fire from around the farm

buildings. Two machine guns seemed to be firing from the farm buildings. The mortars brought

fire and silenced one. Then Pfc. RALPH MATTSON personally took the attack into his own

hands. Leaving his covered position, he moved forward alone through the heavy fire, firing his

BAR from the hip as he went right up to the machine gun nest. He rushed, silencing it and killing

all three Germans behind the gun. This done, he kept right on going, and the inspired platoon

took off after him.

Sgt. WILLIAM M. KENNEDY, back at the mortar OP, who had been directing fire on the enemy

artillery weapons, was instantly killed by artillery fire. KENNEDY was an invaluable mortar

man, having developed a new type of mortar sight. His loss was great.

Pfc. ROBERT L. MACWILLIAMS was killed during the reorganization following this early

stage of the attack when a small counterattack developed. MACWILLIAMS had been the 2nd

Scout of the 2nd Platoon. He had crawled up and dragged back wounded Pvt. PERRY W.

PROUGH under intense fire. He volunteered to get another wounded man, but was ordered not

to. Instead, with the squad still pinned down from fire from a building, he threw in a grenade

and captured fourteen Germans coming out. A short time later, he was shot in the head with machine

gun fire, and killed.

The 1st Platoon of Company L had moved from their position to the east slope in an attempt

to flank the machine gun positions. They continued on along the lane traversing the steep eastern

slopes. By 0920, they were just north of Merlano on the right flank of “Charlie 1,” having bypassed

considerable resistance on the west slopes.

By 1000, Company I was following Company L, and groups of prisoners were streaming

through them. The 2nd Battalion had moved into the old 3rd Battalion positions, near the line of

departure. The 1st Platoon of Company L was on “Charlie 2” by 1030, followed by 2nd Platoon

and weapons platoon. They had flanked completely around “Charlie 1” by the lane, and climbed

up from the east onto “Charlie 2.” Eighteen minutes later, they were on “Charlie 3” looking forward

to “Easy.” Twenty-three more PWs moved down the road to the battalion area.

No sooner had they gone than firing flared up again from over the ridge and the mortar men

had to set up a firing line. T/Sgt. WALTER P. STILLWELL, at the mortar outpost, crawled forward

to the ridge on hearing the firing, and watched an enemy lieutenant organizing the counterattack.

With S/Sgt. JOHN W. TRIPP, he set up the mortar section defense. STILLWELL himself

killed one enemy and shot down three. Then, seeing no help coming for his hard-pressed

section, he ran back to bring up elements of Company K and Company E. With the help of men

from Company K, the enemy threat was beaten off.

Sergeant JOHN W. TRIPP was wounded early in the action. Although struck in both knees,

he continued to coordinate his mortars with the fire of others until the attack was repulsed. He

finally had to be evacuated.

Sergeant ARTHUR H. BURGESS, JR. at the outbreak of the attack, rushed forward to aid the

exposed outpost. He was crawling along a stone wall to get into position to throw a grenade

when he was struck in the head and killed.

Several of the mortar men deserve mention for heroic action during this attack. Pvt. ROY

JOHNS exposed himself fearlessly in beating off the attack. Pvt. NEAL C. YORKER left his mortar

position as he saw the enemy maneuvering toward his section and helped disperse the attack

with his pistol and grenades.

30

After the counterattack had been repulsed, Lieutenant Colonel ROBERT C. WORKS, battalion

commander, reported that the battalion would take “Easy” by noon. Having learned that the

86th Mountain Infantry had secured his left rear, he ordered Company K to move forward, relieve

Company L, defend “Charlie,” and mop up the area between Hill 997 and “Charlie.” He

ordered Company L to seize and organize “Easy,” and directed that Company I pass through L

prepared to continue the attack. By 1100, Captain JOSEPH J. DUNCAN, reported that he had

seized “Easy 1 and 2.” The prisoners of war were flooding down the road. The entire ridgeline

to the Pietra Colora road had been taken. The PWs coming out from their overrun positions were

confused and surprised by the attack.

It was forward on objective “Easy” that Pfc. ALLEN F. SCHAUFFLER, runner of the leading

platoon, distinguished himself. He went to the aid of a helpless wounded squad leader, S/Sgt.

ARTHUR C. DELANEY, who lay in a dangerously exposed area. In the face of intense small

arms fire, he treated the wounded man and brought him to safety. Later, he aided another

wounded man and refused to leave him during a heavy barrage, remaining until the litter bearers

arrived. Throughout the action, he assisted in the treatment and evacuation of the wounded, as

well as doing his own duties.

Pfc. WILLIAM WILLIAMSON, JR. deserves recognition. Although painfully wounded, he

refused to leave his unit and continued firing at the enemy until he had to be evacuated.

Although running into positions all the way along the ridge top, positions that momentarily

held them up, the progress of the company along the crest to its termination above the Pietra

Colora road was rapid. By 1130 they were there. All of the initial objectives of the 3rd Battalion

had been taken. But the swift progress was built on the many brave deeds of the men who

climbed up and moved along that ridge.

The enemy who lived won’t forget men like S/Sgt. JOHN R. BERGSTROM, a forward squad

leader. He spotted an enemy machine gun in a haystack. Ordering his squad to take positions

and prepare to cover him, he crawled carefully up toward the German gun, then with a wild war

whoop, he rushed the haystack, killing one and capturing another. Neither will they forget

S/Sgt. JAMES C. MOREHOUSE higher up on the ridge. His squad was fired on from a stone

wall 700 yards to his front. He led off across the field in a reckless charge, cleared the wall in a

leap, and killed the enemy.

Other stratagems were used. Pfc. WILBUR D. GIESE captured three PWs single-handedly by

moving far forward above, commanding them in German to surrender. As he moved back with

his booty, he was seriously wounded. Pfc. ELMO J. MILLER, although lying helplessly wounded

before a house, repeatedly tried to direct fire on an enemy machine gun he had spotted, until finally

he was evacuated.

Pfc. SIMON A. PROPPER was fired on and his companion wounded as he advanced toward

a building. He refused to leave his companion. Small arms fire was ineffective against the enemy

machine gun, so he threw a grenade. The gun was knocked out, and he returned to the

squad as the wounded man was being taken care of. He himself was wounded later in the day.

Another rescue of a wounded man was effected during an intense barrage by Sgt. JOSEPH A.

CAMPBELL, who had taken over his squad when its leader had been wounded.

Communications became a problem for Company L as it moved rapidly forward on the attack.

The wiremen worked under the utmost danger until hit. S/Sgt. HERBERT C. SPAULDING,

communications sergeant of Company L, was killed, as was Pvt. GERARD E. O’HARA of

Company I, while laying wire. Pfc. JOHN F. JAMES of Company L was seriously wounded

while working on wire lines.

31

T/5 ROBERT H. SUNDELL, a mail clerk, took over and laid wire in the heaviest fire, after the

others were gone. In addition, he brought aid to wounded men and assisted the medics. All of

these had worked in the open under the heaviest fire, sure of the importance of their jobs, and

heedless of their own safety.

Another squad leader, S/Sgt. LAWRENCE J. LA BONTE, was killed during the advance by

an artillery tree burst up on the ridge.

SUMMARY

Only a few deeds are recorded; many were unseen. But the few that are recorded establish

the temper of the whole action. S/Sgt. JOHN R. BERGSTROM rushing a machine gun in a haystack

with a wild war whoop is an unorthodox way to fight. How can you be a “superman”

against such a man, or against men who can race 300 yards across a field and jump the stone wall

on top of you? Many of the PWs were almost resentful. They didn’t like our tactics. One captured

sergeant in the PW cage asked indignantly, “You came from the wrong side. How can I be

expected to hold my sector if my machine gun is pointing the wrong way?”

Up on that narrow, almost knife-edged ridge, along the tumbled boulders and rock faces,

among the battered trees, some fine men fell. Those who fell left a story of accomplishment.

Those who remain can be proud to have served with such men.

Company K lost six men in death, and L lost five; each company had twenty men wounded.

They had killed many times that number of Germans, and the 87th’s PW count by dark that night

was 442, most of whom came from the ridge; and there were still more drifting in.

The bridge at Malandrone was blown out again about an hour and a half after H-Hour. Only

five tanks had gone over it before it went, but the bypass was still passable down to the water’s

edge and up. The bridge and the bypass were shelled all day and levied more casualties on the

engineers, including the death of the platoon leader, Lt. CHARLES MCKELVEY. A tank was hit

and disabled in the bypass, but tanks continued to move up in support. One attempted to climb

up to the ridge from the main road on the west, but struck a minefield on the lower slopes. By

afternoon one platoon of tanks was able to get up to a supporting position on the east side of the

ridge. The bridge was repaired for the final time by 1450.

Before noon of 3 March, the 2nd Battalion was moving forward to the Pietra Colora road at a

point to the left of Company L, to attack objective “Item,” a low hill northeast of the crossroads.

Before they started, S/Sgt. LEO E. MILLER and Pfc. LEWIS S. TRAUTWEIN of Battalion Headquarters

and Sgt. HARVEY F. CORN, JR. of Company F were killed by artillery fire. The 1st Battalion

had left the assembly area to follow the 2nd. However, at 1145, General HAYS, division

commander, ordered the 2nd Battalion to establish a roadblock at the crossroads, later called

“Shrapnel Junction,” before advancing on “Item.” Meanwhile, Company I was ordered to establish

a roadblock north of Pietra Colora, on the right, to seal off the other end of this road across

the regimental front.

COMPANY I

Company I jumped off at 1315 for the town of Pietra Colora, passing through Company L.

The leading platoon, moving south and east of the road across open slopes, was stopped by an

Italian civilian who pointed out a minefield in their path. The town, a German command post,

was defended by about thirty enemy. The 2nd Platoon in the lead advanced against sniper fire,

taking the town and the thirty Germans by 1500. Only one casualty was suffered during the attack—

a sergeant was hit in the hand. However, although the company quickly reorganized and

32

dug in, heavy artillery and mortar fire killed Pfc. ANTHONY S. SCUTO and Pfc. FREDERICK B.

STRAUSS, and wounded six. This town, on a high knob, was rapidly taken as a result of an accurate

and intense artillery preparation that was closely followed by an assault on the enemy’s rear.

By 1400, the 2nd Battalion was ready to jump off from the north end of the ridge “Charlie-

Easy” at Mt. della Vedetta. Here, they were later pinned down and suffered casualties as they

tried to move forward. Heavy fire was coming from self-propelled guns to the west, and artillery

from Crocette di Sotto, a town to the east of Pietra Colora. Both artillery and air support were

requested on this town at a little after 1500.

Also at this time a Brazilian patrol was seeking to come up the road to Pietra Colora from

Santa Maria Villiana, to the east. They had taken this town just after Company I took Pietra Colora,

and were trying to make contact with Company I. However, communications had been cut

with Company I since its jump-off. The progress of the company was reported to the Brazilians

by First Lieutenant LEON C. WILMOT, the 87th liaison officer, from the OP across the valley.

From this position, he had been able to follow the action all day, even to counting the number of

prisoners taken. Since Company I couldn’t be warned, the Brazilian patrol was not allowed to

make contact. Their green uniforms might easily be mistaken for the enemy.

At 1505, General HAYS ordered the 86th to move up promptly on Objectives “George” and

“Fox,” since the 2nd Battalion couldn’t occupy “Item” until the other two were taken. The attack

on “Item” was to be coordinated with the advance of the 86th on “Howe.” Colonel EARL

THOMSON, chief of staff, also ordered tank destroyers to fire on Crocette di Sotto. Three guns

were each to lay in 15 rounds.

The 86th had had a difficult time in Iola, and were still cleaning it out at 1530, thus preventing

any action at “Fox” and “George.” Elements of the 85th, originally scheduled to relieve the

3rd Battalion, all shifted into the 86th sector to hasten them along.

COMPANY E

At 1700, the 2nd Battalion, with Company E leading, moved out to attack “Item.” Division

ordered at 1730 to “button up” for the night whenever a defensive position was reached. However,

Company E had moved out and their wire was cut. The 1st Platoon had stopped southwest

of the crossroad near Flizzone, and the 2nd and 3rd Platoons had gone through them, the 2nd

leading across the road and into the town of Canevaccia. They entered the town as it grew dark

under shellfire from German self-propelled guns.

Communication had been blown out soon after the company had crossed the road. So, after

occupation was completed, Captain LE GRAND PENDREY and three men went back and found

the breaks. Communication reestablished, the company was able to receive word to withdraw

across the road. Their position in Canevaccia was exposed and liable to encirclement during the

night, since the units on the left had not moved abreast.

Company E withdrew to Flizzone. They had suffered five casualties, two of them killed,

from the self-propelled guns. These two were Pfc. EDMON E. HATHAWAY and Pfc. ALBERT L.

SAYER who died firing.

Before they could get down off the ridge in the afternoon, Company F had been plastered

with artillery and self-propelled gun fire and had suffered twelve casualties. Two were fatalities:

Pvt. WESLEY E. LAHTI, and Pfc. EUGENE C. NORTON. Company F spent the night with Companies

E and G near Flizzone.

33

The situation at the end of the first day of attack was excellent. The 87th had taken all of the

ground in its sector up to the Pietra Colora road, including the town itself, and it had established

roadblocks on that road. The plans for the second day included the 2nd and 1st Battalions jumping

off simultaneously at 0800 and moving parallel to each other out to the north, each taking two

of the rolling hills lying before them. The 3rd Battalion meanwhile was to push further to the

right (east) and occupy a mountain above Pietra Colora. The 3rd Battalion requested and received

permission to move their H-Hour from 0800 to 1000.

The total casualties for the first day of fighting had been 25 killed in action and 80 wounded.

The 3rd Battalion, leading, had suffered more than half of these, with 16 killed and 50 wounded.

Word came that night that back at Abetaia, the aid station had been booby-trapped, and had

blown up with its occupants. In it, in addition to its staff and patients, were all three of the chaplains

of the 87th. Few survived the tremendous blast that hollowed the stone building and

knocked out one of its stone walls. Chaplain EDWIN C. GOMKE was one of the few seriously

wounded who were gotten out alive. But the universally liked Chaplains HARRY MONTGOMERY

and WILLIAM S. CONTINO were both killed. Two of their drivers were wounded, and the

87th medic Pfc. FRANK J. PIAZZA was killed in the same explosion.

SECOND DAY—4 MARCH

Early in the morning of the 2nd day of the attack, the 1st Battalion started moving forward

from near Stancadora. They left at 0530, passed through the 3rd Battalion, Mt. della Vedetta

ridge area, and jumped off across the Pietra Colora road at 0800, after a fifteen-minute artillery

barrage, just as the 2nd Battalion was crossing to their left.

COMPANY A

Company A was leading with the 1st and 2nd Platoons abreast as they moved toward Mt.

Acidola. In the draw south of Acidola, they were hit by heavy mortar and artillery fire. Sgt.

EUGENE C. LOUMAN and Pfc. WAVEL P. ELAM were badly hurt here, and soon afterward two

scouts from the battalion headquarters company advancing in front of Company A were hit. Pfc.

HANS JUNGSTER was only lightly wounded, but Pfc. JOE C. MILLER was killed. MILLER,

since the early days of the regiment, had been applauded as the Regimental Cartoonist. With

him went a good many—but not all—of those happy “slope dopes” he carried around in his

mind and put on paper. Many still remain with friends, and in old copies of the Blizzard, and in

the back of other people’s minds. No one who ever saw the cartoon could forget poor old

“Slopey” in D-Series, hunched over a briskly burning stack of broken skis, cooking a C-ration,

resigned to his place in the snowy waste, but making the best of it.

By 0930, Company A had taken Mt. Acidola, and an hour later, the Battalion CP prepared to

displace forward to it. A prisoner of war with a secret document was sent back to the regiment at

this time.

COMPANY B

Meanwhile Company B, followed by C and D, went through A, and the 2nd Battalion moved

by on the left. Company B headed for Bacucco, the objective code-named “Love.” They moved

across a wide valley with 2nd Platoon on the left, 1st on the right. From a group of houses half-

Mar 4

34

way up the hill still 400 yards away, six or seven helmeted Germans emerged holding Italian

women before them as shields. They seemed to be looking the situation over, and as the Americans

continued to advance, they ran back into the houses, waving white flags. One, however,

started to run up the hill. Pfc. GERALD E. MULVANEY at a 400-yard range, raised his M-1,

squeezed, and as the single shot sounded, the running figure collapsed. A “bulls-eye” at 400

yards!

Company B moved up and deployed on a ridge. Next, six Germans came out of the houses

with cloth caps instead of helmets and moved down to surrender to the 2nd Platoon. They apparently

were a mortar squad, but they hadn’t fired a shot.

Later, hearing information about some enemy over on the back of the hill, Pfc. PAUL F.

SCHILLER and one other man composed a voluntary patrol to creep forward and locate the enemy.

SCHILLER came up a gully to the left of the German position, and seeing the German

leader just as the German saw SCHILLER, he beat him to the draw and shot him. Four other

Germans surrendered quickly. In the strong point were one 81-mm mortar, two machine guns,

and some AT grenades. Shortly after noon, all was occupied on Bacucco. Pfc. LUCIEN T.

DEETER was killed by artillery.

During the afternoon, the company dug in along the draw northeast of Bacucco. At this time,

the 2nd Battalion had not reached their final objective on Hill 926 (Objective “King”) nor Madna

di Brasa. These objectives were all taken, however, before 1700, and the 1st Battalion tied in with

the 2nd and shifted over to their left near Madna di Brasa.

Lieutenant Colonel ROSS J. WILSON, commanding the 1st Battalion, when requested by Division

to move on to Castel d’Aiano, explained that he was unable to do so, due to lack of supplies

and the fatigue of his men. So the attack was postponed until morning.

COMPANY E

As the 1st Battalion advanced, the 2nd Battalion had jumped off on the left, closely following

a fifteen-minute barrage. Company E, with the 2nd Platoon leading, crossed the road at 0800, 4

March, the second day of the attack. The battalion received heavy artillery and mortar fire as it

advanced, and had one killed and four wounded before going 600 yards. The leading company

moved to the right of yesterday’s route to Canevaccia, but to the left of the 1st Battalion jumping

off for Acidola.

They held up at a farmhouse on “Item” 500 yards beyond the road. Mortar fire was coming

in at this point, but no small arms fire as yet. Pvt. JAMES P. KENNEY was killed by mortar fire

while covering the building for the assault squad. After the house was taken, Lieutenant Colonel

EMMETT L. NATIONS, battalion commander, came up to survey the situation.

From the farmhouse on “Item,” the 2nd Platoon advanced directly toward Hill 926 (“King”).

The 3rd Platoon flanked around to the right. They were so far to the right that they lost contact

across the valley from Hill 926 on Madna di Brasa.

At about 1500, when the 2nd Platoon was pinned down on the slopes of Hill 926, the 1st Platoon

was used as a flanking element through the gap between the 2nd and 3rd. The rifle squads

of the 1st Platoon moved up the valley followed by a machine gun section. The enemy in position

at the head of the valley allowed the rifle squads to go by, and then opened up on the machine

gun crew, cutting down S/Sgt. DONALD P. DUNCAN, Pfc. HOWARD WINTER, Pvt.

GEORGE E. MITCHELL, and Sgt. CECIL E. NIRIDER. No one was killed. This fusillade of resis35

tance ended the skirmish, for the two squads went up on the hill, captured a mortar crew in position,

and drove back the remainder of the defenders.

COMPANY G

Company G, following E, swung over and occupied Madna di Brasa and Road Junction (RJ)

K 20 just north, about 1600. They received mortar fire during occupation, and S/Sgt. GEORGE J.

BLAKER was killed while digging. Also killed in Company G were: Pfc. HENRY F. ROSE, JR.

and Pvt. BRAINERD E. LYNCH.

The 1st Battalion had meanwhile moved out abreast of the 2nd, and passed over Acidola and

Bacucco by noon. By the time Company G reached Madna di Brasa, Company B had dug positions

that continued a line to the southeast of Madna di Brasa.

COMPANY F

The 1st Platoon of Company F, which had followed E and G in the advance, moved out an

hour and a half after the hill was taken to establish outposts on the ridge running out of Natale,

while E and G established defensive positions on Hill 926 and K 20 beyond Madna di Brasa. At

0430 on 5 March, one squad of Company F established a roadblock at RJ 813 near Casone. During

the morning of the 5th, Lieutenant DONALD DWYER, with half a squad, captured 13 Germans

to the left of his roadblock. He had reinforced his roadblock with a machine gun squad

from Natale, and then with half a squad, he had walked over to Gualandi on the regimental left

boundary. As this patrol approached Gualandi, the men were fired on by snipers. They all took

cover, all except Pfc. PAUL STETTNER who braved the fire to continue moving forward, shouting

in German to surrender for they were outnumbered. This action drew fire, confused the enemy,

and allowed the remainder of the patrol to enter the town and capture 13 Germans.

COMPANY I

To return to the morning of 4 March, the second day of the attack, the 3rd Battalion was to

jump off for Mt. della Croce at 1000, after a fifteen-minute barrage. The barrage was delayed due

to clearance uncertainty with the Brazilians, whose front lines were just below Mt. della Croce.

The jump-off was held up until 1100 when they led off, 2nd, 1st, and 3rd Platoons, Company I, in

that order. As they moved up, they were fired on at long range by automatic weapons from two

houses. The houses were bypassed and mopped up from the rear, all the inmates surrendering.

From long range, heavy machine guns supporting the advance from Pietra Colora fired a haystack,

and more Germans were driven out and captured. Leading elements climbed a ridge running

up to the summit from the left side, and exchanged grenades with the enemy in position on

top. After a fifteen-minute firefight, three men surrendered and the resistance was crushed. The

company then moved rapidly along the open top of the hill, meeting only sporadic resistance

here and there. This initial objective of Mt. della Croce was occupied by 1200.

The final objective, Hill 882, was a knob off to the east on a shoulder of the mountain. The 1st

Platoon went through the 2nd to continue the attack supported by heavy weapons on Mt. della

Croce. They moved through a minefield, followed by the weapons platoon. Although the entire

1st Platoon passed through the field uneventfully, Sgt. G. C. MANIS, mortar squad leader of the

weapons platoon, touched off a mine that blew his foot off, crumpling him up on the ground.

Pfc. KENNETH D. PERKINS fearlessly moved out into the minefield and administered to the

wounded man. As he turned to leave, he blew off two more mines and was killed. Then another

aid man Pfc. ROY K. COMBS, moved into the minefield to try to evacuate MANIS to safety.

COMBS suddenly crumpled in another explosion, his leg gone. Pvt. JACK PITTMAN from the

36

litter team of Company K picked up a length of W-130 wire, and probing his way, moved in to

the three forms on the ground. He tied wire around each of the two living men, and they were

hauled to safety and evacuated.

The Brazilians made contact from the right flank, and took over and secured positions, allowing

Company I to withdraw to Pietra Colora. Company I had suffered no casualties from actual

contact with the enemy, except for the mine casualties. Only one man, Pfc. JOSEPH G. HANCE,

had been hit; he was killed by our own artillery at 1000 that morning. Company M, in support

from Mt. della Vedetta ridge, was hit by artillery. Pfc. FRANCIS A. LA FOUNTAIN was killed.

Company I took ten prisoners of war.

The action for the 3rd Battalion was completed, and they moved their CP into the ruined

buildings of Pietra Colora.

THIRD DAY—5 MARCH

During the afternoon of 5 March, the 87th made its final effort of the offensive, when the 1st

Battalion pushed on to Castel d’Aiano and Hill 813. The attack was to begin at 0630, but was delayed

to allow the 85th time to move up Mt. della Spe on the right.

By noon, friendly tanks had moved into Castel d’Aiano, were being fired on, and had called

for infantry support. The 1st Battalion jumped off across northeast of Madna di Brasa (K 20) at

1400. Company C led off, and as they crossed the ridge and moved down the long open slope

into the draw, everything the enemy had opened up on them. Company C headed for Hill 813, a

thousand yards north. Company A, following across the road, swung to the right toward Castel

d’Aiano.

COMPANY C ATTACK

The trip to Hill 813 was formidable, for 800 yards down the slope was wide open and spotted

with well-prepared dugouts. On the hillside, firing up at the two leading platoons of Company

C, were light machine guns, burp guns, mortars, rifles and rifle grenades. Upon our heavy return

fire the nearer ranks of enemy began to yell “Kamerad!” but those behind them still fired. Just before

reaching the draw that led to the valley bottom, two PWs were taken. These were fired upon

by their own men, and one American was killed as he took the PWs in charge.

First Lieutenant WILLIAM S. RYBERG, with the 1st Platoon, and the company commander,

Captain MORLAN W. NELSON, moved around to the left and got into this draw running on

down and flanking the positions. The 2nd Platoon, led by Lieutenant JOHN W. HAWK, followed

the 1st Platoon down this draw. On the right of the draw was a nose sticking out from Monfenaro.

Lieutenant RYBERG, out in front of his platoon, led them onto the nose to flank the position

on the hillside. He was instantly killed by machine gun fire. Pfc. HORACE H. RAINEY was

killed here too, at about the same time. Pfc. GLENN R. BAILEY, the 2nd Platoon messenger,

running across the open field further to the left under heavy fire, was also killed.

A BAR man, Pfc. ELMER T. PERKINS, advancing with the 2nd Platoon, was being fired on

by a machine gun. He stood it as long as he could and then jumped up and, standing in plain

view, had it out with the German machine gunner, killing him with a hail of fire.

The 2nd Platoon, passing the 1st, continued down to the left of Monfenaro to the mouth of

the draw where it came out at the foot of Hill 813. Here they were in full view of the enemy on

813, and a barrage of artillery and heavy machine gun fire pinned them down.

Mar 5

37

It was now getting toward dusk. Captain NELSON was pinned down at the base of a large

tree. The wire had come part way up to him, but the wiremen were also pinned down about a

hundred yards away. Counter-battery fire was badly needed. Pfc. ALEXIS POUTIATINE

grabbed the wire reel and raced across the open distance for the captain’s tree. Machine gun fire

followed his course; tracer bullets appeared to pass between his legs. By a miracle, he wasn’t hit,

and the request for artillery fire was sent back. Two weeks later, while in division reserve at Pietra

Colora, POUTIATINE picked up a booby-trapped German bazooka while helping to clear out

some buildings and was killed.

Under cover of darkness and the artillery barrage, the company reorganized. Then, with the

2nd and 3rd Platoons abreast, they moved up in the dark and occupied Hill 813, taking six prisoners,

but meeting little resistance.

COMPANY A ATTACK

Company A had less trouble taking Castel d’Aiano. Partisans had made arrangements to

guide them through the minefields and safely into town. S/Sgt. ABRAHAM J. SANTONI, a rifle

squad leader, conducted valuable negotiations with them. He was mortally wounded when

struck by a mine after concluding these conferences and while returning with the company

commander.

The 2nd Platoon took the first row of houses on the south side. The chief resistance was in a

cement factory where about half a platoon of Germans were defending themselves with automatic

weapons. When one of them was killed, the rest finally surrendered. After they surrendered,

some of them were hit by their own artillery, which started thundering down in the town

at about this time.

The 1st Platoon took the east edge of town and Famaticcia. While the platoons were working

through town, a heavy artillery barrage south of town cut them off from the command group and

the rear. Captain HUGH D. KLEMME, in his command jeep, circled around and drove into town

from the east, reestablishing control.

The tanks were ordered back into town to fire back against enemy mountain positions to the

right. But heavy shellfire fell on all rifle companies of the battalion all that night and the following

day. Company A was moved forward to fill the gap between Company C’s position on Hill

813 and Company B’s position at Castel d’Aiano. The 3rd Platoon was shifted over as far as Objective

“Love” where they linked up with the 2nd Battalion.

In the 1st Battalion, casualties were light during the attack. Company A had two deaths and

two wounded; B, one killed and three wounded; C, three killed and two wounded; D, one

wounded; and Headquarters Company, one killed and one wounded. However, the battalion

continued to suffer some casualties in their foremost position in the northward salient. They

were under continuous observation and frequent artillery barrages.

During the day of 5 March, one 37-mm gun was brought up to Casone and used to support

the attack of the 1st Battalion on Hill 813 beyond Castel d’Aiano. This gun, and some heavy machine

guns, were fired in the afternoon on German troops retreating down the rear slopes of Mt.

della Spe. Tragically, First Lieutenant ROBERT B. PFUSCH, of Company E, was mortally

wounded on the final day while returning from a reconnaissance across the road east of Casone.

He was hit by artillery, evacuated, but succumbed the following day.

This ended the action for the 2nd Battalion. Their losses were light in number compared to

the ground they covered. Company E had lost four killed and sixteen wounded; Company F

38

three killed and ten wounded; Company G three killed and three wounded, while Headquarters

Company lost two killed and four wounded.

During the four-day battle, from March 3rd to 6th, the 87th lost in total battle casualties 186

men, 43 of whom died. It cleared the enemy from a mountainous area over 6,000 yards wide. Six

hundred German soldiers and officers were captured and driven through to the PW cage during

the three-day period. An unknown number of enemy dead, and quantities of enemy armament

and equipment were removed from the occupied mountains.

PRISONERS

From the PWs some interesting facts were learned. During the night before the attack, 2-3

March, elements of the 114th Jaeger Division were relieving the 232nd Division. The 721st Regiment

of the 114th Jaeger Division was supposed to assume control of the area on the morning of

the 3rd, but the 87th Mountain Infantry beat them to it. The German relief was never finished.

The 3rd Battalion of the 371st was captured pretty well intact. Into our hands came the battalion

commander, a major, six staff officers and the battalion ambulance, complete with driver, aid

man, and two wounded Krauts.

The prisoners of the second day were less surprised than those of the first, but a lot more disgruntled.

They came largely from the unit relieved the night before. They had been halted as

they marched to the rear, turned around and thrown back into line to try to save the situation for

the Germans. One prisoner, who believed that German PWs were used as forced labor, complained,

“I don’t mind being taken prisoner, but I surely hate losing out on my rest.”

The units facing us at the end of the period were a mauled lot, and reserves had to be drawn

on to stiffen and fill our their lines, in particular the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division. One deserter

on March 7th was from this unit, and he had been bitterly disappointed that the attack had

stopped where it did. He was hidden in a house waiting for the attack to pass him by so that he

could surrender. Since the Americans didn’t show up, he came over to them.

The morale seemed to have deteriorated since the previous attack. This is partly due to the

pounding they had just taken on this front, and partly due to the news from other fronts. They

were well oriented on the situation at home, and they knew the war was lost. The crossing of the

Rhine and the fall of Cologne had been a severe blow. One deserter taken was a fiddler from a

division band which had been disbanded to furnish more front-line soldiers.

While the average German was still more definitely a potential deserter, the measures to prevent

desertion had increased and become more brutal, working mercilessly not only against the

family of the deserter, but also against his commanders and associates. Any German sergeant

could shoot with authority a suspected deserter.

A sergeant from the elite Mittenwald Battalion, made up of Austrians and Bavarians, said

that every man in his company was anxious to desert and would when the chance came. He

claimed that when an absence was discovered, the unit would be pulled out of the line or else the

whole company would soon be over to desert. Actually, the battalion was pulled out within the

next few days.

It was apparent from a study of PW information that rather than the looked-for counterattacks,

the enemy had been knocked reeling back off his feet, and his activity was frantic preparation

for our expected continued advance. In any event, no counterattacks developed, not even

such small-scale ones as the Germans launched against us at Belvedere.

39

ARTILLERY FIRE

Heavy artillery fire fell on the front line battalions during the following days. At first every

day there were casualties. Of those that were fatal, Company A lost Pfc. JAMES CAUDILL and

Pfc. LUTHER P. LEWIS on 6 March. Company C lost S/Sgt. LOUIS O. BROWN; Company D,

Pfc. WALTER O. FLOWE; and Company E, Pfc. FEDER H. BENJAMIN on the 7th of March.

Company H, Second Lieutenant FRANK P. BAKER on the 8th; and Company A, Pfc. JOHN C.

MURPHY on the 9th. The casualties tapered off when the fire slackened more and more as the

month wore on. In Company F, Pfc. HARRY Y. SCHAEDLER was killed on the 12th; in Company

L, Cpl. ALAN H. RINFRET on the 25th; and Company I, Pfc. JAMES F. NEVERGALL on

the 26th of March.

