........................................................Chapter 9: Prior Adjudication

.................................................................A. Stare Decisis .
1. Binding or Persuasive Authority
p. 899: See also Sarti v. Salt Creek Ltd., 167 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1193, 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 506, 510 (2008) (calling Auto Equity Sales "a case that ought to be covered in the very first weeks of every legal research and writing class in any California law school"). "There is no exception for Supreme Court cases of ancient vintage." Mehr v. Superior Court, 139 Cal.App.3d 1044, 1048 n. 3, 189 Cal.Rptr. 138, 140 (1983). "There is also no exception for Supreme Court cases of more recent vintage where the court's composition has changed." People v. Haynes, 61 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1298, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 143, 153 (1998).

p. 900, end of first paragraph: However, one Court of Appeal panel will "ordinarily follow the decisions of other districts without good reason to disagree." Mega Life and Health Insurance Co. v. Superior Court, 172 Cal.App.4th 1522, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 399 (2009).

....................................................................B. Res Judicata
1. Claim Preclusion
p. 928, Note 3:
(c) The California Supreme Court decided that the Hernandez estate and family could not sue the defendant city and police officers in state court on state law claims after the plaintiffs lost on their federal causes of action in federal court. Certain state law causes of action were barred as a matter of issue preclusion and others were barred under the substantive law. The Court did not address the primary rights question, however. Hernandez v. City of Pomona, ___Cal.4th___, ___ Cal.Rptr.3d ___, ___ P.3d ___, 2009 WL 1475256. See also discussion below re: p. 950, Note 6.

(e) A jury found by special verdict that a company selling celebrity memorabilia used the name of the plaintiff without his consent on 14,060 certificates opining to the authenticity of various collectible autographs and memorabilia. By knowingly and without authorization using the plaintiff's name to sell these goods, is the defendant liable to the injured party for one or 14,060 violations of his primary right to protect wrongful appropriation of his name? Miller v. Collectors Universe, Inc., 159 Cal.App.4th 988, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 194 (2008).

(f) In March 2000, Richard Boeken brought an action against Philip Morris USA, Inc., alleging that its cigarettes caused Mr. Boeken's terminal lung cancer. While Mr. Boeken's lawsuit was pending, Mrs. Boeken brought a separate action under common law against Philip Morris seeking damages for loss of consortium. She alleged that Mr. Boeken, as a result of his illness, was "unable to perform the necessary duties as a spouse" involving "the care, maintenance and management of the family home" and that plaintiff suffered a "loss of love, affection, society, companionship, sexual relations, and support" and that he would "not be able to perform such work, services, and duties in the future." Mrs. Boeken later voluntarily dismissed her loss of consortium claim with prejudice. After Mr. Boeken died from lung cancer, Mrs. Boeken filed an action under California's wrongful death statute for "[g]eneral damages for the loss of love, companionship, comfort, affection, society, solace, and moral support" that she suffered as the result of her husband's death. Does Mrs. Boeken's wrongful death action involve the same primary right as her prior loss of consortium action? Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 159 Cal.App.4th 1391, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 454, review granted and opinion superseded, 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 163, 183 P.3d 1146 (2008).

2. Issue Preclusion
p. 931: Another opinion thoroughly discussing the policies supporting the application of issue preclusion is Murphy v. Murphy, 164 Cal.App.4th 376, 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 784 (2008) (probate of estate).
.....* p. 931: Another Court of Appeal went on to explain:

The concept of privity for the purposes of . . . collateral estoppel refers to "a mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property, or to such an identification in interest of one person with another as to represent the same legal rights and, more recently, to a relationship between the party to be estopped and the unsuccessful party in the prior litigation which is sufficiently close so as to justify application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel." This requirement of identity of parties or privity is a requirement of due process of law.

Nein v. Hostpro, Inc., 174 Cal.App.4th 833, 845, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 45 (2009) (quotations omitted).

p. 937, Note 2: Only a default judgment may have preclusive effects. A mere entry of default by the clerk does not. Ferraro v. Camarlinghi, 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 19 (2008).

p. 938, n. 4: One example of how the reach of issue preclusion has greatly expanded is the holding that, if the elements required for application of issue preclusion are present, the doctrine precludes relitigation of any issues finally resolved as part of a class certification determination in a prior proceeding. This applies whether the second putative class action lawsuit is pursued by the same named representative or someone in privity with the original, unsuccessful putative class representative. In Johnson v. GlaxoSmithKline, Inc., 166 Cal.App.4th 1497, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 607 (2008), the Court of Appeal carefully applied this doctrine and found that a second putative class action lawsuit was not precluded despite two rulings to the contrary in federal court. (This case is an excellent review of class action and res judicata principles in a complex factual setting.)

p. 939, Note 4: Other districts of the Court of Appeal have agreed with Newport Beach Country Club that the modern rule of the Restatement of Judgments 2d § 27 should be followed in California. Zevnik v. Superior Court, 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 817 (2008). In a thorough opinion reviewing a host of authorities, Zevnik avoided the conflict with the nineteenth century state Supreme Court precedent by noting that it had addressed only a question of claim, not issue, preclusion. Thus, Zevnik held that the appellate court judgment entitled to issue preclusion incorporates the determinations made by the trial court in support of the appellate court's stated ground of decision. Issue preclusion does not extend to any trial court determinations made in support of alternative grounds for its decision that were not reviewed by the appellate court. Accord, People ex rel. Brown v. Tri-Union Seafoods, LLC, 171 Cal.App.4th 1549, 1575, 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 664 (2009) ("modern case law has effectively dissipated the strength and viability" of the older precedent).

p. 949, Note 4: For a case carefully applying federal and state rules of claim and issue preclusion, see Burdette v. Carrier Corp., 158 Cal.App.4th 1668, 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 185 (2008)...

p. 950 n. 5: See also Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 186 Cal.App.4th 675, 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 39 (2008) (applying rule that the first final judgment renders the matter res judicata in the second court, even if the judgment is rendered in the action which was filed later in time).

p. 950, Note 6: Assume that a federal court specifically declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims brought under state law, but proceeds to adjudicate federal claims. In accord with Court of Appeal in Koch, the California Supreme Court has held that even if there is no claim preclusive effect, adjudication of federal claims still will have an issue preclusive effect in any subsequent action in state court. Hernandez v. City of Pomona, ___Cal.4th___, ___Cal.Rptr.3d___, ___P.3d___, 2009 WL 1475256.
.....The note in the casebook went on to observe that the Koch opinion thought that the result should change (i.e., that claim preclusion should apply) if the federal claims were adjudicated through a full trial on the merits after the federal court had declined to decide the supplemental state claims. In Hernandez, this question was raised in the petition for review, but was not addressed by the majority's opinion. Only Justice Corrigan, concurring, wanted to reach the question. Her position was that defendants and state courts should not be required to relitigate the facts and parse the federal record for precluded issues in every case where a federal court retained supplemental jurisdiction of state claims, then dismissed them after trying a claim under 42 USC §1983. She would hold that under the primary rights doctrine, the plaintiffs should be barred because they elected to litigate only the federal claims in federal court when they could have tried all the claims in a single proceeding in state court. No other justice engaged her on this question. Hernandez, ___Cal.4th at ___, ___Cal.Rptr.3d at ___.