UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C.

National Transportation Safety Board

Board Room and Conference Center

429 L'Enfant Plaza, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20024

Thursday, May 9, 2002

8:00 a.m.

National Transportation Safety Board

Board of Inquiry

JOHN GOGLIA, Chairman

JOHN DeLISI, Chief

Aviation Engineering Division

Office of Aviation Safety

DR. ALAN KUSHNER, Deputy Director

Office of Research and Engineering

Technical Panel

FRANK HILLDRUP

Hearing Officer and Investigator-in-Charge

KEN EGGE

Operational Factors Investigator

FRANK McGILL

Maintenance Records Investigator

STEVE CARBONE

Maintenance Records Investigator

KEVIN PUDWILL

Structures Investigator

Federal Aviation Administration

LYLE STREETER, Manager

Accident Coordination Branch

Office of Accident Investigation

Emery Worldwide Airlines

CAPTAIN RICHARD HAGQUIST

Director Flight Operations

BRUCE ROBBINS

Former Director of Operations

The Boeing Company

RICHARD BREUHAUS

Chief Engineer for Air Safety Investigation

Airline Pilots Association

TODD GUNTHER

Chairman of the Accident Investigation Board

Tennessee Technical Services

DAVID HOFFSTETTER, President

SAM PORTER

I N D E X

WITNESS: PAGE:

Captain Nicholas A. Gentile 27

Chief Pilot/Senior Manager Flight Crew

Boeing, Douglas Products Division

Captain Richard Hagquist 100

Director of Flight Operations

Emery Worldwide Airlines

Mr. Kenneth Wayne Hall 139

Maintenance Inspector

Tennessee Technical Services

Mr. David Hoffstetter 197

President

Tennessee Technical Services

P R O C E E D I N G S

9:42 a.m.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Good morning, everybody. Today, we are here to conduct a public hearing in connection with the investigation of an aircraft accident, Emery Worldwide Airlines Flight 17, a Boeing DC-8-71F, the N number, the U.S. registration number is N-8079U, that occurred in Rancho Cordova, California, on February 16th, 2000.

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome. I am John Goglia, a member of the National Transportation Safety Board, and Chairman of this Board of Inquiry.

Today, we are opening a public hearing in connection with the accident that I just mentioned. The hearing is being held for the purpose of supplementing the facts, conditions and circumstances discovered during the on-scene and continuing investigation. This process will assist the Safety Board in determining the probable cause of this accident and making any recommendations to prevent similar accidents in the future.

When an accident such as this occurs, it is the responsibility of the National Transportation Safety Board, with the assistance of the Federal Aviation Administration as well as other designated parties from government, industry and labor, to find out what happened, why it happened, and how we can prevent this unfortunate event from reoccurring.

The purpose of this hearing is twofold. First, the issues that will be discussed at this hearing, while technical in nature, serve to assist the Safety Board in developing additional factual information that will be analyzed for the purposes of determining the probable cause of this accident.

Secondly, this hearing also provides the opportunity not only to the aviation community but to the public as well to see a small portion of the total investigative process and the dedicated efforts being put forward by the investigators from many different organizations to find the cause of this accident.

I want to assure the families of the flight crew that the Safety Board will pursue every lead to find an ultimate solution. The hearing is available on a worldwide webcast through the Safety Board's website at www.ntsb.gov.

Public hearings, such as this, are an exercise in accountability, accountability on the part of the Safety Board in its conducting a thorough and fair investigation, accountability on the part of the FAA that it is adequately regulating the industry, accountability on the part of the airline that it is operating safely, and accountability on the part of the aviation workforce that they are performing up to the high standards of professionalism expected of them.

As previously stated, these proceedings tend to become highly-technical affairs, but they are essential in seeking to reassure the public that everything is being done to ensure safety of the airline industry.

The purpose of this inquiry is not to determine the rights or liability of private parties and matters dealing with such rights and liabilities will be excluded from these proceedings.

Over the course of this hearing, we will continue to collect information that will assist the Safety Board in its examination of safety issues arising from this accident. Specifically, we will concentrate on the following issues: procedures for training for the DC-8 elevator check and use of the elevator position indicator, maintenance programs, practices and management training of company and contract personnel, maintenance manual requirements and procedures, installation and inspection procedures of the DC-8 elevator system, associated reference manuals and work cards.

At this point, I would like to introduce members of the Board of Inquiry. To my right is Dr. Alan Kushner, Deputy Director of the Office of Research and Engineering, and to my left, Mr. John Delisi, Chief, Aviation Engineering Division Office of Aviation Safety.

The Board of Inquiry will be assisted by the Technical Panel consisting of the following Safety Board staff: Mr. Frank Hilldrup, the Investigator-in-Charge and Hearing Officer, and he is sitting at -- why don't you identify yourself, Frank? Mr. Ken Egge, Operational Factors Investigator, Mr. Frank McGill, Maintenance Records Investigator, Mr. Steve Carbone, Maintenance Records Investigator, and Mr. Kevin Pudwill, Structures Investigator.

Mr. Paul Shlem and his colleagues from the Safety Board's Public Affairs Office are here to assist members of the news media. Mr. Eric Grossoff from the Office of Family Affairs is here to assist family members in attendance. Mrs. Carolyn Dargan and Mrs. Eunice Bellinger are present to provide administrative support as needed, and they will be providing copies of the exhibits to witnesses.

Neither I or any other Safety Board personnel will attempt during this hearing to analyze the testimony received nor will any attempt be made at this time to determine the probable cause of the accident. Such analysis and cause determinations will be made by the full Board after consideration of all the evidence gathered during our investigation.

The final report on this accident involving Emery Flight 17, reflecting the Safety Board's analysis and probable cause determinations, will be considered for adoption by the full Board at a public hearing here at the Safety Board's Headquarters at a later date.

The Safety Board Rules provide for the designation of parties to a public hearing. In accordance with those Rules, those persons, governmental agencies and companies and associations whose participation in the hearing is deemed necessary in the public interest and whose special knowledge will contribute to the development of pertinent evidence as designated by the parties. The parties assisting the Safety Board in this hearing have been designated in accordance with those Rules.

As I call the names of each party, would the designated spokesman give his name, title and affiliation for the record?

The Federal Aviation Administration?

MR. STREETER: My name is Lyle Streeter. I'm the Manager of the Accident Coordination Branch in the FAA's Office of Accident Investigation.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Thank you, Mr. Streeter.

Emery Worldwide Airlines?

MR. HAGQUIST: My name is Richard Hagquist. I'm the Director of Flight Operations at Emery Worldwide Airlines.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Thank you, Mr. Hagquist.

The Boeing Company?

MR. BREUHAUS: Good morning. My name is Richard Breuhaus. I'm Chief Engineer for Air Safety Investigation for Boeing Commercial Airplanes.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Thank you, Mr. Breuhaus.

