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Ambush
21 Sep - 9 0ct 1944
After our retreat from Luneville (IV)(25)(NS) the 2d Platoon Troop A was deployed along highway N414 north of Luneville, which was still held, since the Krauts only reached Jolivet (25) and Einville (25) in this sector.
At 0900 21 September, Lt. Harry Kellogg left to establish liaison with the 2d team under Sgt. Magnum, which was posted in a little ravine near the highway about halfway from Luneville to Einville, and with the 3rd team under Sgt. Beasley, which was located just outside Einville.
Before leaving, Lt. Kellogg kicked Woody and “Major” the French volunteer out of the bantam, saying that he didn’t need them. He then left with Wenzel driving.
We expected him back in an hour, but by noon he hadn’t returned. We were restless so Paschal and Soudoff left to get some information from Magnum’s section.
At 1600 there still was no word. Suddenly the radio came on, and Spadafino jumped to acknowledge it. We heard, “Hello, hello. Bantam has been fired on. No more information. Over.” Our hearts sank. We waited. Paschal finally arrived, quite excited, and told us in a trembling voice that Lt. Kellogg and Wenzel had just left Magnum’s team to join Beasley, using the road N414, which we had used already a few times, when the men with the 1st team heard the chatter of some burp guns, and a long burst from an American machine gun, then nothing more. We felt sure that the Lieutenant and his driver had run into an ambush.
That same night, Sgt. Magnum decided to make a reconnaissance with his team in the direction of the farm de la Rochelle, following the route taken by the Lieutenant. Suddenly they found themselves flanked by three Tiger tanks which blasted at them with their 88’s. The team was caught cold and had to abandon their vehicles in a ditch, making good their escape under cover of darkness.
In spite of the odds against him, Harry Ardilly, a French volunteer with A Troop who was with the team, decided to continue on alone to the Rochelle farm. As he approached he could see it was guarded, whether by FFI or Kraut he couldn’t tell in the dark. Harry faked a password. A gutteral “Ja” was the response which Harry in turn answered with a burst from his Tommy gun. The sentinel fell and some of his buddies started shooting wildly in the dark, which covered the noise of Harry’s strategic withdrawal.
On the 25th the Germans evacuated the farm (this marked the deepest penetration of the German thrust north of Luneville, made untenable by the 79th Division attacking Foret de Parroy (25) on the south) and we were able to find the farmer and ask him about Lt. Kellogg and his driver.
He told us that a German patrol had just arrived at his farm when the jeep with the Americans had driven up at high speed. The Krauts let them get close, then cut loose with their submachine guns. The driver was seriously wounded and lost conciousness. The Lieutenant had his legs smashed by the bullets but still had strength to turn his MG on the German position. With one long burst he killed three and wounded two. Both Americans were taken prisoner and seemed to be in bad shape from their wounds.
Although a few other local actions flared up here and there along the front, by the 25th the situation seemed to be approaching that of a stable line. The day of the wild Cavalry dash was over, at least temporarily, and for a long period advances were to be counted by the yard rather than the mile. From now on until the next big offensive the Second Cavalry would have to “dig like the Infantry”. The balance of September is reported as “continued assigned mission, no change in our front lines”.
October was padded with continuous patrol activity, small limited attacks and intermittant artillery daily. All in all the type of activity that causes such reports as “all quiet on the Western Front”. Usually it wasn’t so quiet for the little people.
Parroy
Troop C, 42d Squadron
10 - 11 October 1944
The 42d Squadron was dug in on the high ground north of the canal (Marne au Rhin) just west of Bures (29a), along the line of an old railroad track bed. Then came the order to prepare to move up. The Squadron was directed to attack east to secure Coincourt (29a)(OHW) and Parroy (29a)(OHW). The Troop Commanders of A and C Troops were briefed at Squadron Headquarters on 10 October and returned to their CP’s to dispatch patrols to reconnoiter the two towns.
Captain Andrews sent a patrol under Lt. Cattlet to the high ground just west of Coincourt and the patrol carried wire for a field phone, so that communications from the proposed base of fire to the supporting assault guns and artillery would be established prior to the attack.
