Civil War, Winter Rest Into Spring Of 1864

 WINTER REST

The regiment now went into winter quarters at Mitchell’s Station a few miles south of Culpeper Court House. During the remainder of the winter it was on provost duty and guarding the fords of the Rapidan River. Large log huts were built for the men and officers of the regiment around a rectangle. On one side were the officers’ quarters and on the other, and along the short sides, were the barracks for the men, and the store houses. In these buildings, constructed by the troops themselves, the Second was quite comfortable until the next campaign started in May, 1864.

The cavalry was now armed with the saber, Colt’s revolver, and Sharp’s carbine, which was a breech-loading weapon with paper cartridge and cap or primer. The regiments were drilled in double rank in accordance with the regulations of 1841, which were largely taken from the French. Following the lead of the Southern cavalry, the men were taught not only to fight mounted, but also to fight dismounted. In doing this numbers 1, 2, and 3 of both front and rear ranks dismounted. Numbers 1 and 2 then linked their horses, while number 3 turned his reins over to number 4, who remained mounted. While the horses moved off to cover led by number 4, the other three men of each four formed line with the rest of the company and were then deployed in extended order at an interval of about one yard.

General Grant was placed in command of the armies of the United States on March 12, 1864, and he left General Meade in command of the Army of the Potomac. General Pleasanton was relieved from command of the cavalry corps because of some differences with General Meade. He was replaced by General Philip H. Sheridan, who Grant brought with him from the West. The First Cavalry Division was now commanded by General Torbert, who soon became ill and was replaced by General Merritt again from the Reserve Brigade of which the Second Cavalry was a part.

Sheridan noticed that the horses of the cavalry were in a run-down condition because they were used on constant picket duty on a line of about sixty miles. He recommended to Meade that his corps be relieved from this duty and concentrated in order to destroy the enemy cavalry. Meade did not see how the front and flanks of the army could be protected under these conditions but he relieved most of the horsemen from picket duty.

SPOTTSYLVANIA, RAID TO RICHMOND

On May 4, 1864, the Army of the Potomac moved against Lee by the left flank in order to force him to abandon his trenches along Mine Run. Sheridan’s 10,000 cavalry was divided so that Gregg’s and Wilson’s divisions preceded the Second and Fifth Corps, while Torbert’s division, of which the Second Cavalry formed a part, remained in the rear of the army to protect the trains.

The regiment crossed the river at Ely’s Ford May 4, 1864, and moved toward Gordonsville. From now until the 7th it was guarding the trains as the army moved south. On this date the army advanced toward Spottsylvania Court House, while the trains moved to Piney Branch Church, which was found occupied by the enemy. The Reserve Brigade was placed on Spottsylvania Road and was supported on its left by Gregg’s division. After some severe fighting, especially in Merritt’s front, the Confederates gave way and were pursued nearly to Spottsylvania Court House.

After the regiment came in contact with the enemy May 8, it was found that he was in great strength. In the severe fighting which followed, the men exhausted their rifle ammunition without being able to renew the supply. From this time until relieved by the Fifth Corps about 8:00 a.m., they amused themselves by firing at the Rebels with their pistols.

After considerable protest as to the way Meade was using his cavalry, Sheridan was given permission to break loose from the army and defeat Stuart. After assembling at Aldrich’s, Sheridan started with the cavalry corps May 9 on the raid around Richmond. With 10,000 cavalrymen in a column thirteen miles long, he succeeded in passing around Lee’s army without being discovered. Sometime later in the day he was overtaken by Stuart’s cavalry, who attacked the rear guard which was Davies’ brigade. Refusing to stop the main body for this combat, Sheridan moved on across the Ny, Po, and Ta Rivers and encamped that night at Anderson’s Ford on the North Anna, with the Second Cavalry as a part of Merritt’s division on the south side of the river and the other two divisions on the north side. Soon after halting here Custer’s brigade was detached to the railroad a short distance ahead and proceeded to tear up that line for several miles, destroyed an enormous amount of property, and released 375 Union prisoners.