Airline Pilots Association?

MR. GUNTHER: I'm Captain Todd Gunther. I'm the Chairman of the Accident Investigation Board for the Airline Pilots Association International.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Okay. And finally, Tennessee Technical Services?

MR. HOFFSTETTER: Dave Hoffstetter.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Dave, I don't think your mike was on.

MR. HOFFSTETTER: I'm Dave Hoffstetter, President, Tennessee Technical Services.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Thank you.

I want to publicly thank all of the other private, municipal, county, state and federal agencies that have supported the Safety Board throughout this investigation.

On April 30th, 2002, the Board of Inquiry held a pre-hearing conference in Washington, D.C. It was attended by the Safety Board's Technical Panel and representatives of the parties to this hearing. During that conference, the areas of inquiry and the scope of the issues to be explored at this hearing were delineated in the selection of witnesses to testify on these issues was finalized.

Copies of the Witness Lists developed at the pre-hearing conference are available in the foyer. There are numerous exhibits that will be used in these proceedings. Copies of the exhibits can be ordered through the Public Inquiries Branch at 202-314-6551.

The witnesses testifying at this hearing have been selected because of their ability to provide the best-available information on the issues being examined at this time. The first witness will be the investigator-in-charge of the accident investigation who will summarize certain facts about the accident and investigative actions that have taken place to date.

The remaining witnesses will be questioned first by the Board's Technical Panel and then by the designated spokesman for each party to the hearing, followed by the Board of Inquiry.

As Chairman of the Board of Inquiry, I will be responsible for the conduct of this hearing. I will make all rulings on the admissibility of evidence and such rulings will be final. The record of the investigation, including the transcript of the hearing and all exhibits entered into the record, will become part of the Safety Board's public docket on this accident and will be available for inspection at the Board's Washington Office. Anybody wanting to purchase the transcript, including parties to the investigation, should contact the court reporter directly.

Now, I would like to acknowledge, before we move forward with Mr. Hilldrup's statement, the fact that we have in attendance other members of the Board, in fact the entire Board. Mrs. Maryann Blakey, who is the Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board. Ms. Carol Carmody, who is the Vice Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, as well as Members George Black and John Hammerschmidt, and for those of you who are new to this room, this room is fairly new to us as well. It affords some additional opportunities that I don't think that the Board realized when we first moved into this facility.

One is, the ability for Board Members to come down and to view certain witnesses and actually ask some questions of certain witnesses in areas of the proceedings that they have an interest in. As you know, ultimately, this accident and any other proceedings comes before the Board for a vote, and any opportunity we have to, we as Board Members, have to become better informed with the issues that are in front of us can only result in a better product.

So, I consider myself very fortunate to have my fellow Board Members here to help and to help answer any questions that they may have because we often find that if one person has a question and other people also have similar questions that may not come to mind immediately or they may not want to ask at the time.

So, I thank all of you for your attendance and afford you the opportunity at any time to join us up here, to participate, ask any questions that you feel that you need to have answered from any of the witnesses.

And with that, Mr. Hilldrup, are you ready to summarize the investigation and enter the exhibits into the public docket?

MR. HILLDRUP: Yes, sir, I am.

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen.

On February 16th, 2000, at about 7:51 p.m. Pacific Standard Time, Emery Worldwide Airlines Flight 17, a Douglas DC-871 Freighter, Registration November 8079 Uniform, crashed near Mather Field in Rancho Cordova, California. The flight crew had declared an emergency shortly after take-off from Runway 2-2 Left at Mather Field and was attempting to return for landing when the airplane crashed near the airport, approximately two miles east of the runway. The three flight crew members were fatally injured and the aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and fire.

Emery Flight 17 was a scheduled flight from Reno, Nevada, to Dayton, Ohio, with an intermediate stop at Mather Field. The flight was operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 and visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

The Safety Board was notified of the accident on the evening of February 16th. Investigators from the Safety Board's Southwest Regional Office initially responded to the accident and secured the site along with local emergency response authorities. Meanwhile, Safety Board Go-Team Members assembled in Washington, D.C., for departure early the next morning. Go-Team Members arrived at Mather Field later that morning. Arrangements were subsequently made to transport the recovered flight recorders back to NTSB Headquarters in Washington. The Board Member on scene was Member George Black.

An organizational meeting was held and investigative groups were formed in the following specialty areas: airworthiness, aircraft operations and human performance, power plants, hazardous materials and maintenance records. Flight data recorder, cockpit voice recorder and aircraft performance groups were subsequently formed in Washington, D.C. Each group functioned under the leadership of a Safety Board Group Chairman.

The following organizations were given party status during the on-scene phase to provide technical assistance to the Safety Board during the investigation: the Federal Aviation Administration, Emery Worldwide Airlines, the Boeing Company, the Airline Pilots Association, Miami Aircraft Support, now known as Worldwide Flight Services, and General Electric Aircraft Engines. During the course of the investigation, Tennessee Technical Services was also made a party to the investigation.

Now a brief history of Emery Flight 17. The accident airplane arrived in Rancho Cordova from Reno, Nevada, at approximately 6:25 p.m. The captain and flight engineer from the accident flight also flew the airplane on the inbound flight from Reno. The first officer from the accident flight met the inbound flight upon its arrival at Rancho Cordova.

Conversations with the inbound first officer and mechanic stationed at Mather Field as well as a review of maintenance log sheets indicated that no operational problems were encountered on the flight from Reno. The ramp supervisor stated that it was a normal load and that the loading process went smoothly. The load planner stated that the cargo load that night was about 61,000 pounds and that the typical load for this flight was about 75,000 pounds. He stated that the center of gravity for Flight 17 was within limits.

Personnel loading the airplane and moving the pallets and containers into position generally reported that it was a routine operation.

When the load plan was completed, the load planner gave a copy to the pilots. After completing the weight and balance and load manifest forms, the pilots gave the form to the ramp supervisor. The ramp supervisor stated that she was the last one out of the cockpit before the airplane departed.

Now, conversations recorded on the cockpit voice recorder for Flight 17 indicated that the first officer was making the take-off. During the take-off roll, as the airplane reached an airspeed of 80 knots, the cockpit voice recorder recorded the captain stating, "80 knots." The first officer responded with "80 knots", followed immediately by "elevator checks."

Now, during the 80-knot elevator checks, the flight data recorder data indicated that the control column traveled forward approximately 4 degrees beyond the neutral position within about three seconds, resulting in a change in the elevator from an initial position of about 5.5 degrees up to 2.2 degrees up. The column was then brought aft to the neutral position in just over a second, and the elevator moved to a position around 5 degrees up.