In the C Troop sector to the south Captain Harris dispatched two patrols, one to the north and one to the south of the Etang de Bures.
The patrols from both Troops left after dark on the night of 10 October, as the attack was scheduled to jump off at 0430 the following morning. At Squadron arrangements were made for 10 minute artillery barrages in Battalion concentrations just before the jump off. The assault gun Troop was to fire in direct support on call. To further coordinate the attack the Squadron Executive accompanied A Troop and the S-3 accompanied C Troop.
At 0400 with the men from the patrols as guides, A and C Troops, totaling six dismounted platoons, started moving up from their old positions through the mud and rain in the pitch black night.
Lt. Hueffner’s platoon of C Troop was given the mission of attacking south of the Etang where the patrol under Sgt. Meredith had reported two MG nests and an AT gun position in the orchard before Parroy.
The remainder of the Troop was to take the high ground northwest of town then the high ground northeast of town, rendering the Kraut AT and MG positions untenable in the first case and completely dominating the town from the second objective.
At Bures there was a temporary halt as NCO’s checked their squads, the flank guards, and location of their automatic weapons. It was sloppy there and the town had that dead smell that comes from being under weeks of shelling. Parroy will be just like this, we thought.
Then we pushed on, bypassing the marsh that is called a lake on the map. As we reached the wooded fringe on the far side we crossed one of A Troop’s platoons moving up on Coincourt. Now the ground started to rise and we noticed that the visibility was improving, so we hurried along reluctant to have our movements observed. Our combat boots made sucking sounds in the goo of the ploughed fields, while great clumps of mud clung to the sides and the soles.
At the top of the rise each man flopped into the mud as the line of squad columns closed up to one firing line. The machine gunners busied themselves getting their guns set up. We could see our first objective 150 yards away across a little gully. Just then the whistle of our own artillery was heard overhead, medium stuff, coming in bunches. It was awfully close; seemed to just skim the hill we were on. Already Captain Harris had dispatched two scouts from each platoon and they sprinted down into the gully by leaps and bounds, while the base of fire watched every bush on the next hill, with fingers on their triggers.
For a while there was no sound but our own artillery. The Captain waved the whole line forward as the scouts disappeared over the top of the hill. Only an NCO with a section of MG’s was left in the supporting position.
As we hit the bottom of the gully machine gun and rifle fire cut loose - some fellows dropped. It was kind of faint; it was the A Troop attack going home. We pushed up the hill. A machine gun opened up on our right 300 yards away. That was Heuffner’s platoon, who really opened up and combed the orchard to our right front. The scouts who had now reached the edge of town opened up with Tommy guns, then waited.
The right flank platoon above the orchard was ordered to dig in. There were hundreds of Kraut trenches and dugouts there, all vacant. Meanwhile the left flank platoon extended to the left, and moving by bounds in squad rushes, rapidly gained the high ground north and east of town as the Kraut artillery started coming in. The holes Jerry had left came in handy! We could hear the rattle of small arms in the town of Parroy to our rear, but no one got out the two roads from the rear of town - alive. We later learned from prisoners taken by Heuffner’s platoon - when clearing out the town, that the greater part of an Engineer Company had pulled back just before our attack, warned by the artillery preparation.
A trooper from Heuffner’s platoon, when asked what he remembered of the operations said, “It was wet as hell!”, then went on to bemoan the untimely demise of “Big Bertha”, a Kraut 75mm AT gun that C Troop had picked up nearly a month before back near Haraucourt. One section adopted it and had daily gun drill, maintenance, and dry run destruction of material.
Actually it had only been fired a few times against the Germans, just to get it zeroed in. The Parroy attack was going to be it’s big test. We had an AT gun duel lined up with the Kraut gun in the orchard. Just as the prime mover (1/4 ton truck) was moving the gun into position off the road leading into Parroy it hit a mine. The two men in the jeep, Sperulli and Baroni, claim they heard the mine going off so they parted. Apparently a very effective anti-AT mine measure as the only injury was the driver getting his face scratched as he high dived into some bushes. The front part of the jeep, including the engine, landed 50 yards away, but the rear was held down by “Big Bertha”. I think it was Meredith that lovingly applied the nitro that cut off the old girl’s nose and put her out of commission.