The artillery fire was greatly reduced by a counter-battery system set up by Major HALVOR

O. EKERN, regimental S-3, and operated under Captain ARTHUR BRODEUR. The gun positions

were sighted from various OPs and triangulated in the regimental CP. This accurate information

was quickly transmitted to our artillery for immediate counter-battery fire. Enemy artillery and

mortar fire noticeably diminished after this system began to function.

The regimental CP, established on the eastern slope of Mt. della Vedetta at Varia di Sotto at

1300 on 4 March, was maintained throughout the rest of the month, with the exception of a brief

period north of Mt. Acidola. The battalion positions shifted constantly. The regimental OP established

on top of the ridge above the CP was shelled out by friendly artillery, fired from just below.

It appeared as though our supporting artillery couldn’t get their shells over the hill. After

several had crashed into the rocks on either side of the OP, a maddened enlisted man rushed

down the hill and “bawled out” the gun crew. They listened, and then fired another round into

the hill. Then First Lieutenant DAVID S. ARNOLD raced down the hill to the battery position.

The gun crew was apathetic; the officer to see was at breakfast. After the difficulty was explained

and supposedly ironed out, another shot was fired. It, too, crashed into the hill. After a few

more tries, most of the regimental Headquarters Company had gathered around registering disapproval

of the performance. Then, without warning, a shell cleared the hill. The men cheered

wildly; the booing ceased. However, the I & R Platoon abandoned their OP, grateful that there

had been no casualties.

COMMENDATIONS

The achievement of the whole Division during both the February and March actions was recognized

by the following commendations:

a. From Field Marshal ALEXANDER, Supreme Commander, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations,

to Major General HAYS:

8 MARCH 1945

MY HEARTIEST CONGRATULATIONS TO YOU PERSONALLY AND YOUR DIVISION

FOR A VERY WELL PLANNED AND WELL EXECUTED OPERATION. WELL DONE. I

AM DELIGHTED AT YOUR SUCCESS.

FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER

b. From Lieutenant General MCNARNEY, Commanding MTOUSA:

8 MARCH 1945

MAY I OFFER MY SINCERE CONGRATULATIONS TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE

10TH MOUNTAIN DIVISION. YOU HAVE SHOWN BY THE SUCCESS OF YOUR FIRST

BATTLE TEST OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY WHICH WILL BE A CONSTANT SOURCE OF

REAL CONCERN TO OUR ENEMIES. GOOD LUCK AND GOOD HUNTING.

MCNARNEY

40

c. From Lieutenant General MARK W. CLARK, Commanding 15th Army Group:

7 MARCH 1945

MY CONGRATULATINS TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE 10TH MOUNTAIN

DIVISION ON THE SUCCESS OF THEIR FIRST MAJOR OPERATION, THE CAPTURE OF

MT. BELVEDERE.

YOUR DIVISION, IN ITS INITIAL BATTLES, HAS ACQUITTED ITSELF WITH THE

COURAGE AND DARING OF A VETERAN COMBAT UNIT. THIS SPEAKS MORE

ELOQUENTLY THAN WORDS OF THE EFFICIENCY OF YOUR PRE-BATTLE TRAINING

AND THE SPIRIT OF OFFICERS AND MEN.

THE 10TH MOUNTAIN DIVISION HAS PROVED ITSELF TO HAVE THE FIGHTING

QUALITIES REQUIRED FOR SUCCESSFUL INFANTRY COMBAT. I AM VERY HAPPY TO

HAVE THIS DIVISION FIGHTING SHOULDER TO SHOULDER WITH THE OTHER FINE

TROOPS IN 15TH ARMY GROUP.

MARK W. CLARK

d. From Lieutenant General L. K. TRUSCOTT, JR., Commanding General Fifth Army:

8 MARCH 1945

UPON THE CONCLUSION OF THE FIRST FULL SCALE OFFENSIVE OPERATION

AGAINST THE ENEMY CARRIED OUT BY THE 10TH DIVISION, I DESIRE TO EXTEND

TO EVERY OFFICER AND MAN IN THE 10TH MOUNTAIN DIVISION MY SINCERE

CONGRATULATIONS ON THE MAGNIFICENT MANNER IN WHICH YOU HAVE

ACCOMPLISHED A VERY DIFFICULT ASSIGNMENT. OVER DIFFICULT TERRAIN

AGAINST STRONG OPPOSITION, YOU HAVE SEIZED EVERY OBJECTIVE IN RECORD

TIME. YOU HAVE INFLICTED SEVERE LOSSES UPON AT LEAST TWO GERMAN

DIVISIONS AND HAVE COMPELLED THE ENEMY TO EMPLOY RESERVE DIVISIONS IN

YOUR AREA.

I AM DELIGHTED WITH THE SPLENDID PERFORMANCE OF THE 10TH MOUNTAIN

DIVISION. YOUR SUCCESS CLEARLY INDICATES CAREFUL AND METICULOUS

PLANNING AND EXECUTION. I ESPECIALLY COMMEND THE COMMANDERS AND

STAFF OFFICERS WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE.

THE 10TH MOUNTAIN DIVISION IN ITS FIRST OPERATION HAS BEEN AN INSPIRATION

TO THE ENTIRE FIFTH ARMY. YOU HAVE SET A HIGH STANDARD AND

HAVE DEMONSTRATED THE HIGHEST QUALIFICATIONS IN LEADERSHIP AND

COMBAT. YOUR OUTSTANDING SUCCESS IN YOUR FIRST OPERATION AUGURS

WELL FOR A BRILLIANT FUTURE. I AM PROUD INDEED TO HAVE THIS DIVISION

FIGHTING SHOULDER TO SHOULDER WITH THE VETERAN DIVISIONS OF THE FIFTH

ARMY.

L. K. TRUSCOTT, JR.

e. From Major General WILLIS D. CRITTENBERGER, Commanding General, IV Corps:

IN THE OPERATION OF 3 MARCH TO 7 MARCH 1945, INCLUSIVE, THE 10TH

MOUNTAIN DIVISION HAS AGAIN DEMONSTRATED ON THE BATTLEFIELD ITS

RIGHT TO BE CLASSIFIED AS A SPLENDID COMBAT UNIT, NOT ONLY CAPABLE OF

UNDERTAKING A SUSTAINED ADVANCE AGAINST A WELL INTRENCHED AND WILY

ENEMY DEPLOYED ON RUGGED TERRAIN, BUT EAGER TO DO SO. THE ENEMY

ESTIMATE OF “ELITE MOUNTAIN TROOPS,” APPLIED BY HIM TO YOUR DIVISION

AFTER SHORT BUT BITTER EXPERIENCE, IS A DESERVED COMPLIMENT.

THE SPIRITED ATTACK OF YOUR ELEMENTS, AND THE SMART, ALERT FIGHTING

WHICH ALL RANKS DISPLAYED WERE DOMINANT FACTORS IN YOUR SUCCESSFUL

41

PENETRATION OF THE ENEMY’S MAIN LINE OF DEFENSE. HE WAS OVERWHELMED

BY THE RELENTLESS PRESSURE OF YOUR ADVANCE. THE ADROIT SCHEME OF

MANEUVER USED BY YOUR BATTALIONS RESULTED IN A LARGE BAG OF PRISONERS

OF WAR AND MATERIEL THAT CANNOT BUT HASTEN HIS FINAL DEFEAT. THE FINE

PHYSICAL CONDITION OF YOUR TROOPS ALSO CONTRIBUTED IN LARGE MEASURE

TO THE FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF THE ATTACK.

AS YOUR VARIOUS UNITS NOW ARE DISPOSED IN FIRM AND CONFIDENT CONTROL

OF ALL OBJECTIVES, IT IS A GREAT PLEASURE FOR ME HEREBY TO COMMEND YOU

AND YOUR OFFICERS AND MEN, NOT ONLY FOR A PRECISE AND MASTERLY

EXECUTION OF YOUR MISSION, BUT AS WELL FOR THE DASH AND VIGOR THAT

NEVER FOR A MOMENT LEFT THE ISSUE IN DOUBT.

WILLIS D. CRITTENBERGER

ACTIVITIES DURING THE REMAINDER OF MARCH

After consolidating the newly won positions, and “sweating out” counterattacks that never

came, the battalions were shifted around frequently. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions relieved the 3rd

Battalions of the 86th and 85th on the west flank of the Division early on 9 March. Later on the

same day, the 1st Battalion 87th was relieved by the 86th in the north sector, and they moved to

the left to establish positions around Sassomolare. The following day, the 2nd took these over,

and the 1st withdrew to an assembly area at Pietra Colora. The 3rd Battalion was also relieved.

Elements of the BEF took over their positions, and they retired to Malandrone.

On the 12th, the 3rd Battalion left for a rest area at Campo Tizzoro, and the 1st Battalion went

to the Fifth Army Rest Area at Montecatini, leaving only the 2nd Battalion at the front.

Montecatini, a former mountain resort, was an amazing surprise to the men of the regiment,

with night clubs, shows, wine, women, and song; hot water, even rest for those who wished it. It

was an unexpected relief to the men from the constant shellfire and the confining existence in a

foxhole.

On the 15th, the 1st and 3rd returned to division reserve at Pietra Colora and Malandrone.

The following day, the 3rd took over from the 2nd who went into reserve with the 1st to prepare

for a stretch at Montecatini, leaving on the 19th. During this period, life behind the lines sometimes

became more important than what was going on “out there.” Talk shifted to Florence and

Rome and Montecatini as leaves and passes were issued. The weather grew more and more

pleasant, and the Italian countryside blossomed forth in spring loveliness. Flowers grew between

the shell holes, and fruit trees covered their shrapnel-torn branches with fragrant blossoms. Still,

shells fell and litter teams sometimes carried friends away across the new grass. The enemy was

no different, even though his homeland was burning away behind him. It was still a grim business

for the men on the line, but the interludes refreshed the spirit.

SUCCESSFUL PATROL

A patrol from Company I went out the night of 19 March to capture German prisoners in

front of their sector. It was one of the most successful patrols ever sent out in the Italian Theater.

They brought back one-half of an entire company (23 men) without suffering a casualty, or having

either side fire a shot. First Lieutenant ALEXANDER JONES and Sgt. ALEXANDER

BEAUCHESNE led the carefully organized patrol. They, with 28 men, were able to send a reinforced

squad around to the right rear of a German-occupied town. They crept with the rest of the

patrol to within 75 yards of the town without being detected. Then, as a prearranged artillery

box-barrage sealed the town off, the reinforced squad supported the balance of the patrol as they

Mar 19

Mar 12

42

moved through town and cleaned the sleepy Germans out of the houses. Fifteen minutes after

the barrage started, the entire patrol was back at the rendezvous with the 23 Germans. The patrol

returned uneventfully to the lines.

At the PW cage it came out that the German company commander had left the town just before

the attack. One of the PWs, a former actor, did a humorous “take-off” of the German officer’s

return to find that all of his men had disappeared. All prisoners agreed that he would die

for having lost half his company, regardless of the circumstances.

The 2nd Battalion returned to the Pietra Colora area on 23 March, and that night the 1st Battalion

relieved the 10th Anti-tank Battalion and the 10th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop on the

right flank of the Division without incident at 2040.

On the evening of 27 March, after a 24-hour postponement, the 1st Battalion, 365th Infantry,

of the 92nd Division, relieved the 3rd Battalion and came under regimental control in that sector.

The 3rd Battalion moved to Campo Tizzoro where a training area had been set up. The next day,

in the rain, the 1st Battalion was relieved and moved back to Pietra Colora leaving none of the

87th battalions on the line for the first time since the 2nd of February. However, the 365th operated

under the 87th, so the regimental CP was active.

RETURN OF THE COMMANDER

The 3rd Battalion held a parade on the smoothest and flattest field that could be found at

Campo Tizzoro. Decorations were presented to officers and enlisted men of the battalion by

Brigadier General ROBINSON E. DUFF, the assistant division commander.

The officers and men of the regiment were genuinely delighted to see the regimental commander,

Colonel DAVID M. FOWLER, return to duty. Colonel FOWLER made his first appearance

at the 3rd Battalion parade. The sun had just broken through the overcast, and the field was

damp and very green from the spring rain, and the 92nd Division Band had drawn crowds of

Italians to the ceremony. As Colonel FOWLER moved across the field with a slight limp, a murmur

of admiration passed through the troops. There was no man there who had been less concerned

with his own safety or more concerned for the safety of the men of the 87th, and the men

of his command recognized it. He had been away from the regiment five weeks.

The month ended with the native people preparing for Easter, and the soldiers watching with

hope in their hearts the tremendous progress of the Allied armies in western Germany.

Mar 27

43

SPRING OFFENSIVE

(1 APRIL — 20 APRIL)

PREPARATION FOR BATTLE

he 87th Mountain Infantry spent the first two weeks of April 1945 planning and preparing for

their part in the final spring offensive of the Fifth Army in Italy. The days were warm and

mild. The fruit trees of the Apennines, many of them torn and shredded by artillery fire during

the winter stalemate, were in bloom on the mountainsides. The narrow mountain roads, built for

oxcart and foot travel, had been pulverized into dust by the 2 1/2 -ton trucks and jeeps coming to

the front with supplies. Tanks, tank destroyers, armored artillery, artillery fieldpieces, and heavy

equipment of all types stretched to the rear as far as the eye could see. For the soldier resting in

the spring sunshine, gathering his gear and cleaning his rifle, it was a reassuring sight, as reassuring

as the war news from Europe’s other battlefields. It all made the end of the war seem more

than a remote possibility.

During the days of preparation there was the never-ending rattle of eleventh hour “zeroing

in” of small arms. Men attended flame-thrower schools, or were transported to other areas to

watch demonstrations of new weapons. Selected personnel were given practical work in actual

minefields. And through all the apparent “peace and quiet” of the lines, maps of unconquered

portions of Italy were distributed to the units—even road maps of the Po Valley and beyond.

There was more in the air than spring.

The general plan of the 10th Mountain Division’s role in breaking through the northern Apennines

was made known to higher commanders about 1 April. The mountain division was to

spearhead the main Spring Offensive. The enemy was to be driven out of the mountains, and the

wide valley of the Po was to be taken away from him. It was hoped that denying him the tremendous

productive and fertile valley of the Po would smash his elaborate plans for a defense in

the “Redoubt” area of the high Alps. The valley, with its immensely productive fields of wheat,

rice, corn, and grain of all kinds, could feed an army in Italy, as well as provide food for the hinterland.

The industrial cities in the north produced great quantities of war materiel. The Fifth

Army would test the vulnerability of this garden fortress. As the days went by, the big mission

was broken down into finer detail for the smaller units.

The month opened with one battalion of the 92nd Division under 87th control on the left

flank. The 1st Battalion of the 87th went to Campo Tizzoro for training on the 1st of April. The

3rd Battalion was in division reserve at Pietra Colora. Only the 2nd Battalion was on the line, and

it was under control of the 86th in the sector near Castel d’Aiano. Misfortune dogged the 1st Battalion

at Campo Tizzoro. While firing on a range on 3 April, a high-tension wire was shot down

and fell across the telephone line to the pits. Two men holding phones, Pfc. WILLIAM D. HUFF

and PRENTIS F. DAVIDSON, were electrocuted. The next day, two men were wounded by

faulty mortar ammunition.

During the two-week period before the jump-off, battalions rotated between the training

area, a reserve area, and front-line positions near Castel d’Aiano. On the 4th, the 3rd Battalion

relieved the 2nd Battalion here and the 2nd moved to Campo Tizzoro after a brief stay at Pietra

Colora. Active patrolling was continuous from the front-line companies, and both the Germans

and Americans attempted to evacuate civilians from the proposed battle areas.

Several German agents in civilian clothes were caught in the sector, and they reported widescale

use of specially trained spies. Our own OSS, too, was sending agents regularly into the

German lines. Meanwhile, the flood of evacuees coming into our lines greatly complicated the

T

Apr 1

44

problem of detecting secret operators. The Germans posted evacuation orders which, translated,

read as follows:

“Your district may become a battle area within the next weeks. In order to save your life and

your property, it is in your interest to evacuate this district up to the line Semalano di Sopramonte,

Righetti, Montetorte, and find safety north of this line. If the evacuation officer agrees

with the area selected by the evacuee, he will vouch for a safe evacuation of livestock and property

as far as the individual can supply the transportation. The area has to be evacuated by the

5th of April at 1900. Whoever shall be found in this area after that date shall be shot as a spy

without challenge. Signed: the Commandant of the German Troop at Rivoca.”

Hundreds of the evacuees, however, sought safety in the south, behind the American lines,

instead of in the north. On the 2nd, the 2nd Battalion area near Castel d’Aiano was overrun with

milling herds of cattle, pigs, goats, chickens, horses, and donkeys; and with hundreds of Italians

with their pitiful collections loaded on all manner of wagons and carts, or being carried on their

backs. For the next few days, truckload after truckload of livestock and civilians were shipped to

the rear to be handled by AMG.

On 4 April, the 10th Division Field Order No. 4 was delivered to Regiment. The field order

drew the picture into sharp focus. Leaves and passes to Rome and Florence were forgotten.

Maps showing the progress of the First and Third Armies across Germany became less important

than the 1:25,000 map of the terrain north of Mt. della Spe. After diversionary thrusts by the reconstituted

92nd Division over on the west coast, and by the Eighth Army on the east coast, the

10th Mountain Division was to jump off at 0700 on the Mediterranean Theater D-Day. The

springboard of the attack was the salient wedge gained in the March offensive, the northernmost

tip of which was Mt. della Spe. The gains of the limited offensive of March had a place in the

“big picture.”

From Mt. della Spe, the 85th and 87th were to jump off simultaneously. The 85th on the left

was to drive to the north and seize the commanding mountains directly ahead of them, and thus

secure the left flank of the Division. In the center, the 87th was to make the main drive, hitting

north of the town of Torre Iussi, and then turning sharply to the right, seizing a long series of

steep, rugged hills that stretched for five miles to the east and northeast. This terrain belt of hills

had been selected by the German for his main line of resistance.

On the right, the 86th Mountain Infantry was to follow along inside of the arc formed by the

87th’s turn to the east and mop up the German areas forward of his main line of resistance. Once

the 87th had shoved back this line to the east, with the 85th holding on the west, the 86th was to

drive into the breakthrough. The 86th action was to be like a football halfback swinging to the

right and then cutting back through the big hole opened by the tackle and held open by the

guard; then racing down field through the secondary. The 87th would be the charging tackle; the

85th would be the checking guard. The 1st Armored Division was to attack on the right (east) of

the 10th Division, moving north along Highway 64.

The difficulties of cracking the initial line cannot be over-emphasized. The first and most obvious

difficulty was the terrain. The hills were steeper than any the regiment had fought on.

Their sides were lightly wooded with chestnut trees, although in many places were bare, rocky

cliffs, outcroppings, and boulders. In places, on the gentler slopes and tops, fields were cleared

and small clusters of farm buildings were built in against the mountainsides. Between the mountains

were deep, wooded draws with precipitous sides, difficult to cross. The valleys, although

cultivated, were gouged out in a deep network of draws with small fields between them. The

location and formation of the band of hills was jumbled and without apparent geographical pattern,

so that individual hills and locations were difficult to identify.

Apr 4

45

In addition to the natural terrain obstacle, the other difficulty was loss of surprise. The German,

this time, knew what was facing him across the line. At Belvedere, the 86th had amazed

him by scaling the cliffs; the 87th and 85th confounded him by attacking in the dark. On della

Vedetta in March, the German was still taken aback by the speed and direction of the attack. But

what surprise could there be in April? The jump-off salient pointed at his center like an arrow.

He knew that the only unit that had been able to punch a hole in his lines all winter was

crammed into this foremost salient of their own making. He knew they were mountain troops.

He also, rightly or wrongly, believed them to be “hand-picked,” “elite corps,” made up of, to use

his own words, “physically superior soldiers, sports personalities, and young men from wealthy

or politically significant American families.” (From captured enemy documents describing the

10th Mountain Division.)

Therefore the usual advantage of the mountain attack, surprising an enemy when he depended

too heavily on natural obstacles, could not be realized. The enemy expected to be attacked

exactly where the attack came. Knowing that rugged terrain had not yet slowed down the

mountain troops, he built up a complete defense with elaborate fire plans covering each key high

point and draw. He prepared concentrations on the ridges that he occupied, so that if forced to

retreat, he could ring immediate fire on the attacking troops when they reached his old positions.

He manned his well-prepared positions with the crack 334th Infantry Division. On D-Day he had

moved all three of the regiments of this division onto the immediate sector in front of the 10th

Division, so that the whole German 334th Division was on the line, and the 94th Division was in

reserve. The only surprise felt by the Germans was that our attack was begun in such excellent

visibility so late in the morning. It is no wonder that both the 85th and 87th were momentarily

stopped in their tracks before some elements had crossed the line of departure.

As the plans for the great spring drive developed, the men thought of their friends who had

fallen in February and March. The military cemetery in which they lay had been completed near

Florence. On 5 April, nearly a hundred officers and enlisted men of the regiment attended a memorial

service for the dead of the 10th Division.

On 6 April the 1st Battalion had moved from Campo Tizzoro to a forward position at Tora,

east of Castel d’Aiano. The next day, the 1st and 3rd Battalions, which had been under 86th control,

were returned to 87th regimental control. Then, early on the 9th, the 3rd Battalion was relieved

by the 85th and went back to Passatore (621229) to remain in reserve. The same night, the

battalion from the 92nd Division was relieved on our left by the BEF and their sector passed from

our control.

As the days passed in increasing tenseness, the road became dustier, was oiled to cut down

the telltale dust, and then the oil was ground into dust again. Enemy agents were caught; a

Company D man was wounded by a sentry on the 7th when he didn’t answer the challenge. The

“get-away man” of a 1st Battalion patrol was lost on the 8th, but he returned safely in the morning.

Some deserters came in. The enemy was observed occasionally and fired on with artillery.

Civilians escaping to our lines supplied information on gun emplacements and minefields. Mineblowing

demonstrations were held. Attached British artillery fired several effective missions.

The 87th regimental field order was being worked on day and night. Aerial photos, terrain

sketches, and intelligence reports were studied.

On the 9th, the 2nd Battalion left Campo Tizzoro for Cargnole, their assembly area, between

the 1st Battalion at Tora and the 3rd Battalion at Passatore.

The 87th regimental field order was presented to assembled officers in a small garden plot

above Varia di Sotto on 9 April. S/Sgt. PHILIP A. ANDERSON, of the S-3 section, had reproduced,

in the freshly plowed earth of the garden, the terrain over which the opening phase of the

Apr 9

Apr 6

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battle would be fought. Present were General DUFF, the assistant division commander, Colonel

FOWLER, regimental commander, and the battalion commanders.

The 1st Battalion was designated to lead the column of battalions, followed by the 2nd and

3rd Battalions. Company A, 701st TD Battalion, was to be attached to the 1st Battalion, and

Company A, 751st Tank Battalion, to the 2nd Battalion. The 2nd Battalion was to jump off after

the 1st Battalion had taken the initial objective, Hill 903, and push on to the northeast on the left

of the 1st Battalion. During the first phase, the 3rd Battalion would support the 1st with its heavy

weapons, and then move forward in reserve as the 1st and 2nd Battalions occupied the band of

hills, and rolled up the German main line of resistance from west to east. The 3rd was also to be

ready to assist the other battalions from a forward assembly area on Hill 903. In the second

phase, the 86th would drive through these hills to the north and northeast. The 3rd Battalion was

to follow the 86th through the “hole” and seize and mop up key terrain on their left. In this

phase, tank destroyers would be attached to the 3rd Battalion.

The field order also assigned the two platoons of Company C, 84th Chemical Battalion, in direct

support of the leading battalions. The 616th Field Artillery and 1125th Field Artillery (Armored)

Battalion had similar missions. Also in support was the Air Corps, with elements under

the control of a jeep radio team called “Rover Pete.” Company C of the 126th Engineers would

support with the principal mission of opening roads for the tanks. The order was clear and direct,

and well understood by all parties. D-Day was announced as 12 April; H-Hour was to be

0700.

On following days, flights were arranged for key officers; an engineer mine school on methods

of launching the “primacord snake” was held. The troops were cautioned against looting

prisoners for watches, money, etc.

On 10 April, administrative details were arranged with supporting units. The liaison men,

Rover Pete, reported from the Air Corps.

On 11 April, the regiment moved the CP forward to a farm building at Tora. Division sent

out a frantic inquiry about a stray mortar round that landed near the Division CP. It was arranged

with Captain LEE E. NEVILLE of the 751st Tank Battalion and Captain PATCH of the

701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, that in the first phase of the attack, one platoon of Company A,

751st, would support the 2nd Battalion. Later, the rest of the company would support the 3rd

Battalion. Company A, 701st TD Battalion, after supporting the 1st Battalion initially, was to

leave one platoon in reserve and support the 3rd Battalion. The terrain was nearly impassable for

tanks, so their employment was planned mainly for the later phase when the 3rd Battalion would

be heading north along the highway from Tolè. At 1828 word came that the attack was postponed

24 hours.

On 12 April, more details were arranged. The airplane identification panel code was sent out

to prevent strafing of friendly troops. To complicate matters, Lieutenant Colonel EMMETT L.

NATIONS, commander of the 2nd Battalion, was suffering with a bad fever, and was in danger

of being evacuated. On the 12th at 1745, a message came from Division announcing that the attack

would begin the next morning. But at 1807, another message announced that the attack was

to be postponed another 24 hours to the 14th. Shortly thereafter, Colonel NATIONS was taken to

the hospital. Major PAUL TOWNSEND assumed command of the 2nd Battalion.

Meanwhile, for the troops, the waiting had been a nerve-racking strain. The 12th had been

overcast. It wasn’t a bad day, but effective air support required perfect weather, and the forecaster’s

report on the afternoon of the 11th had not been satisfactory. The men experienced various

reactions to the delay, some impatient, some grateful for a reprieve. There was little to do

Apr 12

47

since all was in readiness, weapons clean, gear in order. The army term “sweating it out” must

have been born for some such anxious period. Those in observation posts watched the shellfire

fall on both sides. Several haystacks were fired by tracer and white phosphorus fire. Haystacks

seem to have been not only favorite German positions but also very rewarding targets.

The waiting men looked hard at each other these days as though to remember well each face.

These men knew from experience how quickly the faces of the dead dim in memory, how blurred

the image soon becomes, even though the loved name is repeated over and over. They studied

each other gravely. Some optimists still snatched at every radio news report. The attack in Germany

was moving rapidly; the Americans were reported but 76 miles from Berlin. More than a

few hoped there would be no drive in Italy. Perhaps it would end in time. It was so hopeless for

the enemy to fight on. Unfortunately, hopeless Germans made desperate fighters. The enemy

was determined to hold Italy’s Po Valley, for while it was his, there was a refuge for him in the

“Redoubt.”

Tora was a half-dozen stone farm buildings huddled together on the steep side of a narrow

valley running north and south. The command posts of the regiment and the 1st Battalion were

there. To the south waited the 2nd and 3rd Battalions. Forward a quarter of a mile at the head of

the valley on an east-west ridge was the front. From OPs on this ridge the German line could be

studied: Torre Iussi, the little town in a grove of pine trees; to the right, Hill 903, its lower slope

scarred where the road skirting it cut into rock and dirt banks of its steep sides; Hill 868; Mt.

Pigna; Rocca di Roffeno. All looked peaceful and uninhabited. Only puffs of smoke from our

leisurely artillery landing across the valley broke the incongruously peaceful-appearing country.

The regimental OP, a stone barn atop Montesinistro, though it stuck up before the German line

like a billboard, oddly enough drew no fire. Perhaps its very obviousness was its protection. At

any rate, Sgt. BENNETT BOGGESS and T/5 JOHN HAWKINSON of the I & R Platoon, twice

shelled from OPs in the March campaign, named this one “Aiming Stake OP,” with its white

walls and red roofs perched dead center on a hilltop opposite the German OPs.

Directly west, across the narrow valley, and over a sharp ridge, was the CP of the 85th, less

than a half mile away. Between the valley sides, barely hidden by the ridge at Montesinistro was

jammed the indescribably varied equipment and paraphernalia of attack: hundreds of vehicles—

track and wheel; field guns, self-propelled guns, tank guns; stacks of ammunition; crates on

crates of rations; small mountains of gas cans. The valley was covered with tentage and dumps,

and over the maze of ruts cut in the new grass, the jeeps, 6-by-6s, and heavy engineer trucks

crawled back and forth. It was a sobering sight to survey the waiting valley in broad daylight

and realize that just over the saddle ahead were the means and the will to obliterate all of this

ant-like activity in the entire valley. At night too it was alarming, and “Bedcheck Charlie,” the

German plane that came over regularly at about 2230, must have spotted some of the many

chinks of light shining from tent cracks when men entered and left CPs. However, only occasional

shells came in. No real damage was done.

All of the advance planning cannot be related in detail, but the following report is typical:

“Three days while awaiting the attack, the A & P Platoon of the 3rd Battalion kept busy bringing

ammo to the line under cover of darkness and in getting all gear ready for D-Day. During one of

these trips Lieutenant NOEL C. CLAD, platoon leader, was severely bruised when his jeep rolled

over on a narrow, treacherous road in pitch darkness. Approximately 500,000 rounds of caliber

.30 and .50 MG and 2,400 rounds of 81-mm were hauled to positions overlooking Torre Iussi, Hill

903, and Rocca di Roffeno. The battalion was issued its full basic load, and an additional basic

load was placed on a 1 1/2 - ton, a 3/4 -ton, and eight jeeps and trailers. The pioneer tools and demolitions

were separated into different-sized kits and placed on four jeeps and trailers. During the

day preceding the attack the platoon developed a mine-breaching apparatus that was very effec48

tive. It consisted of 13 strands of primacord attached to three 2.36” rockets, which were wired

together with their ignition wire spliced in series. One end of the primacord was staked down

and then, from a distance of twenty feet, the rockets were fired by a small battery. The rockets

carried the primacord out across the mined area, and then a cap placed in the near end detonated

the primacord. It proved able to clear positively a path one and one-half feet wide, and to uncover

mines for four feet in width. Twenty mules were obtained as an additional means of transport

for ammo and equipment for the platoon.”

At 0200 on 13 April, as the 87th men slept, waiting for the jump-off that would end the five

and a half year war in Europe, the sad news that shocked the world reached the area by radio.

Some soldiers were waked up, others learned in the morning that their Commander-in-Chief,

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt had died.

Friday the 13th was fair. There was some slight haze; clouds passed the sun from time to

time, but it was a beautiful, clear day. The reason for the second postponement of the night before

could possibly have been an uncertain weather prediction, but there was another factor.

Some men still hoped that the “high command” was waiting for developments in Germany.

There was an unconfirmed, and untrue, radio report that the Allies were in Berlin that day. Some

men were sure that the great offensive had been shifted from Friday the 13th in deference to the

age-old superstition that still lingered in the middle of the “enlightened” 20th century.

On the afternoon of the 13th, the hour of attack was set back an hour and a half to 0830 of the

14th. A warning came from Division that no one was to break defilade until positive word was

given that the attack was on. The 14th dawned fair and clear. At 0653, another 45-minute delay

was called, setting the time for jump-off at 0915. Finally, one last change set H-Hour at 0945. The

air preparation was to be from 0830 to 0910, and the artillery and other ground weapons were to

fire preparation from 0910 to 0935. The attack was set. “This was it!” After all these delays, the

roar of bombs, artillery, and supporting heavy machine guns was convincing proof that the big

drive was on.

FIRST DAY—14 APRIL

The Air Corps preparation consisted of four Thunderbolt fighter-bombers at a time, on the

front of the Division. For forty minutes they peeled off and dove over the German positions, setting

several fires with firebombs, and doing considerable damage to buildings along the mountain

line with demolition bombs. They also characteristically dropped a bomb on the CP of the

2nd Battalion at about 0830, and another in the 85th regimental area that set their ammo dump on

fire.

The ground support was more effective. Starting promptly at 0910, all the artillery units,

from Corps down, fired for 25 minutes. The ground shook, and great billows of dust and smoke

clouded over the line of mountains to the north. Both air corps and artillery officers claimed that

nothing could live through the preparation. It was a tremendous spectacle, but ten minutes later,

as Company B, the leading rifle company, crossed the line of departure, the enemy had crawled

out of his deep holes and was waiting in the settling dust, very much alive.