Now, as a general note, except as I note otherwise in my opening statement, all the statements that I refer to the crew are from the CVR transcript. At time 7:49:02, the captain called V1, then rotate, and then rotate a few seconds later as the airplane accelerated to 149 knots. Cockpit sounds similar to the horizontal stabilizer trim in motion were recorded, and the captain stated, "Watch the tail." Additional sounds similar to the stabilizer trim were recorded, and the captain then stated V2 and positive rate.

At 7:49:17, the captain asked, "You got it?" To which the first officer responded, "Yep." The CVR recorded several sounds of the stabilizer trim in motion within about seven seconds after the airplane began rotating from the runway. Post-accident examination of the horizontal stabilizer jackscrews indicated a trim position of full nose down.

At time 7:49:20, soon after the flight became airborne, the first officer stated, "We're going back. CG's way out of limits." Seconds later, a sound similar to the stick shaker was recorded, and then the captain stated, "Push forward."

At 7:49:36, the flight crew contacted Sacramento Approach Control to declare an emergency. From around this point until the end of the CVR recording, the CVR transcript contains several references indicating that the pilots were trying to lower the nose and maintain control of the airplane.

At 7:49:40, the first officer stated, "You steer, I'm pushing." The flight engineer then stated, "We're sinking. We're going down." This was followed by the sound of the ground proximity warning system alert, "Whoop, whoop, pull up", which sounded continuously for the next several seconds.

At 7:50:04, the last transmission from the flight crew to Air Traffic Control was "Emery 17, extreme CG problem."

At time 7:50:37, the first officer stated, "What I'm trying to do is make the airplane's position match the elevator. That's why I'm putting it in a bank." Additional GPWS alerts were recorded on the CVR around 7:51:02, and the end of the recording occurred at 7:51:09. The duration of the flight was approximately two minutes.

The blue trace in this slide shows the track of Emery Flight 17. The flight departed to the southwest and began turning back to the airport but impacted roughly two miles east of Runway 2-2, and it impacted into an automobile salvage yard.

Soon after the flight recorders were turned to the NTSB's laboratory in Washington, D.C., investigative groups were formed to analyze the flight data recorder data and to produce a transcript of the CVR recording. A CVR sound spectrum study was initiated to examine a sound just before rotation that had been identified by the CVR Group as a "ratcheting noise ending with a clunk."

As part of this study, investigators recorded and compared numerous noises in an attempt to identify the ratcheting noise, including such things as the airplane stall warning or stick shaker and the movement of flight control columns, flight crew seats and cargo containers. Although the source of the noise was not determined, the study indicated that the ratcheting sound was unlikely to have been caused by movement of cargo over the rollers in the cargo compartment. Likewise, information documented by the Safety Board about the weight and loading of cargo on Flight 17 indicates that the cargo was well within limits for weight and center of gravity.

During examination of the flight data recorder data, staff discovered anomalies with the elevator position parameter recorded for Flight 17. This had not been previously detected because the Safety Board had been provided with incorrect conversions for elevator data. Once staff applied the proper offset and corrected the elevator data, it became apparent that the elevator movement in the airplane nose-down direction was restricted on Flight 17. This was despite forward deflection of the control column.

In fact, at no time during the flight, including during the 80-knot elevator checks, did the elevators travel below neutral. In other words, the airplane nose down. As a result of these findings, investigators from the Airworthiness Group reconvened in Sacramento to perform a detailed examination of Flight 17's wreckage to look for components of the elevator flight control systems.

Now, before continuing, it's appropriate that we take a look at the DC-8 elevator system and the operation and design. The DC-8 employs what's called a tab-driven elevator control system. With a tab-driven elevator, the control columns are linked by cables and linkages to the elevator control tabs. Deflexion of the control tabs causes deflection of the elevators and subsequently changes in the airplane's pitch attitude. In flight with the tabs in the neutral position, aerodynamic forces on the elevator will cause the elevator to trail behind the stabilizer in a nearly fared position.

When the pilot pulls the control column back, the elevator control tabs are moved down, as shown in the plot, in the figure. The aerodynamic effect of this is to cause an opposite movement of the elevators, in this case trailing edge up, this in turn causes the airplane to pitch up. Conversely, pushing the control column forward deflects the control tabs up. The resulting down deflection of the elevators causes an airplane nose-down response.

The DC-8 tail is represented in this slide. The control tabs, you can see in green on the inboard aft portion of the elevators. The outboard on this are the gear tabs and what they do is they deflect opposite the deflection -- opposite the direction of the elevator deflection to assist in moving the elevator.

During the Airworthiness Group's return visit to examine wreckage of Flight 17, additional components of the elevator control system were identified. The group soon focused on differences in the damage to the left and right elevator control tab push rods and associated attachments.

This slide is a diagram of the elevator control tab push rod and its connection to the elevator and to the control tab. If you'll notice on the forward part of the push rod attaches to the elevator crank fitting. The aft portion of the push rod attaches to the control tab crank fitting.

The push rod for the left elevator control tab had been heavily damaged by impact forces. Both forward and aft rod ends were fractured, and the push rod was bent in the middle. The aft crank fitting where the push rod attaches to the control tab had been consumed by fire. In contrast, the push rod for the right elevator control tab, including both ends, was found intact and relatively undamaged.

In addition, the aft crank fitting remained intact and attached to the control tab inboard hinge fitting. The bushings in the clevis lugs were also present with no visible signs of internal damage or deformation. However, the bolt that attaches the push rod to this fitting was not found nor were the associated nut and cotter pin.

Now, if you'll notice on the same slide, we've got a circle that identifies this aft connection of the aft push rod and the elevator control tab crank fitting. The evidence associated with all these components is consistent with this bolt not installed at the time of impact.

In this photo, these two photos, you'll see a photo of the connection between the aft push rod and the control tab crank fitting. It's just on the inboard portion of the elevators. You'll see a close-up view in the upper left-hand corner there.

Using the corrected FDR elevator data and findings from the Airworthiness Group, Safety Board staff began modeling the effects of an elevator control tab split on Flight 17. This is a bit of a busy plot, but let me walk you through it.

In this slide, you're going to see the elevator deflection recorded from the FDR is shown in red. Note that the elevator is trailing edge up, in other words, airplane nose up, for the entire flight. Neutral, you can see the zero on the left-hand side would identify neutral, and this is the plot. It remains in the negative area which is airplane nose up for the entire flight. The FDR data, which is not shown on this slide, by the way, but the FDR data for the control column showed a nose-down command.

Now, because the elevator control tab deflections are not recorded on the FDR, it was necessary for staff to extract this data. This was possible because of the available data, FDR data, for control column and elevator positions, and the known relationship between the control tab, the control column and the elevator. This tab deflection is shown in green in the figure and is labeled "the left control tab" just above the elevator plot. The right control tab necessary to balance the elevator and its recorded deflection was calculated using the DC-8 aerodynamic model. This tab deflection is shown in blue at the top of the plot.

