.........................................................Chapter 3: Pleadings and Joinder

.........................................................................C. Answer
2. Affirmative Defenses
...(b) Statute of Limitations
p. 204, Note 6(b): See also Unruh-Haxton v. Regents of University of California, 162 Cal.App.4th 343, 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 146 (2008) (doctors in a local fertility clinic were accused of selling fertilized eggs and pre-embryos left for future use by their patients and there were over 100 news articles about the scandal).

p. 216, Note 4: A Court of Appeal panel has also held that applying CCP § 351 to a California resident who moved out of state subsequent to the events that were the subject of the plaintiff's action would impose an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. It would force defendants to choose between remaining residents of California until the limitations periods expired or moving out of state and remaining subject to suit in the state forever. Heritage Marketing and Insurance Services, Inc. v. Chrustawka, 160 Cal.App.4th 754, 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 126 (2008).

p. 217, Note 6: The legislative history of the statute extending the statute of limitations for the revival of claims of sexual abuse is discussed in Doe v. Salesian Society, 159 Cal.App.4th 474, 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 565 (2008); and Dutra v. Eagleson, 146 Cal.App.4th 216, 222, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 788 (2006).

...................................................E. Truth in Pleading
1. Frivolous Pleadings
...(a) Vexatious Litigants
p. 235: For the procedure to seek removal from vexatious litigant status, see Luckett v. Panos, 161 Cal.App.4th 77, 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 745 (2008).

2. Anti-SLAPP Motions
....(b) California Rule Revised
p.267, new Note 4: Not all commercial speech falls within the ambit of the commercial speech exemption from an anti-SLAPP motion. For example, Lawyer Two is sued by Lawyer One. One alleges that Two gave advice to a prospective client (previously One's client). Lawyer One's claim is for interference with prospective economic advantage and intentional interference with business relations. Lawyer Two brings an anti-SLAPP motion. Lawyer One responds that Lawyer Two is "primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or services." One therefore asserts that Two cannot bring an anti-SLAPP motion.
However, when a claim arises from the Lawyer Two's conduct of giving advice to a prospective client on pending litigation, it is not sufficiently "commercial," so as to withdraw it from anti-SLAPP scrutiny. If it were, that result "would conflict with the client's fundamental right of access to the courts, which necessarily includes the right to be represented by the attorney of his or her choice. * * * [I]t may include an element of commerce or commercial speech [but it] is fundamentally different from the ‘commercial disputes' the Legislature intended." Taheri Law Group v. Evans, 160 Cal.App.4th 482, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 847 (affirming trial court grant of Lawyer Two's anti-SLAPP motion).

.........................................................G. Special Joinder Devices
3. Intervention
p. 298, new Note 5: California's statute for indispensable parties, CCP § 389, is a nearly verbatim version of FRCP 19. See Cook v. Superior Court, 161 Cal.App.4th 569, 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 895 (2008), where the court ordered dismissal of an action filed in Orange County Superior Court challenging the designation of a candidate on a ballot there. The Secretary of State, who was an indispensable party to such challenges, had not been named in the action; the only proper venue for naming the Secretary was Sacramento County.

4. Class Action
p. 321, Note 3: Assume that the plaintiff in Hypertouch did not have standing to pursue the action against the defendant, but wanted to obtain precertification discovery to learn the identities of potential plaintiffs with standing who might be willing to represent the class of allegedly affected persons. Should such discovery be permitted? Compare CashCall, Inc. v. Superior Court, 159 Cal.App.4th 273, 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 441 (2008) (yes) with First American Title Insurance Co. v. Superior Court, 146 Cal.App.4th 1564, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 734 (2007) (no).
p. 322, Note 5: Assume that the defendants obtain summary judgment against the named plaintiff prior to class certification. May the defendants seek class certification after the court has decided the merits of the plaintiff's individual claim in order to bind absent class members to the ruling? See Ortiz v. Lyon Management Group, Inc., 157 Cal.App.4th 604, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 66 (2007) (class certification should occur before the merits are adjudicated and a precertification decision on the merits does not bind absent class members).

p. 323, New Note 7: If a case certified as a class action is settled, the parties must notify the class of the proposed settlement and the court must hold a hearing allowing class members to comment on or object to the settlement agreement. The court must then decide whether the settlement is fair and reasonable. The court then usually awards attorney's fees to the prevailing plaintiffs. These procedures are discussed in Chavez v. Netflix, Inc., 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 413 (2008).

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Reserved for future use

..........................................................................A. Complaint
1. Special Filing Requirements
3. "Notice" Versus "Fact" Pleading
...........................................................................B. Responses
1. General Demurrer
4. Judgment on the Pleadings
...........................................................................C. Answer
1. General and Special Denials

......................................................................D. Amendments
1. General Practice
2. Relation Back
..................................................................E. Truth in Pleading
2.
....(a) California Rule Established
....(d) Conflict with Federal Law?
....................................................................F. Cross-Complaints
..............................................................G. Special Joinder Devices
2. Interpleader