In the Troop A sector the luck was bad. Major Bill Potts hit a mine in Bures and it killed Muzzey and Hagan. Embleton’s driver was killed by another mine as he was coming up to help them.
October 1944
C Troop, 2d Squadron
C Troop arrived at Lenoncourt, France, for a well deserved rest on the third day of October, after sixty days of continual driving and fighting. Lenoncourt was small, one of those rural towns complete with manure piles, the French sign of wealth, not at all different from the countless other villages passed in the course of the nearly 500 miles covered since August 3 when we first saw action at Fougeres (I)(15).
At Lenoncourt the Troop was billeted in barns and each platoon had it’s own cook. The weather was beginning to get cold, the wind was cutting, and the days usually wet. For eight days we rested in the town, went to nightly shows at the Squadron CP, pulled no guard and had plenty to eat.
On the 11th of October, the Troop moved out of Lenoncourt, heading for Parroy (29a)(OHW). At Henamenil, near our destination, it was discovered that the road into Parroy was heavily mined. Since removal would require too much time, the Troop dismounted and went ahead on foot to occupy the town, relieving C Troop of the 42d. Outposts were established in the woods east of town and for two days things remained quiet, although our dismounted patrols scoured the woods in the area.
On the 13th, enemy artillery began zeroing in on Parroy. S/Sgt. Proebstle, platoon sgt. of the second platoon, was wounded when a shell struck the platoon’s billet. (Note: A captured enemy artillery chart had a concentration number on the CP in Parroy.) A four man patrol was sent out in an effort to discover enemy positions, ran into a machine gun nest and only one man returned, Pvt. DeFeo. Later that day one of the outposts noticed some German soldiers carrying a man in a shelter half and, after arranging a truce, found that they wished to return two members of the patrol, Sgt. Thompson and Pvt. Reidle. Thompson, the patrol leader, and Reidle were turned over to our medics after a half-hour truce. Pvt. Frederick Idzior, the fourth member of the patrol, was never located and was reported as missing in action.
More patrols were sent out during the next four days, most of them drawing enemy fire, but sustaining only one casualty during the period, S/Sgt. Douglas, who was wounded.
The Troop was relieved by the 42d on the morning of the 18th, and pulled back to Bathelmont (29a) for a rest period.
The Group report of 19 October makes note that “Troop A, 42d Squadron, was attached to the 328th Infantry Regiment”. On the 20th, “the 42d Squadron moved to occupy the high ground on Moncourt ridge until the 26th Division attacked Moncourt (29a)(OHW). The Squadron attacked in conjunction with the 104th Infantry Regiment on the north and the 121st Cavalry Squadron on the south”. (Note: “Hambone” woods (OHW) was taken in this push on 20 October. C Troop attacked on the right due east. B passed through and attacked north to Bois Frontiere (OHW).)
Operation “Hambone” Woods
18 - 20 October 1944
The Third Army was jockeying for position for it’s Saar offensive. “26th Infantry Division will seize high ground Xanrey (29a) - Moncourt (29a)(OHW).”
However, the Moncourt ridge which continued south from Moncourt down to the Marne au Rhin canal west of Xures (29a)(OHW) was also in enemy hands. The Second Cavalry was directed to seize and hold the enemy positions south of Moncourt 3000 yards east of the Coincourt (29a)(OHW) - Parroy (29a)(OHW) positions then held by the 42d Squadron. This would secure the flank of the 26th Division during the attack.
A Squadron plan was devised taking into consideration the following factors:
1. The ground was very muddy, due to month long rains, affecting the use of tanks in close support.
2. Enemy positions were heavily mined. (Witness Bures (29a), Parroy and Coincourt in last weeks attack.)
3. Our right flank was partially secured, in that Seventh Army Troops (106th Cavalry) held Mouacourt (29a)(OHW) south of the canal.
4. Strong enemy positions on the dominating heights of Moncourt woods (OHW) were capable of delivering crippling enfilade fire across the front of the position to be assaulted, and in itself it was a strong position.