Note that the working left control tab is at the trailing edge up stop of 8 degrees for almost the entire flight; in other words, the maximum airplane nose-down elevator possible. Because the elevators are designed with much greater travel in the airplane nose-up direction, the left control tab would not be able to overcome the greater deflection and authority of the disconnected right control tab. This is compounded by the effects of the gear tabs which would add to the authority of the disconnected right control tab in keeping the elevator trailing edge up.

As a result of the findings involved in the elevator control tabs, an additional Maintenance Investigative Group was formed. This group focused on the history of the elevator assemblies and their associated installation and maintenance. Numerous interviews were also conducted to better understand issues involving maintenance and oversight of Emery's operation.

A D check had been completed on the accident airplane in November of 1999. This D check had been performed by Tennessee Technical Services or TTS. As part of this D check, the right and left elevator assemblies had been removed by TTS and overhauled assemblies provided by Emery were then installed.

On November 25th, 1999, approximately eight days after the D check sign-off, the flight crew of November 8079 Uniform, the accident airplane, reported that the elevator required more back pressure than normal to flare to the aircraft. After troubleshooting the problem, Emery mechanics discovered that the left and right elevator dampeners were reversed. The dampeners were swapped and an operational check was performed with no defects noted.

A follow-up investigation by TTS and Emery after the dampeners finding revealed that the elevator dampeners had been installed improperly before the elevator assemblies were provided to TTS.

Now, during the course of the investigation of Emery Flight 17, the Safety Board learned of several safety inspections of Emery operations that were conducted by the FAA between 1999 and 2001. The most recent was a focused inspection conducted in May and June of 2001. The purpose of the inspection was to review logbook entries of corrective actions between March 1st, 2001, and May 1st, 2001, to determine if Emery maintained their aircraft in an airworthy condition.

On August 13th, 2001, the FAA and Emery Worldwide Airlines signed an Interim Agreement stipulating, among other things, that Emery would immediately cease all commercial air carrier operations conducted under Parts 119 and 121 of the Federal Aviation Regulations. The Interim Settlement Agreement cited as its basis FAA inspections dating from February 2000.

The Safety Board's public hearing that we had planned last summer, originally scheduled for August 22nd through 23rd, was postponed to allow Emery to focus its efforts on matters related to this suspension.

A Final Settlement Agreement between the FAA and Emery was signed approximately one month later. In this Agreement, the FAA and Emery agreed to work together to address issues outlined in the Agreement and that Emery would not be allowed to resume operations until meeting standards set by the FAA.

Subsequently, in an Amendment to the Final Settlement Agreement, dated December 4th, 2001, Emery informed the FAA that it did not wish to resume commercial air carrier flight operations.

Mr. Chairman, the record of this investigation to date has been entered into the public docket. All materials now public and available to the Safety Board's Public Inquiries Branch.

This concludes my opening remarks.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: All right. Thank you, Mr. Hilldrup, and would you please call the first witness?

MR. HILLDRUP: Yes, sir. The first witness will be Mr. Nick Gentile for Boeing.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: All right. Mr. Gentile, would you please take the stand?

Whereupon,

CAPTAIN NICHOLAS A. GENTILE

having been first duly sworn, was called as a witness herein and was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION

BY MR. HILLDRUP:

Q Mr. Gentile, could you please state your name for the record, your address, your current employer and your title, please?

A I'm Captain Nicholas Gentile. I'm employed by Boeing as Chief Pilot, Flight Crew Training. My current address is 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California, and I work for the Boeing Company.

Q Could you review your experience, please, for your job?

A As a Chief Pilot, Flight Crew Training, at Boeing, my job entails responsibility for training airline pilots worldwide and those who purchase Boeing equipment. I'm also responsible for achieving type rating for new aircraft, based on -- on the training for -- for first -- first-of-a-type with writing the manuals, developing flight training procedures and obtaining approval for the -- for the training for the courses from the FAA for first-of-a-type aircraft.

Q Thank you, sir.

MR. HILLDRUP: Captain Gentile will be interviewed by Mr. -- excuse me -- Captain Egge.

MR. EGGE: Thank you.

BY MR. EGGE:

Q Good morning, Captain Gentile.

I'd like to thank you very much for your participation at this public hearing today.

A Good morning.

Q I'd like to discuss three general topics with you today. A history of the DC-8 events leading up to the installation of the elevator position indicator or EPI, a review of Boeing or McDonnell publications on elevator checks and the EPI, and elevator-checking procedures.

Let me start by asking you if you would give us an overview of the DC-8 elevator operation and a history of events leading up to the installation of the EPI on the DC-8?

A I will. Thank you.

We would like to cover the elevator control system overview, the elevator position indicator history, the elevator control check evolution, the current procedures for the elevator control check, what is known and explained, what the 80 knot check during take-off is, and -- and if I can summarize the presentations.

For the elevator control system overview, we'd like to particularly point out what was already pointed out, the location of the control tab, the gear tab, and the relationship of the elevator to the horizontal stabilizer.

These pictures portray that on the actual airplane. The left photo shows the elevator with the gust lock on and shows the position of the gust tab -- of the control tabs and the geared tabs in relationship to the elevator with -- with the gust lock on as being faired.

The picture to the right and upper part of the screen shows the gust locks off. It shows the elevator trailing edge up. It shows the elevator control tab trailing edge up, and it shows the gear tab trailing edge down.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Mr. Gentile, before you go on, would you just, for the audience, let them know what a gust lock is?

THE WITNESS: A gust lock is a control in the cockpit which allows the controls to be -- the elevator to be locked to the stabilizer, and it allows the rudder to be blocked in a powered-on position to overcome gusts on -- on the ground, and it also blocks the inboard 2 and 3, 3 throttles, so that the aircraft movement with the gust lock on is very difficult. It's for the protection of the controls on the ground in high-wind conditions.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Thank you.

THE WITNESS: Finally, the bottom photo shows the empennage with the gust locks on.

We have a simplified DC-8 control system, some of which has been pointed out to you already. This shows -- this shows the first officer's control column, and in the first officer's control column and the captain's control column are bussed together, but for simplicity, we just show the first officer's control column, and we particularly would like to note the control stops on the -- on the -- on the first officer's -- on the column as depicted.

We then also show the cable and mechanisms back to the elevator which move the elevator in accordance with the desires of the pilots from the control column, and we also want to point out the control tab stops for the control tab mounted on the elevator.

Later on, when we discuss the control checks, it'll -- it'll be important to understand that we will be moving the controls to where we will contact the elevator control tab stops previous -- prior to the control column stop, so that as we move the control columns for the check on the ground, we will be moving, actually moving the entire elevator. This is a completely manual and -- and these control checks are important in -- in this manual system.