At daybreak on the 10th the enemy began shelling the troops in camp, while the Second and Third Divisions crossed the river. They were protected from the south by Merritt’s Division, which had crossed the evening before. This command in turn became the rear guard for the day. When the Confederates attacked the rear again on the 10th, they used the same tactics as the day before. As the Second Cavalry was in Merritt’s force, it took part in a spirited affair at Beaver Dam Station. Since the commander knew that Sheridan intended to push on, he soon broke off this affair and continued with the main column. Later Stuart detached Fitzhugh Lee’s division from the Confederate cavalry, and by a forced march reached a point in front of the Union Cavalry on the road to Richmond. Sheridan continued his march to the South Anna where he went into camp at Ground Squirrel bridge. He sent out Davies’ brigade that evening to destroy the railroad for several miles near Ashland Station.

The morning of the 11th was inaugurated by an artillery bombardment by the Confederates. Sheridan pushed on south until he arrived at the Glenn Allen station on the Fredericksburg railroad, where he destroyed several miles of track. At this time word came that the Confederate cavalry was concentrated at Yellow Tavern between Sheridan’s force and Richmond. The Second Cavalry, as a part of the Reserve Brigade under Colonel Gibbs, met the enemy first near the intersection of the Telegraph road and the Brook turnpike, six miles from Richmond. They dismounted, sent their horses to the rear, and attacked in a most gallant manner. The Second Brigade of this division soon was placed on the right and the combined attack caused Merritt to gain possession of the Brook road leading to Richmond. The Confederates were dismounted behind temporary breastworks on partly wooded hills and the line threatened Sheridan’s flank if he advanced. In this attack the Confederates fought with desperation, until in one regiment, the Fifth Virginia, only three officers were not killed or wounded. The First Brigade of the division under Custer came up and took position on the left of the Reserve Brigade. Merritt ordered them to drive the enemy from the woods on the bluff, which they did most gallantly. Custer then made a mounted charge against the enemy artillery which was unsuccessful. It was during this charge that the General J. E. B. Stuart of the Confederate force, while rallying his men, received his mortal wound.

Meantime, Gregg’s division had been engaged all day with Gordon’s brigade during the time the former was destroying the railroad toward Ground Squirrel bridge. As Gregg withdrew in the direction of Yellow Tavern, his force was soon united with Sheridan, which left Gordon fighting the rear of the Union force. The Federals finally, in a spirited charge, defeated Gordon’s brigade, driving it to the rear, and during this last attack the Confederate commander was killed. Gibbs’ ( ( which included the Second ) and Devin’s brigades now forced the enemy’s right and center and the battle was won. The road was now open to Richmond.

After making arrangements concerning the prisoners and wounded, Sheridan moved through the outer defenses of Richmond about midnight. Instead of attacking the city, he turned to the left and took the Mechanicsville road with the intention of supporting Butler, who was supposed to be coming up the James River from the south end of the peninsula. At daylight of the 12th the Confederates attacked from the inner works of the city only a short distance away and this made it impossible for the Federals to follow the Chickahominy River on the south side. At this juncture Sheridan decided to cross the river to the north side on the Meadow bridge. He sent Merritt’s division to the rear to repair the bridge, but it was found that Fitzhugh Lee’s division was already on the north side of the river to dispute the crossing. While Merritt’s men, including the Second Cavalry, were busily engaged in repair work in the face of great difficulties, the Confederates came out from Richmond and attacked the other two divisions. Sheridan was undoubtedly in a precarious position at this time, but soon the First Division forced a crossing below and drove back the Confederates far enough to permit the men to work on the bridge. It was soon repaired and they began to cross, driving the Rebels before them. It was a well-laid plan to destroy the Union force between the bridge and the defenses of Richmond, but it failed because of the good judgement of Sheridan and the cool conduct of the men.