The small arms support was under the control of Company D. The mortar platoon under

First Lieutenant THOMAS H. COLLINS was emplaced well behind the line of departure. With

this platoon were the attached mortars and machine guns of the 3rd Battalion, nine .50-calibers

from the 616th Field Artillery Battalion, fifteen additional water-cooled .30-calibers, and twenty

Apr 13

Apr 14

49

additional .50-calibers. The 37-mm guns from the 3rd Battalion gun platoon were also used in

support. Altogether, more than sixty machine guns were fired under the direction of Company D

that morning. The 3rd Battalion guns alone fired 500,000 rounds. One gun fired so continuously

that three barrels were burned out. Second Lieutenant DONALD W. HOFFMAN of Company H,

attached to Company M during the initial supporting fire, was wounded by shellfire.

COMPANY B—HILL 860

The morning of 14 April, Company B left its rear assembly area at 0500 and marched to the

forward assembly area on the reverse slope of Montesinistro, arriving there at 0600. After the

two days of postponement, the men were still not certain that today would be the beginning of

the offensive, until Thunderbolts came in, bombed and strafed the valley and ridges to the front.

There was then no doubt that this was the day. The company commander, Captain CLARENCE

H. SWEDBERG, called the platoon leaders and NCOs together once more and gave them the battle

plan. Very little resistance was expected the first day, with the devastating preparation of air

and artillery promised.

The company left the assembly area at 0910 hours, with two platoons forward, 1st on the

right, 2nd on the left, and 3rd in reserve. One machine gun platoon of Company D, under First

Lieutenant WILLIAM S. SPINNEY, was attached, and one light machine gun squad was attached

to each of the leading platoons. One section of short (stubby) mortars under First Lieutenant

OLAN D. PARR was also attached to Company B. The distance from the assembly area to the

line of departure was about 1,500 yards over rough terrain. Pfc. WALTER LULUE, a BAR man of

the 2nd Platoon, slipped on the steep incline, injuring his ankle so that he had to be evacuated.

Most of the time, while approaching the line of departure the men were under clear observation

of the enemy, and they began receiving small arms fire before they actually reached the line

of departure.

The 1st Platoon moved out across the LD on time with two squads abreast and one in reserve.

As they approached the first group of houses, Pfc. WALTER L. HANEY, 1st Platoon messenger,

was hit in the shoulder and foot by sniper fire. Then a thunder of fire smashed into the

men and the two leading platoons were pinned down. The Germans threw artillery, mortar, and

everything they had into the area. The 2nd Platoon tried to advance to the left, but was caught in

the fire and unable to move far. They radioed back for artillery support, but were refused. The

men were disillusioned about the effectiveness of the artillery preparation. The town of Torre

Iussi had hardly been touched, and the Germans had set up a strong point in their main line of

resistance there. With the aid of the bazooka, the 1st Platoon cleaned out the first group of

houses by 0950 and took eight prisoners. The 3rd Platoon, which was following, ran into a minefield

near the road junction at Serra Sarzana, and S/Sgt. DONALD G. HAIGHT was killed. They

selected a new route and caught up with the rest of the company.

The mission of the 1st Platoon was to clear out Torre Iussi only a few yards down the road.

They went up the reverse slope of Hill 860 to the left to start the assault from above the town.

Here they took five prisoners at 1000. All types of fire hit them, coming from the town and from

the narrow valley to the north. S/Sgt. WAYNE C. CLARK and S/Sgt. HARRY M. SHEVCHIK

were killed as they moved down to the town and Pfc. GERALD E. MULVANEY, Pfc. HENRY M.

LEMMENES, Pfc. LEON BURROWS, and Pfc. JOHN M. GABRI were all wounded by machine

gun fire. The rest of the 1st Platoon doggedly moved into the town and flushed out fifteen prisoners.

S/Sgt. JACOB R. NUNNEMACHER, who spoke German, asked the prisoners if there

were any more Germans in the nearest house. The Krauts said “No.” He started into the building,

and was immediately shot and killed by a sniper.

50

While the 1st Platoon was attempting to clean out Torre Iussi, the 2nd Platoon was flanking

enemy emplacements to the left on Hill 860. Upon reaching the top of this hill, First Lieutenant

HAROLD E. GARFINKEL, Pfc. WAYNE E. HERMON and Pfc. PAUL F. SCHILLER were all

killed by machine gun fire. S/Sgt. BETTA FOTAS took a squad of men to wipe this out, but he

and Pfc. FRANCISCO L. SANTIESTEBAN were killed and Pfc. ASCENCION L. SIMENTAL and

Pfc. JOHN B. MEYERS were wounded. T/Sgt. OSCAR L. CLEMENT assumed command of the

2nd Platoon.

The 3rd Platoon, in reserve, moved to the reverse slope of Hill 860 and dug in waiting. First

Sergeant WALTER R. HARD, JR. had been wounded by artillery, and T/Sgt. ERNEST W. DAVIDSON

took over his duties. In the attached machine gun platoon from Company D, Pfc.

EARNEST B. STOLLER was hit by a sniper on the road, and Pfc. BURLEY F. YOUNG, JR., and

Pvt. HAYDEN CLAYCOMB were wounded by mortar fire.

The fifteen remaining men in the 1st Platoon were still trying to clean out Torre Iussi. About

1130, they discovered that they were trapped by machine gun fire inside the enemy main line of

resistance, and were unable to move forward or withdraw. Communication was out, and a runner,

Pfc. LEWIS A. HOELCHER, volunteered to take a message back to the company. Finally,

withdrawing one man at a time, the 1st Platoon got back to the reverse slope of Hill 860 and dug

in. Second Lieutenant GILBERT G. HOUSLEY called for 81-mm fire on the buildings but was

unable to locate the Company D mortars. Then, finding the forward observer with the company,

he learned that the radio was out. A runner was sent back, and 4.2s partially leveled the town.

Sgt. THOMAS A FOLEY was wounded by shrapnel from mortar fire and while being evacuated

was killed when a mortar round scored a direct hit on his litter. The squad of light machine guns

had tried to give the 1st Platoon covering fire while it was assaulting from Hill 860, but were

forced to the reverse slope by shelling which killed Sgt. MARVIN G. HALE and Pfc. JOHN M.

WILBUR. Second Lieutenant RAY WILSON, weapons platoon leader, was hit by enemy sniper

fire and evacuated. S/Sgt. LLOYD P. WICK took command of the weapons platoon. During the

action T/5 ALBERT MANCHIO was killed and the following men wounded: T/Sgt.

WOODROW SLONE, T/4 HAMILTON J. ALLEN, Pfc. RODERICK W. BOYLES, Pfc. ROY C.

COBB, Pfc. LOYAL F. COLOSKY, Pfc. EMMETT H. DUNKIN, Pfc. NEWT L. DURHAM, Pfc.

CHARLES HANSON, Pfc. HELMAR J. HUNT, Pfc. JOHN C. KNEER, Pfc. ADOLPH REINHARDT,

Pfc. MELVIN H. WISEMAN, and Pvt. CLELL DOYLE.

It was a tense morning for the regiment. The two previous offensives, with their initial surprises,

had started off with great speed and the first objectives taken ahead of schedule. This time

the enemy had expected the attack. He was ready, deep in the ground safe from our artillery,

and he was ready behind sandbags and stone for our riflemen. By noon, scores of casualties had

gone through the 1st Battalion aid station, and the little town of Torre Iussi still held out athwart

the regiment’s route to its initial objective, Hill 903. From the thick stone-walled buildings in the

pines, bullets spit all over the valley, not only holding off Company B, but searching the approach

trails and pinning down the rest of the battalion and firing into the flank of the 86th on the

right of the 87th. Not only in Company B had casualties been heavy, but also the long column

approaching the line of departure had been pounded as the men inched forward on the exposed

slopes. Even back over the Montesinistro ridge at the head of the narrow valley, where the heavy

weapons had pulled back on the lifting of their supporting fire, shellfire caused casualties.

Back in the regimental CP, Lieutenant Colonel SCHMELZER and Captain ARTHUR

BRODEUR were poring over the S-3 operations map, coloring with a red or yellow crayon each

advance of the 1st Battalion. For more than two hours the map lay untouched while the ringing

telephones brought bad news, but little good. For a while it looked as though the attack had

failed. Company M, out of the fight after its supporting role, was eating rations and congratulat51

ing themselves on the lack of counter-battery fire. Without warning, a short concentration of

shells came in, killing S/Sgt. WALTER R. HUCKABEE, Sgt. ROBERT W. STROMBERG, and Pfc.

MARVIN D. LEDBETTER. Wounded were S/Sgt. ROLAND E. CLARK, Sgt. RAYMOND W.

HUGHES, and Pfc. JOE ADAMS, Pfc. DENZEL R. EAREHART, Pfc. LEAROYD A. HOOVER,

Pfc. JAMES R. MORECRAFT, Pfc. ARVO SUORSA and Pfc. ROLAND A WEIPERT. Sgt.

STROMBERG had just been ordered to leave the battle for Officer Candidate School, but hadn’t

been reached before he was killed. In this same area, three men from the 37-mm gun crew of the

1st Battalion were wounded: Sgt. WILLIAM F. WILSON, Pfc. OLLIS E. SIKES, and Pfc. DAVID

O. CUNNINGHAM. Also, M Company wireman, Pfc. WAYNE H. WILSON, had been wounded

by machine gun fire while in the company OP on Mt. della Spe.

The entire area, forward from the Montesinistro ridge to Torre Iussi, was littered with dead

and wounded mules, and men hit by machine gun, sniper, mortar or artillery fire, or mines. The

continual pounding and the roughness of the steep trails made the evacuation problem hazardous

and difficult. The Medical Section of the 1st Battalion lost Pfc. HOWARD MCMILLIAN, Pfc.

AREL BAJKAN, and Pfc. RUDOLPH W. HEINS, all killed by artillery fire while lying on the

ground tending a wounded man. Pfc. DOUGLAS ATON broke two ribs while bringing in a

casualty, and after taking care of the casualty, had to be evacuated himself. Pfc. GENE L.

RIGNEY was wounded on Mt. della Spe.

At 1220, Company A was ordered to pass through Company B, take Torre Iussi and seize Hill

903. Company C was to take Mt. Pigna, the original objective for Company A, and Company B

would become reserve. Actually, Company A did succeed in taking both of its objectives, Torre

Iussi and Hill 903. But an hour and a half after being ordered out, the regiment, not being well

informed of the progress being made, directed the 2nd Battalion to jump off at 1355, with two

companies abreast bypassing Torre Iussi on the east and capturing Hill 903. This attack was to be

coordinated with the 2nd Battalion of the 86th on the right, and was to be supported by two battalions

of artillery.

COMPANY A—HILL 903

Company A crossed the line of departure thirty minutes after Company B. As they climbed

down the northeastern slopes of Mt. della Spe, they were held up by the tail end of Company B

during the fight for Torre Iussi. Company A was pinned down behind Company B and both

companies stretched out in one unbroken continuous line along the wagon trail, reaching back

almost to the assembly area. Mortar and artillery fire punished the men, and snipers and a machine

gun opened up from the high ground to the left front and worked over the column. Many

of the men did not dig in, as the column was expected to keep moving, and casualties were heavy

under the terrible concentration of 105s, 120s, and mortars. At the sides of the trail, the men

found rocky ravines or draws to seek cover in, but these were wooded and tree bursts took their

toll. Pfc. MOSE CAREY, still on Mt. della Spe, was hit by artillery and later died of his wounds.

The 3rd and 2nd Platoons had led the company, while the 1st and weapons platoons had been

further to the rear where the artillery barrages were heavier. They suffered the most casualties.

As the attached 1st machine gun platoon of Company D moved out with Company A, they

suffered casualties. The platoon, under First Lieutenant ANTSELM BRADLEY, came under

sniper fire from the front when they crossed the road below Mt. della Spe. They moved off of the

road just as artillery fire crashed down on them. Pfc. EARL R. BUMGARNER and Pfc. TIMOTHY

H. DOUGLAS were wounded.

Some time after 1200, the 2nd Platoon, abreast of the 3rd on the left, moved up on Hill 860

under the artillery and machine gun fire. The 3rd Platoon moved through pinned-down Company

B, and was itself pinned down for two hours just short of the town from which elements of

52

Company B had been driven. During this advance the 1st Platoon lay in the ditch along the road

and drew fire. An 88 hit a mortar hole in which Pfc. CASPER A. BEHRING was crouching. He

was wounded, and First Lieutenant JAMES E. HAWKINS III was hit by flying shrapnel.

The “536” radios were on the same frequency as those of one of the companies of the 86th on

the right. Consequently, their use became too confusing, and a messenger, Pfc. RICHARD D.

JOHNSTON, was sent back with a message to First Sergeant GILBERT S. BATES. He was shot in

the chest, but climbed back onto his feet and continued on for three hundred yards. He delivered

the message and then fell dead at the sergeant’s feet.

T/Sgt. RAYMOND H. TIGER of the weapons platoon was injured by concussion. In the machine

gun section, S/Sgt. WALTER L. MONTGOMERY, Sgt. CECIL T. WILCOX, and Pfc. JAMES

A. CONOVER and Pfc. RALPH J. BREWER were all wounded.

Back with the company command group, executive officer First Lieutenant THEOPHILE B.

RANGER, S/Sgt. JOSEPH L. SARRI, Pfc. EDGAR J. HATCH, JR. and Pfc. JOSEPH ZANN, were

all wounded by artillery. Pfc. BASIL E. DAY was lightly wounded while serving as battalion

runner. Also Pfc. JOHN K. BRYANT was hit. In the 1st Platoon, wounded by artillery were: Pfc.

CLARENCE J. SEGREST, SR. and Pfc. JAMES E. BENFIELD. Pfc. CARL R. AMASON, of the 2nd

Platoon, was hit; and one of the world’s finest skiers, Sgt. FRIEDL PFEIFFER, was seriously

wounded. Also, Sgt. MARK E. CAUCH was hit in the leg. Pfc. OKEY C. DEAN, while applying

first aid to a wounded man, was hit and killed. When the order came for Company A to pass

through B at about 1200, Company B had completely withdrawn from the town, but some of its

elements were abreast of the town up on Hill 860. As the 3rd Platoon, Company A, entered Torre

Iussi, elements of Company F, 86th Infantry, came abreast of them on the right, and went through

the east section of town where most of the resistance seemed to be coming from. They cleaned

out five machine gunners just beyond the town, killing two and capturing three. Then the 3rd

Squad of the 3rd Platoon passed through the town and moved into a draw beyond to establish a

base of fire so that the rest of the platoon could cross the valley to Hill 903. The artillery laid in

on them and nine of the twelve became casualties as they gave covering fire. Pfc. JESUS M. SALAZAR

was killed. S/Sgt. JAMES D. GRAVELLE, Pfc. HENRY A. GREEN, Pfc. WILLIAM C.

ALBRIGHT, Pfc. JOHN C. GUINN, Pfc. ALLEN E. LUGINBILL, Pfc. NORMAN G. OLIVER, Pfc.

ARTHUR V. RECTOR, and Pfc. PAUL E. WANTULOK were wounded.

T/Sgt. WILLIAM H. WEBB, JR., platoon sergeant of the 2nd Platoon, stood out in the open,

guiding his men through the minefields that had to be crossed in the draw beyond Torre Iussi.

He was killed by artillery, as was Sgt. LLOYD A GORMAN. Pfc. WILLIAM B. ADDY was

wounded. A little farther on, two more men, Pfc. GRADY L. BREWER and Pfc. JOHN A.

ANASTASI, were wounded. The 3rd Platoon captured two more prisoners in the draw. Altogether

14 prisoners were captured in Torre Iussi out of about 35 estimated Germans in the town.

From the draw, the 3rd Platoon led up onto the left shoulder of Hill 903, receiving some machine

gun fire from the valley to the north. Pfc. WILLIAM W. GOLDSMITH was wounded by

this fire, and Pfc. EARL O. ENG was wounded by artillery. Much of this fire seemed to be coming

from the lower slopes of Hill 898, and the company mortars were set up to snipe at it. Captain

HUGH D. KLEMME of Company A and Captain JAMES C. KENNETT of Company F met in

Torre Iussi and coordinated their attack. The two companies, however, had bottlenecked in the

town, and Company F had been held up here and by a steep bank too high to climb unaided.

The 3rd Platoon climbed rapidly up the hill and reached the western crest a little ahead of Company

F coming up on its right. Having reached the crest, they swung to the left and out toward a

knob to the northwest. Pfc. MICHAEL SAWYER was wounded out here when a bullet glanced

off another man’s helmet and struck his leg. A machine gun opened up from the knob, and the

53

3rd Platoon set up a base of fire. The 1st and 2nd Platoons, moving up the hill, went to the top of

Hill 903 first and then to the left knob, passing behind the 3rd Platoon. They then flanked around

to the right of the machine gun and drove it off the hill. Having taken the knob, the company

received mortar, machine gun, and small arms fire from Hill 898 across the valley to the west.

They dug in on the knob between 1700 and 1800. Later, Company E, holding Hill 903, tied in

with them.

After Torre Iussi was taken, Company B was given the order to dig in on the reverse slope of

Hill 860. The enemy artillery concentrations were still coming in and causing casualties. When

Company A moved through and headed for Hill 903, Company B followed in a column of platoons,

2nd, 3rd, and 1st. The company was still under mortar and sniper fire. Company B arrived

on the reverse slope of Hill 903 at dusk and dug in for the night.

COMPANY C—BATTALION RESERVE

Under the command of Captain MORLAN W. NELSON, Company C crossed the line of departure

in battalion reserve. The company was held up behind Company A at the foot of Mt.

della Spe’s wooded slopes, and remained pinned down there most of the day. Both artillery and

mortar fire pounded them throughout the day, starting even before they had left the assembly

area. The occasional halting forward movements to keep contact with the company ahead forced

the men to keep looking for new cover. At one time, the 3rd Platoon, leading on the hillside, was

moving into the cover of a ravine. Some of the men had taken cover in old shell craters on a clayslide

area, when a straight line of shells burst one after the other across the craters, landing full in

one of them, killing Sgt. JOSEPH E. STREUMEYER. Behind the 3rd, the 2nd Platoon had reached

the foot of Mt. della Spe when a dud struck the side of the trail, followed by a shell that wounded

Sgt. MURRY L. LOEFFLER and Pfc. MARTIN W. LUECK, Pfc. FELIX F. CHURCH, Pfc. ALBA D.

BARTHOLOMEW, and Pfc. CLIFFORD J. ARCHER. In the weapons platoon, Pfc. JOHN T.

KELLY and S/Sgt. JOHN H. ASHCRAFT suffered almost a direct hit, the concussion of which

temporarily paralyzed one of them and shocked the other. Pfc. ROBERT W. WINBUSH, a medic

who had been running from casualty to casualty throughout the bombardment, took care of both

of these men and miraculously remained unhurt.

At about 1600, the company started to move again and got down into the cover of a ravine.

At this time, Pfc. PAUL J. BROWN, a BAR man who had insisted on trying to keep up with the

company on a badly injured foot, was unable to go further. From the ravine, the 3rd Platoon had

to move out into the open in order to watch and become familiar with the route of Company A

through the minefields in front of Torre Iussi. They were held up here on a hard, clay hillside,

unable to dig in successfully, and kept from advancing by Company A’s difficulties with the

mines. Trees overhead made the shallow holes they could dig less effective, and tree bursts

killed Pfc. CARL H. ORTWEIN and Pfc. ELMER FRISTOE, and wounded Pvt. OWEN J. RICKER.

The heavy shellfire seemed to be drawn by the mule trains moving along the trail, and many of

the animals were killed. The 3rd Platoon was spread out on this hillside area for nearly three

hours. They watched as almost miraculously the shellfire lifted just long enough for Lieutenant

Colonel ROSS J. WILSON, the battalion commander, to travel down the road past them, and then

started thundering in again right where he had been. The number of casualties gives no indication

of the severity of the shelling. Only the roughness of the terrain saved many lives. Pfc. ROY

L. HART, an assistant BAR man, had a shell land practically on top of him, but he crouched in

under the overhanging bank of a stream. When the earth settled, he was buried under a foot and

a half of dirt with only the shovel handle sticking from his pack showing his position. When

quickly dug out, he was uninjured.

54

COMPANY E

At 1325, when the decision was made to move the 2nd Battalion to the east of Torre Iussi and

take the initial regimental objective, Hill 903, Company E was ordered to attack on the right and

Company F on the left. Company G was to be in reserve. At that time, as far as was known, the

1st Battalion was still pinned down.

Company E, with the 1st machine gun platoon of Company H attached, was to lead off. They

had been waiting for four hours behind the line of departure and had been under artillery fire.

During the morning, Pfc. OTTO KORBAN was hit, and S/Sgt. JOHN L. WIGDAHL had been

wounded at 1130. Major PAUL A. TOWNSEND, the acting battalion commander, gave them

their orders and they jumped off just before 1400. After being temporarily held up by Company

C as they crossed the line of departure, they moved on across the valley in a column of files, with

2nd Platoon leading. Reaching the foot of Hill 903, the 3rd was echeloned to the right rear, with

the 1st following the 3rd. The valley was mined, but the company passed through the minefields

without difficulty. However, two men, Sgt. ALFRED E. MAHONEY and Pfc. EDWIN P. HADSELL,

were injured crossing the rough terrain. Machine guns were attached to the leading platoon,

and one mortar squad was with each platoon. At the very southernmost point of the road

nearing the base of Hill 903 was a cluster of buildings at Point 750. First Lieutenant RICHARD L.

CROOK led his 2nd Platoon around these buildings, and men from the weapons platoon cleared

the houses and took 24 prisoners without difficulty. Heavy shellfire fell around the buildings as

the company pushed on up the hill, and Pfc. RAYMOND R. LINDSAY and Pfc. EUGENE E.

SULLIVAN were wounded as the 2nd Platoon climbed the steep, wooded and rocky slope.

There was little resistance except for some small arms and mortar fire coming in from the left,

which wounded Pfc. LELAND A. HUFFORD. The gullies and rock outcroppings afforded good

cover against this fire. S/Sgt. THADDEUS BENEDICT was wounded by a round of friendly artillery

fire further up the hill. As they reached the top they fired at the retreating Germans withdrawing

over the hill, and wounded two of them. Twenty prisoners were taken. The company

dug in on the reverse slope, and five BARs and two machine guns were sent over the crest onto

the forward slope. The mortars were emplaced and the company took positions to cover Company

F moving up.

COMPANY F

Company F had moved up late in the morning and dug foxholes just behind the regimental

OP. At 1355 they started out for Torre Iussi behind Company E. They moved in a column of files

through artillery and sniper fire, led by the 1st Platoon and attached machine guns, followed by

the company machine guns, 2nd Platoon, mortars, 3rd Platoon, and a section of heavy machine

guns from Company H. As the company approached the road junction at Serra Sarzana, south of

Torre Iussi, the leading elements took a footpath short-cut across the fields while the company

followed along by the road. T/Sgt. JOHN C. DECKER of the weapons platoon stepped off the

trail to check on his men. A schu mine blew off his foot. He lay on the side of the trail joking with

his men about his foot as they went by, and telling them to do a good job for his sake. The road

from here on to Torre Iussi was a grim sight with men and mules scattered. Parts of mules were

everywhere. The hardest soldier was shocked by broken and dismembered bodies in his own

familiar uniform.

In the attached machine gun platoon of Company H. Pfc. CLARENCE W. LINN, JR. was

killed by artillery fire ten minutes after the platoon crossed the line of departure on Mt. della Spe.

LINN had been a jeep driver; this was his first day of line duty.

Apr 14

55

By this time Torre Iussi had been cleaned out by Company A and part of the 86th. On the

north edge of town the company reorganized and received orders to continue on to Hill 903. An

artillery shell crashed into the company, wounding Pfc. JOHN W. VALENTINE and Pfc.

PALMER E. COUILLARD. As the company moved down through the deep draws between

Torre Iussi and Hill 903, they were under intense artillery, mortar and long-range machine gun

fire. They were to move up the draw to the north and then up Hill 903 on the left of Company E.

First Lieutenant EUGENE CLAWSON, even though the two lead scouts had gone through

the marshy draw safely, probed and dug up a large number of mines and put them on the side of

the poorly defined trail. He then ordered that four men at a time should cross the exposed field

through the mines. Pfc. CLARENCE E. LOCKMAN, the messenger, while guiding four men

through, was wounded by artillery. Then Pfc. DENNIS R. HUNTLEY, the lead scout of the 2nd

Platoon, took LOCKMAN’s place and, leading a group of four, missed the trail and set off a mine,

blowing off his foot. HUNTLEY, in order to be with the company for the spring offensive, had

gone AWOL from the hospital, where he had been recovering from a wound received at C. Florio

on 20 February, and had arrived just a few days before the jump-off. HUNTLEY sat by the trail

for 26 hours, cared for by Pfc. GEORGE HIRAK. HIRAK had undertaken alone to clear the minefield

and tried vainly to get litter bearers up to where HUNTLEY was lying under small arms and

artillery fire. HIRAK finally moved HUNTLEY over to the shelter of a cliff. During his long wait,

HUNTLEY pointed out the various mines to the men coming through, and guided the troops by

voice while HIRAK taped off the area. Pvt. JAMES K. INGRAM had taken HUNTLEY’s place as

guide, and another mine destroyed his foot. When HIRAK, of the A & P Platoon, had first arrived,

he had probed and cleared the mines out of the trail, and established movement at a 20-

yard distance. It was later discovered that there were 3,000 mines in this marshy draw. The enemy

had carefully placed them in the hummocks so that a man stepping from hummock to

hummock would hit them. HUNTLEY, who had been for 26 hours under spasmodic shelling,

was found to have six mines under him when he was moved. Apparently the distribution of his

weight in the reclining position was so even that the mines were not detonated.

Company A, preceding Company F through Torre Iussi, was by this time well up the draw

and starting up Hill 903 on the left. The weapons platoon of Company F had been emplaced on

Hill 860 to fire support for the two assaulting platoons, the 1st and 2nd, as they went up Hill 903.

Captain KENNETT boosted every man in the 2nd Platoon up from his knee to his shoulder, and

then to the top of a steep bank as they came across a road. A sniper on the shoulder of Hill 903

wounded Pvt. JOHN V. IHLENFELD as the 2nd Platoon moved up. Sgt. JOHN J. LANDER, suffering

from shellshock, stayed back with Pfc. JOSEPH E. SADOWSKI who raked the ridge with

his BAR. SADOWSKI was then wounded by a sniper from the right.

The 2nd Platoon on the left climbed up the left nose of Hill 903 and into a saddle. They received

some fire from Hill 894 beyond Hill 903 as they came over the hill. Sgt. AUSTIN T. CRANOR

spotted four Krauts near the top and yelled at them in German to surrender. The Germans

waved the American over as if they wished to give up. S/Sgt. LOUIS H. BARGMANN and two

men left their cover and started over. As fire opened on them, they dropped and returned fire

with a BAR and rifle grenades. Lieutenant CLAWSON and two men flanked around the base of

the hill to head the Germans off, but they escaped.

On the other side of the hill, Pfc. WILLARD WILLIAMS and Pfc. MILTON JOHNSON approached

the top of the hill on the right, in front of the 1st Platoon, and broke over the crest at an

enemy artillery OP, taking the occupants completely by surprise. One Kraut reached for a rifle,

but WILLIAMS loaded him up with BAR slugs. The other two, after a glance at their dead comrade,

threw their hands into the air. In the OP was an artillery radio and firing data chart, which

was sent back. Many of the barrage areas were thereby known and avoided.

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On top of the hill the company reorganized on the forward slope, actually on the knob to the

northeast marked 894. Here they awaited further orders and, at 1800, made contact with Company

B, which had followed A up on the left. Company E made contact, too, from the right. As

they organized defensively, the 3rd Platoon passed through onto the forward slope and received

machine gun fire out there from the valley near Tabole. The area was well dug up with unoccupied

German dugouts complete with abandoned weapons.

General DUFF appeared on the hill to confer with the acting battalion commander, Major

TOWNSEND, and the company was ordered to take Hill 868 before dark.

COMPANY G—BATTALION RESERVE

Company G was in battalion reserve at the outset. The 1st Platoon under Second Lieutenant

STANLEY JAZWINSKI was detached from the company to form a tank combat team riding tanks

of the 751st. Shortly after 1330 the company left foxholes behind the LD and followed the leading

elements of the battalion across the shell-torn valley to Hill 903. Artillery fire came in on them,

but there were no casualties.

COMPANY H—MORTAR PLATOON

The 3rd, or Mortar, Platoon of Company H, in reserve with Company G, moved up in the

morning to supporting positions at approximately 1000. The 1st and 2nd Sections emplaced at

Calvana southeast of Torre Iussi. There during the day they were frequently pinned down by

heavy enemy shellfire.

The 3rd Section remained in a draw to the right of Mt. della Spe from where they fired several

missions. Just forward of Mt. della Spe near the cluster of buildings called Serra Sarzana,

S/Sgt. ORTON TALBOT was hit and wounded by artillery. Second Lieutenant HAROLD V.

STOUT and Pfc. LOUIS W. PETR moved forward with Company F as forward observers. After

nightfall, the 3rd Section displaced forward on the southern slope of Hill 903.

During the afternoon, information of the enemy was pieced together by the IPW team under

S/Sgt. LEO A. HANDEL. It was learned that the 755th Regiment of the 334th Infantry Division

was opposing the 87th Infantry. This meant that all three regiments of the enemy division had

been thrown into the line. There was now no reserve regiment of the 334th Division, and obviously

this situation was based on a desperate confidence of the German command, not only that

the Allied thrust would come where it did, and when it did, but also that the German position

was strong enough, and their troops good enough to stop the 87th in its tracks.

The enemy that were met on the first day were good. They were young, many of them fanatical.

Not many were captured; many more were killed. Many stayed in bypassed positions

and fired into our flanks and rear. Eighteen machine gunners on the steep slopes of Hill 898 just

north of Torre Iussi fired all day on April 14th and 15th into our passing reserve battalion, service

elements, and artillery battalion, even though the 85th occupied the very hill they were concealed

on. They finally had to be rooted out man by man. During the afternoon, the IPW team was able

to plot mortar and gun positions, CPs, minefields, and profitable artillery targets. They also

learned that the 90th Panzer Division was in German reserve.

At 1730, Major TOWNSEND acknowledged an order for the 2nd Battalion to take Mt. Pigna

upon the securing of Hill 903, which was reported taken ten minutes earlier. Actually, Company

A had passed over the main summit of Hill 903 on its way out to the northwestern knob just

ahead of Companies E and F, but the 2nd Battalion found the eastern high ground still held by

the enemy, and they completed the capture.

Apr 14

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Between Hill 903 and Mt. Pigna was Hill 868, which the 86th reportedly took at 1620. Companies

F and G jumped off for 868 just after 1900.

COMPANY G—STRADA

At 1913 the company was committed to attack the village of Strada and the south side of Hill

868. They moved down the eastern slope of Hill 903 with the 2nd Platoon on the right and the

3rd Platoon on the left. The weapons platoon and attached heavies under Lieutenant EDWIN H.

RICHARDSON were to support the action from a finger of high ground to the southeast of Hill

903. The mortars were set up on the reverse slope of this finger with observation on the crest.

The mortar squad noticed three German dugouts 75 yards up the draw from their position,

and moving up to investigate, flushed out a dozen Germans. The company commander, Captain

RALPH ALLEN, JR., as his company moved into the attack, established an OP about 200 yards

from the town. A sniper opened up, the first shot hitting Captain ALLEN in the shoulder. At the

same time the 3rd Platoon, two squads abreast, hurrying to try to take the town before dark, were

fired on. Pfc. FREDERICK D. WEIDER and Pvt. ROY J. WALLACE were wounded before the

platoon realized it was under fire. The men scrambled for shell holes and a nearby hedge. Some

of the fire seemed to be coming from Strada, and some from German positions in the rear already

bypassed by Company F on the left. Four of the men were behind a hedge not fifteen yards

across the road from the nearest building. They were firing on other buildings in the town when

German hand grenades thrown from the house near them drove them off. Instead of running

back, they rushed to the cover of the buildings. With their own grenades they drove three prisoners

out of the building. These prisoners were questioned as to the location of mines and booby

traps in the town, but they either couldn’t or wouldn’t give any information. As the rest of the

platoon rushed up, a German lieutenant fled back over a hill leaving his men to surrender from

dugouts surrounding the town. A total of 18 prisoners were taken. All buildings were flushed

out. The company reassembled at Strada under command of the wounded captain.

