The Institute of Medicine Committee on
Health Effects Associated with Exposures During The Gulf War.
Public Meeting
December 15, 1999
Testimony of
Victor Silvester - President
Operation Desert Shield/ Desert Storm Association.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, Fellow Veterans, Ladies and Gentlemen.
My name is Victor Silvester, President of the Operation Desert Shield / Desert Storm Association, which was formed in November 1990, responding to the directives of our young men and women who were about to enter into harms way in the defense of Freedom and Human Rights. I would like to take a moment to express our appreciation for this opportunity to express our views to this committee, and we thank you for that opportunity.
Joining me today, is Georgina Brown, Co-Chair of the Operation Desert Shield / Desert Storm Association, and wife of a Gulf War veteran undergoing the Gulf War Demonstration Treatment Project serving veterans in Kentucky and Ohio, and we are fortunate today to also have the Co-principal investigator, Doctor Irvine G. MCQuarrie in our audience today; Angie Lee Finchley, Owner and Director of Intertrac Research, a professional Internet research program who has not only been retained for a number of years, on a commercial basis by our organization, but who has also donated many, many hours of research to our program, and to the Gulf War Veteran community overall. Also joining me today is Debbie Moodie, the ODSSA North East Regional Coordinator, and an RN, and one of our program’s primary veteran/medical coordinators. Both of these young Ladies will be available for consultation and comment at the completion of my testimony, and I of course, will utilize their expertise if so needed during my presentation.
It is our understanding that the purpose of this project and this meeting, is to conduct a review of the scientific and medical literature regarding health effects associated with the exposures that are similar to those experienced in the Gulf War.
Any review of scientific and medical literature into this broad-based issue must begin with the first involvement of U.S. military forces and its utilization and concerns of weapons of mass destruction, the Civil War and the issuance of General Order 100, by the U.S. War Department on April 24, 1863. (Overhead #1).
This official action, I must point out (in our opinion), is the foundation of the Department of Defense Strategic, the Military Medical Community, and Department of Veterans Affairs, scientific base of official information and parameters pertaining to toxic exposures of military personnel. It belay’s the Department of Defense, the Military Medical Community, and the Department of Veteran Affairs, documented claims of limited knowledge on the overall subject, and confirms over 130 years of U.S. military involvement, both tactical and medical, in these issues.
This distinguished body is gathered here today as part of the ongoing review
of the Scientific and Medical literature associated with exposures similar
to those experienced in the Gulf War.
Ladies and Gentlemen, Members of the Committee, these exposures happen everyday
in varying degrees, throughout the world, there is nothing new about the
majority of them. There is nothing new about the degree of intentional
ignorance of potential toxic exposures that the military leadership of this
nation has displayed on behalf of tactical advantage, and mission accomplishment,
during a time of conflict. They have no concern in regards to health effects,
long-term or otherwise, they have only the concern of winning that particular
battle.
Modern Era utilization of toxic materials for the purpose of warfare, for information purposes, can be dated back to the venue of World War I, and the year of 1914. The Medical and Scientific Community hands-on experiences with these materials also date back to this time-frame. This committee knows it, the medical community knows it, the veterans of Operation Desert Shield / Desert Storm and their families know it, and slowly but surely, the American people are beginning to know it as well.
The modern age of communication allowed the winds of war to flow deep into the heart of the home-front, the marvels of visual images also brought the realities of the falsehoods and fabrications of this noble conflict.
The asset’s of communication were available to the Servants of War and their families, as well as to the Master’s of War and their propaganda machines.
Technology that once belonged only to the secrecy of the Pentagon, and to the control of it military and medical masters, was now common-place in the working environment of the common man, and to the families of those who now served in harm’s way. Propaganda and its politics was now seen through the eyes of available technology, prior and current hands-on working knowledge, not through the rose colored glasses of ignorance.
So what did we observe during the drive for victory, a drive by the best trained, highest educated, best equipped, and the highest level of physically fit, service members in the history of the United States Armed Forces. Did we see our loved ones suffering from being unable to shower for days on end, no, we saw the projected efficiency of the military machine as the masters of war wanted us to. Did we hear the story’s and see the pictures sent home from the field? Yes we did. Did we hear the story’s of our loved ones going for days without hot food? Yes we did. Did the masters of war project that same image to those on the home-front? No.. they did not. Did the details of activities relayed to us from our loved ones, within hours and day’s of the action, by the modern marvels of communication, correspond with the information that the masters of war projected in the “Official Reports” to the American People? No they did not.