The command now moved to Mechanicsville unmolested by the enemy. After leaving this place, the Reserve Brigade was attacked vigorously by the Confederate cavalry but the attack was repulsed and the whole force camped for the night at Gaine’s Mill. In the fighting since the 11th the corps lost four officers killed and 167 men killed, wounded, or missing. On the 14th the command reached a point opposite Bermuda Hundred, where were General Butler and his headquarters, and went into camp.

On the evening of May 17 Sheridan broke camp and after an all-night march reached Jones’ Bridge on the route back to Grant’s army. He rested here two hours and pushed on during the 18th to Baltimore Cross Roads, where he encamped. Gregg and Wilson were sent with the Second and Third Divisions to Cold Harbor to demonstrate toward Richmond. Custer’s brigade was sent to Hanover Court House to destroy the railroad. Merritt’s division was set to work repairing the bridge over the Pamunkey at White House. With only local materials available the First Division worked on the bridge for nearly twenty-four hours. The division crossed the Pamunkey on the evening of the 22nd and the other two divisions, having returned, crossed the next morning. Marching up the Mattapony River until the 24th, Sheridan received word that the main army was at Chesterfield Station. The next day he made contact with it and went into camp at Polecat Creek.

This raid demonstrated the self-reliance of the cavalry in the enemy’s country. A large mounted force operated in rear of Lee’s army, greatly hampering its efficient functioning, destroying railroads and millions of dollars’ worth of property. In addition, the Confederate cavalry was eliminated to a large extent as an important factor in the war. The casualties were comparatively small, being 625 altogether.

COLD HARBOR

Torbert took command of the First cavalry Division again on May 26. His and Gregg’s divisions now covered the crossing of the Army of the Potomac over the Pamunkey River. They succeeded in crossing at Hanovertown Ford and pushed rapidly ahead on May 27. The First Division, under Torbert, soon came in contact with Gordon’s brigade of the Confederate cavalry and drove it toward Hanover Court House. Behind the screen of these two divisions the Army of the Potomac crossed the river unimpeded on May 26th. The cavalry corps was confronted at Hawe’s Shop by Hampton’s and Fitzhugh Lee’s cavalry divisions and Butler’s cavalry brigade. The fight continued all day but toward evening Custer’s brigade made a breach in the Confederate works and the whole Union line then surged forward and carried the position. The fighting was desperate at this time, the Reserve Brigade alone losing over 300 officers and men in the engagement.

On may 30 Sheridan moved to Old Church, where he was attacked severely that afternoon at Matadequin Creek. The enemy was driven within one mile of Cold Harbor, where the cavalry corps went into camp that night in line of battle. With references to the fighting on this day, General Torbert says that at one time in the dismounted fight the Second Cavalry drove the enemy before them with their pistols after their carbine ammunition had given out.

In the fighting on May 31 General Merritt’s brigade, which included the Second cavalry, drove the enemy before them for one and one-half miles until the latter took refuge behind breastworks. Custer’s and Devin’s brigades of this division then connected on the left and the Reserve Brigade ( Merritt’s ) moved around the enemy left, causing him to abandon his breastworks. After driving the Confederates three-quarters of a mile beyond Cold Harbor, Torbert’s division took up a position along the Bottom’s Bridge and Bethesda Church roads. The enemy infantry was beginning to realize the importance of this location and made preparations to attack the next day in force. Because the First Division was three miles from Gregg’s division and about nine miles from the main army, Sheridan issued orders for Torbert to withdraw to the position of the night before. This was almost accomplished when word was received from Meade to hold Cold Harbor at all hazards. The command was counter-marched and reoccupied the old breastworks before daylight. About 6:00 a.m. June 1, the Confederate infantry made a desperate assault on the Reserve Brigade but were handsomely repulsed by Merritt’s men. After a second unsuccessful assault, the enemy made no further attempt until the cavalry was relieved by the Sixth Corps at 10:00 a.m. Sheridan’s force then marched to Prospect Church and went into camp.

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