Meanwhile, Company F had been moving up the long, narrow ridge of Hill 868 north of

Strada. They had run into difficulty and Captain KENNETT came down to urge Company G to

move up on his right. However, the ridge was too narrow to put both companies abreast. Company

G echeloned to the right, and Company F was able to move on and take Hill 868. During

this action, Company F had been crowded over to the right (east) side of the sharp knife-edge

ridge by heavy fire from the valley to their left. This shoved them over onto G’s portion of the

hill and Battalion ordered Company G back. As Company G followed F up the hill, S/Sgt. ROBERT

C. CLUKAY was shot and wounded. CLUKAY, guide of the 3rd Platoon, had caught sight

of two Germans coming out of a bypassed dugout. With two other men he went over to take

these prisoners and check the dugout. As he moved up, the Germans still hiding in the dugout

opened fire and wounded him. All three Germans were dispatched by CLUKAY. This was the

third wound for Sgt. CLUKAY in two months. Company G reorganized after dark on the hill,

tying in with F on the left, and making contact with the 86th on the right. Captain ALLEN was

evacuated at 2200, and First Lieutenant OSCAR E. DUTTWEILER took over the command of the

company. Throughout the night and until after daylight the next morning, the company was under

intense shellfire. Most of this fire was landing on Company F on the left. No one was hurt in

Company G.

COMPANY F—TABOLE

Company F jumped off abreast of G on the right. Machine gun and mortar fire was coming

in on Hill 894, a knob on the northeast end of 903. It was coming from the valley to the east as the

1st Platoon moved out on the left and the 3rd on the right. The weapons platoon, as well as First

Lieutenant DAVID M. SNYDER’s heavy machine gun platoon from Company H, set up on 894 to

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support the attack across the valley. The platoons moved down south of Tabole, part of the company

passing through the town of Strada. The group of buildings called Strada, which Company

G had already cleaned out, was passed through without resistance, and the company, now south

of their objective, turned left (to the north) and started up the razorback southern arm of Hill 868.

By this time the 2nd Platoon which had been following, but which had stayed on higher ground,

and had not swung so far south, had reached the hill abreast of the other two platoons and to

their left. Therefore the 2nd Platoon, and part of the 1st, was on the left of the razorback ridge

while the rest of the company was on the right.

The route of the 2nd Platoon, while direct, had crossed a very steep ravine that had injured

Pfc. JOSEPH I. MACTAVISH and Pvt. LEONARD P. GOLDAPSKE. They wouldn’t go back until

the hill was taken, however, and were with their platoon on the sharp, steep ridge. At this point

machine guns opened up from the valley they had just crossed from a point immediately north of

Tabole. The 2nd Platoon out on the exposed left face of the ridge was helpless. Pfc. GEORGE J.

LAWRENCE was killed, and the platoon leader, First Lieutenant EUGENE H. CLAWSON, was

wounded. Also Pfc. HERSCHELL D. KIMBRELL of the 1st Platoon fell, seriously wounded, on

the exposed ridge. KIMBRELL was in a very bad spot, and Second Lieutenant FRED R. FRICK

unquestionably saved his life by leaving his covered position, going over onto the exposed side of

the ridge and carrying KIMBRELL back. It was here that First Lieutenant DONALD DWYER was

fingered by fate as a bullet neatly slotted his lieutenant’s bar, leaving it for him to wear. So thick

was the air with bullets on the left that one of the men reaching up to twist off a stubborn branch

interfering with his field of fire had the branch sliced off cleanly in his hand by a passing slug.

Lieutenant CLAWSON, six feet four, weighing 240 pounds, couldn’t be evacuated until 12 prisoners

were sent to carry him down after the hill was taken.

At the same time on the right, the 3rd Platoon received some fire from its right in the area

that Company G was expected to be moving into. No one was hit, but the company held up

while Captain KENNETT chased down to G, who had taken some prisoners at Strada, and got

them moving. Company G, as mentioned, had just lost its captain. Company F, from their advanced

position on the flank, assisted G to move up by delivering fire from BARs, bazookas, and

antitank grenades against burning buildings holding them up from over on Mt. Pigna. Then

Company F continued on up the hill under some sniper and machine gun fire from both sides.

Company G was held back, by Battalion order, on the lower slopes near Strada, the hill being too

narrow for both companies to go up abreast. As they reached the top of Hill 868, an enemy

popped up out of a dugout, and Lieutenant FRICK shot and wounded him. S/Sgt. PAUL

STETTNER was brought up to question the prisoner and he disclosed that there were many others

over on the forward slope. STETTNER hollered over for them to come out with their hands

up. In answer he got a grenade thrown at him. He yelled to them again and fifteen of them came

out. At dark, Sgt. ROBERT ARKLANDER and two men reconnoitering positions passed over

some dugouts. A head popped out and the sergeant opened fire, bringing out a whole stream of

Krauts. Altogether, 35 prisoners were rounded up on the hill that evening.

Since they were under machine gun fire, especially from the northwest, as they organized defensive

positions, they dug in on the reverse southeastern slope facing the unknown country to

the east. However, some fire came from both directions. They were joined in the evening by the

weapons platoon. The soil on the hill was so rocky that digging was difficult. Many of the men

had to start several holes before they found a spot free enough of boulders to get down deep.

At 0200 of the 15th, a terrible concentration of artillery fire started falling on the company positions.

With short lulls the shells smashed the area throughout the remaining hours of darkness,

and until 0800 when it wound up with a 45-minute steady concentration. The fire came from the

east—heavy stuff mixed with high velocity 88 fire. Friendly artillery added to the terror of the

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morning. Because of the rocks, some foxholes were hallow, but so thick was the pattern of fire

that most of the deaths were from direct hits killing two or three men in a hole. Killed were: Pfc.

ALFRED A. GARNEAU, Pfc. CECIL D. LARGENT, Pfc. ANDREW F. SIMPSON, Pfc. LEWIS M.

THOMAS, and Pfc. SIDNEY B. UTTER. Wounded were: S/Sgt. QUINCY W. GINTER and

S/Sgt. MARSHALL MORRIS, Sgt. BOYCE E. WILLIAMS, Pfc. JAMES M. BUTTON, Pfc. WILLIAM

L. TAYLOR, Pfc. LESLIE L. MUNCTION, Pfc. JAMES H. SORAGHAN, Pfc. GEORGE L.

PRICE, JR., Pfc. ARNOLD J. BURCH, JR., Pfc. WILSON G. MACDONALD, Pvt. GEORGE KISSEL,

Pvt. NEVIN P. KENDRICK, and Pvt. EARL B. KLINE. Sgt. WILLIAMS and Sgt. MACDONALD

refused evacuation until two days later when their wounds had become infected.

T/5 LAURENCE ADAMS and Pfc. GEORGE WARDNER exposed themselves time and

again running through the barrage to administer aid to the wounded. Captain KENNETT ran

back and forth all night long checking his men, finding the wounded, and encouraging the rest.

It was miraculous that he was not hit. He carried one man with both legs broken to the shelter of

his own foxhole, and remained outside thereafter. The extraordinary concern shown by Captain

KENNETT for his men, and literally complete disregard for his own comfort or danger, created in

the men of Company F something akin to a religious devotion toward their leader. It was a tangible

factor in all of Company F’s activities. The men constantly brought him food and urged

him to eat; he seldom thought of it himself. They vainly tried to keep him behind the scouts in

attacks and under cover during barrages. As the campaign went on, they became less concerned,

as it appeared that some force greater than they protected him.

From the top of Hill 903, after dark, the 2nd Platoon of Company H supported Company F in

its attack on Hill 868. Then the 2nd Section remained on Hill 903 for the night, while the 1st Section

displaced and dug in on Hill 868. Sgt. RUSSELL F. FICKETT and Pfc. ARTHUR LUCERO

were both wounded on Hill 903. At dawn with artillery still coming in, Sgt., WILBUR E.

SODERBERG was hit in the hand by an artillery fragment while cutting trees for a roof to his

foxhole.

COMPANY E—TABOLE

When the battalion moved out with Company F on the left and Company G on the right, E

followed G traversing down the southeastern nose of Hill 903. They swung left (north) and came

in on the town of Tabole from the right (south), passing behind Company F. They dug in around

the little village through which part of F had passed ahead of them. Company F moved on to the

east and was working its way up Hill 868 while G was behind in the vicinity of Strada. As darkness

settled, the 2nd Battalion was ordered to hold up in their present positions and not to continue

on to Mt. Pigna until morning. During the night heavy shellfire passed overhead, mostly

landing on Company F. Company E had no casualties, but “sweated it out” all night long.

COMPANIES A AND B

Back on Hill 903 Company A “buttoned up” for the night. The company organized a reverseslope

defense where the enemy artillery, which was reaching for them, couldn’t hit. Mortar fire,

however, landed in the area. After receiving the order to hold that position all night, Battalion

had ordered Company B to move up to fill in the gap between A and E.

Company A had established outposts on the forward slopes. These were manned by twohour

shifts. At about 0300, three Germans crawled up the slope. They challenged squad leader

Sgt. HOWARD H. BREITMEYER of the 2nd Platoon, as he crossed back over the ridge after

checking the outposts. They fired at him with a burp gun. The bullet passed through his belt

without wounding him. He lay on the ground listening to a commotion down below in the dark,

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trying to make out what was going on. The Germans had reached a forward foxhole and

dragged Pfc. ROY F. BREITENBACH out of the hole. The other soldier in the same hole, helpless

to aid his companion, pretended to be asleep and wasn’t noticed. Then as Sgt. BREITMEYER

made out the shadowy figures retreating down the hill, he fired and shot one of the Nazis, an SS

sergeant major. The other Nazis then shot BREITENBACH in the stomach and fled. S/Sgt.

BERTRAM A. BIDWELL went down and pulled the badly wounded BREITENBACH up over the

ridge to safety, but he soon died of his wounds. From the body of the German sergeant major the

men picked up the German password for the next three days.

At about dark, a machine gun section under section leader Pfc. AMOS P. CROSS was hit on

the trail between the knob and Hill 903. CROSS was wounded and Pfc. ANTHONY L. SKOMP

was killed. At this same time, acting squad leader Sgt. FRED T. CLARE of the 1st Platoon and

S/Sgt. ROY E. LAWSON of the 3rd Platoon were wounded. Another machine gunner, Pfc.

HENRY A. GREEN, was also wounded. Brigadier General ROBINSON E. DUFF, arriving on the

hill, assisted dressing the machine gunner’s wound at the company aid station. He said, “Hell,

there are no medics for forty miles.”

At dawn, 15 April, Pfc. JAMES A. ALDAHL, who had spent most of the night evacuating

wounded, was killed by a shell that hit the crest of the hill. Pfc. JACOB H. BEAL and KENNETH

L. GRANT were wounded with him. The men suffered that night because of the lack of water,

and had little to eat. Many of the mules of the Italian Alpini Pack units were killed as they went

forward with supplies. All through the night enemy mortar rounds came in, but casualties were

light. The plan was to jump off at 0700 the next morning, and the battle plan was given. The men

had little sleep.

COMPANY C—HILL 860

As darkness neared, the 3rd Platoon weapons, and 2nd Platoon of Company C moved up

onto the eastern slope of Hill 860 overlooking Torre Iussi to dig in for the night. Before the jumpoff

that morning the 1st Platoon had been separated from the company and had moved down

with the tanks. The tanks had difficulty with the terrain and drew AP fire as soon as they crossed

over the ridge, driving off the men of the platoon and leaving the tanks in the rough terrain unable

to move either way. Fortunately, the AP fire drawn by the tanks was less dangerous than

the fragmentation the rest of the area was catching, and the 1st Platoon escaped lightly.

However, up on Hill 860 the situation was grim. S/Sgt. MARION F. LAY and Pfc. JOHN B.

KEELEY, JR. went down to a house on the edge of Torre Iussi at the bottom of the hill to get some

boards to cover their foxholes. An almost direct hit killed LAY and wounded KEELEY. The

company, minus the 1st Platoon, was shelled all night in their dugouts on the reverse slope of

Hill 860, the weapons platoon down below. One squad of the 3rd Platoon under S/Sgt. WILBUR

MORROW was detailed to help the engineers. They spent all night walking and looking for the

engineers and never did find them. Meanwhile, artillery shells, including some white phosphorus,

landed on the hill all night. Sgt. JACK PEHR was killed as he came out of his foxhole. Also a

headquarters lineman, Pfc. RUDOLPH B. WIEBOLDT, was wounded. During the night Lieutenant

DONALD FOX came with a patrol from Company A, trying without success to make contact

with the 85th on the left. The shelling continued throughout the night. Pfc. PAUL L. THYGESEN

and Pfc. GROVER R. MANTOOTH had both been casualties during the day.

COMPANY D

Late in the afternoon the mortars of Company D started to displace to Hill 903, and the battalion

OP group established themselves on Hill 860. Here at about 1830, a mortar round killed Second

Lieutenant WILLIAM B. BLOCKER, JR., the company forward observer. The mortar platoon

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spent the night on Hill 903 while the two machine gun platoons remained with the companies to

which they had been attached.

By nightfall, the 85th Infantry had “buttoned up” on Hills 909, 913, and 898. The 1st Armored

Division had started its attack on Highway 64 late in the afternoon at 1700, and some elements

were in Vergato and had gone as far as the railway station. The BEF had jumped off on the

left, too, and had taken Montese, the pinnacle town that the 88th had looked at from “Shrapnel

Junction” during March.

During the night four air targets were fired. Five planes attacked each target by flares.

The enemy password key for the rest of the month, the enemy radio net sketch, radio frequencies

and call signs, were all captured and sent to G-2 before midnight. Also, overlays were

distributed to battalions of the enemy’s mortar and artillery barrage and concentration areas

taken from captured maps.

SECOND DAY—15 APRIL

At 2055 of 14 April, General HAYS, commanding the Division, ordered the regiment to renew

the attack in the morning at 0700 in a coordinated attack with the 85th Mountain Infantry on

the left. The 1st Battalion was to jump off to the northeast at the same time the 2nd Battalion was

to begin the attack on Mt. Pigna. The attack of both battalions was to be preceded by a 20-minute

artillery preparation. Rover Pete was ordered to “plaster” Mt. Pigna before 0700. The 3rd Battalion

was to move forward to an assembly area on the south slopes of Hill 903.

COMPANY E

Company E jumped off at 0700 leading the battalion to take Mt. Pigna to the northeast.

Company F, on Hill 868, was to hold south of Pigna for a time and support this attack of Company

E. T/5 ALAN HUNTLEY, a radio operator, was killed, and S/Sgt. GEORGE MARCH of

the battalion S-2 section, was wounded by an artillery shell on top of Hill 868. The attached

heavy machine guns from Company H prepared supporting fire from around Tabole. Two light

machine guns were attached to the leading 3rd Platoon and one to the 1st Platoon which followed

right behind them. The mortar squads were attached one to each platoon. As they moved

north up the valley toward Santa Lucia, they ran into Company B southeast of the town. Company

F held up while E started up Mt. Pigna from the southwest.

The 1st Platoon moved over to the left, coming abreast of the 3rd Platoon as they climbed up

the wooded, rocky slopes. They received some machine gun fire from Hill 840 lying southeast of

Pigna. Also, snipers fired from Pigna itself. When the 3rd Platoon was just short of the crest, artillery

and mortar fire hit them with a terrific barrage. The men were caught out in the open as

the accurate barrage came down on the hillcrest just as they swarmed over it. Killed were:

S/Sgt. THOMAS O’NEIL, Pfc. HECTOR W. BRUNEAU, acing mortar sergeant, Pfc. FREDDIE

DICKENS, Pfc. CHARLES G. STICE, and Pfc. ROBERT A BERGENDORFF. Wounded were:

First Lieutenant GEORGE J. FOX, S/Sgt. LESTER L. HAMILTON, Sgt. KENNETH E. JOHNSON,

Pfc. HARRY R. GILMORE, JR., Pfc. WILLIAM W. SHIEW, Pfc. EDWARD C. OGDEN, Pfc. RAYMOND

D. HUCKLEBERRY, Pvt. BILLEY W. HARMON, Pvt. ARTHUR J. HOLLAND, Pvt. WILLIAM

J. WOLFE, Pvt. ROBERT O. THOMAS, and T/5 VINCENT B. DOWD of the Medics. Pfc.

JOHN A. KASABUSKI was killed by a hand grenade at this same time. As the barrage tapered

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off to spasmodic firing, fifteen Germans surrendered from positions on top of the hill, and several

others fled down the reverse slope. The company dug in and reorganized atop Mt. Pigna.

The battalion attack was to move on to the southeast to Hill 840, while E remained on Mt.

Pigna to support the advance of Company F with machine gun and rifle fire.

COMPANY F

At 0900 on 15 April, Company F was ordered to attack the southeast side of Mt. Pigna. This

was a smaller peak known as 840. Company E was to attack Pigna on the left, and the attacks

were coordinated. The men had had no sleep, nor any water or rations since jumping off the day

before. At dawn on Hill 868, the 1st Section of H’s attached machine gun platoon was hit by

friendly artillery fire. Two artillery observers were killed and six men from the artillery were

wounded. They had all been in the same hole with their radio. Moreover, since the radio had

been destroyed, there was no way to lift the friendly fire, and the shells continued to come in for

45 minutes. Finally a British artillery observer was able to relay a message and the fire was lifted.

Pfc. DELNOE LE FEVERS of Company H was hit twice by this fire while traveling back to Hill

903 for water. Lieutenant DAVID M. SNYDER had a very narrow escape. He left his foxhole,

and immediately afterward, while it was occupied by Company F men, a direct hit blew up the

foxhole. One of the machine guns was hit by this artillery fire.

As Company F attacked Hill 840 south of Mt. Pigna, the heavy machine gun platoon supported

the attack from Hill 868. Company F took off with the 3rd Platoon leading, then the 2nd,

and the 1st. The weapons platoon and heavy machine gun section remained on 868 and laid

down a curtain of fire on Mt. Pigna and Hill 840 for both attacking companies.

The 3rd Squad of the 3rd Platoon led the company down off Hill 868 and turned left on the

road toward Mt. Pigna. They soon started receiving sniper fire. Then the entire platoon, except

the leading squad, was pinned down by machine gun fire. First Lieutenant FLOYD E. ALEXANDER,

the platoon leader, was hit here but he refused to be evacuated. The 3rd Squad went on

through the sniper fire, becoming separated from the company. They started up Pigna, hit a trail

and turned to the right to work up the draw between Pigna and Hill 840. Here they came to a

bunker and cleared it out, and sent a prisoner to the rear accompanied by one man with a

sprained ankle. Starting about halfway up 840 they ran into more sniper fire. Just as Pfc. FRANK

S. KOVAR got up to see where the sniper was, another shot cracked from the sniper. KOVAR

yelled, “I see him! Let’s go! He’s right up on the hill!” He pointed and fell over dead. Pfc.

DONALD M. MCCOY, JR. was also shot dead. The five men left in the squad were reorganized

by squad leader Sgt. STANLEY LESZKO. One of the men, Pfc. BEN F. GUNNELL, had been injured

coming down off of 868, but had kept up. One platoon of the 86th appeared on the knob to

their right, and with this encouragement, they pushed further up the hill, Sgt. JOHN H. EASTMAN,

JR. getting a sniper wound on the way. Then they waited for the 86th, but the men of the

86th were driven back and weren’t seen again. S/Sgt. LOUIS H. BARGMANN of the 2nd Platoon

made contact with the squad, and they returned to the road to rejoin their platoon. Sgt.

BARGMANN and Sgt. LEO SADIN were met by Captain KENNETT who planned the attack using

the 1st Platoon to flank around to the right.

Down on the road, Pfc. ROBERT M. KING had been wounded, but the platoons, after waiting

for Company E to catch up on their left, were ready to move out. The 2nd Platoon under S/Sgt.

LEO SADIN, was receiving heavy mortar fire, wounding Pfc. VINCENT J. MESSINA. They were

to move up the hill to the right of where Sgt. LESZKO’s squad had been, climbing the southwest

crest of Hill 840, and coordinating their attack with the 1st Platoon, flanking around further to the

right. This flanking position got the 1st Platoon into a position to make two Germans with rifle

grenades helpless and the 2nd Platoon was able to advance and take them prisoner. However,

63

Pfc. TOIVO H. LEINONEN, a scout providing flank security for the platoon, was killed by a machine

gun just as he, Sgt. HOWARD E. RUX and S/Sgt. LEO SADIN came over the brow. The

two captured Krauts were sent to get the German machine gunners down on the north slope and

bring them back. They started down the hill, their hands still in the air. The men of the platoon

yelling at them in anger as they left, and the Germans not sure what it was all about, ran faster

and faster. It looked as though they were making a break for it. Pvt. STANLEY F. JANOWICZ,

Pvt. RENE A. DI GIACOMO, and Sgt. RUX ran down to the flank to cover the pair. They ran into

a whole maze of pillboxes and trench systems on a flat, table-like area just short of the top of the

mountain. There were Germans hidden under the leaves in the trenches and in pillboxes. JANOWICZ

stumbled and fell before one of the pillboxes, and a German lieutenant reached out and

shot him with a burp gun. Fortunately, JANOWICZ wasn’t too seriously wounded. The German

was later dragged out from where he was hiding under a bed in a pillbox. Meanwhile, the two

Krauts had done their work well, and they appeared again leading fifteen or twenty prisoners

from the various strong points. Other prisoners rounded up more, and a total of 45 were collected

by the 2nd Platoon on the left alone.

Second Lieutenant FRED R. FRICK and the 1st Platoon had had no fire on the way up, and

they passed by the 2nd Platoon as they cleaned up the pillboxes on the reverse slope tableland.

They went over the top of the hill and collected a few prisoners.

Lieutenant FLOYD E. ALEXANDER’s 3rd Platoon, after some heavy initial mortar fire,

reached the top without a fight, going to the right of the 1st Platoon. They cleaned out dugouts,

dragging out Germans all the way to a draw running down to the northeast. Then while the 2nd

Platoon still rounded up prisoners on the reverse slope table, the 1st and 3rd were pinned down

by machine gun fire from Mt. Sette Croci to the northeast.

Company G cleared off Sette Croci and the company was able to move down the forward

slopes. About 60 prisoners had been taken from this one little hilly offshoot of Mt. Pigna, and all

manner of supplies and equipment were intact in the elaborate pillboxes.

COMPANY G—MT. SETTE CROCI

Company G, in reserve, moved out at approximately 1000 behind the leading elements of the

battalion and followed up the slopes of Pigna. Near the top of the hill, snipers bypassed by

Company F opened up on the right. Someone yelled, “Go after those guys. They can’t shoot all

of us.” One squad of the 2nd Platoon was selected to flank to the left of the snipers. They moved

up the slope and over. Pvt. DALLAS MCGRAW was wounded by machine gun fire.

Pfc. OLIVER R. HANCOCK took another squad with a bazooka team down a trail to the

right, and came up to within fifteen feet of the snipers who were right on the trail. From behind a

rock, HANCOCK threw a couple of grenades into some well-concealed and camouflaged dugouts.

Another squad went down into a draw further to the right and had come up behind these

dugouts. After the grenades exploded, a white flag appeared from the dugouts and five Germans

surrendered. Pvt. FRANK J. MALOZZI was wounded at this time.

Reaching the top of Mt. Pigna, the company passed through Company F towards Mt. Sette

Croci with the mission of taking this mountain. Before the company crossed the line of departure

small arms fire was dusting off the shoulder of the hill they were on, from machine gun emplacements

on Mt. Sette Croci. They pushed through this fire, crossing the line of departure at

noon, and moved down the forward slope into a draw forty or fifty feet deep. The company filed

down the precipitous sides using a narrow, difficult trail. They had been told that the draw was

mined. Only two mortar rounds interrupted their progress and they suffered no casualties.

Emerging from the draw, they came upon open fields stretching up the hillside to the top of the

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hill, which was lightly wooded. Second Lieutenant JOSEPH H. SHEPHERD, JR. led the 2nd Platoon

up on the left, went over the nose under small arms fire, and cleaned out seven or eight emplacements

on the top. The company weapons, meanwhile, had supported this action with overhead

fire from the right side of Mt. Pigna. On the right flank, First Lieutenant JACK K.

BENNETT led the 3rd Platoon up under the supporting fire to the enemy’s left flank. Here Sgt.

HERBERT E. STECKMAN’s squad took 22 prisoners from off the top right side and forward

slope of the mountain. This action was completed rapidly and without casualty.

COMPANY H—MORTAR PLATOON

Company H’s 1st and 2nd Mortar Sections moved forward and rejoined the 3rd Section on

the southern slope of Hill 903. They dug in here and fired several missions for support. Then

around 1400, the platoon displaced forward and into a draw to the left of Mt. Pigna and just beyond

Santa Lucia. Here they dug in for the night, firing several missions, and guarding the left

flank of the regiment.

COMPANY G

At 1400 Company G pushed north in the battalion lead for Hill 807. This was a result of a

sudden change of mission, for the battalion had previously been directed to continue in a more

easterly direction to capture Mt. Mantino. This latter mountain had just been assigned to the 86th

Mountain Infantry, so the 87th was directed to turn sharply north. Major PAUL TOWNSEND,

doing a remarkable job of leading the troops in this complicated terrain, accepted the change with

his usual calm confidence. There had not been time to make more than a map reconnaissance. It

was impossible to get observation forward. Neither could they learn any information about

friendly troops. The extended wire lines were becoming very unreliable. The country ahead was

wooded, with patches of small fields, and dissected by networks of deep erosion draws. As the

3rd Platoon led over the difficult terrain, they had to string out in single file in many places in

order to get through. Remembering the bypassed resistance they had been running into, they

carefully flushed out all dugouts and houses.

At this time the 3rd Battalion, heading east for Mt. Croce, was passing through the northbound

2nd Battalion. Company I, 3rd Battalion, advancing across in front of G, fired into a house

and then went on by it. Company G then went up and flushed out a half-dozen prisoners from

the house. Between the company and its objective, Hill 807, lay another deep draw. The company

machine guns had been left back on Pigna before crossing the first difficult draw. Therefore

Company I prepared to support Company G’s crossing, and took up positions to give this covering

fire. The fire was not needed, as the draw was crossed uneventfully. This maneuver of two

battalions crossing each other as they pressed forward in their attacks, and of one company of

one battalion pausing in its own attack to support elements of the other battalion attacking in another

direction, was one of the most unusual and complicated situations of the campaign. The

two battalions were still crossing each other at dark, and by this time dozens of prisoners were

milling around in the valley amongst them. That no one was lost is a great tribute to the control

of the organization.

Once across the draw, Lieutenant OSCAR E. DUTTWEILER and a field artillery forward observer

went forward to adjust the artillery preparation on Hill 807. By this time the company machine

guns and mortars had moved up and had taken positions to fire support with the artillery.

Company E came abreast on the right and started up Hill 807 at about 1830. Then, as Company E

reached the start of the steep pitch, Company G jumped off with the 3rd Platoon on the left and

the 2nd on the right. The supporting artillery fire was very good. Moving up the hill they took

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two officers and three enlisted Germans out of the first dugout. One of the officers protested that

the American soldiers were not gentlemen for making him keep his hands up. The soldiers were

unabashed; the officer kept his hands up. Higher up the hill they fired at a hasty machine gun

position on the northeast slope of Le Coste to the left of Hill 807. One squad assaulted the position,

surrounding it with fire. A German captain hurled a hand grenade which rolled between

Pfc. RUDOLPH MARON’s legs. Pfc. JAMES LE ROSSIGNOL shot one German; the other three

surrendered. They took three more prisoners from a nearby dugout.

Directly ahead of them was the left shoulder of Hill 807. Still further to the left ran the long,

narrow ridge of Le Coste. The 1st Battalion attacked Hill 807. However, Company G could neither

hear nor see any sign of activity on Le Coste. Lieutenant SHEPHERD, on the right, went up

on Hill 807 toward machine gun fire near the top. He got pinned down by this gun with two

squads abreast and one to the rear. They fired four or five grenades of white phosphorus, and

then S/Sgt. HERBERT STECKMAN, Pfc. LOVELL O. HARRIS and Pfc. ROBERT D. MOOTZ

worked their way up, creeping and crawling, to within ten feet of the gun and opened fire again

with white phosphorus grenades. Suddenly another gun on the left flank, over on Le Coste,

opened up. It peppered them and the whole of the two leading squads. MOOTZ was fatally

wounded; HARRIS was seriously hit. Sgt. RAYMOND C. KLOCKMAN was wounded, also Pfc.

JOHN M. BENSON, and Pvt. WILLIAM V. MCKEON. The fire on the hillside was intense. Even

those who weren’t hit had their packs riddled by machine gun fire. Through this fire Pfc. RALPH

LEAVITT dashed up the hill and dragged back the wounded BENSON who was forward on an

exposed ridge. The platoon made litters from raincoats, blankets and shelter-halves, and used

the recently captured prisoners to carry the wounded to the base of the hill where they were

cared for by the weapons platoon.

While the 2nd Platoon was held up on the exposed nose of Hill 807 by fire coming from Le

Coste on their left, the 3rd Platoon under Lieutenant JACK BENNETT, tried to advance up on the

right nose of Le Coste. They hoped to clean out the machine gun firing on the 2nd Platoon. This

machine gun, being on the north reverse slope of Le Coste, was masked from their fire, but had a

clear field of fire on Hill 807. As Lieutenant BENNETT’s 3rd Platoon reached this mask, they in

turn were fired on by snipers from the German reverse (north) slope of Hill 807. When they tried

to move further to the left on Le Coste and thus over the ridge, two machine guns opened up

with enfilade fire from further west on Le Coste. They now were pinned down by this fire from

their left. Pfc. JEROME GREEN volunteered to run back through the fire to Lieutenant DUTTWEILER

to explain this situation.

It was rapidly growing dark. Battalion headquarters and Company F had moved up behind

Company G. Before GREEN got back, Lieutenant BENNETT was able to withdraw his platoon

under cover of darkness. Also at this time, the 1st Battalion was heard far down on the left slope

of Le Coste. Company F advanced into the gap between the 1st Battalion and the nose where the

3rd Platoon had been held up, and took this section of Le Coste without trouble, in the dark.

Then Company G was able to move up over the crest, with the 3rd Platoon on the right nose of Le

Coste. The open slope on the left end of Hill 807 remained an unoccupied gap between Companies

G and E. Contact was made on both sides and fifteen prisoners worked all night carrying

wounded back. Artillery fell during the night, but most of the firing was over.

COMPANY E

At about noon, after Company F men had worked their way up and had taken Hill 840 by

flanking action, Captain LE GRAND A. PENDREY of Company E walked over to 840 to meet

Major PAUL TOWNSEND for further orders. He was instructed to move off of Mt. Pigna and

follow Company G in its attack up Mt. Sette Croci to the east. The company reached the top of

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Mt. Sette Croci without incident, and at 1600 they were ordered to lead the battalion off to the

north to Hill 807.

The company moved out, the 2nd Platoon on the right and the 3rd Platoon on the left. They

crossed through a deep difficult draw and across the valley and up the wooded slopes of 807. To

their left was one platoon of Company G. The section of Hill 807 in front of Company G was an

open slope, and while the platoons of Company E moved up through the woods to the top of the

hill without difficulty, the platoon of Company G was pinned down on the bare shoulder by machine

gun and sniper fire. Sgt. ARTHUR HARRINGTON and Sgt. JOHN DIANI, from the 1st

Platoon, moved over under the covering fire of the platoon to assist Company G. As they closed

in on a machine gun from the rear, they came under heavy fire. The two sergeants, however,

kept on going, and the German machine gunners fled up the hill with their gun. Some enemy

snipers further up the hill followed them.

Another platoon of G was pinned down to the left on Le Coste ridge. As darkness fell, Company

F moved up still further left on Le Coste allowing G to move forward again. Company E

dug in on Hill 807 for the night, but the barren shoulder to the left was unoccupied. Company G

occupied the east end of the long Le Coste ridge and the gap between Le Coste and Hill 807.

Wire was laid up to 807 during the night that somehow had direct connection with General

HAYS. The company was cut in on many Division conversations. They overheard Colonel

FOWLER order the 1st Battalion to move onto their objectives with more speed. He said, “The

2nd Battalion is carrying the ball. The 1st Battalion has not even been running interference.”