Finally, on the upper part of the screen, we show the gear -- the geared tab and its linkage, and what we'd like to show is the relationship to the horizontal stabilizer since it's -- it's permanently affixed to the horizontal stabilizer. So, as the -- as the elevator moves, the control tab -- the geared tab will move in relationship to the movement of the -- of the elevator, and it does not have any controls to that geared tab from the cockpit.

Next, we'd like to cover the elevator position indicator history. This depicts the picture of the EPI, elevator position indicator, in the cockpit of the sister ship for the accident airplane taken -- taken in the Emery cockpit in Dayton, Ohio, and it shows especially the location of the -- of the EPI. It is located on the first officer's panel. We will actually show in a video that we have the -- the operation of the control check and the operation of the EPI. This indication of the EPI shows -- is an indication with the gust locks on, which shows it in the neutral faired position.

The elevator position indicator history. We had some occurrences of FOD jamming in the elevator hinge line in 1970. TIA, TransInternational Airways, aircraft had a take-off accident in which a foreign object became logged between the -- the horizontal stabilizer and the elevator in -- in -- in that area. It was determined to be a piece of macadam.

In 1972, a flight engineer during a walk-around discovered some FOD in the hinge line of a DC-8 in which it -- it was an object that appeared to be an axe handle sort of thing. It was about two foot long, and it was wedged directly between -- in that hinge line between the -- the elevator and the stabilizer.

Some other incidents of -- of issues leading up to the EPI was during the '72 and '74 time frame, there were some reports of fractured and cracked control columns, and then in 1974, we had requests and reports from operators, excuse me, and from ALPA reporting the snow and ice might be creating -- might be FOD in this hinge line.

Developmentwise, in 1970, the NTSB recommended consideration of -- of an elevator position indicator. In 1971, Douglas Aircraft and the FAA concluded that the EPI was not necessary. That was also the position of many of our operators at the time.

In 1973, Douglas Aircraft began an engineering study to -- to look again at the requirements for an EPI. In 1974, ALPA again requested the EPI system be installed on the DC-8, and in 1974, we began an in-service evaluation of an EPI system installed on a customer's airplane. I believe it was Flying Tigers. At the end of that time, reports were very positive on the -- on the use of the EPI in service, and in 1975, Douglas Aircraft released a Service Bulletin for the installation of an EPI.

In 1977, Philippine Airlines had an RTO accident in which they had some geared tab crank-ons failed, which jammed the elevator in the trailing edge up position. The airplane aborted due to the nose coming up early in the take-off run, did run off the runway and -- and had an accident.

After that, 1978, the elevator position indicator was mandated by an AD from the FAA and for the installation, and also at that same time, elevator check procedures were described using the -- when the EPI was not available.

The control check is an integral part of this DC-8 operation, and there's an evolution to the control check, also, for baseline or roll-out. From the very beginning, the directions were for full-aft control column movement followed by a full-forward control column movement, checking for full and free movement with no binding.

In 1970, after the TIA accident, the DAC baseline check was reiterated in a -- in a "Know Your DC-8" Letter, Number 43. In 1973, in an Addendum to that letter in 43-A, it was recommended that to accomplish the roll-out check into the wind. Since this is a manual system, when you're taxiing normally, you're taxiing downwind, the controls become very heavy with the wind pushing against them, and it was recommended that if the control check could not be satisfactorily concluded, at that point, then it was suggested to wait until the airplane was turned into the wind to accommodate the proper control roll-out check.

In '73, also, an "All-Operators" Letter was released to inspect the areas between the stabilizer and the elevator for FOD after ground engine runs. It was felt like that was probably the time when most of the FOD was -- was being ingested in the -- in the area between the stabilizer and the elevator.

In 1974, on the heels of the control column fatigue cracks and failures, it was recommended that, in an AOL and also an All Operators Letter, that both pilots should simultaneously apply full aft and then full forward pressure to the controls during the roll-out check.

In 1975, along with the installation of the EPI, it was also a "Know Your DC-8" Letter that recommended roll-out check procedures which incorporated the EPI installation. The letter in Number 53 was to check the EPI needle moves down into the -- into or transitions through the white band with full aircraft nose-down elevator applied to accomplish the elevator roll-out check into the wind if tail wind prevents a valid roll-out check and, finally, if neither of these things happen, to accomplish a positive visual check to verify proper elevator operation, if -- if the -- neither of the first two were accomplished.

In '75, of course, there was the Service Bulletin 27-254 released for the installation of the EPI as an aid to flight crews during elevator checks, and also in '75, the flight crews were informed in an AOL to apply control column pressure slowly during roll-out checks.

The -- the issue with applying control column -- trying -- applying pressure slowly was to overcome the resistance of the yaw dampeners -- I'm sorry -- the -- the gust dampeners in the control system to the movement of the controls. So, the dampeners are such that they're -- they would resist rapid movements from -- from wind gusts and they would also resist rapid movements and the object is a slow, steady, especially the push part.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Mr. Gentile, again for the -- for those in the audience and maybe elsewhere, the gust lock is a separate system from the dampeners?

THE WITNESS: Yes. Yes, they are. The gust dampeners are -- are built to provide some resistance to rapid movement to keep large controls that are manual controls from slamming and damaging the controls.

In 1977, as part of the elevator control check evolution for airplanes that were not equipped with the EPI, again a letter was released encouraging the use and the installation of the EPI to accomplish the elevator roll-out check into the wind was reiterated and also to introduce an optional 80 knot check during the initial take-off roll.

This was also done at the point in time to allow for inoperative EPI and to give the crew some guidance. We'll talk about -- well, we'll describe the 80 knot check again later, but what we have is to recommended was a small movement forward of the control column during -- during the take-off roll between 60 and 80 knots and also to check for the reaction of the aircraft nose to the slight movement of the controls. In 1977, all this was again reiterated in a letter, "Know your DC-8", 53-A.

In 1978, after the EPI was mandated by AD for -- for the airplanes not yet equipped with an EPI, the elevator checks were restated and also the 80 knot check was restated, and for airplanes with an EPI to use -- utilize the elevator check procedures, if the EPI was inoperative, and --

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Mr. Gentile, I don't think you've made it clear why this check was proposed at 80 knots.

THE WITNESS: The -- this was a check that was proposed at the time, if the EPI was inoperative, to -- that a -- the -- this -- to assure the crew that the elevator and the -- was -- was -- and the airplane was reacting properly to elevator inputs, and they could do this on the runway during take-off roll between 60 and 80 knots.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: And that's because there's air flow across the flight controls and that they could feel the response to the control column?

THE WITNESS: Correct, and there should be -- there should be a response by the airplane actually to the nose of the airplane in dipping.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: That -- that's the point I wanted you to make.