So now, as we approach the Tenth Anniversary of the Persian Gulf conflict, where do we stand? We stand with the issue that the credibility of the Department of Defense, the Department of Veteran Affairs, and anything involved with their activities, is accepted with reluctance and suspicion. This is a major issue that the scientific and medical communities dealing with this issue face on a daily basis, and is an issue that this honorable body will face in the near future.
Where did we stand Nine Years ago? We stood in the confusion of Fear. We stood in the tears of frustration, frustration of facing family members we no longer knew, Teddy Bears who had gone to serve their country, who were now Grizzly Bears who were demanding the impossible from their families. However, a wiseman, who had fought the frustrations of Agent Orange, gave a word of wisdom to those who would listen.
“Document all you can of these complaints because the scientific and medical worlds, along with the DoD and VA, will decide you fate, and they only work with statistics.”
Taking that glimmer of wisdom to heart, we began to document each call, the extent of those calls are available to those who wish to find them, in the documented testimony of the Oversight Committee Hearings, Chaired by the Honorable Lane Evans and Joseph Kennedy in June, 1993.
Eight Years ago, as a result of that documentation, based on the calls that we were receiving, the symptomology, the medical research materials available to us through medical school and college libraries, along with the fast developing Internet environment, the leadership of the Operation Desert Shield / Desert Storm Association and its family of researchers, determined a mordality with five areas of concern.
Five areas of concern that we would fight not to allow any portion of, to receive any level of lesser concern or focus on. We did not wish a veteran to suffer because nobody bothered to check a symptom, not bothering to check because they were focused on a single causation, as had been known to happen within the history of the veteran community, and their treatment.
Those Five areas of concern, areas that were determined in October 1991, and still stand true as areas of concern today, were and are: (Overhead #2)
Why would the simple people of the Gulf War veteran community come to such a determination? Because thanks to the modern world of communications, the Gulf War community was no longer restricted to the information provided by the Department of Defense and its propaganda team. The families of those standing in harm’s way, were able to receive the information from all aspects of the environment, and form their own opinions.
We saw for ourselves the stockpiles of weaponry, we listened to the heartfelt
and often tearful recounting of experiences from our loved ones, and we heard
the screams of pain, and the cries
of fear in the middle of the night, while those who determined their futures
slept peacefully in their beds.
Following the advice of experienced experts, the experiences of many family members who had fought for many years for some sort of assistance in spite of the spirited denials of the military medical community, the Operation Desert Shield / Desert Storm Association began to document the cries for help, culminating in the presentation of their findings to a House Oversight Committee hearing in June 1993, the hearing being chaired by the Honorable Lane Evans and the Honorable Joseph Kennedy.
The primary goal of these survey’s and questions were then, as they are today, an attempt to find the reason of why our veterans were sick, not to find fault, or to lay blame, but to find the causation of the illness and fix it.
The final percentages were based on the total number of telephone calls received and written survey's completed at group meetings during the latter months of 1991, and the years of 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995. 10,051 telephone calls and/or surveys were received. 4,611 calls or surveys were verified sickness calls, which reflects some 45.87% of the total calls received. Calls from Active Duty personnel were not verifiable due to military policies. Verification was performed by calling medical entities providing the treatment and requesting verification that subject was being treated by that entity or examination of hand-carried medical records at group meetings.
In other words if you called us and said you were sick.. you were not sick.. If you called and provided us either documentation, or the capability to personally call your treating physician and their program authenticated your participation... you were then listed as sick.
SECTION 1.
Gas Alarms,Your Unit Went Into Mopp Status.......... 84 %.
Dead Animals in Operations Area..................... 65 %.
Came under Iraqi Artillery Fire..................... 67 %.
Entered Captured Enemy Vehicles..................... 82 %.
Operations Area Under Scud Attack................... 78 %.
Entered Captured Enemy Bunkers...................... 64 %.
Entered Area or Building With Radiation Warning..... 09 %.
Entered Captured Enemy Ammunition Dump.............. 62 %.