This referred to the fact that the 1st Battalion was thought to have taken all of Le Coste ridge

before the attack of the 2nd Battalion on Hill 807. Actually, while E and G fought up 807, the 1st

Battalion was fighting for the extreme left end of Le Coste, which was of no assistance to the 2nd

Battalion. Fire from Le Coste had held up Company G on 807, and then G, attempting to go up

Le Coste, had been pinned down by fire coming from Hill 807. In the absence of the 1st Battalion

on the right (eastern) half of Le Coste, Company F after dark had to move up to solve the situation.

As will soon become clear, the 1st Battalion was having difficulties of its own.

COMPANY H

The 1st Platoon of Company H, still attached to Company E, crossed over Mt. Pigna and Mt.

Sette Croci during the day through frequent shelling. From here they had moved forward to Hill

766 and delivered overhead fire in support of Company E’s attack on Hill 807. After dark they

displaced and arrived on Hill 807 at 2200. There they dug in for the night. Only a few of the men

were able to get rations, and they had no water except what some of the men in desperation had

taken from the mud holes. During the day, so great had been the desire for water that in one

place water had been drunk from streams that the mules had fouled up. The digging in, so necessary

under the constant artillery fire, at times was nearly impossible on the rocky Italian mountaintops.

Pfc. JACK M. BROWN, going back for ammunition just before dark, was hit in the leg

by shrapnel.

COMPANY F—LE COSTE

At 1700, Company F moved over onto Mt. Sette Croci, and later, at 2100, they were sent to

Hill 815 directly north to await further orders. It was a long, difficult march in the dusk for the

weary, thirsty troops, down the steep hill, through the draw on an azimuth, and up to the top

again, under some artillery and mortar fire.

On their arrival at dark, the company was ordered to take the central section of the long hill,

Le Coste. Company G had been, and still was, pinned down on the right end, and F was to pass

by G and take the hill, the 1st Battalion being on the west end. The weapons and heavy machine

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gun section set up on 815. The fire was good and lifted on a red signal as the company took the

hill. Ten Germans gave up without resistance. The hill was organized defensively in the order of

their coming up, with the 1st on the left, 3rd on the right, and the 2nd in the middle. That night

rations and water caught up and were issued to the company.

Early in the day the battalion aid station had moved to Mo. Dozzone, southeast of Mt. Pigna.

From here they handled the large number of casualties of the day over a litter haul of three difficult

miles. Prisoners were used to carry many of the litters because of the shortage of litter bearers.

Two men of the section were wounded near the aid station: T/5 VINCENT B. DOWD and

Pfc. EDGAR F. ALLEN.

Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion had jumped off and taken a series of small hills on the way to Le

Coste. All of these hills were very exposed on the regiment’s left flank. The attack of the 85th on

the left had not gotten far. Its right battalion was in fact still on the hills due west of Torre Iussi.

Therefore, each of the hills taken by the 1st Battalion on the second day was entirely exposed to

the commanding ground to the northwest, supposed to be taken by the 85th as well as the rolling

country to the north.

COMPANY B—HILLS 834 AND 838

Company B moved out at 0700 for Hill 834 with Company A on the left. There was little opposition,

and many prisoners were taken. However, enemy sniper fire continually harassed the

men. While halted on Hill 834, Sgt. WILLIAM J. BETTENBERG, 3rd Platoon, was killed by a

sniper bullet. Company A passed through while B waited on Hill 834. From 834 the company

moved to the next objective, Hill 838. Opposition was light, and only occasional artillery and

mortar fire was received. The 2nd Platoon cleared out Hill 838 and took many prisoners. Orders

were received to dig in and prepare to attack Le Coste. The foxholes had no more than been

completed when an artillery concentration came in, and small arms fire combed the area. Second

Lieutenant GILBERT G. HOUSLEY, leader of the 1st Platoon, was killed in his foxhole by an 88.

Pfc. JAMES C. SERAKOS, Pfc. JOHN J. TOMICH, Pfc. WILLIAM E. WELLS, and Pfc. WALTER

DILLER were all killed by 88s. S/Sgt. ALBERT N. FRANK was wounded and evacuated, Sgt.

SYLVAN D. WALDRIP taking over the 1st Platoon. Also wounded were Pfc. MAURO R. ALEMAN,

Pfc. LAWRENCE A. DE VORE, Pfc. LEONARD R. DYER, Pfc. DONALD F. ELDER, Pfc.

ROY E. FERNANDEZ, Pfc. HARRY F. GATES, Pfc. CHARLES E. HULL, Pfc. LESTER A.

MANUEL, Pfc. HERBERT B. STOUT, Pfc. JAMES E. TOOHILL, Pfc. VIRGIL H. WASHBURN,

Sgt. RALPH L. EDLUND, and S/Sgt. EARL G. SONRICKER.

COMPANY A—HILL 802

Meanwhile Company A was to take Hill 802. They followed as B took Hill 834. Machine gun

fire at this time hit them, wounding Pfc. RAYMOND J. CYCHOSZ. Hill 834 was taken in a hurry,

and then A moved up over the hill through B. Hill 802 lay directly to the north and a deep draw

separated the two hills. As they crossed down into the draw, they came to a muddy stream, the

first water they had seen since they pushed off. The men greedily drank the dirty water.

The 1st and 2nd Platoons abreast attacked up Hill 802, through machine gun and sniper fire

coming both from Vedetola to the right front, and from Hill 834 in the left rear. They took the hill

with little trouble, receiving fire on top only from a group of houses in the valley to the left rear.

Then artillery pounded the top of the hill forcing them back onto the reverse slope. Here, safe

from the artillery, they were opened up on from the rear by machine gun and sniper fire that

drilled all over the slope. Second Lieutenant OWEN W. FLIGG, JR., the D Company forward observer,

was instantly killed. Then the enemy artillery took more elevation and dropped rounds

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into the trees as the machine gun fire continued to rake the hill. One tree burst killed Pfc. ERIK

H. HAMILTON and Pfc. PAUL L. KLEIN, and wounded Pfc. HERBERT B. CLARKE, JR. and

DONALD W. BAKER. T/Sgt. MASON B. FLAGG, S/Sgt. WILLIAM A. PRICE, Pfc. LOUIS F.

ANDERSON, WILLIAM C. ALBRIGHT, SALVATORE J. TOSCANO, and ALOIS J. HOELLER

were all wounded by this combination of fire.

Company B had moved on and left Hill 834 open. It was believed that had they stayed there,

this fire from the rear would have been neutralized. Actually, Company B was ordered off to

attack Hill 838, but Company C was expected to close in behind B. At 1220 Colonel FOWLER

ordered the 1st Battalion to get Company C forward closer behind A and B. Company C at this

time was back with the Battalion CP on Hill 903, where their company commander had just been

wounded. Fire from the sector of the 85th had slowed their progress through the Torre Iussi

minefields in the morning.

Captain KLEMME’s messenger, Pfc. HARRY H. DUNN, was killed by this fire on Hill 802,

and the mortar sergeant, Sgt. EUGENE C. LOUMAN, was wounded. The 3rd Squad from the 1st

Platoon was sent back to occupy and hold Hill 834 to protect the company’s rear. As they moved

back across the ravine, two men, Pfc. ALFRED R. OAKES and Pfc. WILBUR H. CORNISH, were

wounded by artillery. Reaching the top, the squad opened up on the sniper fire and silenced it.

Then Lieutenant DONALD FOX led half of his 3rd Platoon down into the valley and assaulted

the machine gunners. They were covered by company fire, and advanced directly into the face of

the machine gunners for about 500 yards. Pfc. GEORGE B. GREGORY was hit and S/Sgt. WILLIAM

A. PRICE also was wounded, but the men kept going down into the grassy valley. Assaulting

the positions, they killed six Nazis, took four prisoners, and the rest fled. This was a brilliant

maneuver.

COMPANY C—BATTALION RESERVE

Company C was to follow Company A to the northeast from their reserve position on Hill

860. They moved out, led by the 2nd Platoon, then the 3rd, and the weapons platoon. One squad

of the 3rd was designated as rear guard security, for the country to the northwest of the regimental

left boundary had not been secured. After they passed through Torre Iussi, and as elements

were picking their way through the heavily mined draw, sniper fire opened up on them at close

range. One observer, T/5 RANDOLPH C. SMITH, from the 616th Field Artillery was killed and

another wounded. A little later, First Sergeant LESTER S. ERSLAND was sniped at, the fire

throwing dirt into his eyes, blinding him and throwing him off the narrow trail through the

mines. As he stumbled off, he tripped a schu mine and fell on four others, dying instantly. The

majority of the company, by this time, was on Hill 903 occupying the old positions of Company

A. They had crossed in two separate groups which joined at this time. Their movement had

been covered with BAR fire by Pfc. JOSEH ZIMINSKY who had also covered for part of the 2nd

Battalion. Some shellfire had hit the draws during the crossing, in addition to the sniper and

mine danger, but no one was hit.

The men who still had some of yesterday’s ration left had lunch while waiting orders on the

reverse slope of Hill 903. The hillside was quiet and the men moved about in the open, and some

of the men sat by their holes. Captain MORLAN NELSON was returning with the order from the

forward slope where he had just left Colonel ROSS WILSON. Captain WILLIAM D. CAMPBELL

of the 616th Field Artillery was with him. Just as they reached their hole, a single mortar round

crashed in. Both captains were wounded, also Pfc. GERALD E. BIRDSONG and Pfc. CHARLES

MILAUSKAS. Second Lieutenant JAMES A. ANDERSON III assumed command since First Lieutenant

RICHARD C. POWERS, the executive officer, had gone back where the First Sergeant fell

to get the company records. At about 1400 the company moved out, dropping down the forward

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slope and striking the road running up the valley. Some time around 1500 or 1600 they met the

1st Platoon, which had been with the tanks, and First Lieutenant JAMES H. PENROSE took over

the company.

COMPANY B—LE COSTE

Company B remained on Hill 838 until the order to attack Le Coste was given at 1445. Corps

artillery fired 100 delayed-action 155-mm shells on the north slope to “crater the ground,” in addition

to the regular preparation. At 1500, the company moved out, 2nd Platoon leading, 3rd and

1st following. The heavy machine guns of Company D and the 37-mm gun platoon of Headquarters

Company supported the attack. At the bottom of Hill 838, the 2nd Platoon received enemy

machine gun fire from its right front, and the platoon shifted to the right under cover of a

wooded knoll, to try to locate the enemy positions near a group of houses. The 1st and 3rd Platoons

moved up and took positions on the left of the 2nd. The 3rd Platoon moved on to Le Coste,

covered by fire from the 2nd Platoon and the light machine gun section. Pfc. WILLIAM R.

ROACH was hit by the heavy mortar fire that began to fall at that time. The mortar fire raked the

open draw to be crossed ahead, and also the company’s position at the foot of Hill 838.

S/Sgt. JAMES R. FERRIL advanced to the top of the knoll on the right, and was promptly hit

in the arm by machine gun fire. By this time the mortar fire was growing heavier, and the 1st

Platoon, followed by the command group, crossed the open field to Le Coste on the double. After

the 1st Platoon had taken positions on the objective, the 2nd Platoon moved to its left and

crossed in the same place. The 3rd Platoon had attempted to clear out the houses down the slope

to their right, and S/Sgt. EIVIND JAHR, Pfc. WILLIAM E. CULLEN, Pfc. HAROLD V. WEEDMAN,

Pvt. THEODORE WEIDEMAN, Pvt. DALE L. BERTCH, Pvt. EDWARD A. BILLOTTI, Pvt.

JAY R. BULTMAN, Pvt. LORA N. HAUGHT, Pvt. DON K. KILLOUGH, Pvt. EUGENE A. RICE,

Pvt. KENNETH S. RYMAL and Pvt. LLOYD A. HARRIS were wounded by machine gun fire.

Then Captain CLARENCE H. SWEDBERG ordered T/Sgt. OSCAR L. CLEMENT, acting platoon

leader of the 2nd Platoon, to take a volunteer group armed with automatic weapons and grenade

launchers to clean the houses out. The group returned to report that the enemy had withdrawn.

Seventeen Germans, carrying white flags, came out of a dugout at the foot of Hill 838, walked

up to our positions, and surrendered. Second Lieutenant GEORGE B. BOSWELL put them to

work as litter teams to evacuate the wounded men of the 3rd Platoon.

After the west end of Le Coste was secured, and foxholes dug on our reverse slope, the 2nd

Platoon, at about 1900, was ordered to go back to a group of German aid station buildings on the

ridge 200 yards north of 838, and set up defenses for the night, with the 37-mm gun platoon of

Headquarters Company. The rest of the company dug in on Le Coste. Holes were dug protecting

the buildings, and were manned in shifts until morning.

COMPANY A—LE COSTE

Company A was ordered to attack Le Coste in conjunction with Company B at 1500. It was

impossible to be sure which of the many hills to their front was Le Coste, so the company waited

for the 15-minute artillery barrage to open up, and with this as identification, moved forward.

The reorganized company was cut down to two rifle platoons and a weapons platoon of one machine

gun squad and two mortar squads. The 2nd Platoon established a base of fire on Le Coste,

covering the assault of the 1st Platoon. They advanced up the hill under machine gun fire from

the draw to the left, and against some sniper fire from the left and from the top of the hill. This

did not hold them up, and they gained the top of the left end. Cpl. DAVID C. HOYT, with two

other men, ran over the crest of the hill, and was shot and killed by fire from bypassed dugouts to

the rear. Sgt. GEORGE C. MCCUTCHEN, the acting 1st Platoon sergeant, led four men along the

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ridge to the right. They ran into four enemy and captured two of them. A BAR man, LEE L.

HALL, when artillery started to hit the hill, jumped up to move into a safer position. A shell hit

and killed him. Pfc. MELVILLE W. BORDERS, JR., firing with his M-1 at a Kraut one hundred

yards away in the bushes, was struck and wounded by a rifle grenade. The same grenade

wounded Sgt. FLOYD P. BUTLER. Pfc. BORDERS, who was seriously wounded and in danger of

bleeding to death, was saved by Pfc. WELDON STOREY who stayed all night by him changing

his tourniquet. The 2nd Platoon, delivering covering fire from the rear for the assault, received

heavy artillery fire that burst in the trees above them, as well as some machine gun fire. Pfc.

EMIL BIJAK, Pfc. LAZARO BARRERA, Pfc. VERN A. UPTON, and Pfc. MANUEL G. ABASTA,

JR. were wounded and lay in this area all night ABASTA later died of his wounds. The artillery

fire became so fierce that the platoon had to move out, firing as they went.

At this time Company B, which was to attack on the right abreast of A, was held up by machine

gun fire, and had been able to get only one platoon up onto Le Coste. The 1st Platoon of A

had made contact with B. The 2nd Platoon of A was crossing the draw to move up onto the hill

when a German counterattack struck them. The platoon rushed into position behind a knife-like

ridge. German grenades started dropping over the ridge on the men occupying the reverse slope.

Pfc. JOHN R. BENTON, Pfc. LOUIS H. KOSITS, and Pfc. FREDERICK J. HARE were wounded.

The platoon was in a bad position because the men were unable to see over the ridge without exposing

themselves to the waiting Germans. To regain the initiative, Pfc. ALLEN CURTIS jumped

up on one knee and with his BAR fired one whole magazine of ammunition. He killed three of

the Germans, and may have hit several others. This aggressive action shoved the counterattack

back, but enemy troops could be seen forming for a larger scale assault of the whole hill. It was

1800 and the men were very weary. Their apprehension for their dangerous situation combined

with their fatigue and their many casualties put them in low spirits.

Suddenly an artillery shell whistled just over their heads, barely clearing the ridge, and fell

on the enemy below. Others followed by the dozens. At first the apprehension of the men grew.

These shells were falling too close for comfort. This was no time for a friendly artillery barrage to

fall short and disorganize the company. Their fears were unfounded. This was the first of many

magnificent close-support “box barrages” to be fired by the British artillery 5.5s at crucial moments

when most needed by the troops. As the shells tumbled over right in the box, the scared

men took heart, the gloom lifted, and they felt like cheering. Meanwhile Company B had infiltrated

across onto Le Coste, one at a time, and had reassembled on the hill. Down the left in the

valley was a little town clustered around a church. A machine gun opened up in the tower pinning

down the exposed left flank. The artillery barrage shifted over into the valley and the machine

gun fire ceased. All of Company B had reorganized on the hill by 2000, and both companies

dug in for the night on the western half of Le Coste.

The regimental attack order for the day had assigned the whole ridge to the 1st Battalion.

The 2nd Battalion, with the mission changed during the day to seize Hill 807, assumed that the

whole of Le Coste would be occupied by the 1st Battalion simultaneously with their occupation

of 807. Therefore, when no sign of the 1st Battalion was seen on the eastern end of Le Coste,

Company F was sent after dark to seize and occupy the eastern half.

Also wounded on Le Coste during 15 April were Pfc. JOHN D. SMITH, Pfc. TROY R. WINSLETT

and Pvt. RONALD V. WILSON. Pfc. FRANK S. LONCKI, a 1st Battalion driver, was

wounded by rock fragments from an artillery burst while evacuating wounded from Le Coste.

COMPANY C—BATTALION RESERVE

Company C reached Hill 834 at 1700 and dug in for the night. They were still in battalion reserve

with A and B on Le Coste. The 85th Mountain Infantry had made little progress on the left,

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and Company C had the almost impossible task of being a reserve for the 1st Battalion while being

held back nearly a mile to protect the gap between regiments. At dusk, elements of the 3rd

Battalion were still passing through on their way up to Mt. Croce where Company K was fighting.

Sgt. EDWARD D. STACKWICK, moving his men, glanced around at a man who came up to

him. Then he looked again. The light was poor, but the man was a German and Sgt. STACKWICK

took him prisoner with his shovel. The digging wasn’t pleasant in this area; one man uncovered

a buried Kraut, and much worse, another man dug up a schu mine. The night was very

cold and the men had no blankets, and had had no food or water since jumping off the day before.

COMPANY D

Late in the morning, the mortars displaced forward to a point just south of Mt. Pigna. Here

they set up at about noon and fired in support of the attack on Hills 834, 802, and Le Coste. The

OP was established on Mt. Pigna in a field of schu mines. At dusk the mortars moved forward

again to a position between Hills 815 and 838. This entire movement was by hand-carry.

The machine gun platoons had moved along with their respective rifle companies. The 2nd

Platoon, moving up Mt. Pigna behind Company B, was hit by artillery fire at about 1600. S/Sgt.

JAMES C. WHYTE was killed. At about noon, artillery falling on Hill 812 had wounded Pfc.

JAMES A. GILMORE, Pfc. CARL L. DUMPS of the 2nd Platoon, and Pfc. JOSEPH R. HIGDON of

the company medics. Also Pfc. LOUIE J. GWATNEY had fallen in the rough terrain while carrying

a machine gun and had badly injured his hand. The 1st Platoon, following Company A in

their attack on Hill 802, came under frequent shellfire. On 802, Sgt. GUSTAVO E. FELIX and Pvt.

JOSEPH S. WARNER were hit by artillery just as the attack was jumping off at about noon. Late

in the afternoon at about 1800, while the platoon was digging in on Le Coste, a shell landed in the

hole with Pfc. J. B. SPARKS. Miraculously he was not killed, but seriously wounded. The shovel

he was using was blown to fragments. Second Lieutenant OWEN W. FLIGG, JR., forward observer

with Company B, was killed by machine gun and sniper fire just after the company occupied

Hill 838. The company had been forced back from the forward slopes by artillery fire and

then was opened up on by snipers from the valley to the rear. In the “stubby” mortar section,

which had been switched from B to A during the attack on Le Coste, Pfc. HENRY LEYMAN was

killed during the assault.

In the morning Colonel FOWLER had ordered that the 3rd Battalion be committed at 1300 to

take Le Coste, the long ridge which was later seized and held jointly by the 1st and 2nd Battalions,

and Mt. Croce to the east. Earlier, General HAYS had directed that the 3rd be used to assist

the 1st if its attack slowed down anywhere. The 3rd Battalion was to come into this attack from

the south. The 1st Battalion was expected to be still fighting on 802, with Company C protecting

the left flank and rear. It was still hoped that tanks could be gotten up for the attack with the 3rd

Battalion, and the weary engineers continued their efforts to open the mined and blown roads

forward.

However, the 1st Battalion reached 802 and 838 before noon, so it was directed to continue on

to Le Coste, and the 3rd Battalion was to remain behind Mt. Pigna in reserve. At 1447 a new mission

was given to the 3rd Battalion as a result of a new directive given to Regiment by General

HAYS. Lieutenant Colonel ROBERT C. WORKS, commanding 3rd Battalion, had just returned

from a reconnaissance of Le Coste to Hill 838, then held by Company B, when the order reached

him to “attack Hill 807, if the 2nd Battalion doesn’t get there before you do, and continue on to

capture Mt. Croce before dark.”

Apr 15

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After the leading company of the Battalion, Company I, had moved east down the draw from

Vedetola to Treviso, killing or capturing 40 of the enemy, and crossing at right angles through the

2nd Battalion already moving north from Mt. Sette Croci, Colonel WORKS met Major PAUL

TOWNSEND on Hill 784 and learned that the 2nd Battalion was taking Hill 807. Therefore, at

1800, after his battalion in moving parallel to the front had passed through two other battalions,

Colonel WORKS issued the order to seize Mt. Croce further to the east. Meanwhile the 3rd Battalion

had done some fighting en route.

COMPANY I—HILLS 815, 784 AND 766

Starting at 0900, Company I led the battalion along the wagon road into Torre Iussi. The 1st

Platoon was leading, and as they reached Torre Iussi, they and part of the 2nd Platoon were

pinned down by machine gun fire coming from Hill 898 northwest of the town. This hill was

presumably occupied by one company of the 85th. However, eighteen Germans with several

machine guns were located down on the steep sides of the hill. Even though bypassed the day

before, they continued fanatically to fire into the town. Repeated requests to the 85th through

regimental headquarters finally brought about their capture. Sgt. ARMANDO CIANCHETTI

and Pfc. MORRIS LIEBMAN, both from the 2nd Platoon, took BARs over into a clump of trees.

From there they were somewhat able to neutralize the machine gun fire and cover the withdrawal

of the pinned-down elements. Sgt. ALEXANDER J. BEAUCHESNE got his 1st Platoon

organized under this covering fire, and moved them across through the woods, into the draw,

and up onto the road running south around the base of Hill 903. The rest of the company in the

rear had not been pinned down, and they led the battalion across the valley about 500 yards

southeast of Torre Iussi and came up onto the road south of Hill 903. A few men from the 2nd

Platoon and the two men with the BARs still remained in town. Lieutenant ROBERT STEWART

went back from the road, rounded these men up, and rejoined the company.

As the various elements of the company reached a point of safety on the road behind the

shoulder of the mountain, Lieutenant MAURICE EWING, of the 1st Platoon, directed them up on

the steep hillside into dispersed positions. Then he went up the hill with one other man to set up

an observation post while the company dug in. Some artillery started dropping in on this area.

Lieutenant EWING, although he had left his rifle down below in a foxhole, returned with two

frightened prisoners. Also, T/5 EUGENE S. FITZSIMMONS, a company medic, discovered a

German in a foxhole nearby. Since as an aid man he was unarmed, he grabbed the German’s rifle

from him, and ordered him to move up to the company area. The company dropped their packs

in this assembly area.

Sgt. BEAUCHESNE captured a prisoner as the company advanced up the saddle east of Hill

903, and the platoon scout, Pfc. LEON STEWART, flushed out two more Germans from a dugout.

The objective of the company had been Le Coste, but because of the unexpected progress of the

1st Battalion, the order was changed and the company was ordered to clear the high ground on

either side of the draw east of Vedetola by seizing Hills 815, 784, and 766. The company marched

down and turned right (east) into the valley north of Mt. Pigna. The 2nd Platoon made their way

to Hill 815. They saw a German run into a house halfway up the slope, and covering the house

with rifle fire, assaulted it with a squad of men. They threw two grenades into the house, and

two Germans came out with their hands in the air. The hill was taken without further incident.

The attached platoon of heavy machine guns was emplaced on the southeast slope of Hill 838

to support the attack of the 3rd Platoon on Hill 784. The platoon moved without difficulty up the

hill and occupied it. Then Second Lieutenant CHARLES F. BARNWELL and Pfc. EARL H. STEVENS

went down to make a reconnaissance near the town of Seccadella. Sniper fire hit them,

killing STEVENS and wounding Lieutenant BARNWELL. Platoon sergeant GEORGE BREED73

LOVE took command immediately. He sent three or four men over to seek out the snipers. They

killed one and wounded the other. A total of six prisoners were taken from the hill. The 1st Platoon,

under Lieutenant EWING, meanwhile had been moving toward Hill 766 further to the

south, crossing some rough country and a very deep draw. They reached the objective and

moved up the hill without being fired on. On top of the hill they received two rifle grenades,

fired at them from a draw to the right side of the hill. No one was hit, and elements of the platoon,

working their way down, took ten prisoners from a cave well stocked with ammunition.

Their objective was occupied and consolidated by 1700. It then took them two hours, over the

rough terrain, to find the rest of the company.

Three men from the 1st Platoon had been lost while returning, and they didn’t rejoin the

company until the offensive had moved out into the Po Valley. One man found himself in Company

B and continued to fight through the action with Company B.

That evening the company waited on Hill 784 from 1900 to 2000 while the rest of the battalion

passed through them on their way to attack Mt. Croce. At 2400 the company was moved to the

town of Coste on the south slope of Mt. Croce and spent the night there, some in foxholes, others

in the houses.

COMPANY K—MT. CROCE

Company K had followed I past Torre Iussi, the town that had proved so costly to the 1st Battalion

the day before, and through the valley west of Mt. Pigna. On reaching the battalion assembly

area northeast of Pigna at noon, they ran into sniper fire coming from Hill 834, which had

already been taken and left behind by the 1st Battalion. Elements from the 3rd Platoon went up

and cleaned up the hill taking two prisoners, and bringing down a wounded 1st Battalion man.

The company rushed though the own of Vedetola as it was being shelled, and hurried into a deep

draw beyond. While moving down this long draw, more shellfire hit them, killing S/Sgt. JOHN

C. MARRONE, and wounding Pfc. RODNEY M. VINCENT, both from the 2nd Platoon, and Pfc.

DONALD M. MARSHALL of the weapons platoon. Pfc. MARSHALL W. JAMES, Pfc. PHILIP A.

SANTASIERO and Pfc. JOHN J. SLIFKA injured themselves falling on the rough terrain.

At 1600 Company K was ordered to take Mt. Croce. Company I had finished taking Hills

815, 784, and 766 by 1700 and was firmly established on 766. Captain ROGER EDDY, the company

commander, took the platoon leaders out of a very deep draw and moved up to the left to

make a visual reconnaissance. The 1st Platoon was to lead the attack, followed by the 2nd and

3rd. The machine guns were to be attached to the leading platoon, and the mortars were in the

rear. While the company waited in the draw they were hit by intense mortar fire.

When the leaders returned, the company moved out into a terrific mortar barrage. S/Sgt.

EDWARD LYJAK, and Pfc. LORN W. PHILLIPS and Pfc. CLIFFORD E. MACQUEEN were

wounded. They moved through the fire to the main Tolè road, and up the road, not clearing out

the buildings as they went. A half-mile from Tolè they turned right at a road junction and started

up along the south edge of Hill 807. The 1st Platoon reached the top of the shoulder of Mt. Croce

before being opened up on by an enemy light machine gun. The fire came from a house to the

right rear below them on the Locari Scuola road. Squad leader S/Sgt. CLAUS SCHROEDER and

platoon guide S/Sgt. JOHN J. WELCH were killed as the platoon kept advancing. The platoon

leader, Second Lieutenant ROBERT S. BARR, Sgt. CARL P. HUJANEN, Pfc. MARVIN C. LUTZ,

Pfc. EDWARD SNYDER, and Pvt. CHARLES W. ADKINS were all killed as the 1st Platoon

pushed on up the hill against rifle fire. Pvt. WILLIAM J. SHERRARD, the platoon runner, was

wounded. Also Pfc. SEVILLE S. FUNK and Pvt. JACK R. BERGLUND were shot by rifle fire, and

Sgt. ROBERT F. ZATREPALEK got a rifle shot in the neck. T/Sgt. ARTHUR O. SCHIMKE of the

1st Platoon, running forward up the hill, took twelve prisoners out of dugouts without firing a

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shot. Then he moved the platoon on without orders up to Mt. Croce. They had excellent artillery

support. Starting at 250 yards distance, the support lifted when the platoon came within 100

yards, under excellent control by “300” radio. Mt. Croce was taken without a shot being fired by

the platoon. The company reorganized at 2030 just at dark, the 3rd Platoon on the left, 2nd and

then 1st in a defensive position.

During the reorganization, heavy mortar fire killed S/Sgt. WARREN H. SEEBADE, and

wounded S/Sgt. THEODORE R. MUENSTER and Pfc. PAUL P. PAONE. Also Pfc. DENZIL

WILLIAMS was hit in the ear by shrapnel, and Pfc. WILLIAM R. ROBERTS had to be evacuated

because of shellshock. They could see the mortar position only 150 yards away, and fired at it.

Five of the enemy mortar men started up the hill toward them, but were driven off by one squad

of the 2nd Platoon. Then the company defense was consolidated on the hill, and contact was

made by patrol with the 2nd Battalion on the left, on Hill 807. Company L next appeared moving

through in a column of twos, and took positions on the right rear on Mt. Croce.

The 1st Platoon was next hit by a counterattack. It was of only about seven-man strength,

with two light machine guns, but it caught the men digging in. Two more men of the 1st Platoon

were wounded: Acting squad leader Pfc. CLARENCE C. LEVERS, and Pfc. WILLIAM D.

FLETCHER, were both hit by hand grenades. The 1st Platoon, by this time, was cut down to 18

men, but with Sgt. JAMES C. TOOMEY of Company M and his heavy machine gun, the enemy

was finally repulsed. TOOMEY stuck by his gun as the riflemen withdrew. Alone, he fired furiously

at the counterattacking Germans, and then as they spread out he grabbed an M-1 and killed

three of them. The riflemen from behind him got two or three, and the rest were driven off. The

18 men of the 1st Platoon were then reinforced by two squads from the 3rd Platoon. At the same

time, a squad was requested from Company L.

All night, long-range harassing machine gun fire fell, just enough to keep the men awake. It

sounded like the Germans were pulling back, but early in the morning another counterattack

struck the 1st Platoon. The Germans attacked with one squad and a machine gun. The 1st Platoon

fired a rifle grenade which hit the German machine gunner squarely and wounded his assistant,

breaking up the attack. However, Pfc. ROBERT L. WAGNER, Pfc. ARNETT W. MINEAR,

and Pfc. JAMES W. ARNOLD were all wounded by hand grenades.

COMPANY L—BATTALION RESERVE

When the battalion moved out at 0900 on the 15th, Company L was in battalion reserve, following

K. They marched along the road toward Torre Iussi passing the previous day’s carnage of

mules and men, turned right before Serra Sarzana, cut across the valley and passed around the

southern edge of 903. They then turned left to the north between Hill 903 and Hill 868, and circled

around through the valley north of Mt. Pigna.

As the company approached the houses of Vedetola from the west, they came under machine

gun fire, but were able to keep moving. Beyond the village they moved along into a draw, and

on through the draw toward Treviso, when artillery fell on them, killing Pfc. GLENN L. CHRYSLER

and T/5 MERVIN H. LEWIS. T/Sgt. RAYMOND G. FLYNN, Sgt. CLARENCE E. KENTZ,

Pfc. OWEN R. JOHNSTUN, and Pfc. ROBERT J. WILLIAMS were wounded. Pfc. PEDRO L. ISLAS

was also wounded, but stayed with the company. They captured four prisoners through

here and used them as litter bearers. By 1700 Company I had taken the last of its three hills, and

L, echeloned to the right, was following K up Mt. Croce. East of the little town of Coste they captured

an enemy CP including two battalion commanders. Then they occupied the high ground to

the right rear of Company K on Mt. Croce and dug in for the night. Pfc. WALTER W. HODGE

was killed here by artillery. Sgt. NEAL C. YORKER had been hit in the arm by a shell fragment

earlier in the evening.

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COMPANY M

Company M, using mules instead of jeeps, had three casualties in the morning when hit by

mortar fire across the minefield beyond Torre Iussi. Wounded were Pfc. JOHN H. WIGGINS,

Pfc. JOHN W. RUIS, and Pfc. HOLLIE BOWERS, all from the 1st Platoon. Later that night on Mt.