THE WITNESS: Thank you.

In 2001, Boeing amplified control check procedures in a Flight Operations Bulletin. It was the reiteration of previous recommendations, plus the -- a reiteration of the check for the position of the elevator and tabs during a walk-around, and we will -- we will show the -- all of that in the video when we have a video for the walk-around, and to check the EPI needle to move during this -- during the control roll-out check to a point below the white band with full aircraft nose-down elevator during -- during that check.

If the roll-out check is unsatisfactory, then a positive check must be made with a trained observer prior to take-off, and this was to advise operators that the 80 knot control check was not an adequate substitute for control roll-out check, as it had been in the past. It was now retracted. The 80 knot check is still available to the -- to the operators as a load check, but if the controls do not achieve the desired movement of the EPI needle, then they must return and get a visual control check accomplished.

Okay. Current -- current procedures for the elevator control check. The system is checked during the flight engineer's or second officer's walk-around inspection, normally twice. It's checked prior to starting engines. Some operators check it once, some operators check it twice. The roll-out check is performed after engine start during -- normally during -- during taxi procedures.

The flight engineer' walk-around visually checks the elevator in the tab position and condition. With the gust locks on, the elevators and the tab are faired with the stabilizer as shown in the early picture and as will be shown in the walk-around video.

With the gust locks off and no control inputs, the elevator goes trailing edge up because it's mass balanced in that direction. The control tabs go symmetrically trailing edge up, and the gear tabs go symmetrically trailing edge down.

Okay. If we could have the -- if we could play the walk-around video, please?

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Mr. Gentile, while they're getting that up, the flight engineer in doing his walk-around normally would have the gust lock engaged or on?

THE WITNESS: Both. The first -- approaching the airplane, it would be with the gust locks on, and then the flight engineer would normally go into the cockpit, do his cockpit prep, then release the gust lock.

We wanted to show from the flight engineer walk-around what the gust lock -- what it would look like with the gust locks on. If it's bright enough to see that the elevator, the elevator tabs and the stabilizer are all faired.

(Walk-Around Video)

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Now, that view is not a view that we normally have from the ground.

(Walk-Around Video)

THE WITNESS: And stop the video, please.

That last view is also one that the flight engineer would not have since -- since he wouldn't see the motion. He would just know where the controls should be from the -- from the walk-around training.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: And also, the view was taken from 10 feet off the ground, and he would be on the ground.

THE WITNESS: Correct. Actually, I wasn't there, but they tell me that they tried to show both on the ground and -- and a head-on view.

Okay. The DC-8, the cockpit check after engine start for the controlled roll-out. The roll-out check checks the elevators, the ailerons and the rudders. For this hearing, we're only going to focus on the elevators.

It's performed after engine start because the ailerons and rudders are hydraulically actuated, so that they need the hydraulic power for those two. The elevator check calls for both pilots to simultaneously apply full aft control column followed by full forward control column.

In checking for freedom of control column movement and appropriate elevator motion on the elevator position indicated, the EPI, it is important for the crew to note the position of the EPI when the gust locks are on prior to releasing it, so that they can ascertain at that point that the elevator does move and is free to move and it does move to trailing edge up position.

Could we do the -- roll the video for the roll-out check, please?

(Roll-Out Check Video)

THE WITNESS: This is a picture of an EPI gauge from another aircraft which is in a different position on the first officer's panel.

(Roll-Out Check Video)

THE WITNESS: Thank you.

That would be a satisfactory control check by the crew in that it showed the movement of the elevator position and the elevator from the faired position. When it was released, the elevator was free to move, and it moved to its balanced position of trailing edge up, and the tabs were checked by coming back. Since the trailing edge was already up, the tabs just move on that first check and that's the reason that we asked for the check to be made with the trailing -- with the nose up pulling the controls back, and finally then the full control movement for first the tab movement going nose down and then when the tab engages the stop that we talked about on the elevator tab, when that stop is engaged, then the entire elevator is moved by the pilots and the controls to the nose-down position, and the requirement now is that the -- the EPI gauge move below the neutral position, and then finally the EPI gauge needs to be watched the entire time so that as that's released, then the elevator will again return to its normal trailing edge up position.

Okay. The 80 knot check that we discussed earlier, which is a check performed during a take-off roll, it's optional. Control check during the initial take-off roll, small up and down elevator movements to check weight distribution. The crew observes the pitch of the aircraft in response to that small movement.

The use of the EPI at this stage is not recommended by Douglas, has not -- was not recommended by Douglas when it was installed and is not recommended today by Boeing and that we also noted under the Change 2001 that this 80 knot check is not a substitute for an elevator control roll-out check.

So, in summary, Mr. Egge, the DC-8 elevator control checks have evolved with service experience. The EPI was designed to aid the flight crew during pre-take-off checks, and the 80 knot control check is not a substitute for an elevator control roll-out check.

Thank you.

MR. EGGE: Okay. Thank you for that presentation, Captain Gentile.

BY MR. EGGE:

Q In the presentation, you spoke rather extensively about the EPI or the elevator position indicator.

Could you give us some insight by what was then Douglas Aircraft in the design and development of that gauge?

A The gauge was designed at the -- at -- at -- at the behest of -- after the studies and the proving grounds, and it was designed to be used on the ground, basically statically, to -- to ascertain that the elevator was -- was free to move and that it moved properly and that's the only purpose for the EPI gauge.

Q There are other airplanes out there that have an elevator control system somewhat similar to the DC-8's elevator control system. The DC-9 and, I believe, the Boeing 707, also, come to mind.

Could you tell us why these airplanes are not required to have an EPI gauge?

A Well, I've never been associated with the 707 and can't -- can't respond to that.

But -- but I have flown the DC-9 as part of my qualifications and my background with Delta Air Lines, and the DC-9 elevator, unlike the DC-8 elevator, is not bussed together. So that, the tabs, that the elevators are free to move in either direction independent of one another, and if one were to create a jammed tab on the other elevator would operate -- the elevator would operate and would be certainly a handful of airplane but would be flyable.

Q Okay. I'd like to draw your attention to Exhibit 2-Q, which is the Boeing Flight Operations Bulletin, dated June 19, 2001.

First of all, could you tell us something about this document? Basically what it is, what its purpose is, how it came about?

A The document came about to reiterate the -- the proper elevator control roll-out check and also it was to discuss the -- the -- the 80 knot check. In the -- in the evolution of the -- of the operation over the years, we've noticed that the checks are conducted on the elevator control roll-out much more rapidly than they were designed to do, and therefore it seemed to some operators to be more difficult to achieve the proper positioning of the elevator position indicator, and yet what we saw in -- in the -- in the video was what we looked to achieve, and if it's done slowly so that there's less resistance from the gust dampeners, it'll be done properly, and they'll get the reading below the neutral.

