..........................................Chapter 7: Securing and Enforcing Judgments

........................................................ A. Provisional Remedies
2. Temporary Restraining Orders and Preliminary Injunctions
p. 777, Note 3: Another good example of a careful delineation of the preliminary injunction standards is contained in Right Site Coalition v. Los Angeles Unified School District, 160 Cal.App.4th 336, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 678 (2008) (remanding denial of preliminary injunction sought by group trying to stop demolition of houses on a site designated for a new school).

........................................................C. Costs and Attorney's Fees
1.Costs
p. 807, Note 1(b): Compare Goodman v. Lozano, 159 Cal.App.4th 1313, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 275 (2008), which goes to great lengths to show how the Wakefield majority misinterpreted the statute regarding who is a prevailing party in the context of the problem.

p. 808, Note 3: The California Supreme Court has decided that the fees for an expert hired by a party may not be recovered as part of an award of "attorney's fees" under the private attorney general statute. More express authority than CCP § 1021.5 is required. Olson v. Automobile Club of Southern California, 42 Cal.4th 1142, 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 81, 179 P.3d 882 (2008).

2. Attorney's Fees
p. 818, Note 1: For an example of a denial of attorney's fees under CCP § 1021.5 because the gains achieved by the plaintiffs in avoiding layoffs were personal and any benefit to the public was incidental, see Roybal v. Governing Board of Salinas City Elementary School District, 159 Cal.App.4th 1143, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 146 (2008).

p. 820, Note 4: In cases where the plaintiff obtained relief from the court, attorney's fees may be awarded if the plaintiff succeeded on any significant issue in the litigation, which achieved some of the benefit sought in bringing suit. In contrast, in cases where attorney's fees are requested under the catalyst theory, the plaintiff must obtain the primary relief sought from the defendant through settlement or through the defendant's actions prompted by the suit. Marine Forests Society v. California Coastal Commission, 160 Cal.App.4th 867, 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 32 (2008).

p. 821, new Note 6: It is vital that the court consider a request for attorney's fees under the applicable statute. For example, in Chavez v. City of Los Angeles, 160 Cal.App.4th 410, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 783, review granted and opinion superseded, 2008 WL 2152191 (2008), after five years of litigation in an employment retaliation action, a jury awarded the plaintiff $11,500. The plaintiff sought approximately $871,000 in attorney's fees under the Fair Employment and Housing Act. Cal. Gov't Code § 12965(b). The trial court instead denied costs under CCP § 1033(a), because Chavez's ultimate recovery was below the jurisdictional minimum for an unlimited civil case. The Court of Appeal reversed. Although the latter statute was intended to encourage the pursuit of minor grievances in courts of limited jurisdiction, that rationale was inapposite in a claim of statutory discrimination under FEHA or other civil rights actions, which do not always involve large sums of money. The California Supreme Court has granted review.

p. 832, Note on Adjusting the Lodestar in State and Federal Court: For an example of how to adjust the lodestar, see Harman v. City and County of San Francisco, 158 Cal.App.4th 407, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 750 (2007). In Harman, the plaintiffs sought damages under state and federal civil rights law, but prevailed on the latter claim only. The trial court set (and the appellate court affirmed) the lodestar for the plaintiffs' partial success on the basis of precedent for the award of fees under 42 USC § 1988.

p. 830, Note 3: One court summarized the distinction as follows:

[I]f an unlawful detainer action is based on an alleged breach of the lease during an unexpired term (e.g., nonpayment of rent, improper use of the premises), then it is an action sounding in contract. If an unlawful detainer is brought to oust a holdover tenant following expiration of a lease, then the action is premised on tortious conduct (e.g., trespass), and it is an action sounding in tort. By logical extension, if the unlawful detainer action is premised on a breach of the lease, like any other action on a contract, it is subject to section 1717, subdivision (b)(2).

Mitchell Land and Improvement Co. v. Ristorante Ferrantelli, Inc., 158 Cal.App.4th 479, 486, 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 9, 15 (2007) (citing Drybread).

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Reserved for future use

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...............................................B. Enforcement of Judgments and Orders
1. Execution
2. Contempt of Court
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