Col. Hargis‘ staff came up with a simple, effective plan of attack. The 42d Squadron would attack north in a column of Troops from an assembly area south of the Marne au Rhin canal in the vicinity of Mouacourt. This line of action was arrived at after a careful terrain study, and consideration of enemy positions and defense measures. It provided for the concentration of the entire Squadron effort against a single platoon at the only point sheltered by folds in the ground from direct fire of all supporting positions in the enemy Regimental sector. (Moncourt-Xures.)
By hitting the enemy flank, the remainder of the enemy line could be pinned down by closely coordinated artillery fire (the whole 26th Division Artillery was available to support the operation) and the assault force could deal successively with single enemy platoon positions.
The decision was made to initiate the assault with a night attack, in order to effect surprise, and since the mud and mines and canal would unduly restrict immediate tank support.
So much for the general plan, which was approved and the attack ordered for the night 19-20 October.
Let’s take a look at the job and method of the leading assault Troop. C Troop was elected for this unenviable task and had engineers and tanks attached. Its mission, phase one of the operation, was the seizure of Jambon woods (OHW). (Forever after known as “Hambone” to the Second Cavalry) Capt. Harris (still wearing his Lieutenants bar, just so his luck wouldn’t change) elected to attack initially in waves of platoons (the night attack) with emphasis on silence and surprise and bayonets, to secure objective 1 and a bridgehead over the canal, the critical point as it included the southern tip of the Bois de Jambon. Engineer mine sweeping parties were to accompany the assault groups, clear mines, and mark lanes with white tape for the supporting tanks. These routes, designated in advance, led not only to positions to support the attack, but also along the routes of the various counter-attack plans which had been made in anticipation of smashing every attempt by the enemy to retake the position. The canal was to be bridged (a matter of minutes with treadway equipment) in the initial phases of the assault.
When C Troop gained a foothold in the south tip of Bois de Jambon, they were to dig in for the remainder of the night while the mines were swept and tanks brought up. It wasn’t considered wise to advance through the woods after dark.
At dawn Troop C was to jump off and mop up the woods. In event of determined resistance Troop B would be brought up, and the two Troops would attack abreast with a security force digging in on the right flank to contain Kraut forces in Bois de Frederick (OHW).
Upon clearing Hambone woods (Objective 2) Troop C was to establish a defense position along the east edge of the woods and support by fire the attack of Troop B against the south edge of Bois de Frontiere (OHW). (Objective 3.)
Here again, Troop B was to assault the left extremity of the enemy’s prepared positions while our artillery pounded the remainder of the line. As it was to be a daylight attack, the assault guns were to smoke the south edge of Moncourt woods to blind enemy artillery observers.
The attack was to be made just east of the slight ridge running between Jambon and Frontiere, thereby protecting the attacking groups from direct fire and observation from the enemy Regimental reserve position at Haut de la Crois (OHW). Since enemy tanks had been reported in Bois de Frontiere, radio communications with our tank destroyers in the orchard above Coincourt was available to Troop B, and a small portion of armor piercing shells by TD’s was included in the artillery preparation in that woods. Another detail of the fire plan was the mixture of shells, including 155’s with instantaneous fuse high explosive for tree bursts, delayed fuse HE for penetration of deep dugouts, and phosphorous for fires and blinding observation.
510 radios were carried and Squadron staff members went along with the attack echelons to further effect coordination, and authorize on-the-spot changes in the execution of the plan as the tactical situation developed.
Troop C patrols on the 19th reported the latest changes in enemy gun positions and booby traps. The harrassing artillery fires at irregular intervals that had been fired for the last several days, were continued on the night of the 19th, positions that had been pinpointed receiving maximum attention. No general barrage preceded the night attack in order to retain the element of surprise.
At 0200 advance elements silently crossed the canal and the die was cast.
Vigorous execution of the plan by Capt. Harris‘ men overwhelmed the Kraut left flank. Enemy artillery reaction was instantaneous, and the men of C Troop dug in under fire. During the night they hung on grimly to their toe hold in the Hambone woods. Lt. Hueffner’s platoon seemed to receive special attention from the enemy and passed a rough and unpleasant night.
At dawn came our tremendous artillery preparation and the attack progressed according to plan. | |