Entered or Worked in Landfill / Garbage Dump....... 76 %.
Within Clear / Visual Area Of Oil Fires............. 90 %.
Breathing or Enveloped In Oil Fire Smoke............ 96 %.
Worked In, Lived In Or Numerous Travel Through Oil.. 72 %.
Oily Taste To Food.................................. 66 %.
Oily Taste To Drinking Water........................ 65 %.
Washed Body In Water With Oily Sheen................ 68 %.
Ate Local Economy Food.............................. 87 %.
Drank Local Water................................... 69 %.
Bathed In Local Water............................... 78 %.
SECTION II.
Received Investigational Drugs and Vaccines......... 94 %.
Symptoms:
Chronic Fatigue..................................... 90 %.
Headaches........................................... 84 %.
Eyes Sensitive To Bright Light...................... 81 %.
Blurred Vision, Lose Focus For No Apparent Reason....80 %.
Rashes, Spots To Water Blister's.................... 87 %.
Bleeding Gums....................................... 61 %.
Aching Joints....................................... 85 %.
Rectal Bleeding..................................... 30 %.
Constant Diarrhea................................... 79 %.
Hair Loss........................................... 58 %.
Blood In The Urine.................................. 18 %.
Blood In The Stool.................................. 47 %.
Loose Teeth......................................... 43 %.
Sleep Problems...................................... 95 %.
Skin Lumps.......................................... 65 %.
Abdominal Pains..................................... 84 %.
Dark, Or Off Colored Sputum......................... 51 %.
Skin Changes, Color Or Texture...................... 68 %.
Short Term Memory Loss.............................. 91 %.
Mood Swings, Out Of Normal Range.................... 93 %.
Married............................................. 65 %.
Spouse Problems..................................... 51 %.
Children Have Uncommon Problems..................... 22 %.
It must be noted at this time that these survey’s of questions were developed in October of 1991, based on the majority of descriptions and symptoms being referred to by veterans, and their family members, who were calling the Operation Desert Shield / Desert Storm 800 telephone number.
The following questions were asked, and reason behind the question listed:
There were alarms that sounded even though there were no reported SCUD attacks, in some cases after an explosion, or after an aircraft fly-over.
* It is now known that Iraq had the capabilities available to them to utilize the nerve agents Tabun, (GA) and Sarin(GB), the vesicant (Blister agent) Sulphur Mustard (H) along with the riot agent CS. Cyclosarin (GF) and VX have also been found along with Nitrogen Mustard (HN) and Dusty
Mustard (H). Iraq also had the weaponization capabilities for Soman(GD) and
Phosgene(CG), the psychochemical BZ and the vomiting agent Adamsite(DM).
Hydrogen Cyanide(AC) is also listed as being available, also noted is the
fact that captured supply documents also show that the Iraqi soldiers were
also issued Chlorine Gas grenades. there is also the concerns of exposure
to
Agent 15.
Numerous comments and justifications against the possibility of confirmed exposures have been made by the military leadership of the Pentagon and their various “Special Investigation Teams.” However, these claims have to be viewed with the knowledge that the NATO Supreme Allied Command did not activate NATO’s Southern Flank Warning and Reporting System until 21 January, 1991, four days after the bombing of Iraq’s Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological facilities had begun.
In reality, no matter how the Department of Defense presents its programs, the determination of chemical attacks or exposures was left to the capabilities and options of the local units in each location, units that were spread out throughout the Arabian peninsula, and area of 2,590,00 square kilometers. Consideration also have to be given to the reporting entity and if in fact the equipment being used to deny the concerns of chemical exposure, was actually “detection” equipment or “monitoring” equipment.
Detection equipment is designed for continuous and unattended operation, and is fitted with an alarm to provide warnings of hazard, while monitoring equipment is used in specific situations where it is already suspected that a chemical agent may be present. All of these issues are important to the concerns of scientific discovery.
Based on information available from Coalition countries, we know that there
were gaps in the Allied Chemical Warfare detection capabilities, we know
that those entities did not even bother with their own protective activities
in the event of what was considered “low” threat levels, and
detection’s. They did not even bother to suit up, let alone notify adjoining
units.