We wanted to reiterate that the indication should be below the neutral and the EPI gauge rather than just in the band so that it will take that much longer to be held in a position and will give the crew a more positive indication that their elevator control system is operating properly.

On the evolution that we found on the -- on the 80 knot check, in fact, some airlines were using that operation and it was done at higher speeds. In the original and all the way through in the letters, we've always recommended that in cases of crosswinds and in cases of slippery runways, that -- that this not -- not -- not be used.

The concern, of course, is destabilizing a take-off and that we've never recommended the use of the EPI gauge at any time during take-off or the 80 knot check. So, we wanted to reiterate what the check should -- how the check should be done and also to remove it from the proper roll-out check, proper control check of the elevator prior to take-off. Prior to the beginning of take-off roll, a proper control check should be -- should be conducted for the manual -- for the manual system, even if it means going back and having a visual check accomplished.

Q And I believe you've touched on this a little bit earlier, but how does this FOB different from previous All Operator Letters, other FOBs or other publications put out by Boeing or McDonnell on the subject?

A Well, I guess the two -- the two changes in

-- that is significant in -- in this letter is that we have also mentioned that the tabs, the tabs in the walk-around, need to be faired which the tabs had not specifically been mentioned in the past. It's just that the elevator needed to be faired to the stabilizer, but here we mention tabs, also, as a proper check and -- and then this -- this FOB removes the -- the 80 knot check as a substitute for a control roll-out check that was not properly performed.

Q Also in Exhibit 2-Q, on Page 1, the last sentence in the second paragraph states that "During the flight control roll-out check, elevator function should be verified by first applying full up elevator and confirming that the needle on the EPI moves in the up direction", and then as you've pointed out before, "followed by full down elevator to the column mechanical stop and verifying that the needle moves through the faired position to a point below the white band."

Here's a case where the full up and full down elevator has been commanded, but the EPI is not required to show the respective full up or full down indication for a valid test.

How can a pilot looking at this be assured that the elevator is truly functioning properly when this check is accomplished?

A Well, by the -- by the proper control roll-out checks, the elevator was free to move to the up position and then free to move down to the neutral position. If there was a possibility of an elevator obstruction as we had noted in the past between the -- the elevator and the stabilizer, that -- that would -- control roll-out in that manner would not be possible.

In a manual system with -- with the resistance and the weight that this elevator has, there's a lot of cable stretching and there's a lot of resistance from the gust dampeners to the movement to prevent a full -- a full movement without -- without the proper wind over the tail and that's why having the needle move just below the neutral is a satisfactory check, and the crew can be comfortable with the fact that the elevator is free to move.

Q Let's say that the elevator for whatever reason is malfunctioning and the movement is restricted. How would a pilot be able to tell that based on this roll-out check procedure?

A Well, if the elevator is restricted, when -- the first indication might be when the gust lock is released that the elevator would not move to its normal trailing edge up position and that's why it's important that they check prior to releasing the gust lock and during releasing the gust lock.

Secondly, when the elevator -- if it -- if it were to be in the jammed position, would be -- movement would be difficult since once you get past the control tab stops, then you will be carrying the elevator itself with the controls, and it would be -- it would be difficult to move or it would not move on the indicator, and we're really relying on the indicator to check the proper movement as we saw in the video.

Q And along those same lines, let's say that one of the elevator control tabs was malfunctioning again for whatever reason. How would a pilot know that?

A Probably the best indication would be during the walk-around, when the elevator control tabs and the elevator are in the -- are in known positions. If -- if the control tabs are malfunctioning, that -- that would probably be the best indication. There are no indications in the cockpit of the control tab, and unless it were some type of jam where it wouldn't -- the controls wouldn't move, the pilot would not know that there was an issue with the control tabs.

Q In the video that you showed, whenever the check was being accomplished, it appeared that there was considerable effort by the operator to move the elevator.

Can you give us some idea of how much force that takes to -- to do that?

A It -- it could take up to a hundred pounds and -- and that's the reason that we ask both pilots to move those controls on the ground together.

Q In the "Know Your DC-8" Letters that you mentioned and in this latest FOB, it states that "When accomplishing the flight control roll-out check, that pilots should first apply full up elevator and then followed by full down elevator to the controlled mechanical stop."

Could you tell us why the procedure's performed in that order?

A Yes. The procedure is performed in that order since, you remember, when we release the gust locks, the elevator goes trailing edge up, and it's just about on its -- on its stops due to the mass balancing.

At that point then, we are checking the elevator control tab for its movement, but we're really not moving that elevator, and then when we get all of that back first, then when we start forward, we start moving the elevator control tab to the nose-down position, and then when the elevator control tab hits the elevator control tab stops as we showed in the early diagram, then we will begin moving the elevator to the -- to the nose-down position, and we're looking for a movement past neutral there.

Q Also in your presentation, you've explained what an 80 knot control check is, and I believe you've touched on this already, but to properly accomplish this check, would it be necessary for one of the pilots to observe the movement on the EPI?

A No, it would not be necessary for a pilot, and -- and Boeing does not recommend that the pilots divert their attention in the cockpit. We really do think that the attention should be outside the cockpit during -- during the take-off roll as much as possible.

Q Okay. And along the same lines that -- that I asked before on the roll-out check, let's say for whatever reason, we've got an elevator that's malfunctioning, restricted in movement. On this check, on the 80 knot check, how would a pilot know that?

A If the elevator were restricted in movement, then on the 80 knot check, the -- they may not be able to get any reaction from the nose of the aircraft, if in fact it is not moving.

Q Okay. And again along that same line, say the elevator's free to move but say one of the control tabs is not operating properly, how would a pilot know that then during that 80 knot check?

A I'm not sure that the pilot would know that during the 80 knot check. It depends on a lot of conditions that might be present, but if -- if the other controlled tab is functional and this -- and it may allow for the operation of the -- of the elevator sufficient to -- to in fact give some movement to the nose to convince the pilots that it was a satisfactory check.

Q Okay. And you've already mentioned that Boeing does not recommend that check.

Could you give us some idea, based on your experience, what -- what other tasks are the pilots performing, say the flying pilot, while going down the runway and then some of the operators do use this 80 knot check? But could you give us an idea of what -- what tasks are being performed by the flying pilot during that time?

A Well, during the time, they have, of course, responsibility for communications. They will have completed the checklist. They will be managing the power on the -- on the aircraft, steering the aircraft down the center of the runway, watching the air speed indicators and -- and -- and looking out, of course, for traffic and any abnormalities that might occur outside the aircraft as well. Pretty busy time.

Q And also along that line, how about the non-flying pilot, the tasks being performed at that time?