Croce, Pfc. MOSE KEARSE, a 2nd Platoon machine gunner attached to Company K, was killed by

shrapnel. Pfc. J. B. BALLEW, Pfc. JACK ARIAIL, and Pfc. CLOYCE E. COLLIER of the same platoon

were wounded at the same time.

In the other section of the same machine gun platoon, which was still attached to Company I,

Pfc. VERN E. CROWELL and Pfc. MAYFORD W. LAWRENTZ were wounded at nearly the same

time.

In the 1st Platoon, Pfc. JAMES E. COBB was hurt and evacuated, and Second Lieutenant

JAMES T. MILLS, the mortar platoon leader, was wounded by shell fragments outside of the

company CP. The battalion gun platoon had trouble with the mules which had to be used because

of the blown-out narrow mountain roads and the narrow trails through the minefields.

The men had trouble keeping the bulky, heavy weapons on the backs of the small Alpine mules.

Throughout the push in the mountain phase, the mules remained a problem for the gun crews.

They had to be overloaded; they tired easily; and then would lie down in their tracks, rolling off

their loads. It was an ordeal in an open valley under observation to get the mule to his feet and

repack his load while artillery and mortar fire came in. The gun platoon had difficulty keeping

up with the rapid battalion advance.

Wire had to be laid by mules until the advance reached the Po Valley. Many of the mules

were killed or maimed, and while the use of mules brought many headaches, it was agreed that

they are invaluable for mountain fighting. The only alternative is backpacking.

THIRD DAY—16 APRIL

On the afternoon of the 15th, the 2nd Battalion of the 86th Infantry had the mission of seizing

Mt. Mantino, while the 3rd Battalion, 87th, was directed to capture Mt. Croce. Both battalions

were successful by dark. The 3rd Battalion, 87th, was then directed to continue the attack early

the next morning, along the ridge to the east to Mt. Mosca. This attack was to provide a line of

departure for the 86th Infantry to push vigorously through to the northeast. The 86th was expected

to cross this LD about 0900. The area between Mt. Mantino and Mt. Croce had not been

assigned to any unit. Early on the 16th, Colonel CLARENCE M TOMLINSON, 86th Infantry, reconnoitering

beyond Mt. Mantino, was hit in the arm by sniper fire and evacuated. Lieutenant

Colonel ROBERT M. COOK, executive officer, replaced him as regimental commander. The attack

of the 86th, delayed partly by this change of command, did not cross the LD before 1500. It

will be evident that this delay seriously affected the action of the 3rd Battalion, 87th, all during

the day, because its left flank was thus left entirely exposed.

COMPANY K—MADNA DI RODIANO

At 0200, the order came in by phone to attack to the east toward Madna di Rodiano at 0600,

with K on the left, L on the right, and I in reserve. The attack would run along the ridge that extended

about 4,000 yards east to Mt. Mosca.

In the morning, after a 20-minute artillery and mortar barrage, the 3rd Platoon, Company K,

led off, followed by the 2nd and 1st. The initial situation was confusing. There was a heavy

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morning fog, and the LD was under mortar and small arms fire. Colonel ROBERT C. WORKS,

making his reconnaissance, had four of his party of seven wounded at the outset, including his K

Company runner, Pfc. FRANK S. BISHOP, and Captain WALKER T. WEED II, Battalion S-3. Another

one of the group was hit later. At the moment of crossing the line of departure, a 20-man

enemy counterattack hit the company from the left. All of the 3rd, one-half of the 2nd Platoon,

Lieutenant TOIVO RANTA, and five men of the 1st Squad had crossed. The rest of the platoon

stopped. Pvt. FREDERIC L. PALOW was wounded in the legs by machine gun fire. The platoon

was split.

Captain ROGER EDDY took the rest of the company way around to the left and then forward.

In this way they came around to the rear of the counterattacking Nazis. They shot one

and drove back the rest.

The squads crossed the line of departure on their own initiative and rejoined their platoons.

One squad with one machine gun was left under First Lieutenant JACK T. BURNETT to guard

the rear since the enemy counterattack was not completely broken. The 2nd Platoon passed

through the 3rd, and they were ordered to swing to the right and then forward as far as possible.

If necessary, they were to join Company L on the right. Then the 3rd Platoon and two squads of

the 1st Platoon, plus the heavy machine gun section, went forward along the top of the ridge. On

each knob they left a half-squad to prevent the enemy retaking the knobs and following them

along the ridge. These squads were under fire all morning, but were successful in their mission.

During the morning, the Battalion S-4, First Lieutenant EVERETT J. QUINE, had personally

flushed out 25 Germans from a single house, including a major and a captain. The captain gave

the complete defense plan of Tolè to the IPW Team.

Although Company K had occupied Mt. Croce at dark the night before, there were considerable

pockets of resistance remaining which they had to fight through before crossing the line of

departure and heading east. At 0900 in the morning, Lieutenant Colonel HAY, of the 3rd Battalion,

86th, was heard by Company E over their direct wire, complaining to Division that they were

receiving fire from Mt. Croce, and that they were sure that there was an enemy observation post

there. He said the 3rd Battalion, 87th, had done a poor job of cleaning out. This indicates the

misunderstanding that existed about the area between Mt. Mantino and Mt. Croce. This intervening

area had not been cleaned out, nor had the 3rd Battalion, 87th, been directed to do so.

At 1100 the company was low on ammunition. They were on a small hill, the last before

Madna di Rodiano, the first objective. No physical contact had been made with Company L, or

with the 2nd Platoon of K. To the right front, however, could be heard the sound of firing. Then a

mortar barrage fell on them, an exceedingly heavy one. At this point they were ordered forward

to join Company L in the attack to the east. Without reconnaissance, in the heavy barrage, a

fragmentary order was given and the company moved out. They had thirteen casualties in five

minutes. The shells were bursting in the trees. Killed were: Pfc. DAVID H. C. DENNIS, Pfc.

ORLON J. YODER, and Pfc. JAMES M. STEVENS. Wounded were: S/Sgt. ERLING O. OMLAND,

Sgt. WILLIAM M. GROVES, Pfc. ELMER L. SIMPKINS, Pfc. RAYMOND E. HATCHMAN,

Pfc. CALIXTO L. MURO, Pfc. VICTOR PESPENI, Pfc. DONALD J. FRANK, and Pvt.

JOHN E. MORO. Pfc. GEORGE ZORICK, the commander’s runner, was wounded while running

a message. Also Lieutenant BURNETT, who had rejoined the company, was wounded through

his helmet, creasing his scalp. Pfc. ORVEL E. WOLF of the attached machine gun platoon from

Company M was wounded by artillery while going after ammunition. To go through the mortar

fire was suicidal, so the company stopped and moved to the right over the ridge. From here they

moved down to Madna di Rodiano without further fire, and there found the 2nd Platoon which,

with Company L, had already taken the town and a host of prisoners, 75 men and 4 officers, and

an entire aid station.

77

To go back: the 2nd Platoon, after it swung to the right off of Mt. Croce in the morning leaving

the rest of the company, had an interesting action by itself. They crossed over the ridge and

dropped down to the town of Capponara. There they ran into Company L in the town. Having

been ordered to keep moving, they skirted around the right and south edge of town and worked

east on the right of L. Therefore L Company was between this platoon and the rest of K as both

companies moved toward Madna di Rodiano along the high ground. The platoon soon came to a

group of buildings and flushed out a prisoner. S/Sgt. JOSEPH LEUTHOLD asked the prisoner in

German if there were any other Germans in the houses. The prisoner in a loud voice declared

that there were no others in the buildings, but as he spoke he slyly pointed to one of the buildings.

The sergeant tossed a grenade into this house and eight more Germans came out hands in

air.

This was at about 1100. Some shellfire was coming in, but it wasn’t bothering them much, as

most of it was going down into the valley or hitting Company L further up the ridge. Therefore

the platoon was able to move rapidly and reach a point due south of Madna di Rodiano from

where a rocky lane ran up into the hilltop town of scattered houses and big shade trees. They

moved up the lane.

At the first house a German machine gun was firing west. They tossed in a grenade from behind,

and the platoon sergeant, T/Sgt. PHILIP THURSTON, took two prisoners. From here looking

up the lane they saw six or eight Nazis running out of the front door of the church. The

church was on the west side of the lane so that the door was away from the forces of Company L

fighting toward the church rear. The leading 2nd Squad opened fire and killed three, the rest

fleeing back into the church. This sudden fire from the southern flank must have thrown panic

into the Germans, who until then had been beating back Company L’s successive attacks from the

west. As the platoon waited, a German medic came from the church and said he had a wounded

man inside. Wary of trickery, and covered by the platoon, Lieutenant TOIVO RANTA, S/Sgt.

EDMUND D. BENNETT, Pvt. CARL MORELLI and Pvt. MICHAEL KARPEN moved cautiously

to the church. Lieutenant RANTA stood at the front door, covered by the others, and shoved his

rifle in—ordering anyone inside to come out. Out filed 67 Nazis and two horses. Inside were six

more wounded in a small anteroom. The building was a combination arsenal and aid station. A

wagon outside flew a Red Cross flag. The horses had pulled the wagon down filled with

wounded, and back filled with ammunition. By this time it was noon, and the last units of Company

L, and the 12 men, remnants of the 2nd Platoon, arrived from the west. One of the 12 was

fatally shot by a sniper. The squad went to locate the sniper without success. Some mortar fire

came in at this time too, wounding one L Company man and hitting some prisoners. After allaround

security had been set up, the rest of Company K arrived.

COMPANY L—“BANZAI RIDGE”

Through the morning fog Company L, too, ran into small arms fire, both automatic and rifle,

and had to fight their way to the line of departure near Coste. The area was one of small,

wooded knolls, confusingly broken up, and the fire coming from three sides through the fog

added to the confusion. Before they left Mt. Croce, Pfc. HARRY E. HESKELL was wounded.

Later, a machine gun section leader, S/Sgt. ALLEN C. STROMER, was killed by a machine gun,

as was Pfc. ROBERT P. REICHE. Some mortar fire started crashing into the area too. Sgt. KENNETH

RAFFETY, of M Company, a squad leader in the 1st Platoon, was fatally wounded while

supporting the attack. The 1st Platoon, leading to the line of departure, had its platoon leader,

Second Lieutenant WILLIAM J. WOLFGRAM, killed by machine gun fire, and the platoon, as it

reached the LD at 0630, had been cut down to nineteen men. Killed with Lieutenant WOLFGRAM

was Pvt. CHARLES H. REYNOLDS, JR. by the same machine gun. Pfc. SAM GALLEGOS

was killed by a sniper. Also at this time Pfc. LYNN R. BURTON was hit in the arm and leg by

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machine gun fire and Pfc. JOHN F. KAZMIERCZAK was hit in the mouth. Pfc. THOMAS H.

WARD, Pfc. HENRY A. GREINKE, Pfc. SAMUEL G. TORRICE, and S/Sgt. ALVIN C. SMART

were hit by mortar shrapnel during this same advance. Cpl. HENRY B. SMITH of Headquarters

Company, who was an acting squad leader for the 1st Platoon, was also hit by machine gun fire.

At the same time, lending uncertainty to the situation, Company K was fending off a counterattack

on the left. In spite of this precarious position, the battalion commander, Colonel

WORKS, urged the companies on, believing the 86th Infantry on his right (south) to be waiting

for him to clear the ridge, so that they might cut across his rear, driving north and then northeast

to work out along the ridge nearly parallel to his on the left.

Actually the 86th didn’t cross until 1500, six hours after schedule, and the German occupation

of this ridge throughout the day, armed as they were with direct-fire, high-velocity weapons, cost

the 3rd Battalion dearly. Because of the nature of the rough terrain and the fog, neither of which

permitted a view, and because the enemy had to be fought back from the line of departure, reconnaissance

of the usual nature was impossible. Company L was ordered to “advance by leaps

and bounds as the situation permitted.” Colonel WORKS’ party, trying to make a reconnaissance,

was under aimed fire and lost three of its seven men, plus a fourth later on.

The 2nd Platoon passed through the remnants of the 1st on the LD and moved out on the

right side of the ridgeline. Company K was over the crest on the left where fire was so heavy that

their 2nd Platoon was sent on a flanking mission over onto the south side of the ridge with Company

L. In order not to intermingle with L, this platoon flanked wide and way around to the

right of L, so that K, less one platoon, was on the left of Company L, and the one platoon of K was

on the right, farther down the slope. This platoon moved fast and Company L could see them a

little ahead and down to their right, work fifteen Krauts out of a house.

As the 2nd Platoon of L moved along the ridge, a heavy artillery concentration was landing

harmlessly in the valley to the right. They cleared a stone house and haystack, killing two snipers

and taking three prisoners. They moved rapidly through the swirling fog toward the company

objective of Madna di Rodiano. The weapons platoon received most of the enemy fire. Pfc.

HEINZ KATZMANN, an acting squad leader for the mortars, was hit by artillery while directing

fire. He refused to be evacuated and kept on for two days.

Pfc. ROBERT W. GUSTAFSON, wounded and ordered out of action, first directed his squad

into a fine German dugout as shells came in the area with increasing fury. GUSTAFSON, waiting

until all others were inside, found there was no room for him, and although they called him in, he

yelled back that he would “sweat it out” on the ground. Three artillery shells landed almost on

him, and an unselfish man died.

The 2nd Platoon, meanwhile under no fire, stopped to reorganize in defilade below the last

ridge before their objective. One squad was missing and out of contact. The remaining two

squads formed as skirmishers and attacked the ridge frontally. As they neared the crest, the fog

was lifting, but all opposition seemed to have ceased when, without warning, a fanatical Nazi

officer opened fire point-blank with a burp gun. He was in a shallow foxhole in front of a large

bunker. A BAR man and two riflemen dispatched him quickly, and the squads charged up,

grenaded the bunker and captured fifteen surprised enemy.

Unfortunately, this maneuver must have attracted enemy observers, for as soon as the prisoners

had been disarmed and sent toward the rear out of the line of fire, a concentrated barrage

of 81-mm mortar fire laid in on the ridge where the squads were reorganizing, and machine guns

opened up on them. There was no cover. The squads scrambled back down off the ridge. Pfc.

BERNIE C. GAY and Pfc. HERALD W. MUNDORFF were wounded by rifle grenades, and Pfc.

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JAMES E. HALL by mortar fire. It was now some time after 1000, and from this time until Madna

di Rodiano was taken was as desperate a period as any the 87th experienced. Pfc. FRANCIS P.

GALLES, serving as battalion runner, was sent back from the battalion CP to order Company I

forward. He was hit in both knees by machine gun fire back in the Locari Scuola area.

Back at the foot of the ridge, four of the men of the 2nd Platoon, led by Sgt. STANLEY J.

SLUSARK, worked up unobserved to the forward slope of the ridge where there was some concealment.

There the barrage pinned them down. The rest of the platoon, at the first lull, tried

desperately to reach them. As they crossed the skyline in their charge, the barrage laid in again

and beat them back. Pfc. EDWARD B. SAWYER was seriously wounded by shrapnel, Pfc. WILLIAM

WILLIAMSON by machine gun fire and Pfc. THOMAS C. MCGUIRE by mortar fire.

Back at the bottom of the hill they were joined by the missing squad. They attacked again

with this added strength. For the third time they were forced back. Pfc. STEVE SINCEK was seriously

wounded by machine gun fire. While reorganizing for the third time, Sgt. SLUSARK, one

of the four pinned down on the forward slope, came crawling around the side of the ridge. He

had been seriously wounded, shot through the hip, and had dragged himself back to give the

position of his three buddies, who were holding off a large group of enemy riflemen. The platoon

was desperate. The radio had been shot out of the radioman’s hands, so the platoon had no

contact with the company.

It was decided by Lieutenant JOHN H. GRAHAM, the platoon leader, to make a “Banzai

charge” through a slight saddle to the left, and to reach the forward slope by this route regardless

of the cost. By the time the enemy saw the new tactic and had adjusted fire, the charging men

were high on the ridge. They charged on, trying to get below the line of grazing fire across the

ridge. They hit a draw and were rejoined by the three who had been pinned down. One man,

Pfc. DANIEL CALLINAN, had his head creased, and Pfc. ALLEN F. SCHAUFFLER was seriously

hit in the neck attempting to bring the wounded man over to the platoon. Wounded in this

final assault were: Pfc. RUSSELL PINKERTON hit by rifle fire in the chest, Pfc. MICHAEL SAVINO

hit by shrapnel, S/Sgt. JOSEPH A., CAMPBELL hit twice by machine gun fire, and Lieutenant

GRAHAM injured when thrown to the ground by a shell bursting near him. Pfc. EAGAN L.

FOSTER was killed by machine gun fire.

The platoon, with but twelve out of forty left, now went on to take their objective. They

fought their way into the little village of Madna di Rodiano. The 3rd Platoon was charging up at

about the same time. Here they saw German prisoners emerging from the church. Unbeknown

to them, the 2nd Platoon of Company K had come in on the extreme right flank from the valley to

the south, and captured the 67 Krauts now coming out of the church, followed by the two horses.

Outside was the first-aid wagon the enemy had used under a Red Cross flag to haul up ammunition.

However, the heroic fight of Company L for the ridge had made this entry possible.

In town another of the heroic twelve was cut down as Pfc. LEE R. NORRIS was shot in the

stomach by a sniper and died in a German medic’s arms. Then Pfc. FRED J. WAHL was

wounded by mortar fire as he marshaled the prisoners after the attack was over. This fire hit

prisoners as well.

The 3rd Platoon, following the 2nd in the attack, came under heavy fire. Pfc. VERNON J.

CARTNER was wounded by mortar fire, and during the attack at the church Pfc. MICHAEL

NICOSIA and Pfc. HOMER P. JUMP, JR. were killed by machine gun fire. Pfc. PAUL T.

PUSKARICH was fatally wounded. Pfc. JOHN G. NIX and Pfc. HILARY A. NEWTON of the 1st

Platoon were wounded in the same action.

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To the men of Company L, the hill will always be known as “Banzai Ridge.” The pitiful sight

of helpless wounded and smashed dead comrades will never be forgotten by the survivors of that

charge.

COMPANY K—HILL 787

Just after arrival at about noon, Company K reorganized and prepared to capture the last hill

before Mt. Mosca, Hill 787. K on the left was to take the nearer hill overlooking the town from

which there was, even at the moment, machine gun fire. Under artillery support, Hill 787 was

taken without casualties. The 2nd Platoon on the right grenaded an enemy dugout and took five

prisoners.

Then they reorganized, using enemy dugouts for defense. At this time they again came under

intense friendly artillery fire. It was stopped by a “300” radio message. That was at 1500.

During the afternoon, Company I, which had moved onto Mt. Mosca, complained about a rifleman

shooting into their rear from a little grassy knoll, Hill 779, in front of Company K’s position

on 787. Captain EDDY, to make sure, sent the whole 3rd Platoon and part of the 2nd. Pfc.

ROBERT TURNER, the scout out ahead, sighted a German at a dugout entrance surrounded by

several others. He immediately opened fire, shooting from the hip, and killed two of the Germans.

Then one of his bullets must have struck a large German Panzerfaust charge, for a third

German blew up. Eight prisoners were then collected and sent back.

Late in the day, Company K, with the rest of the battalion, was relieved by infantry of the 1st

Armored Division, and withdrew to Rodiano, south of Madna di Rodiano. Their ammunition

was 80 percent expended. The men had no water, no food, and were close to exhaustion.

COMPANY L—HILL 765

Captain JOSEPH J. DUNCAN, while reorganizing Company L by the church at Madna di

Rodiano, was ordered on to Mt. Mosca. Company K was still on the left and both companies

jumped off at 1330 after a thirty-minute artillery preparation which was to lift at 400 yards and

then lift on call. The 3rd Platoon, under First Lieutenant WILLARD W. DORA, led off. From a

house on Hill 765, beyond and above the church, machine gun fire had caused many of the casualties

in the assault of the church. Lieutenant DORA led his platoon forward so fast up the

wooded hill that they were caught by their own artillery fire. S/Sgt. CHARLES E. HOGUE and

Pfc. BRUCE E. BERENDS were wounded by enemy fire, but Lieutenant DORA and Pfc. CHARLES

R. MEISER, JR., lying down near each other as DORA looked at his map, were killed by one

of their own artillery shells, and Sgt. WILLIAM CONGER was lightly wounded. Pfc. JOSE

VASQUEZ, sent to contact the 2nd Platoon, was hit by the same fire. However, the hill was

quickly assaulted and seventeen prisoners were taken. Here on 765 and 787 they were ordered to

dig in behind Company K. The company had only about eighty men left.

Meanwhile, Company I, which at about noon had been ordered to move forward from reserve

near Mt. Croce, with the objective of attacking Hills 765 and 787 from the south, had arrived

and was ordered on to take Mt. Mosca.

COMPANY I—MT. MOSCA

Back at dawn, while K and L were moving to the line of departure, Company I moved up

onto Mt. Croce and remained in battalion reserve during the attack along the ridge to Madna di

Rodiano. The 2nd Platoon took positions on the left, and the 3rd Platoon on the right. A morning

fog hung heavily over the mountain, cutting visibility down to a few yards. The company

tried to dig foxholes in the hard, rocky ground as some sniper fire was directed at them. Next, a

heavy concentration of 120-mm artillery fire landed in the company area. An assistant squad

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leader in the 2nd Platoon, Sgt. ORVAL R. MCDANIEL, was killed, and S/Sgt. THEODORE B.

REINERO, of the 1st Platoon, Pfc. THEODORE G. HOOPLE, Pfc. ANTHONY J. BABICH, Pfc.

JACOB C. LOWERY, and Pfc. STEVEN J. MOTYKA, were all wounded. The company moved

over to the right to a position in some cover.

Captain ADRIAN RIORDAN, the company commander, moved forward to make a reconnaissance

through the fog. The high ground was open with brushy knobs and little trees here

and there. He met Captain EDDY of Company K, and they were pinned down for a time by

automatic fire.

The machine gun section was out on a point to the right front. Sgt. EDWARD R. CRIST and

Pfc. OSCAR B. SATHERS moved forward from this section, went over the ridge and down the

hill about twenty yards to the front. Here they came upon three Germans in a dugout, and

opened fire on them with M-1s. The Nazis ran off in the fog, and it was not known whether they

were hit or not. Then two others ran from the dugout and were fired upon as they disappeared.

The two men entered the dugout, a large permanent installation, and found extensive wiring and

equipment, which indicated that it had been an artillery observation post. Simultaneously with

the occupation of this position, the artillery fire, which had been continuously landing on the hill,

ceased.

Before the two men could complete their examination of the dugout they were called back.

The company was moving forward at battalion command to close up behind Company L. Pfc.

HANS MOSER, JR. was wounded by a tree burst as they started out. Captain RIORDAN, finding

the battalion commander, Colonel WORKS, at his OP, had the two objectives Hill 787 and Mt.

Mosca, pointed out to him. By this time the fog had lifted.

Shortly after noon the company moved along the southern traverse of the long ridge and contacted

Company K, which had already taken the first objective, Hill 787. Here they set up their

own machine guns and the attached heavies and their 60-mm mortars on the south slopes of Hill

787 in order to join the artillery preparation planned to fall on Hill 779, on the east knoll of 787,

and on Mt. Mosca. Although the initial objective could not be seen, they moved out over the hill,

down into a deep ravine and up the far side without being fired on. They reorganized southwest

of the knoll, 3rd Platoon on the right, 1st on the left. More artillery was called for on Mt. Mosca.

The “300” radio was working well and the company “536s” were functioning very well. As they

moved up, the 3rd Platoon hit a group of houses on the side of another knoll, Hill 761. Here they

engaged in a short fight against automatic weapons (not machine guns). Under the platoon fire,

two men were designated to move up to the houses, and then the whole 3rd Squad was sent up

after them. Twenty-six Germans were flushed out of these houses and captured.

Meanwhile the 1st Platoon had pushed out into the exposed north end of the knoll where

they took two more prisoners. Here on top, however, automatic pistol and machine gun fire,

coming from Hill 779, cut into the platoon’s left flank. Most of the men were safe in the woods to

the right, but Lieutenant MAURICE EWING and six men were out on the open knoll. EWING

yelled to his men to make a dash up over to the woods, and jumping to his feet reached safety

himself. The six men behind him, seeing the bullets pepper the open hillside all around them,

froze to the ground. EWING continued to yell to them, and Captain RIORDAN commanded,

“Get off that hillside before you are all killed!” Pfc. JOHN D. SPRENG had been fatally wounded

as the fire opened up. T/5 BARTON C. MORRISON, the company medic, ran to his aid. As he

dressed the dying man’s wound, he was hit in the leg, and running over a few yards, he lay flat

on the ground. There more machine gun fire struck him. He was mortally wounded. The other

four men got over the hill.

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Then the company cut south of the exposed knoll and swung back on the east slope, then

across the saddle and up onto Mt. Mosca. The 3rd Platoon went around to the right flank, and a

light machine gun was sent forward. All but the very top of Mt. Mosca over to the northwest was

occupied. As they cleaned up this area, enemy were driven out of holes all over the slope. Five

were killed and about twelve taken prisoner from the wooded northern slope. After the company

was on top of their objective, one German, completely outfitted in full field equipment, and

carrying a heavy pack and rifle, marched up the hill toward them as though he had just reached

the front. As he hove in sight, the company, being otherwise unengaged at the time, opened fire

in unison with all weapons. Fire engulfed him, tearing off his equipment and breaking his rifle in

three pieces, but the astonished young soldier emerged from the barrage unharmed, threw his

hands into the air and surrendered.

As the company reorganized, two or three men moved over onto the exposed eastern slope to

investigate. As soon as they appeared over the ridge, accurate artillery fire dropped on them.

Pfc. DENZEL C. CARRICO was wounded and the other two men withdrew. In the reorganization,

the 2nd Platoon was sent back onto the south slope of the grassy knoll, Hill 761, to take positions

with the heavy machine guns. Here they dug in under some artillery fire and some sniping

fire still coming in from Hill 779 in the rear. A sniper wounded S/Sgt. EDWARD H. VITALIUS

of the 1st Platoon. Company K was radioed to clear out this enemy pocket. They sent a platoon

and captured about 16 Germans.

Pfc. VITO ACCIARITO was wounded by a mortar shell. Then three short rounds of friendly

artillery struck Mt. Mosca, wounding T/Sgt. ALEXANDER J. BEAUCHESNE. During the rest of

the afternoon, and until relieved after dark, the company continued to be subjected to enemy artillery

fire. Pfc. LUTHER E. DOANE, JR. and Pfc., HOMER H. LOWE were killed from the 2nd

Platoon. Pfc. ROY D. TAYLOR of the 3rd Platoon was wounded. In the 1st Platoon, Pfc. HARRY

R. ARCADO was slightly wounded by shellfire, and Pfc. MALFORD C. HEIMER was more seriously

wounded. Sgt. BRADFORD ROUSSEAU had been occupying a foxhole with the 1st Platoon

when a member of the 3rd Platoon ran up and accidentally stabbed him with a bayonet,

thinking him a German. Pfc. HERMAN A. FREYER, JR., Pfc. AUGUST J. KAPUSTA, and Pfc.

JOSEPH FRIEDMAN of the weapons platoon were wounded by artillery. Early in the day, the

battalion runner from Company I, Pfc. JAMES A. BAKER, had been wounded while with Colonel

WORKS’ reconnaissance party. Pfc. CECIL C. FLOWERS was wounded while carrying a litter

with the medics.

Elements of the 11th Armored Infantry Battalion (1st Armored Division), which relieved

Company I after dark, received several casualties as the shellfire continued. Company I withdrew

to the town of Rodiano for the night with the rest of the battalion.

OTHER CASUALTIES

During the afternoon the advance 2nd Battalion aid station was hit and suffered six killed

and nine wounded. Killed from the 2nd Battalion were Pfc. RAYMOND V. DE SORCY, Pfc.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, Pvt. SAMUEL L. IRVIN, and Pvt. GEORGE SMITH, JR. Two men from

Company F, sent back to Service Company to help evacuate wounded, were hit here: Pvt. BENJAMIN

KASEN and Pvt. GEORGE E. SLAUGHTER. S/Sgt. RICHARD A. ROCKER of Battalion

Headquarters was wounded lightly during the day near Vedetola beyond which the battalion

headquarters spent the night.

While the 3rd Battalion swung wide the gate along the German line to Mt. Mosca so that the

86th Infantry could drive through, the 2nd Battalion was assigned the mission of buttressing the

83

flank of the open door. Company F was to punch north from Le Coste to the town of Torre.

Company G was to follow tanks through Tolè on the main road north, and Company E was to

mop up Mt. Croce and drive to San Trinita beyond Tolè on the same road, and finally Company F

would leapfrog beyond Baccuchi.

COMPANY F—TORRE

Torre was directly north and down hill from Company F. At daylight on the 16th, looking

out through the heavy morning haze, they found the knob on the northernmost slope of their hill

was organized with some well-dug positions. An observer on the extreme left of the company

adjusted assault mortars at two Krauts at a 100-yard range. A BAR opened up on two other

Krauts crawling up a ditch, and killed one of them. Then the 2nd Platoon, with S/Sgt. LOUIS H.

BARGMANN leading, jumped off, squads abreast, and overran the positions. To their surprise,

instead of a handful, thirty prisoners were taken.

The weapons platoon, the 2nd Platoon of heavy machine guns of Company H, and four tanks

moved up on the knob to support the attack on Torre. The 2nd Platoon led off. On the left flank

S/Sgt. RUDOLPH W. KONIECZNY led a bazooka team of Pfc. THEODORE F. AUBREY and Pfc.

JOE DUNN, KONIECZNY as usual toting his powerful BAR. The sergeant got so far ahead that

the rest of the men were running trying to keep up with him. He was first to Torre, which was

entered without resistance at 0900.

Artillery then started landing in town, wounding Pvt. JAMES C. IASSOGNA and Sgt.

KERMIT T. GOODMONSON, and the platoon pulled back to the knob on Le Coste. At 1100 the

company moved off of Le Coste, marching to Mt. Croce, arriving there and digging in at 1600. At

about dusk (2030) the company left for Baccuchi over rough terrain, but without being fired on,

followed by the 2nd Platoon of Company A. They dug in again at 2400.

COMPANY G—TOLÈ

First Lieutenant GORDON A. ANDERSON, the executive officer, had assumed command of

Company G the evening before as soon as he caught up with it. Also during this evening the 1st

Platoon, with one platoon of tanks and one of TDs, caught up with the company. In the morning

of the Mt. Mosca attack, Company G, led by the 1st Platoon, the tanks and TDs, was given the

mission to take, secure, and defend Tolè. They moved up the main road toward Tolè at 1015.

The road had not been previously checked for mines, but sixteen men of the 1st Platoon rode

two tanks right down into town under the command of Second Lieutenant STANLEY F. JAZWINSKI.

The company following had dismounted a mile short of town and within sight of the

leading elements, when long-range machine gun fire opened up on them from beyond the town.

The tanks fired back, hitting some scattered houses in the area from which the fire was coming.

Meanwhile in the town, JAZWINSKI’s sixteen men had jumped off the tanks and worked their

way through town clearing out the houses without resistance. The rest of the company followed

them into town, and almost at once heavy shellfire dropped on them. The town became a cloud

of dust, flying masonry and tile. Many men were hit, including Sgt. PETE BRITO, Pfc. RALPH E.

NANNINGA of the 2nd Platoon, and Pfc. HENRY J. SHAW and Pvt. ROBERT J. KNOWLES of

the 3rd Platoon.

After this shelling eased off, the 1st Platoon moved into the far end of town. There they

found a big headquarters of the enemy abandoned only five minutes before. Italian civilians told

them a general had left just before they arrived. An elaborate German kitchen was found, potatoes

all peeled, the day’s menu laid out on the table, and beside the menu a piece of bread and

jam with one bite gone. As the rest of the company secured the town under intense shellfire, the

1st Platoon with the tanks and TDs advanced another mile beyond the town. From near the town

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of Baccuchi they observed Germans on their left on a hill. The tanks fired six 76-mm shells into

Baccuchi and into machine gun positions on the left. Then the 1st Squad of the platoon was ordered

into town. Machine gun fire opened up on the leading scout, Pfc. FRANK MOON. The

entire squad, by creeping and crawling, crossed an open field and then rushed for thirty yards to

the cover of a sunken road. Pvt. ALBERT F. GROEGER hit the ground after dashing across the

field and was fatally wounded as he lay stretched out on the ground. The platoon was then ordered

to withdraw since it was discovered that they were 300 yards beyond their assigned objective.