A qualified yes answer to both parts of the question resulted in a positive answer to the survey question. A non-visible cause of death lends to the possibility that there could have been some sort of chemical warfare involvement.
* Knowledge of the fact that many of the points where these animals were
located were sprayed with insecticides by the discovery troops, and the
subsequent attending investigators, makes specific scientific parameter
investigation and conclusion to a specific cause on this issue, impossible.
It is known that the Iraqi Forces had Chemical and Biological Artillery capabilities, as shown by news coverage of the Artillery Rounds found by the U.N. Inspectors.
* The Iraqi means of delivering Chemical Warfare agents included mortars, artillery shells, rockets and bombs. Chemical Warheads were also available for the Iraqi Ballistic ,missiles (SCUDs) along with cluster bombs and air to surface rockets.
Used to identify the possible exposure to the toxic oxidization and reactivation effects of depleted uranium rounds when they explode.
Used to identify the possibility of Chemical / Biological Attack, and the fact that there are only two feasible reasons for a missile to explode in mid - air without anything being fired at it, (1) equipment malfunction, (2) to disburse its payload.
Radioactive Isotopes are utilized in the production of Crude Oil to assist in the inspection of Oil Well Pipelines, they have to be stored, such a storage location that might have been hit could have released commercial radioactive materials.
* The concerns of the exposures resulting from the destruction of Iraq’s
nuclear facilities also has to considered.
It has been confirmed that the Iraqi military had moved Chemical and Biological
ammunition to
the operational area, it is also know that many of these munitions leaked
and could have been stored in some of these ammunition storage locations.
Many of the Dead Animals were picked up with front end loaders and hauled
to the Land Fills, if they were contaminated, people working in the area
may have been exposed to whatever contaminated them.
Consideration must be given to the possibility of exposure to the documented
health dangers of low level H2S Gas, the oil fire smoke and the toxicity
of the oil production chemicals, and the possibility of exposure to RADON
Gas.
We are looking for possible ingestion of crude oil.
Again looking for the possible ingestion of crude oil.
Looking for possible bacteria and parasite ingestion.
All surveys and studies are only as objective as the entity who created them. Government studies have for many years touted the assurances of peer-review by external agencies, institutes of higher learning and distinguished members of the scientific community.
However, such reviews must viewed with the knowledge of the association between those who are the primary investigators and those who are providing the peer-review.
Many government studies pertaining to the Gulf War Illness situation have been authenticated by government supported institutions, and in some cases, by scientific personnel with questionable independent alliances and connections.
In the sixteen years between the Vietnam and Gulf Wars, the academia of U.S.
colleges and universities enjoyed the benefits of a resurgence in Defense
contract research. Pentagon funding for research contracts exploded, from
just over $203 million in 1975 to almost $1.5 Billion in 1990, in constant
dollars. For the past nine years, millions more have been distributed for
the research community to further investigate these issues, and this Honorable
Committee is also
here to assist in the disbursal of even more tax-payer funds.
Despite the military buildup, colleges and universities present themselves as apolitical institutions dedicated to the unfettered exploration of knowledge. The academic defense of this myth is (in our opinion) a study in the psychology of collective denial.
The Gulf War has and continues to, divide much of academia into two camps. One group, forced to confront reality, are shocked at the extent of campus militarization. Another group claims to be proud of higher education's patriotic service.
The militarization environment of this nation does not end with DoD research
contracts. We
know that some professors and administrators, own and direct, and consult
for, various entities
in the Military Industrial Complex, assisting in developing and producing
their military equipment.
Some have formed professional associations and scientific societies which
lobby for increased military funds. And finally, many influential administrators
and faculty serve on over 40 federal committees advising military and
intelligence-related agencies. In plain language, the welfare and well being
of the Defense Industry Community is of primary concern to them.. it is their
economic future, it is the nest egg of their retirement years.
Clearly, many universities and their medical schools produce far more than
"objective" scientific theory and scholarly treatises. It is obvious, based
on our observations of the “Gulf War Issue” that political decisions
based on academic knowledge are made not only in Washington but also
in Cambridge, Berkeley, Baltimore, Ann Arbor, Austin, and Chapel Hill just
to name a few. It is not surprising that in our opinion, many of those with
the most significant political roles, have the greatest skill in denying
their responsibility. All of these aspects must be taken into consideration
when an objective review is made of the various committee reports and studies
that have been conducted relating to the Gulf War health situations.
