Tangents  
New
 Dec 1998 
Copyright © 1998-2003 by owner.
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Edited
 02 Jun 03 



Everyone Must Believe in Something!

Religious people of the world generally agree that there is a supernatural entity of some kind, but they cannot seem to agree upon what that entity is, or upon what, if anything, it wants from us.  Yet one belief most religious people appear to have in common is that faith of some kind is an inescapable part of being human, and that anyone who does not currently believe in a god or a devil or a transmigrating soul of some sort must therefore be looking for something in which to believe.  As an atheist I've been told many times:  "Everyone must believe in something!"

So if it is any comfort to these well-meaning people, let me affirm that I do believe in something.  (It is just not what they believe in.)  What is more, casual observation would seem to indicate that my own belief is considerably more robust and durable than that of most traditional believers.  For it is they, not I, who must seek periodic reinforcement of their beliefs through rote, ritual, recitation, and tradition, lest they find opportunity to think about those beliefs too critically.  It is they, not I, who crave the exclusive fellowship of others of similar belief, so they can reassure one another that because they all share the same fantasy they are not really fantasizing.  It is they, not I, who feel their beliefs threatened by the possibility that others might have different ideas, and who thus feel compelled to convert everyone they can to their own view.

What is it that I believe in, so easily and naturally that it does not require a constant effort to deny and stifle the doubt which otherwise would inevitably arise?  What is it that I believe in, so strongly and spontaneously that the combined forces of hope and dread cannot persuade me that I ought rather to believe in the unbelievable?  What is it that I believe in, that I did not even have to search for but simply made itself obvious to me when I was finally ready to see it?

It's simple.  What I believe in is reality.  Now, reality might include gods or it might not.  But so far I have seen no credible evidence hinting at the existence of gods, which is not counterbalanced by evidence of at least equal weight to the contrary.  True, I cannot disprove the existence of gods.  But neither can believers prove their own gods' existence, nor can they disprove the existence of the gods of other believers.  That is, after all, why religious belief is referred to as "faith."

Granted, unadorned reality is not nearly as appealing as the almost cartoonish splendor of organized religion, just as sobriety is not nearly as appealing as intoxication.  Reality doesn't pretend to answer all of our questions with charming legends and pretty myths.  Reality doesn't promise us life after death.  Reality doesn't decree what is right and what is wrong, but challenges us to consider which course of action will produce the greatest benefit and the least harm.  Reality doesn't hold out the hope that some caring but unseen entity is guiding us when we have tough decisions to make.  Reality doesn't cheer us, when things go wrong, with the dream that a mysterious power is shaping all events toward a happy end.  Worst of all, because of the imperfection of our own senses and reason, many aspects of reality are infuriatingly difficult to pin down with certainty.  Yet reality has one incontestable point in its favor:  because it is real, you never have to make-believe in it.  Though considerable investigation and experimentation are sometimes required in order to discover the truth of reality, once it is clear all you must do is open your eyes and mind to it, and have the intellectual integrity and courage to accept it.

Reality is not always unambiguously clear, however.  In such cases we must consider the possibilities based on incomplete or questionable information, either tentatively selecting that hypothesis which seems most plausible or desirable at the time, or resolving to postpone any decision until we have more information.  Now, selecting the obvious option—that the simplest answer in accord with the facts is the most likely to be true—is in this case unsatisfactory to most people, no matter how logical and pragmatic they may be in other matters.  They desperately want all the promises of religion to be true, and because nothing positively disproves the existence of gods, they choose to believe.  If that makes them happy that is fine with me, so long as they do not demand that I also accept their choice.  For in my own view religion appears a delusion, and not an entirely benign one at that.  And the thought of allowing myself to succumb to delusion—no matter how grand and glorious—makes me unhappy.

So, yes, I do have my belief, though it might be quite different from yours.  If you are happy with your belief and I am satisfied with mine, and if exchanging beliefs would make us both unhappy and dissatisfied, then let each be true to his own mind and conscience, and may happiness and peace be to us all as we walk the road of life together.

=SAJ=


This essay reflects an earlier stage in the evolution of my own understanding of how people relate to ideas.  It still works, provided we understand that there are fundamentally different kinds of belief, and that we are careful to distinguish between them.  One kind, ordinarily expressed as belief about or that, requires only passive acceptance of what is evident or logical, and can easily be revoked, revised, or replaced whenever necessary.  The other, often expressed as belief in something, demands active commitment to an idea, often without supporting evidence, or even in spite of evidence to the contrary.  Such active, purposeful belief in things engenders a willful bias that the passive sort does not.  In a later essay, "Beyond Belief," I therefore attempt to distance myself from the term, since for many people belief carries this automatic connotation of willful bias, which, rather than revealing truth, all too often distorts or hides it instead.