A Society Without a Future
August 1998
By Robert Stacy McCain
There is a tendency among American political observers to classify the adherents of conservatism as either "economic conservatives" or "social conservatives." It is supposed that economic conservatives are interested solely in policies which will promote economic growth, especially low taxes and the deregulation of commerce and industry. Social conservatives, by contrast, are supposed to be interested in issues involving support for school prayer, opposition to abortion and homosexuality, and other concerns of the so-called "religious right."
But there is a close connection between "family values" and economic prosperity. For instance, we know that a child's socioeconomic background is a strong predictor of that child's future economic well-being. Parents' marital status is, of course, a basic determinant of socioeconomic background. Children from two-parent homes generally do better in school and are more successful participants in the workforce than children who are the victims of illegitimacy or divorce. If businesses desire a better educated, hard-working labor force, then, they have a definite interest in fighting illegitimacy and divorce, promoting policies that allow more children to grow up in stable, happy homes.
This connection between the social and economic spheres is too often neglected by political commentators, and businesses naturally favor the short-term, bottom-line view that reduces individuals to consumers and workers -- mere ciphers in a calculation -- without regard for those individuals in relation to their families.
The possible long-term consequences of such an attitude should be alarming, when we examine what has happened to Japan in recent years. Ayako Doi and Kim Willenson, writing in the Sunday, July 26, 1998, Outlook section of the Washington Post, explain that Japan's recent economic ills stem from a "deeper disease ... a disastrously declining birth rate -- a baby bust." Of this demographic disaster, Doi and Willenson write:
“The consequence is fewer babies, and the consequences of that have been economic and tax policies skewed toward the demographic troubles of the future, rather than to the need for a healthy economy in the present.
“In short, the postwar business-as-combat model that created the Japanese miracle has led the country, literally, to working itself toward extinction. ...
“The problem began a quarter-century ago as a gentle decline in Japanese birthrates, which has now become such a precipitous drop that as of this year, there are more seniors than there are children under the age of 15. The number of children being born is falling so fast that by 2007 the Japanese population as a whole will begin to shrink.”
As good feminists, the authors manage to blame this troubling phenomenon on Japan's "patriarchal" corporate culture. Placing the blame for Japan's disastrous baby shortage is less important, however, than the realization that low fertility is a serious threat to economic prosperity. The same general point is made by Australian writer Murray Sayle, in an article entitled "The Social Contradictions of Japanese Capitalism," in the June 1998 issue of The Atlantic Monthly. Sayle labels Japan's distinctive financial-industrial system "ethno-economics," based upon cultural ideals of ethnic unity and bureaucratic expertise. But the tremendous post-WWII boom this system produced in Japan was dependent upon a surging birth rate -- and the birth rate is now in sharp decline:
“When Japan began its stunning revival, it had modern medicine and public-health measures, a postwar baby boom, and one of the highest birth rates in the industrialized world. As Japan has prospered, the birth rate has steadily fallen; it is now at a crisis point: 1.43 births per woman, well below replacement level. Fewer babies were born in Japan in 1993 than in any year since 1899. Two thirds of Japanese women between 20 and 30 have never married. ... Japan is one of the oldest societies on earth. Its population, currently increasing at a glacial 0.21 percent annually, will peak early in the next century at around 127 million and will then begin a long decline. ...
“Why don't today's Japanese marry or have more children? In part because all developed societies have low birth rates. ...
“Early marriage and large families were once enforced by community pressure, as a duty to the Emperor. Now, marriage has become both voluntary and unfashionable, and young people are increasingly saying no, thanks.”
Remember, Sayle is writing this for a prestigious liberal magazine, not for some right-wing eugenics journal or a Christian family values newsletter. What Sayle's story means, on a large scale, is that Japan is a society without a future. In years to come, more and more of its resources will be devoted to providing pensions for its aging population. On a smaller and more personal scale, the situation is even more bleak.
Suppose that you an only child living in Japan. The Japanese have a very long life span. From the time they retire at 65, your parents will probably live another 20 or 25 years, depending upon you for assistance and companionship. Now, suppose you get married -- and your spouse is also an only child. Your spouse also has two aging parents. With four aging parents between you, the chances are pretty good that, by the time you reach middle age, at least one parent will be seriously ailing. Now, suppose that -- despite the dependency of your parents and your spouse's parents -- you and your spouse also decide you can support a child. That lone child will not only have no brothers and sisters, but because both his parents are only children, he'll also have no first cousins, no aunts, no uncles. In fact, he will be the sole possessor of the genetic heritage of both your families. And if, for some reason, your child never begets children of his own -- well, your family will become genetically extinct.
The birth rate in the United States is not quite as low as that in Japan, but it is still very low -- even with high birth rates among recent immigrants, the total fertility rate (TFR, the average number of children a woman will have in her lifetime) is barely at 2.1, or replacement level. As the problems of Japan demonstrate, such low birth rates must ultimately prove disastrous, both socially and economically. The rising prevalence of the "American microfamily" -- the two-income middle class household with 1.7 children -- may portend a Japanese-style fertility collapse.
In 1950, the Japanese TFR was 4.32. It fell to 1.58 in 1966, rose briefly to 2.14 in 1974, and has since declined steadily. In 1949, Japan had 2.7 million births. In 1997, Japan had only 1.19 million births. Such a feeble birth rate -- 1.19 million children born annually in a nation of 125 million people -- is incompatible with long-term economic growth. But the U.S. is not much better off, having seen fertility rates fall from 3.6 in 1955 to 1.7 in 1976. Only because of high fertility rates among recent immigrants have those numbers recovered since the mid-1980s.
Even worse, the U.S. has extremely high rates of illegitimacy and divorce. More than a third of all U.S. children are now born out of wedlock. Even where children are born within marriage, nearly half of those parents will divorce before the children reach 18. Between the "birth dearth" (as Ben Wattenberg has called it) and the increased destruction of the traditional family, American corporations can expect that skilled, reliable workers will be harder and harder to find in coming years. Moreover, because these skilled, reliable workers have higher incomes, the collapse of the family also means a future shortage of the prosperous consumers and investors who help make businesses successful.
Seen in this light, the distinctions between "economic" and "social" conservatism are mythic. Until the business community understands that it has a definite interest in the social health of American families, our economic future is troubling at best.
r.s.mccain@worldnet.att.net
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