Where do we stand now?
Time and time again, the Operation Desert Shield / Desert Storm Association receives calls from the research community in regards to the problems of getting veterans and their families to participate in the various studies that are being conducted.
Let us take a look at the study’s, and I am going to use a current study that is being conducted at this time. Dr. McQuarrie, I hope that you will not take this discussion as anyway a negative reflection on your program.
Dr. McQuarrie’s program goals are:
(a). To reduce physical symptoms and improve mood.
(b). To address fears and misconceptions of the consequences of service in the Gulf War.
(c). To assist the veteran in maximizing his/her control over physical symptoms.
(d). To reduce excessive use of the health care system through consistent, primary care follow-up with easy telephone access to a small team of providers.
(e). Address the psychosocial factors that contribute to physical disability.
(f). Maximize use of coping skills for dealing with persistent and disabling physical symptoms.
(g). Improve relationships within the veterans primary support group.
(h). Begin an individualized program of gradual increases in physical activity with appropriate monitoring.
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, this is the profile of what looks to be a wonderful program, and having visited Doctor McQuarrie and his staff in Cleveland, I can vouch to the veterans and this Committee the sincerity of the both Doctor McQuarrie and his staff in their efforts to assist the veterans and their families. I might add that I have also had occasion to work with the veterans that Doctor Haley and his staff are working with thesame results.
So let us look at the obstacles that these programs face. First of all there
is the VA system itself,
a system which in itself, is an absolute frustration to any scientist who
is trying to maintain a scientifically acceptable standard of test parameters
with which to prove his or her theories to withstand the scrutiny of
peer-reviews.
The Second point of concern is the perception of the veteran that the VA,
and anything to do
with the VA, has no credibility nor does the VA really have any concern for
the veteran or his problems trying to comply with their demands. I hold here
a statement from a veteran in West Texas who in the past couple of weeks
has made two 400 mile round trips at in response to scheduled appointments
only to find them canceled upon his arrival. 800 miles for nothing. At his
own expense because the appointments were canceled.
Many of these research programs for the veterans, that require the veteran to travel, sometimes hundreds of miles in a week, are at the expense of the veteran. And we have heard the excuses that these expenses cannot be met by this or that government research program.
However, many times, as I have a number of times in the past couple of weeks,
the veteran and his or her family, hears of research programs being conducted
in the private community, where payment for travel, food and lodging, as
well as a stripend for participation is being offered.
Many times these research programs cover some of the same symptoms that the
veteran is suffering from.
Fully aware that many of our veterans have been insulted, demeaned, treated
as malcontents,
and labeled as lazy bums looking for a handout, the issues of improving moods
and self respect,
is a major issue for the veteran and his family.
In regards to the fears and misconception of the consequences of service in the Gulf. This is an interesting and formidable barrier to surmount.
Is there anybody in this room who can tell any of us what our undiagnosed loved ones are suffering from?
Fear of the unknown is basic human nature and this is the fear that the Gulf
War veterans and
their families have faced day in and day out for the past nine years. The
Misconceptions of service in the Gulf War? The misconception that the Department
of Defense has not honored its contract with the All Volunteer members of
the Armed Forces who served in the Gulf? That the Department of Defense has
spent millions of dollars to try to ensure that this situation does not happen
again, because they have a major concern that it they once again try to deploy
troops into a possible similar situation, those troops may not fight their
war?
The legalities of a contract, a contract that: U.S.CT.1871. It is as much the duty of the government as of individuals, to fulfill its obligations.
U.S. v Kline, 80 U.S. 128, 13 WALL, 128, 20 L.ED. 159, Affirming Kline v U.S. CT. CL. 559.
The contract of enlistment that the men and women of Desert Shield /Desert Storm signed when they voluntarily joined the United States Armed Forces, is based on the:
" Obligation of mutual faithfulness." In Re Grimly, 137 U.S. 147, 152, the Supreme Court held a valid, enforceable contract exists between the above parties. In Bell v U.S., 366 U.S. 393 (1960), a ruling maintains the existence of a contract, and it notes disputes are to be settled through the principals of contract law.