Pfc. ROGER COREY directed tank fire on suspected German positions on two hills to cover

the platoon withdrawal. Then Sgt. WILLIAM MCGOWAN made it back and ordered two tanks

to move forward into a field to cover the evacuation of the fatally wounded GROEGER. This field

was very exposed, but Lieutenant FOX, the tank commander, was one of the few aggressive tank

men the regiment had experience with. Under the direction of Sgt. MCGOWAN and Sgt.

FRANCIS J. DUFFIN, Lieutenant FOX moved his tanks out and covered the withdrawal of the

men. One tanker was wounded. This action took place at 1300, and shortly thereafter the platoon

and tanks were back in Tolè and the defense of the town was set up.

The 3rd Platoon had followed the tanks out and were dug in along the road. As the tanks

and the 1st Platoon withdrew, they remained in position out there. Friendly aircraft searching

out enemy tanks dove and strafed the road, wounding T/Sgt. GEORGE E. KEARNS of the 3rd

Platoon. After the first plane dove and fired, the men displayed panels and shot up two yellow

flares. The second plane dove, but seeing the panels did not fire.

Tolè was shelled throughout the afternoon and evening. Artillery fire wounded Sgt. PETE

BRITO for the second time, and Pfc. EDWARD M. SCHUSTER, while bringing six prisoners from

the right. BRITO’s wound was treated by a captured German medic.

At 2200 Company G moved out on order to take Hill 687. On their way, led by the 2nd Platoon,

the company went through Baccuchi, clearing the buildings along the way. On the far side

of town Lieutenant JOSEPH H. SHEPHERD and his scout were fired on. Then the 3rd Platoon,

moving up on the right, had its lead group with Lieutenant JACK K. BENNETT fired on as they

came abreast of the 2nd Platoon. The tanks had left to refuel, but after a brief holdup, both platoons

moved forward in the dark and found the positions on the hill unoccupied. Company F

occupied the hill to the northeast, but there was a gap between the companies in which Company

F took 60 prisoners the next morning. The objective was secured at 2300 and the company dug in

for the night. During the entire day’s action 73 prisoners had been taken, and the company had

suffered eleven casualties. Other men wounded in Tolè by artillery fire were: Second Lieutenant

EVERET E. NORCROSS, JR., Pfc. ANTHONY S. KOWALSKI, Pfc. MICHAEL LAGUNA, Pfc.

MILFORD E. MILLER, and Pvt. WILLIAM P. RIDGEL.

COMPANY E—S. TRINITA

As Company E went east along the ridgeline to mop up Mt. Croce, with the 1st machine gun

platoon of Company H attached, they found no opposition, but the draw they had to go through

was blanketed with mortar and artillery fire. On Mt. Croce, from which the 3rd Battalion had

jumped off at 0620, were Colonel FOWLER, and Lieutenant Colonel NATIONS, who had come

back from the hospital the evening before to resume command of the 2nd Battalion. It was desired

that Company E attack to the north to take Baccuchi and San Trinita, two clusters of buildings

directly north on the road from Tolè, now held by Company G. Having little ammunition,

the company was unable to move out immediately. They sent back for ammunition, and while

waiting on Mt. Croce watched three unidentified tanks moving away on the Tolè-Baccuchi road.

They also could make out individual soldiers near the tanks. They were eager to open fire on

85

these targets, but did not dare on the possibility that they might be friendly. The targets moved

out of range.

At about 1400, the ammunition having arrived, the company moved off down the forward

slopes of Mt. Croce and passed through Torrello. The 2nd Platoon led, followed by the 1st and

3rd Platoons. On the way down, while moving through a draw, Pfc. CHARLES L. DOUGLAS of

the 1st Platoon was wounded by mortar fire. Upon reaching Baccuchi, the company ran into one

platoon of Company L of the 86th Infantry, who were pinned down and had suffered casualties

by flank fire coming from San Trinita. Presumably this fire was from the tanks previously seen

withdrawing. The company requested tank support. Some tank destroyers were already in the

vicinity, and others moved up under Captain PATCH. Lieutenant RICHARD L. CROOK’s 2nd

Platoon, which had been in the lead and which was consequently pinned down, was to attack on

the left and the 1st on the right, both to be supported by the TDs.

As they jumped off at 1800, tank fire was still coming in from the north, wounding Lieutenant

CROOK. After advancing some distance, Pfc. HARRY S. HART, also of the 2nd Platoon, was

hit. Before they reached San Trinita, two friendly planes dove on the attacking company and

strafed. Then they roared on, dropped bombs and strafed San Trinita before making their turn

and coming back. On the first run no one was hit, although one man’s bayonet was sheared off.

Yellow smoke signals were immediately set off to mark the company as friendly troops, but by

the time the plane had completed their strafing run and made their turn and circled back, the

smoke was completely expended. Sgt. JACK HEPFER of the 2nd Platoon, who had determinedly

lugged the colored phosphorescent identification panels, hastily spread them out, and the planes

pulled out of their dive without firing.

The company got excellent tank destroyer support, Captain PATCH being very aggressive,

and moved easily into San Trinita, taking eight prisoners. The wounded HART was taken back,

and the company dug in at San Trinita for the night. In the abandoned German dugouts, candles

were still burning, and the hungry men found cheese, bread, and German whiskey. Ironically,

their first rations since the jump-off reached them that evening. Heavy artillery, mortar, and

sniper fire hit the town during the night, and the Germans were still so close to the town that they

could be heard talking.

COMPANY H—MORTARS

Supporting the attack of Company G on Tolè, the 3rd Section of Company H at 0800 displaced

near the battalion and company CP at buildings between Hills 838 and 815. From here

several missions were fired on Tolè. At about 1000, the 1st and 2nd Sections moved up and

joined the 3rd. At 1500 the whole platoon moved to the vicinity of the battalion and company CP

at the village of Coste. They fired several missions at San Trinita and Tolè in support of the main

attack. They spent the night here.

COMPANY B

Company B remained in its positions on Le Coste until 1700 on the 16th, when the 2nd Platoon

was ordered to go to the battalion CP several hundred yards to the east to act as security.

Just after having completed digging foxholes near the CP, under sporadic enemy mortar fire, the

platoon was ordered to move out and rejoin the company.

Retaining positions on Le Coste, the company was then spread out thinly on a defensive line

running east along a road south of Tolè. The positions ran from left to right, 1st, 3rd, and 2nd,

with the weapons attached to rifle platoons. Company C was on Hill 807 to the east, and A was

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on Le Coste to the left. The 2nd Platoon found abandoned German foxholes to occupy for the

remainder of the night. At 2400 several replacements joined the company. Throughout the night

and the next morning, the road and ridgeline along which the company was stretched, received

shelling from heavy guns, but there were no casualties.

COMPANY A

Company A stayed on Le Coste throughout the day. After B extended over to the road junction

at Tolè, Company A moved over to join with B. Replacements arrived, but the company lost

more of their valuable men through shellfire. S/Sgt. BERTRAM A. BIDWELL, Sgt. HOWARD H.

BREITMEYER, Pfc. HERBERT F. HOLMGREN, Pfc. MICHAEL A. GUERRA and Pfc. WILLIAM

H. APLIN were all wounded.

On the morning of 16 April, Company C moved out to Le Coste and relieved Company F.

First Lieutenant ROBERT F. BOYER was in command, having rejoined the company during the

night after his recovery from a previous wound. In the evening, at 2200, the company moved to

the east again. They took positions on Mt. Croce at 2300, the 1st Platoon stopping on Hill 807 just

south of Tolè, which was in the hands of Company G.

By the night of 16-17 April the biggest task of the 87th had been accomplished. The enemy

main line had been broken. The secondary line shown on captured enemy maps had been penetrated

by 86th and 87th units in front of San Trinita. The prisoner bag was swelling steadily, the

3rd Battalion alone taking more than 200 during the 16th.

On the 15th, Regiment had established a forward CP at 750 south of Hill 903. Consisting only

of the S-2 and S-3 sections, it was able to move quickly, jumping three times within eighteen

hours on the 17th in an effort to keep in close contact with the battalions. The regimental wire

section worked ceaselessly to keep all three battalions tied in to these changing locations.

During the night of the 16th, the 10th Anti-tank Battalion prepared to relieve the 1st Battalion,

87th, and free them for further advance to attack Mt. Serra through the 2nd Battalion not

later than 1500 on the 17th.

Information from IPW indicated that enemy defending companies were down to about 45

men. However, they had received orders for the morning to “hold to the last man.” General

HAYS gave the information that a column of enemy tanks was approaching along the road to

Tolè.

It was learned from a captured German officer that the Mt. Mosca attack had achieved some

surprise on the 3rd day, for the Reconnaissance Battalion of the 94th German Division defending

the ridge, had expected to be attacked from the southeast by the 1st Armored elements that had

taken Vergato. The opening of the road from Vergato to Tolè, announced during the night, reduced

the difficult and hazardous use of the narrow mountain trails. Units of the 1st Armored

Division were given priority on this road, and it soon became clogged with armored vehicles so

that regimental supply and evacuation were much delayed.

FOURTH DAY—17 APRIL

At 0910 of the 17th, General HAYS visited the CP and told Colonel FOWLER that the “breakthrough”

had been accomplished and that the 87th must “keep pushing and exploit the breakthrough.”

At 0925 all three battalion commanders were ordered to alert their units and be ready

to move fast. The regiment was ordered to push toward Mt. Serra and Mt. Prospero.

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By 1200 noon, Major General HAYS was awaiting an answer to his call to Lieutenant General

LUCIAN K. TRUSCOTT, commanding general of the Fifth Army, as to how far north he could

push the Division.

COMPANY F—THE COOKS’ PATROL

Before their attack on Mt. Serra, Company F had a surprising action. On the night before,

during darkness, Captain JAMES C. KENNETT and Lieutenant DONALD M. DWYER walked

out on reconnaissance of their new position. After walking a short distance, they found themselves

almost surrounded by German voices, but it was too dark to see anything. They returned

and silently moved the 1st Platoon, now down to twenty-one men, and two machine guns out to

take up positions where they had heard the voices. They reinforced the platoon with mortar men

who were used as riflemen. At this time the 2nd Platoon had only sixteen men left, and the 3rd

but twenty-two. Sgt. GERALD O. HALVERSON had broken some ribs while diving into a foxhole

and had been evacuated.

At dawn, the 1st Platoon found themselves, in their forward positions, right on the edge of a

minefield and barbed wire entanglements, and only 100 yards from the German positions. The

Germans started toward the company, apparently innocent of their presence, and the forward

platoon opened up. S/Sgt. WILBUR WRIGHT of the mortar section hit two with his carbine. The

volley of fire from the close range surprised the advancing Germans and they dropped all their

weapons, except one machine gun they were carrying, and ran back. A sniper started firing from

the left, and S/Sgt. RUDOLPH W. KONIECZNY went off alone, promptly killed the sniper and

reported back. Sgt. KONIECZNY, who was AWOL from the hospital where he had been convalescing

from his previous wound, was piling up a large score of personal victims.

Then Sgt. WRIGHT asked for volunteers for a patrol to investigate the German strength in

front of the leading platoon. The mess sergeant, S/Sgt. BAYNE HILL, and the cooks, T/4 VERNE

HARTENSTEIN, and T/5 CHARLES DOLSON, and mortar men Sgt. MICHAEL DE BAGGIS,

Pfc. PALMER E. COUILLARD, already once wounded, and Pfc. EUGENE BURNS, all volunteered

for the mission. S/Sgt. PAUL STETTNER went along with a “536” radio and as interpreter.

WRIGHT led them carefully around the German flank to the right rear. From here they

could make out a series of trenches that completely covered the company’s positions. The patrol

had outflanked the Germans without being seen, and Sgt. WRIGHT was able to crawl to the end

of the trench and watch the heads of the enemy in a dugout 25 yards away. After getting a good

firing position he yelled at them in English to surrender. A Nazi warrant officer answered with a

burst from his automatic pistol. WRIGHT pulled his carbine trigger and killed the warrant officer.

That “broke the ice,” and with the officer dead, 52 Germans marched out of the dugout and

surrendered to WRIGHT and his cooks and mortar men. Sgt. STETTNER called five more from

another dugout. Then the platoon went through the dugouts, finding no less than ten machine

guns, many other automatic weapons, grenades, rifles, and all kinds of ammunition. The elaborate

bunkers had excellent camouflage, with wire netting, and were steel-shuttered and seemingly

impregnable.

COMPANY F—“BLOODY RIDGE”

At 0930 the company received orders to attack to the north and seize Mt. Serra. The 1st Battalion

was to go through to San Prospero. The battle for Mt. Serra, or “Bloody Ridge” as it was to

be called, was the grimmest that Company F was to encounter. The ridge itself was one of the

least imposing of the long list of hills and mountains captured by the regiment, but its defenders

put up probably the most determined resistance encountered by the 87th. The day had started

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off smoothly for Company F, with over fifty prisoners and an elaborate fortification system taken

without a casualty, but the rest of the day was rough and bitter.

The company started out with the 2nd Platoon of machine guns from Company H attached.

The 3rd Platoon with one section of heavy machine guns led on the right. The 2nd Platoon was

slightly echeloned to the left on the other side of the road with the second section of “heavies,”

and the mortars, and the 1st Platoon followed the 2nd. As the platoons moved up toward the

series of three low knobs bending to the right and forming Mt. Serra, the men had to run to keep

up with the five supporting tanks. The 3rd Platoon to the right was fired upon from the first

knoll, which was to the left of the road bend. A squad leader of this platoon, S/Sgt. OLE B. DALEN,

lost his arm when struck by a Panzerfaust charge, and the platoon guide, S/Sgt. JAMES P.

RYAN, and Pfc. RANDOLPH HABURNE were killed by Panzerfaust charges. Pfc. ROBERT A.

CARLSON was hit here too.

As the 3rd Platoon men threw themselves to the ground, the 2nd Platoon broke into a run to

rush the knoll where the fire was coming from. Fire from further left killed Pfc. FLOYD H.

LUNSFORD, the scout for flank security, and wounded Pfc. WILLIAM M. SCANLON, Pfc. RENE

A. DI GIACOMO, and Sgt. ARTHUR J. COFFEY. The 1st Platoon rushed down after the 2nd.

They were to flank to the left if the 2nd were pinned down. Pfc. TONEY A. KNUTSEN and Pvt.

GEORGE C. SLIGER were wounded. At this time, two sections of machine guns were on each

side of the road, one on the left with the 2nd Platoon, and the other with the 3rd. One of the tanks

remained two or three hundred yards in the rear. As the men on the left came up the knoll, the

Germans were still there. They had no intention of retreating. One man from Company H killed

six Krauts with his carbine. Sgt. DAVID BURT killed one with his pistol. Many were killed from

a distance of three or four yards. Pfc. JOSEPH MCNEALUS came over the hill face-to-face with a

Nazi. Joe pulled the trigger faster. Two machine gunners from Company H, Sgt. BERNARD D.

RUTERBORIES and Pfc. JAMES GILLIES, JR. set their gun up over a foxhole; a German stuck his

head up from underneath and surrendered. The 2nd Platoon of Company H fought up forward

with the riflemen, the 2nd Section fighting savagely on the first knoll. The action was so furious

that it was remarkable that the platoon was able to keep together and well organized.

However, the 2nd Platoon, in spite of the desperate fighting on the knoll, managed to establish

a base of fire, using German foxholes and the defilade of a sunken road, and the help of the

heavy machine gunners on the knoll. Not that they had cleared the knoll in the usual sense, for it

was being fired on from every side, and the tanks were drawing all kinds of fire. But the platoon

and attached gun were nevertheless able to deliver a terrific volume of fire—both light and heavy

machine guns being right up on the line. Pfc. HUGH B. GIVENS was shell-shocked here and

evacuated.

On the way up, Sgt. KONIECZNY went off on another one of his frequent solo missions to

clear out a bunker. He was never seen alive again, and the details of his death are not known.

Later, members of the company found his helmet near two German bunkers, but couldn’t locate

the body. It was found later, some distance away at the foot of the hill. Sgt. KONIECZNY had

just been promoted to Technical Sergeant, but he never heard the news. With the death of

KONIECZNY, the 87th lost one of its oldest and most colorful members. From his exploits on

skis at Mt. Rainier to the two BARs he managed to fire simultaneously in the Apennines,

KONIECZNY’s exploits were legendary. He might have been safe in a hospital bed from his previous

wound; but no hospital could hold him when his outfit was jumping off.

Under the covering fire of the 2nd Platoon, Lieutenant FLOYD E. ALEXANDER led the 3rd

Platoon, and the attached heavy machine gun section forward to the group of buildings on the

second knoll under severe artillery fire. Pfc. ANDREW KEREKES was injured on the movement.

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One tank stayed back by the first knoll and three went on with the 3rd Platoon. Pfc. ROBERT H.

MCCAIG was wounded at noon by artillery at the houses. From the houses Lieutenant ALEXANDER

pushed on with only sixteen men toward the third knoll.

Heavy fire pinned them down 100 yards beyond the houses, and the tanks were ordered on

to support them. Two of them moved up, followed by the third. The platoon moved on another

250 yards and gained a hold on the objective, the third knoll. Here Pfc. WILLIAM E. FISHER was

wounded and Pfc. HOWARD KUMPULA seriously injured his leg. Since the tanks’ aerials were

shot away, communication with one another was impossible. One tank started to swing its turret

around to fire at a knocked-out German tank, now occupied by our machine gunners. The men

couldn’t make the tankers hear to stop them, so machine gunner Pfc. GORDON E. SUNDSTROM

jumped up on the tank, which was drawing machine gun fire from front and both sides. He

stopped the tank from firing and miraculously was not hit. Captain KENNETT, too, climbed up

on the tanks as bullets rang against their steel armor, to point out targets. The tanks started to

withdraw in spite of Captain KENNETT climbing up on their hulls and issuing direct orders to

stay. A tracer bullet struck the rear end of one tank and fired up the blankets and gear lashed on

the outside. The crew leaped out, abandoning the undamaged tank. The other two tanks retreated

behind the buildings, leaving the remnants of the 3rd Platoon forward on the third knoll

without tank support, and drawing high-velocity fire onto the buildings in which the supporting

machine guns were located.

Some men of Company H were hit, and Pfc. MORRIS J. KRIEGER of Company F was killed.

After the heavy machine gun section had set up in a house and fired five long bursts, six rounds

from a German self-propelled gun crashed into the building, knocking out one of the guns. The

men came under terrific fire. Some time about 1400 the machine guns were running low on ammunition.

The three heavies alone fired 9,000 rounds during the attack, and the .50-caliber fired

another 1,000.

Pfc. ROBERT A. MOTHERWELL volunteered to go back from the forward position and get

some ammunition from the carriers. On the way to the rear he was hit in the leg by a sniper. He

went on in spite of his wound. As he came forward within shouting distance of the guns, he was

hit again, by artillery, and couldn’t go any further. He was able to yell to the men, and they came

and got the ammunition.

Due to lack of ammunition, however, and the scant number of men left, Lieutenant ALEXANDER

bitterly brought his squad-sized platoon back to the shelter of the houses on the second

knoll. High-velocity fire, attracted by the tanks, was whizzing in at the houses, tearing the roofs

and striking one heavy machine gun. Also mortar fire was falling in the area, one direct hit killing

Pfc. FRED J. ANETSBERGER and seriously wounding Pfc. HANSON A. COOK from Company

H in their machine gun dugout. ANETSBERGER had killed seven Nazis before his death.

Other Company H men were hit and knocked about. The heavy machine guns took an aggressive

front-line part in the action. Sgt. DONALD B. WALES, while taking his gun out of action,

was knocked off his feet, stunned and wounded. He was able to walk back, and he took with

him some F Company casualties. A British 5.5 artillery observer and his radio operator were both

killed. Sgt. FORREST RYAN, a machine gunner, was in a foxhole with his second gunner. He

had his hand on the other man’s knee when a piece of shrapnel penetrated the hand. The second

gunner, thus saved from a wound in his knee, cried out in annoyance, “Son of a gun, I’m cheated

out of a million-dollar wound!”

Throughout the action Captain KENNETT ran back and forth all over the area. He tried desperately

to keep the tanks up with Lieutenant ALEXANDER to support his men. When their

aerials were shot away, he recklessly climbed up on the bullet-splattered tanks to point out en90

emy machine gun targets. When the luggage and gear lashed on the rear of one tank had been

set on fire, and the tank abandoned by the crew in panic, Captain KENNETT ran up and unlashed

the five-gallon can for the water that his men so badly needed. Then he ran around

among the men with water and ammunition, inspiring them by his lack of concern for himself.

So hot had been the firing and scarce the water, that one machine gun crew, when their gun went

dry, passed a can from foxhole to foxhole to collect urine. This they poured into the machine gun

water jacket.

At about 1500, the foxhole on the first knoll, used as a CP, received a direct hit. Killed was

Pfc. THOMAS I. MALLOY, and fatally wounded were Second Lieutenant MELO VUKOVICH

and Second Lieutenant CLARENCE K. MUSICK. Wounded were First Lieutenant HAROLD F.

ROSSI, 1st Sgt. ALEX MILLER, and Pfc. MARIO S. CALCAGNO, and three men from artillery.

Pfc. LESTER L. ALLISON of Company H was killed by the same hit, and a sergeant of H Company

was wounded in the legs.

Immediately afterwards, S/Sgt. NELSON COCHRANE, Sgt. DAVID BURT, Sgt.

MELINKOVITCH, Sgt. WILBUR WRIGHT, and Pfc. STANLEY GOSNAY organized the men

around the CP, cut trees and prepared litters, and carried the casualties down to the aid station

under intense shellfire. Pfc. JULIUS G. SUSTARIC was wounded in the chest by a sniper as he

helped evacuate the wounded. He crawled for about 250 yards to near the aid station, where he

lost consciousness and was picked up and taken to the aid station. The wiremen, Sgt. THOMAS

CORRIGAN, Pfc. JACOB BOYCE and Pfc. JOHN POWERS were just reaching the CP, and they

helped evacuate the wounded.

By 1700 the company finally received the order issued by Battalion much earlier to stay back

in place and let Company E pass through. There were less than eighty men left in the company.

Before Company E passed through, some TDs came up and did some good. Then an old tank

officer ran out on the field and organized the tanks and led up some new ones, which supported

Company E. When E passed through, they were well supported by Company F, Company H,

and the tanks.

Four hundred and fifty Germans were captured on the hill. One of them remarked in good

English, “Well, this wasn’t as easy a one to take as the others have been, was it?” Few Nazi

comments are so close to the truth. Company F, with less than 100 men, had been attacking a

well-fortified hill defended by 500 Germans. Odds of five-to-one against the attacking force is

not even mentioned in the books.

COMPANY E—MT. SERRA

In the morning Colonel NATIONS arrived at San Trinita to go over the situation with Captain

PENDREY. Company E was to the right of F on Hill 693, ready to attack Mt. Serra. Company

E waited in place during the attack. Artillery and mortar fire started falling on the buildings

at San Trinita, killing a radio operator from the 84th Chemical Warfare Service. Lieutenant

GORDON ANDERSON effectively returned fire with his chemical mortars. Colonel ROSS WILSON,

commanding the 1st Battalion, arrived at about noon to make a reconnaissance in preparation

for his battalion to tie in its attack on San Prospero. The 1st Battalion had been slow to move

its companies from the defensive positions along the Le Coste ridge until properly relieved by the

85th Infantry, and the companies weren’t yet past Tolè.

The 1st machine gun platoon of Company H, attached to Company E, had supported the attack

of Company F on Mt. Serra. Their guns at San Trinita ran out of ammunition at about 1400.

They had fired 9,000 rounds from three .30-calibers, and 1,000 rounds from the .50s. More ammunition

was gotten up to them 45 minutes later. German medics were observed most of the

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day, apparently bringing up ammunition. They never took back a casualty, although there were

six of them running to German positions all day long under Red Cross flag immunity. Both the

1st and 2nd Battalions had CPs in the San Trinita church, and Colonel WILSON finally ordered

fire from the platoon on the bogus medics.

At 1600 Company E was ordered to pass through F at 1700 to take the final objective on Mt.

Serra. They jumped off at 1710, moving along to the right of the ridge under its cover on the reverse

slope from enemy fire. There, on the right of the road, the supporting tanks ran into a

German minefield. The clearing of these mines momentarily held up the attack, but they soon

caught up. An excellent artillery preparation and effective supporting fire from Company H was

laid down. The 2nd machine gun platoon fired support for Company E, as they had with F. Four

of the tanks that had supported F joined the tanks and TDs with E. As soon as the company,

flanking around F, came abreast, the leading 3rd Platoon built up a base of fire with one squad.

Another squad flanked around to the right. By well-executed fire and movement the squads and

platoons advanced from commanding ground to commanding ground.

Beyond the second knob the 3rd Platoon remained in supporting positions and the 1st Platoon

then advanced in the same manner and seized the third and last knob. In the 3rd Platoon

Pvt. RALPH HUBBARD was killed and Pfc. BERNARD V. GILLARD was wounded by sniper

fire. The 2nd Platoon, in reserve between the second and third knolls, had many casualties from

artillery, some after the hill was taken. Wounded were: S/Sgt. CLIFFORD A. NOBLE, Sgt.

THEODORE M. BRINK, Pfc. EDWARD J. PRICE and Pfc. OTIS H. NIBLETT.

From the weapons platoon S/Sgt. JOSEPH E. LONGPRE, Pfc. FRANCIS J. MCCABE, Pfc.

WILLIAM F. TILLMAN, and Pfc. FREDERIC G. KINSON from company headquarters, were

wounded. GILLARD had been the lead scout for the 3rd Platoon. He was hit on the side of his

head by sniper fire and painfully wounded. After throwing his hand grenades, he crawled back

to the machine guns and lay on the ground by them directing their fire to targets he had seen.

The two machine gun squad leaders, Sgt. FRANCIS J. BLAIS and Sgt. HENRY C. CHASE, had

their machine guns right behind the scout. From there they engaged targets of opportunity and

built up tremendous bases of fire as the squads flanked forward. At times they had to be held

back lest they pass the scouts. Sgt. BLAIS was alone with his machine gun at the end of the action.

Pfc. ROBERT H. LATHROP was killed while bringing up ammunition for BLAIS’ gun, and

BLAIS started to get a litter for LATHROP as he died.

More than 25 of the enemy were killed and 150 prisoners were taken. Lieutenant JOHN J.

DOHERTY, crawling up to one dugout, threw in several grenades and fired into it. Seventeen

prisoners walked out. DOHERTY, weapons platoon leader, was up in the front action throughout,

directing machine gun fire.

Early in the battle, a BAR team, advancing around the right, took 25 prisoners, including one

high-ranking officer. This team, acting First Sergeant OWEN W. THOMPSON and Pfc. TOBIAS

BAUER, went after some Germans waving a white flag, pointed out to them by tankers. When

they came in sight, one of the Germans was setting up a machine gun. They killed him instantly,

and the others surrendered. Sgt. BURTON BATCHELLER moved some of the 1st Platoon onto

the exposed forward slope to fire on enemy at San Prospero to support the 1st Battalion attack.

The company reorganized and dug in. The 2nd Platoon of H, under Lieutenant EDWIN H.

RICHARDSON, moved out with them. They stayed on Mt. Serra all night under some light mortar

fire. Pfc. JOHN LYONS was hit, not seriously, and did not report to the medics until the next

day. The company had received six replacements on the 15th and ten on the 16th. They stayed

on Mt. Serra throughout the next day.

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COMPANY C

Company C was pulled back to an assembly area south of Mt. Croce in the morning. They

were told that the 2nd Battalion would take Mt. Serra and the 1st Battalion would move through

them to San Prospero. At 1300 the company moved to the forward assembly area behind two

companies of the 2nd Battalion near San Trinita, where the company leaders were given an orientation.

Shortly after jumping off, the 3rd Platoon on the left and the 1st on the right crossed over

the ridge and started down the long open forward slope that stretched out more than 1,000 yards

to the north. Here the terrain was more gentle, with more rolling, grassy hills than the terrain of

the opening days of the offensive. The attack had broken through the rugged wall of rocky,

wooded mountains from Hill 903 to Mt. Mosca. However, some of the roughest terrain ever

fought over still remained.

As the 3rd Platoon moved down, Company F was still fighting bitterly for Mt. Serra on the

left, and C came into machine gun, mortar, and artillery fire as they came abreast. They were

able to keep moving until two or three hundred yards from the houses beyond La Ca. Here a

machine gun opened up on the platoon after allowing the scouts, runner, platoon leader, and

four men of the 3rd Squad to go by. The platoon lay flat in the tall grass unable to move. Only

those men without packs were safe as the bullets mowed across the grass tops. Pfc. MANFRED

BUTLER was fatally hit in the neck by machine gun fire, and Pfc. ROBERT N. GANZ, JR. was

wounded as his rifle grenade was detonated. T/Sgt. DONALD E. MIRON and S/Sgt. GEORGE

L. MYER were both hit in the hand as artillery started coming in as soon as the platoon hit the

ground. Pvt. RICHARD W. HAWK was also wounded by artillery.

Fire from mortars and Company D’s heavy machine guns, as well as rifle grenades, were put

on the enemy machine gun positions, but it didn’t stop the gun. The reason was discovered later.

The gun was being traversed and fired by a system of ropes and pulleys ingeniously controlled

from a deep safe dugout a little way off. All the elements of the platoon, except the one squad

pinned down before the gun, were able to swing further to the right. The 1st Platoon was able to

move forward and take the buildings, although in doing so T/5 BILL PORTOLOS was wounded

in the leg. The company command group, supposedly following the 1st Platoon on the right,

suddenly found itself following a single squad that had gotten way off to the right. They moved

up toward La Ca. By this time, the pinned-down squad, by crawling through the grass and by

individual dashes, had extricated itself, and the 1st Platoon had withdrawn to the rearmost group

of houses where the entire company reorganized. Pvt. EVERETT L. JONES had been wounded,

and Pvt. WILLIAM E. HEMSTREET had been killed during the action.

It was decided to circle around to the right, down into and along an old creek bed. The 2nd

and 3rd Platoons were to make a combat reconnaissance up to the town. They moved without

difficulty to a point below and to the right of town in the creek bed. Here they had excellent support

from the tanks, which had been reorganized and taken over on Mt. Serra by a tank officer

with a more aggressive spirit. The tanks came rolling right down the main road to San Prospero

atop the ridge, banging away at the town. Excellent support also came from 105s and 75s, and

British 5.5s. Under cover of this barrage in the late afternoon the 2nd Platoon on the left went up

a steep side road into town, while the 3rd in defilade filed up a traversing trail into the east edge

of town. The rest of the company followed the 2nd up the road in a column of twos. The Germans,

expecting to be attacked from the west, were stunned as they were caught pouring out of

basements to man positions. Sixty-four prisoners were taken, and another twenty-seven the next

morning.

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A sniper in the church hit machine gunner Sgt. DAN T. BENNER of the weapons platoon and

Pvt. JESSE N. BAIRD. BENNER was slightly wounded by fragments from his own grenade,

which was shattered, but not exploded, by the sniper’s bullet. The 3rd Platoon got into a house

with an Italian family in it. They claimed no Germans had been there for three or four months.

From the basement the soldiers dragged out a German medical captain and twelve men, three of

them wounded.

On the west side of town another machine gun was found rigged up with ropes and pulleys

to be fired from a dugout. On this side of town too, at dusk, Lieutenant JOHN W. HAWK and

the 2nd Platoon was fired on. Two BAR men, Pfc. WILLIAM THOMAS and Pfc. ROBERT E. DE

WICK, dropped to the road and crawled along the bank to where they could fire into the house.

They threw in grenades and fired rile grenades. During lulls in the firing they could hear the

Germans talking inside. They set the building on fire, but the Germans got away in the dark,

abandoning three machine guns.

During the evening one of the strangest incidents of the campaign took place. Sixty of the

prisoners with five guards were sent down the ridge road that ran back to the south to our rear.

It was getting dark as they started out, and the lead guard soon picked up tank tracks in the dirt

road and followed them. Unfortunately, the tracks had been made by German tanks and shortly

made a sharp turn off to the west and northwest. Mile after mile the column followed the road

that wound its way deep into Kraut territory. They passed a couple of stray Krauts, but it was

dark and apparently no one was sure who the other party was. In any case, the Krauts didn’t

challenge and the guards with the sixty prisoners allowed the armed Krauts to go along the road,

possibly thinking them deserters.