The Fifth Circuit Court, Johnson v Powell, 414 F. 2d 1060 (1969), defined the provisions of this contract as those statutes in effect at the time that the contract was sworn to.
When the men and women of our nation's All Volunteer Armed Forces swore their oath of enlistment, they swore to a contract. An oath and contract that they would face possible legal penalties for if they did not fulfill their commitment.
The oath is essential, see Girouard v U.S. 328 61 (1946). An enlistee's oath is taken by an officer of the United States who has also sworn the oath (Affidari). An oath binds an individual by conscience to perform faithfully and truthfully. To break the oath creates perjury.
Is there a Misconception when a veteran cannot get a job if he mention’s that he is a Gulf War Veteran, because the insurance company for the company that he is trying to work for will not insure him? Is there a Misconception that the Department of Defense has continuously, as reported in the Rockerfella Report, misinformed and misrepresented the facts pertaining to Gulf War and the Health effects on the Guff War veterans?
Is there a Misconception that a child is hungry and has no shoes because his daddy cannot work and because the claim is still in progress, the family has to live below the poverty level and beg for assistance. Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, these are not Misconceptions of the results of service in the Gulf they are Facts, facts being faced by people in this room, facts being faced by veterans and their families across this nation.
I could go on, however, as I said I do not have an intent to slam, or in anyway, shape, or form, reflect a bad image of Doctor McQuarrie, Doctor Haley, or their staffs, its just a statement of fact.
Before I conclude, I would like to address one further thing. While all of these research activities are being conducted, there is the concerns of the physical capabilities of the veterans. Twice in the past three weeks, the Operation Desert Shield / Desert Storm Association has had to provide assistive devices to veterans who were unable to obtain such devices from the VA because they have no diagnosis. For any assistance program to work, the veteran has to be given the tools with which to be able to participate. If the veteran is unable to get out of bed, or out of a chair, to walk to a car, how can he get to the facility to participate in your proposed programs.
While a veteran waits for these programs to be approved and become a standard of treatment in his own VA, who bears the cost of his needs for assistive and supportive programs, his family.
Two weeks ago, I requested an analysis of the cost of a disability for an individual being released from a hospital or for an individual who had lost the use of his legs through degenerative illness. The cost without hospitalization or physician charges. The analysis was performed by the A.B.L.E. Center For Independent Living, an organization that is recognized and used by various Federal and State entities in these matters. The cost that we are looking at, for a veteran who becomes incapacitated while waiting for VA assistance and benefit determination, is $56,000.00 to afford the person in question the capabilities to become independent with that disability.
In conclusion Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to leave you with these thoughts.
An insight to the attitude of the veterans and their leadership and their perceived opinion of the military / veteran medical community may be garnered from the published works of Daniel K. Winstead, M.D. Chief, Psychiatry Service, Veterans Administration Hospital, New Orleans.
In developing an innovative theoretical and therapeutic framework for a psychosomatic unit, Blackwell conceptualized "Chronic Illness Behavior" as patients who showed these common features:
(1). All have pain or disability disproportionate to disease or tissue damage.
(2). All have a lifestyle arranged around the sick role.
(3). There is a perpetual search for diagnosis or treatment that never succeeds.
(4). Each patient displays a mixture of passive or dependent behavior that sustains the sick role and which is designed to place relatives or physicians in a caretaking position.
(5). The behavior style is maintained or reinforced in two major ways:
From the historical perspective presented above, one can readily see how personal concerns and mass panic at the time would provide the susceptible individual with a psychological nidus for further symptom development. Disability payment would further facilitate the learning of the sick role. (Military Medicine, Chronic Illness Behavior, December, 1978).
Keeping this school of thought in mind, and delving back into the history of medical care and parasitic, viral, and bacteriological infections and exposures by the Department of Defense and the Department of Veteran Affairs; the efforts to avoid acceptance of responsibility of treatment and the funding required to provide such treatment, is apparent to any layperson with common sense reviewing the issue.
During World War II, some 38,000 men were estimated to have been exposed to Filariasis, a parasitic disease. Nearly 16,000 were clinically diagnosed as suffering from the illness. Approximately 2,600 were treated, with only 171 being separated from active duty for other difficulties. All others were returned to active duty.
When the Desert Shield / Desert Storm veterans returned from the Persian Gulf, the Department of Defense, the Department of Veteran Affairs, and the National Guard Bureau, all attempted to down-play the possibilities of parasitic type infections. They denied the seriousness of Leishmaniasis, just as they did with the problems of Filariasis.
They denied the fact that Leishmaniasis could remain dormant for up to ten(10) years, and in some cases, up to twenty (20) years, or that certain types of the disease could develop into a fatal illness if left untreated. They told troops that there were no tests available that could detect it.
One of the major concerns of the Desert Shield / Desert Storm community was the massive attempt by the Department of Defense and the Department of Veteran Affairs to blame the surfacing illnesses of Persian Gulf service on "Post Traumatic Stress (PTSD) without the completion of a full testing regiment.
The Gulf War veterans community's response to this "official" position was to draw attention to the New England Journal of Medicine, dated March, 1991. The article published in that journal states:
"Anybody returning from the Persian Gulf, suffering from Chronic Fatigue and Post Traumatic Stress-like symptoms, should be given testing for Sand Fly Fever because the symptoms are the same."
The Department of Defense and the Department of Veteran Affairs labeled the Desert Shield / Desert Storm veterans who were reporting sick, as suffering from PTSD without conducting any testing for Sand Fly Fever as suggested by the New England Journal of Medicine.
The Operation Desert Shield / Desert Storm Association's position on this revelation, is the fact that:
"If you don't conduct the test's, How do you correctly diagnose the illness that the patient is suffering from?" How do you know if they are suffering from Post Traumatic Stress or Sand Fly Fever?
Time and time again, we have had Desert Shield / Desert Storm veterans being told that all that is wrong with them is PTSD, without a complete range of know required testing being performed. Since when did PTSD cause a person to have diarrhea for four, almost five years?
Federal Practitioner, October, 1994. The distribution and prevalence of complaints have been similar in the population evaluated in the VA system, and in units such as the 123rd Army Reserve Command, an Indiana-based Combat Service-Support unit, and in a Naval Reserve Mobile Construction Battalion (Seabees).
Reservists and National Guard troops, however, have been more likely to seek medical attention. It has been suggested that these groups may be more susceptible to the syndrome because they are older, less physically resilient, and experience greater disruption in their lives with consequent psychological stress. Alternatively, active duty troops may have under-reported symptoms due to fears that complaints would adversely affect their careers in face of the force reductions in effect.
One of the major concerns as to the diagnostic creditability of the Department of Defense and Department of Veteran Affairs medical community's public statements in regards to parasitic, viral and bacteriological diseases and their problems is the statement by D.K. Winstead. Military Medicine, 143 (1978) 869-871.
" The American Medical Corps failed to sufficiently recognize Wuchereriasis and Filariasis in general, which effected over 16,000 soldiers.
The wide range of endemic diseases that Persian Gulf veterans were exposed to is well known. The American. August 23, 1992. As early as March 1991, doctors at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington D.C. warned that the following ailments could be contracted by Desert Storm troops, and could be rapidly fatal if untreated:
1. Congo - Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever.
2. Enteric Fever.
3. Malaria.
4. Meningococcal Disease.
5. Rabies.
6. Typhus.
7. Sand Fly Fever.
8. Q Fever.
9. Viral Hepatitis.
10. Dysentery.
11. Giardiasis.
12. Leismaniasis.
13. Schistosomiasis.
It is the opinion of many members of the Desert Shield / Desert Storm community, that the Department of Defense and the Department of Veteran Affairs had already made the administrative decision in 1991 to continue the trend that had been set with the World War II Mustard Gas veterans, the Korean War era experimental veterans, and the Vietnam War Veterans.
That trend is perceived as being that the DoD and the VA will do as little
as they can possibly
get away with; do not spend any more of the defense budget and VA Administration
dollars
on actual Persian Gulf veteran treatment/medical care than they had to; to
keep the majority
of the veterans satisfied with at least getting something to help their
situation.
Well Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, Ladies and Gentlemen, the Veterans
of the
Gulf War and their Families, will never be satisfied until the Department
of Defense Honors its Contract with the members of its All Volunteer Armed
Forces who stood in Harm’s way in the defense of Freedom and Democracy.
I Thank you for your time.
~ END ~