A little further on they met an unmistakable German mule train, which they captured, making

the driver a prisoner and driving off the mules. It finally began to dawn on them that they

had taken the wrong road. They turned around and started back. After returning about a halfmile,

they were fired upon by a German machine gun to the right of the road at a close range of

ten to fifteen yards. The burst of fire hit a good many of the prisoners. The lead guard, Pfc. WILLIAM

THOMAS, scrambled up onto the bank and emptied his pistol into the machine gun position,

seven rounds point-blank from the edge of the hole. Then, since the column had scattered

or lay dead on the road, and since they were still deep in German territory, THOMAS and another

guard made their way directly back to the company. The company wrote the prisoners off

as lost.

However, Pfc. ALLEN BRILL and Pfc. GLENN DORCHEUS, after the firing abruptly ended,

reorganized and rounded up the prisoners, both the well and the wounded, and got them back

on the road. The enemy medical officer, previously mentioned, and several German aid men

patched the wounds. Thirty-eight were mustered to start back to the lines, some of the wounded

being carried. A short distance below San Prospero, BRILL, marching in the rear, was tapped on

the shoulder by an armed German sentry and spoken to in German. BRILL swung around, disarmed

the surprised Nazi, and shoved him into the column without breaking the column’s cadence.

They came back through the lines with 39 prisoners. Of the sixty they started with, they

felt sure that ten or twelve were killed on the road by the short-range machine gun burst.

Throughout the night Company C, in San Prospero, could clearly hear large numbers of

German horse-drawn vehicles moving out to the north. Unfortunately, artillery communication

was out, and the tanks were unable to get up the steep road into town to bring direct fire on the

fleeing enemy. A fine opportunity was missed.

With the daylight of 18 April, Germans were uncovered all over the company area. Men out

looking for eggs from the friendly Italians had Tedeschi pointed out to them. One group brought

94

back nine, five of whom were wounded. Another man climbed out of his foxhole to relieve himself

at dawn, and stopped, as he looked down onto two Germans in the next foxhole. Later in the

morning a deserter directed the men to a house where they interrupted ten Germans in various

stages of shaving, cleaning weapons, washing and sleeping. They were perfectly willing to come,

but first they demanded time to wash and pack. After a rather indelicate American command

from Pfc. WALTER HOFFMAN of company headquarters, they hustled out unwashed and unpacked.

Altogether, twenty-seven prisoners were collected in the morning.

HOFFMAN was then sent out with two men and a BAR to get seven other Germans who

were reported to be willing to surrender. However, when they were spotted, they were armed

and working their way carefully up a draw toward them. A brief firefight followed. Although

the Germans waved a white flag, they returned the fire. Two of them were hit and the other five

were chased but without success. By the time they returned, the company, having been relieved

by Company F, had pulled out at about 1400. The company spent the night of 18-19 April east of

Merlano under occasional heavy artillery fire.

COMPANY D

Company D moved up on mules for the attack on San Prospero. The mortar platoon got lost

while Lieutenant THOMAS H. COLLINS and Captain J. DUANE VANCE made their reconnaissance.

As they were going through Tolè they caught one of the terrific barrages laid on the little

town. Quick action on the part of T/Sgt. RUDOLPH WUOTILA saved the platoon from casualties.

As the barrage was moving up the main road toward them, he led the platoon off onto a

trail, and joined the command group south of San Prospero. Lieutenant KENNETH W. ALPERT,

company executive officer, received word by radio to rush two jeeps of ammunition to a point

south of San Prospero. Supply sergeant HARRY HINSLEY, delivering the ammunition, stopped

the jeeps as he hit the barrage at Tolè, and the men came under sniper fire as they sought cover.

He moved forward alone and got six prisoners from a building just beyond Tolè. Then he raced

on with his jeeps and reached the designated point ahead of the battalion. He sat waiting with

the jeeps loaded with ammunition until the battalion arrived. Over on his left rear, the 2nd Battalion

was attacking Mt. Serra.

COMPANIES A AND B

At approximately 1030, the 1st Battalion was ordered to move out to an assembly area in the

rear of Mt. Croce. Then the battalion, with Company C leading, moved almost due north behind

the 2nd Battalion to a position on the reverse slope of a gently sloping ridge just south of San

Trinita. Here they were able to get “wonderful cool water.” Companies A and B remained there

for 24 hours while Company C took San Prospero. During the afternoon and evening, a twentyman

detail from Company B manhandled a re-supply of ammunition all the way up into San

Prospero from San Trinita.

At Bortolani, where the aid station was shelled on the morning of the 18th, five scout observers

of the 1st Battalion S-2 section were withdrawing from the battalion OP to rejoin the companies

for the march to Merlano. As they sat in the shelter of a stone house, a shell clipped the roof

corner and exploded in midair. Wounded were: Pfc. WALTER S. BOURNE, Pfc. LEWIS J.

FLETCHER, Pfc. DONALD H. HENDERSON, Pfc. WALTER LAUBER, and Pfc. ROBERT A.

VON NEUMANN. Five other men were wounded and one killed by the same freak burst.

In the morning, while Company F prepared to attack Mt. Serra, the 3rd Battalion moved

north, three companies abreast, past Madna di Rodiano to mop up the valley beyond. Around

and in Madna di Rodiano were dozens of dead, both Nazis and American. Twenty German bod-

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ies were counted in one building alone, and there were many of ours out in the woods nearby.

The high ground by the town will always be hallowed ground for men of the 87th, where so

many 3rd Battalion men had died the day before. The 3rd Battalion had completed the breakthrough,

and other units had already started the fast drive for the valley of the Po. Already the

86th had moved across the threshold and were well out on the ever-diminishing hills to the

north. The 1st Armored units were expected to move out too, along the road through Tolè and

down into the valley of the Samoggia River.

The companies crossed the valley abreast almost without incident. The day was extremely

warm and the march long. A good many men dropped out from heat exhaustion. Two prisoners

were picked up in the valley and another one was taken from an artillery position. They offered

no resistance. One hastily laid minefield was discovered and dug up. Lieutenant RUSSELL M.

MCJURY, suffering from sickness, left Company I and was wounded at the aid station. Sgt.

KENNETH D. ARMSTRONG of Company K was wounded by a single round of artillery. Early

in the afternoon the company closed and dug in at the battalion area around the town of C. Costa.

Here the terrain was more open, the gently rolling fields cut up by stonewalled lanes, and with

only occasional trees. The battalion could see heavy artillery barrages landing on the roads in the

Tolè area to their left where the roads were jammed with tanks and trucks heading north.

Around the town were many abandoned artillery pieces. A little distance away, one was still

firing into the battalion area. Captain JOSEPH J. DUNCAN sent a patrol with Lieutenant WALTER

P. STILLWELL, JR. to locate it and knock it out. Captain DUNCAN himself, his runner, Pfc.

WALTER F. SMITH, JR., Lieutenant HARRISON H. KING from Company M, and Pfc. ALBERT

E. SORIA, the radio man, crawled up to watch from a very exposed OP in order to give the patrol

what support it might need. Their position must have been observed, for a shell struck the rock

ledge just above their heads, killing Captain DUNCAN and Pfc. SMITH, and fatally wounding

Lieutenant KING. Captain DUNCAN’s death removed a brilliant and inspiring leader from our

ranks; his continual regard for his men’s welfare and his repeated personal heroism won not

merely the respect, but the love, of his men and associates. His loss was greatly mourned by all,

even at a time when there were so many fine men to mourn for. Lieutenant WILBUR S. SHEETS

assumed command of L Company. The battalion remained in place for the night.

For the fifth day it was planned for the 86th and 87th to continue the attack. The 85th was

ordered to prepare to push past the 87th and through the 86th to spearhead the continuing drive

north toward the valley of the Po. The left boundary of the Division’s advance was defined as the

Samoggia River, and the 87th was assigned to hold and mop up the left part of the Division Zone.

In accordance with this directive, the 2nd Battalion was ordered to hold open the doorway from

Tolè to San Prospero so that the 1st Armored Division could move through and get abreast of the

10th Mountain Division by moving rapidly past San Prospero to the main road on the west bank

of the Samoggia River. For the past four days, the left flank of the 87th had been exposed, and all

looked forward to the comparative security to be provided by the “tankers” working abreast of

the regiment. This rosy prospect never fully materialized. The other two battalions of the regiment

were directed to move rapidly north in the assigned zone and mop up the few pockets of

resistance that might still remain. This mopping up, however, was not to delay the forward

movement of the leading elements. They were to bypass the resistance and push on.

96

FIFTH DAY—18 APRIL

This was the beginning of the pursuit following the breakthrough. These phases cannot immediately

be recognized by the troops of a regiment. The division commander, General HAYS,

undoubtedly recognized it, and tried to instill into all his troops the urgency of bypassing resistance

and continually driving ahead—something like Farragut’s “Damn the torpedoes! Go

ahead!”

Information of the enemy was increasingly vague. No one knew where he could go with

safety, or where he would meet a stubborn, fanatical enemy. Units began to operate with greater

distances between them; control by radio became the normal means of communication; GIs began

to realize why they had been required to make 25-mile hikes in Texas. Officers remarked, “They

never taught us this at Benning!” Those who referred to their field manuals to learn what should

be done during a ”pursuit” were disappointed to find just one short paragraph of generalities.

Later, as the campaign unfolded, these officers realized that no one could foresee the variety of

fantastic incidents that make up “the big picture.”

In the morning, the 3rd Battalion was ordered to mop up the area to the north as far as the

Samoggia River. Company K moved out at 0800 with L on the right, and marched up onto an

open ridge to the north without resistance. At 1100 the company reached the high ground overlooking

Savigno down on the river. Colonel FOWLER arrived and directed that a company go

down into the valley to clean out the town and seize the bridge just beyond. Nothing was known

of the enemy situation in the town. The 2nd Platoon of Company K was sent straight into town,

while the rest of the company made a wide flank on the left with the mission of attempting to join

the 1st Armored Division tank elements moving down the valley toward the town. The 2nd Platoon

moved rapidly and entered the town.

An Italian civilian had declared that there was no enemy in the town, but the streets were

ominously deserted. There were no cheering people to welcome them. The 3rd Squad moved

directly down the main street. The 2nd Squad swung around to the right of town to meet them

on the far side. Lieutenant TOIVO O. RANTA, the platoon leader, followed the 1st Squad. There

was some scattered sniper fire, but they moved rapidly through the buildings finding only one

dead German. They found the road junction at the end of town to be mined, and as the squads

reached this point they were opened up on by a machine gun from across the river. The 3rd

Squad holed up in a convenient building to cover the 2nd Squad which had joined them from the

right, and which now moved out again to the right toward the bridge. The road to the bridge ran

parallel to the river, and was up on a fill affording cover from the machine gun for the squad

moving on its right. After they were sufficiently far down the river from the machine gun, the

going on the right became impossible, and they crossed the road through a hole in the thick

hedgerow. As the first man popped through the hole out onto the field by the river, two machine

guns directly across the river from them opened up at a range of 150 to 200 yards. It was a set-up

for a machine gunner. An ideal range, and the ten men popping into an open field. The men

claim that an American with a BAR couldn’t have missed getting all of them. No one was hit by

the initial bursts, and the men lay flat on the field “sweating it out.”

Captain ROGER EDDY, at about the same time, came under fire from one of the guns firing

from a house just across the river. One at a time, since the hole was only large enough for one,

each man jumped up, ran, and dove through the hole, scrambling across the road. Each time the

machine guns fired. No evasive action was possible, for there was but one hole as plain as a

Apr 18

97

bulls-eye, and every man in the field went through it with bullets zinging around him. No one

was hit. For such a target some of the men would have changed sides!

Captain EDDY decided this was a job for the TDs or tanks, and radioed for armored support.

The 1st Armored unit had been stopped way up the river. The battalion commander instructed

them to wait where they were for the TDs to arrive to support them. One TD soon appeared and

fired six rounds into houses across the river. Then the TD started up a side road into town. It

blew a mine in the road and was disabled, although no one was hurt.

Meanwhile, the 1st Armored elements had been approaching from up the river, and their

first tank arrived in town at just about the time the TD hit the mine. As the medium tank cruised

about the town, the 2nd Platoon withdrew. The company was then ordered up onto the high

ground to continue the advance. The company climbed back, and bivouacked with Company D

near Merlano for the night.

COMPANY L—SAVIGNO

In the morning L moved out on the right of K down into the valley of the Samoggia River.

Part of Company K went through the town of Savigno and came under intense machine gun fire

from across the river. Later, Company L, heading for the bridge, received some fire which killed

Pfc. RICHARD B. NOCITRA and wounded Sgt. RUSSELL W. BERG. After one TD and one tank

of the 1st Armored Division arrived and relieved Company K, part of a platoon of Company L

moved out and dug in along the river bank, while two rifle squads of the 2nd Platoon, with bazookas,

and one section of light machine guns went across the river to guard the bridge. The rest

of the company dug in to the rear of the town in a field.

After the tank had come and gone through the town, foot elements came in and were opened

up on, and pinned down, by a machine gun sniper.

At 2330 Company L was ordered by radio to pull out and up onto the hill overlooking the

town and bridge. It took the rest of the night to collect all of the men from the scattered positions

across the river, and to lead them back up the hill.

COMPANY I—BATTALION RESERVE

Company I remained throughout the day in battalion reserve, while K and L mopped up

Savigno on the bank of the Samoggia River. Company I moved up beyond Mt. Nonascoso. They

were then ordered to assemble near Mongiorgio. As they approached this town they ran into

elements of the 1st Battalion, so they holed up in the fields east of Mongiorgio. The company encountered

no artillery, which was a glorious experience for the men.

COMPANY A—MOP UP

Company A moved out to the battalion assembly area, behind the 2nd Battalion, at San

Trinita, on the morning of the 18th. There they waited from 1000 to 1200. They were then given

the mission of mopping up along the Division left flank from San Trinita to Merlano. As they

moved along the gently rolling ridgeline, some German 88 fire wounded Pfc. MAX B.

KUHLMAN, and two brand new replacements, Cpl JOHN H. HAYWORTH and Pvt. JOHN R.

FORBES, JR. They entered the town of Merlano with scouts and point forward. The leading elements

expected to be fired on at any moment. Cautiously moving into the main street, they were

surprised to come upon Captain TOM STEWART of Battalion Headquarters, shaving himself in

the street. He and Lieutenant DARROCK CROOKES and Cpl. OLIVER ANDREWS, JR. had entered

the town in advance of everyone else.

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At 1700 orders were received to attack Mongiorgio. Company B, supported by TDs, was to

attack around the right. Company A was to attack directly. Mongiorgio was the first of several

riverside towns to be encountered by the regiment. It was built high on a commanding pinnacle,

walled in and surrounded by cliffs like a medieval fortress. As Company A reached the second

of a series of deep draws which ran from a ridgeline down towards the river on their left, they

received sniper and automatic weapons fire coming up the draw from across the river. They

swung to their right behind Company B. Here artillery fire hit them and they couldn’t move.

They dug in. This was heavy-caliber shellfire, many of them delayed-action 170s or 210s that

threatened to dig them right out of their foxholes. The company moved to a new area, and received

shellfire there too. They moved three times in succession trying to evade these shells

which dug huge craters. Lieutenant DONALD FOX was wounded by clods of dirt that struck

him in the face as they reached their new area. Although half-blinded by blood, he refused aid

until he had the men in position. Also wounded in the company were: S/Sgt. GEORGE C.

MCCUTCHEN, Pfc. JOE FLORES, Pfc. DONALD A. HAYNES, and Pfc. BURTON C.

NEUMEYER. Two men from another company nearby were killed in the area, and a tank was

knocked out. At 2000, the message came that the attack was delayed till morning, and the company

was to dig in for the night.

COMPANY B—SULMONTE

Around noon of the 18th, Company B began a march. It did not end until they reached Sulmonte

that night. Passing along the ridges on the other side of the valley east of San Prospero,

the company moved unopposed through hilly country to a ridge overlooking Mongiorgio and

Sulmonte. By then it was late afternoon. At 1800 Companies A and B were ordered to attack

Mongiorgio, passing through a battalion of the 86th Infantry to do so. The attack was to be made

with six tanks, with the 2nd Platoon on the left of the road and the 1st on the right. However,

only five tanks jumped off with the company. They advanced in good formation across level,

grassy country, but one of the tanks pushed on ahead of the company up the road. When it had

almost reached Sulmonte, and was for the moment backing and filling, trying to make a rightangle

turn, it was directly hit by a round from a German TD and knocked out.

At almost the same time, the flat open ridge along which Company B was advancing was

swept by grazing machine gun fire from the direction of Mongiorgio. The 2nd Platoon, fortunately,

had joined the 1st on the right side of the road, and the company advanced by rushes in

the direction of Sulmonte. At the same time, heavy shells began to drop right in, and the whole

company raced for cover under the protection of the steep reverse slope of Sulmonte. Pfc. ANDREW

R. SISENSTEIN and Pfc. AUSTIN C. WHEELER were wounded. Together with a company

from the 86th Infantry, they dug in there for the night. The Germans were throwing some

very heavy shells, but they all cleared the ridge. There were no casualties, but very little sleep.

Company C, as has been noted, bivouacked near Merlano.

COMPANY D

Company D reached the vicinity of Mongiorgio late in the afternoon behind Companies A

and B. The mortar platoon had 900 rounds of ammunition ready. One section of Lieutenant

ANTSELM R. BRADLEY’s 1st Platoon was attached to each of the attacking companies. Lieutenant

WILLIAM S. SPINNEY’s 2nd Platoon was kept in general support. From behind the line of

departure, east of Mongiorgio, the mortar platoon was not able to reach the town, so they moved

forward 600 yards, putting them beyond the line of departure. It developed that an enemy sniper

outpost lay between the line of departure and the mortars. The 37-mm pack howitzers of the battalion

fired at these enemy dugouts, and Lieutenant SPINNEY’s heavy machine guns chased the

enemy as they fled from the dugouts down the hill on the left hand side. This happened at about

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1800. The mortars were able to register on Mongiorgio and on the enemy reverse slope. When

the attack was called off until morning, the men spent the night in position.

Companies E and F rested in position. Company G at 1100 moved out on a mop-up operation,

going over onto the forward slope and working north on the high ground parallel to the

Samoggia River as far north as San Prospero. One platoon from Company H was attached for

this operation. They met no opposition, and spent the night in San Prospero, previously taken by

the 1st Battalion.

During the morning, the 1st Platoon of H stayed in place receiving a complete ration and water.

The Italians came back to their houses from their hiding places in the woods, and furnished

the men with wash water. Their packs caught up with them, as well as the new supply of ammunition,

some cigarettes, and socks. At approximately 1300 they moved out with Company E

to San Prospero. On the way Pfc. ERNEST C. HAMPTON was wounded by artillery. However,

he was so far forward that he didn’t report back to the aid station, but continued on, finally reporting

back the next day with some prisoners. The 2nd Platoon of Company H remained in the

same area throughout the day while other units passed through. Some artillery fire fell on the

area. Lieutenant DAVID SNYDER was stricken ill and had to be evacuated. One replacement

was received.

All sections of the mortar platoon remained in the same areas throughout the day and night.

Several missions were fired and a heavy artillery barrage was received late in the morning at C.

Bacucchi. This barrage killed Cpl. ANDREW E. DALTON, JR.

Two men of 2nd Battalion Headquarters were wounded during the day. T/Sgt. HARRY

COOPER, delivering ammunition to Company F, was hit near Bortolani by shell fragments while

lying in a ditch by his jeep. Pfc. BARNEY JABLOWSKI, while removing the dead in the same

area, was hit and wounded. Two others from another unit were killed.

SIXTH DAY—19 APRIL

Colonel FOWLER issued the following order at 0010 on the 19th of April:

“10th Mt Div will continue attack at 0800 on 19 April with the 85th Mt Inf on the right, 87th

Mt Inf on the left. The 87th will jump off from present front lines near Merlano at 0800 with 1st

Battalion on the left and 3rd on the right. The 1st Battalion with Co A 751st Tank Battalion and

Co A 701st Tank (1 platoon) attached, will attack left guiding on the river and mop up in zone.

The 3rd Battalion, with 1 platoon of TDs attached, will attack from line now held by 3rd Battalion

front line units. It is to advance rapidly and capture the high ground in zone overlooking the Po

Valley keeping contact with the 1st Battalion. (This directive to maintain contact later proved

impractical, and was revoked.) The 2nd Battalion in regimental reserve is to follow the 3rd Battalion

at 1,000 yards. The 616th FA Battalion reinforced by the 604th is in direct support. Company

C 84th Chemical Battalion priority to the 3rd Battalion. Patrols to front will return before

0730 with information as to whether enemy positions are occupied. If not, advance will be made

without artillery preparation. If occupied, artillery preparation will last fifteen minutes from

0745. Display panels along line of departure for one hour starting 0630. The 86th Mt Inf will assist

by fire until passed through.”

During this day the troops began the series of long movements which carried them across the

Po and to the Alps. The regimental CP moved three times to keep up, and the regimental commander

spent most of the day visiting his battalion commanders.

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At approximately 0800 on the 19th of April, Companies A and B resumed the attack on

Mongiorgio. An urgently requested air mission had not been flown. Company B was still on the

right of A, with a platoon of tanks on the road on the right of B.

COMPANY B

Company B moved out in a column of platoons, 1st, 2nd, weapons, and 3rd, with the heavy

machine guns of D giving support fire. The company moved out in good order some 400 yards,

when the German machine gunners in Mongiorgio opened up, pinning the company down for

several minutes. Meanwhile, the lead tank ahead and to the right opened up on the church steeple

in Mongiorgio which was thought to have a machine gun in it. The tanker scored about half a

dozen hits on the tower.

The 1st Platoon was attempting to advance when Pfc. ERVIN A. HARMON was hit in the

head by machine gun fire. A few minutes later, our tanks began to receive direct fire from Tiger

tanks across the wide valley to our left. Pfc. PETER A. PANTSARI and Pfc. ZALE R. RUBINS

were instantly killed by a direct hit from this fire, and Pfc. EDWARD F. ELEPHANT was

wounded in the hand and evacuated. Three of the tanks were knocked out by this time, but the

fourth tank kept moving on down the road into town, firing both its machine guns and 76s as it

went.

While the tank was moving into town, the 1st and 2nd Platoons shifted to the right to take

advantage of cover, and moved by rushes up into the village. Several prisoners were taken, but

many Krauts pulled out to positions to the north. The 2nd Platoon manned positions in the

buildings to repel a counterattack, while the 1st Platoon under Sgt. SYLVAN D. WALDRIP

moved out in front of the buildings with elements of Company A. Several more prisoners gave

themselves up, and one small group, told to move to the rear, took off down the hill. All were

killed as they ran away. During the battle T/5 MARLIN A. PERKINS was killed and the following

wounded: Pfc. FORREST I. BASS, Pfc. ROY E. GAROUTTE, Pfc. FRANK J. HERZIG, JR., and

Pvt. RALPH H. BARNARD.

COMPANY A

Company A was to move out at 0800 with tanks, with Company B on the right. The line of

departure was near the road junction at Sulmonte. From here the exposed road ran directly

along the ridge-top and through the gate into town. The tanks didn’t arrive in time, but the two

companies moved out abreast. Half an hour later, the tanks arrived and moved up the road

abreast of A and on its right. The tanks silenced machine gun fire which had initially opened up

on the attacking elements, but all four were eventually knocked out.

The company entered the town and took the first group of houses surrounding the church

without difficulty. Beyond the church was an open clearing and another group of houses. As the

men started across this clearing, the enemy opened up from the houses beyond. Pfc. GROVER P.

WOODS and Sgt. EDWIN R. GORDON were killed, and Pfc. ARTHUR M. CROSS and Pfc.

FORREST A. BARTHOLD were wounded. The attack was halted and the Germans counterattacked.

First Sergeant GILBERT S. BATES killed six of the enemy with his Tommy gun, but German

grenades and mortar fire struck the church and the surrounding area, and the weary men of

the company started to retreat. S/Sgt. JOSEPH C. FARRELL was killed, and Pfc. STEPHEN O.

ROSE, Pvt. GEORGE F. HUMBURGER, Pfc. EARL MASTERSON, and T/5 CHARLES T.

MCNERNEY were wounded by machine gun fire. The machine gun section had started the day

with twelve men and ended with only one. During the day they had three different section leaders.

101

Then, guns of the British 178th Medium Lowland Artillery, with observation from Merlano,

laid in on the German-occupied group of houses with a perfect pinpoint barrage. The tiles few

high in the air as the German-occupied houses were zeroed in. The counterattack died and

Mongiorgio was taken.

Company C had swung onto the right to take the town of C. Lezza and the high ground

above it to the north of Mongiorgio. Company B was ordered to withdraw, and A was to remain

in Mongiorgio. From the town they watched the 1st Armored units moving down the valley

across the river. Germans in bunkers, organized in antitank teams, were holding up their progress.

They would blow the tracks, stopping the tank, and then lay a sticky charge against the

tank, blowing it up. As the crews fled from the burning tanks, they were being captured. Three

tanks were burned this way. Captain HUGH KLEMME called for concentrated “time fire” from

the 616th Field Artillery, and put his company mortars, the attached 81s from Company D, and

the “stubby” mortars on the German bunkers. Then as the enemy were driven out of their holes,

the company opened up on them with machine gun and M-1 fire.

After dark, some 88 fire came into the town. One round slammed in the doorway of the

building the machine gun section was in. Pvt. SIDNEY W. BENNETT was killed and six men

were wounded: Pfc. WILLIAM B. ADDY, Pfc. RUBEN CLEMENTS, who lost an arm and a leg,

Pvt. JOSEPH J. FITZPATRICK, Pvt. JOHN A. BERGMAN, Pvt. EDWARD D. FLACZYNSKI, and

also S/Sgt. DOUGLAS A. MINNERLY of the 2nd Platoon. Pfc. MOSES A. BROOKS was slightly

wounded. On their way back, S/Sgt. LAWRENCE E. HOTALING and Pfc. EDWIN W. STANKE

captured one German officer and two enlisted men who had been wounded in the morning.

COMPANY B—MARCH TO C. SILVESTRI

About noon, Company B was ordered to withdraw to Sulmonte, leaving A to hold Mongiorgio.

The company soon found that the move was not for a rest. Colonel FOWLER, the regimental

commander, came up and asked Lieutenant DONIPHAN CARTER if they were ready to attack

again, and just as C-rations were being issued, the first meal that day, the company was ordered

to move again to the north. Most of the men still had had nothing to eat all day. The attack

formation was organized as 1st Platoon, weapons platoon, 3rd Platoon on the right, and the

2nd Platoon on the left. After advancing several hundred yards, they left the rolling, grassy hills,

and were confronted with a desolate, heart-breaking series of knife-edge, bare, clay hills. By this

time they could see men of Company K on il Poggio and hear firing from that direction.

The 2nd Platoon on the left, struggling up and down across the transverse series of ridges,

couldn’t keep up, and after thirty minutes was forced to fall in behind the rest of the company

which was parading in single file across the skyline along the ridge to the right. The 2nd Platoon

lost several men from exhaustion and heat as it proceeded. The 1st Platoon and the command

group reached il Poggio first, and Sgt. HARRY V. MCCLINTICK took a small group to clear a

house of snipers. Company K had already moved out for C. Silvestri. After a halt for breath, the

company moved down into a deep valley in the direction of C. Silvestri. Sniper fire, which had

bothered the company all afternoon, finally took effect. Pfc. ROBERT J. LA BOMBARD was shot

through the head.

After another couple of miles of rugged terrain, the company moved up to C. Silvestri where

some Company K men left to guard the rear were holed up in houses and barns, receiving occasional

mortar and machine gun fire from the rise ahead. Company B started to dig in below the

buildings, but before holes could be finished, a concentration of mortar fire came in and killed

and wounded many men. Those killed were: Sgt. SYLVAN D. WALDRIP, T/4 PAUL T. WILSON,

Cpl. EDWARD O. WOZENCRAFT, Pfc. ROBERT L. STANGER, Pfc. EDWARD J. KOSA,

and Pfc. ROBERT W. GRABOWSKY. Wounded were: First Lieutenant JOHN S. GYLES, Sgt.

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WALTER MIILU, T/Sgt. RAY S. DOTY, Pfc. EDGAR D. BOYER, JR., Pfc. KAYWOOD C.

SNOOK, Pfc. DALE R. WOLD, Pfc. VERNON E. CAMPBELL, Pfc. TOM B. CHAPLIN, Pfc. ATTILIO

L. DEINI, Pfc. JACK P. DICKINSON, Pvt. ARLAN A. HINESLEY, Pvt. JAMES C. JOHNS,

Pfc. HARRIS P. STEED, Pfc. STERLING E. RED EAGLE, Pfc. CLIFFORD L. JOHNSON, Pfc.

THEODORE KANELL, Pfc. HENRY P. MARTIN, JR., Pfc. WAYNE L. NICHOLS, and Pvt. JOSEPH

J. BECKMANN. German medics captured by Company K were used to evacuate many of

these casualties. Others wounded were Pfc. FRANK J. NEMEC, Pfc. HARMON W. WARD, JR.,

and Pfc. JAMES A RANDOLPH.

About 1900 Company B began to dig in a defensive position 100 yards north of the farm

buildings in a vineyard, with the 1st Platoon on the left, 2nd in the center, and 3rd on the right.

There was no action during the night.

COMPANY D

When the attack on Mongiorgio was resumed the following day, the mortars fired 500 rounds

before the artillery got registered on the town. The 1st Platoon, moving with the attack, suffered

no casualties, and after the town was taken they fired across the Samoggia River to assist the 1st

Armored units moving up along the road. The “stubby” mortar section under Lieutenant OLAN

D. PARR moved forward with Company A and assisted in this fire across the river. Pfc. CECIL S.

OVERTON from this section was wounded.

During the action from Torre Iussi to Mongiorgio, every one of the fifteen men and one officer

in the “stubby” mortar section was at least scratched, although only two were lost: Pfc.

HENRY LEYMAN, who was killed on 14 April at Le Coste, and Pfc. CECIL OVERTON, seriously

wounded on 19 April. Pfc. EDWARD B. COSETTE was wounded on 15 April, and S/Sgt.

ROGER W. HARLOW at Mongiorgio on 19 April should have been evacuated, but refused.

The mortar platoon was ordered forward toward Mongiorgio, and the mortars were in the

act of displacing when a counterattack developed in the town. They quickly set up and were

ready to fire, but the counterattack was broken up by British artillery. The mortars were then

ordered up to il Poggio. Pfc. JACK GOLDBERG, radioman for the mortar platoon forward observer

attached to Company A, was fatally wounded by artillery fire.

COMPANY C—VENERANO

On 19 April Company C, in battalion reserve near Merlano, marched to Sulmonte, arriving at

1300. Some artillery continued to come in as they marched, and they brought some small arms

fire on Sulmonte as they approached, erroneously thinking the fire over to the left on Mongiorgio

was coming from there. Companies A and B had spent the night at Sulmonte before resuming

the attack on Mongiorgio. So all the company found at Sulmonte was Pfc. WALTER HOFFMAN,

the company headquarters man, who had made his way up there alone looking for them.

Company B had by this time pulled back from Mongiorgio, leaving A holding the town.

Company C was given as an objective the village of Venerano and the steep hill beside it. This

turned out to be C’s grimmest battle. In early afternoon, the 2nd Platoon jumped off on the left

and the 3rd on the right. They were supported by five medium tanks. The 3rd Platoon moved

down a draw skirting the edge of a heavily wooded hill on its right. To the left were open rolling

fields sloping down to the south. Across these fields the 2nd Platoon was advancing. The 3rd

Squad of the 3rd Platoon and attached machine gun squad had already swung to the right (north)

around the west edge of the wooded hill, and hit a trail leading up to the steep hill objective,

when the 2nd Squad behind them was opened up on by cross-firing machine guns and rifle fire.

The squad dumped itself instantly into the ditch running along beside them only to find that another

machine gun was adjusted to fire up the ditch. Pvt. JOHN L. HEICHEL was killed, and Pfc.

Apr 19

103

GILBERT R. ERICKSON, Pfc. DAVID A. BLEICH, Pfc. PAUL W. ZURCHER and Pvt. DONALD

C. HOGUE were wounded. The squad leader, Sgt. EARL A. FOLSE calle