A Well, it -- it -- it varies with which of the pilots is the non-flying pilot, but in -- in most cases, the non-flying pilot is assisting with the setting of the -- of the engine powers and is assisting with air speed call-outs which both -- both pilots will acknowledge, like an 80 knot check, which is the first indication of air speed movement since the air speed starts -- indicator starts at 60 knots, 80 knot check to cross-check air speed. They're checking for any -- any other problems that -- or any other indications that might be abnormal in the cockpit prior to reaching a decision speed or the V1 speed. So, both pilots are involved in calling call-outs. Pilot not flying calls out the air speeds all the way through V1, VR and V2 and checks for positive rate. So, the pilot not flying is inside and outside the cockpit.

Q Because this check's being accomplished on the take-off roll, you've mentioned a number of concerns about that.

Is there any concern with -- in addition to what you've already said, with the location and size of that gauge, of the EPI?

A No. I operated the airplane for about 3,000 hours with that gauge, and it's never been a concern for me. The purpose of the gauge is -- is for ground control checks prior to take-off, and it was never intended for any other purpose, and it was never a concern.

Q Okay. Again, you've stated that your view about this 80 knot check and many operators do indeed use it.

Are there times when -- when this 80 knot check just absolutely should not be done?

A Well, we recommend that it not be done on -- in wet, slippery runway conditions and also in moderate crosswinds, and it is -- it is a check that is still available to all the operators and is a check to, in essence, to check the load of the airplane, the handling characteristics, based on load, rather than a control check at this point.

Q Can you give us a feel for how many carriers out there actually do use this 80 knot check on take-off?

A I think the majority of the -- of the DC-8 operators who -- who were using the DC-8 in freight hauling use that. At Delta Air Lines, where I operated a DC-8 in passenger service, we never used that check, and if we didn't get a good control roll-out, we had to go back to the ramp.

Q Okay. Could you give us any insight as to why you didn't use it in the passenger operation?

A Well, at that point, we did feel it was a bit destabilizing, and it also would be a bit uncomfortable to the passengers because in this check, you're moving the entire 197 feet of aluminum up and down, and if at the same time you start hitting little potholes in the runways or dips, it -- it would exacerbate it. So, we didn't feel it was -- it was an option, and we didn't -- we didn't choose to use it at Delta Air Lines at the time.

Q If you could, how could you improve this gauge? Any thoughts on that?

A I think the gauge is -- is -- is performing what it was developed for and that is the purpose of checking the fact that the elevator is free to move, and it came as a result of the FOD problems that we had, and I -- I don't -- I don't feel that there's any -- I never considered the gauge for any other purpose when I operated the airplane. That was a lot of years ago, and -- but even today, I don't consider it as any requirement to do anything different. It would have to be for a different purpose and -- and for the purpose that this gauge is used, that's -- that's sufficient and proper.

Q Okay. Other than the gauge itself, how about the procedures? Any thoughts on how the procedures could be improved?

A I -- I think we -- we did that in the 2001 letter that we put out in which we reemphasized some of the procedures that were there in calling for checking with the tabs and any alignment of the elevator and the -- and the -- to the stabilizer with the gust locks and checking it.

I think we can achieve satisfactory results with the control checks that we have requested without -- without the 80 knot check requirements. So, I -- I don't see that we can do much with a manual system, other than check it.

Q Okay. You've got considerable experience, obviously, with a malfunctioning elevator, one that's restricted in movement in one or both directions.

How could that be misconstrued by a pilot as being a center of gravity or CG problem?

A The reaction of the -- reaction of the airplane would be the same, and it would be if -- if it was a reaction of a nose-up, it would appear to the pilot right at take-off to be a bad load. The same with a nose-down. It would appear to the pilot to be a heavy forward load to -- to where the -- they wouldn't be able to rotate.

So, it could easily be construed by the pilots to be a load since in flight, there's no other indication to the pilots of an elevator problem.

Q And finally, some folks are familiar that Boeing held a DC-8 CG conference in June of last year.

Could you tell us what the purpose of that conference was and any accomplishments that may have been derived from it?

A The -- the CG conference was held at -- at the request of -- of one of our customers from about nine months probably prior to the -- to the accident that we're sitting here for, and they had had some CG problems on take-off, and they had asked that we develop some procedures which might be termed "escape maneuvers".

At this time, in -- at Boeing, we determined it would probably be proper to study the engineering aspects of their request and then to assemble the -- the DC-8 operators from the industry since they had tremendous expertise and experience that we could use for -- for the -- to answer the questions from our -- from our customer on an escape maneuver.

We did -- we did some engineering studies and are still studying the issue and -- and have determined with the -- with the experience of the customers in attendance at the meeting that there may be an escape maneuver that -- that could be developed in -- in the future, although we're still doing engineering studies on that, which -- which would allow itself to -- to training to where we could maximize the use of the energy left in an airplane with a bad CG and then -- and then at the proper time go through some procedures and basically a steep turn maneuver to allow the airplane to accelerate in a turn and to where air speeds will be gained and altitudes gained, where the airplane then can be leveled and flown back and -- and -- and in the type of bad CG that they might encounter.

We are still studying the engineering aspects of the possibilities of -- of applying this to -- to a flight control issue, but that is not as clear as it is in applying this to a bad CG. So, we hope that we'll be able to make some suggestions for training in the -- in the future when we finish our engineering studies.

MR. EGGE: Okay. Thank you very much, Captain Gentile, and I have no further questions.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: All right. Captain Gentile, I have a clarification I'd like you to make or a little addition.

You talked in great depth about the captain and the first officer, but as we both know, there's a third person in the cockpit, the flight engineer. I wonder if you can explain for the benefit of everybody here what the flight engineer's duties are at this time. Just what is he doing, and what's his role, what he's required to do?

THE WITNESS: The flight engineer's duties are -- are really company-specific, but in -- in -- in speaking in generalities, he -- he, along with the rest of the crew, is very busy. He has to operate all of the -- all of the systems from -- from the fuel through the pneumatics through -- through the air conditioning and -- and have hydraulics and have everything prepared for take-off.

He also completes the checklists. He's -- he's the person at that point who -- who is also helping with the management of the engines, if that's the company's procedures, some companies use that others do not, and he's also facing forward rather than sideways at that time and helping with the scanning out-- out -- out the window and -- and -- and also watching his own panel for any abnormalities.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Okay. Thank you.

And one other question. In your video, I noticed what appeared to be shaking motions on the part of the person sitting in the first officer's seat when he was pushing the control column forward. Now, that could be construed as -- as really excessive column forces.

Do we know what the column forces were, and is that in fact a -- a considerable amount of force being placed upon the control column?

THE WITNESS: The control column forces at that juncture could be up to a hundred pounds of force on the ground. We don't normally hear that wavering sound in the cockpit, but we did -- we did on the video, and I'm not going to cast any aspersions to the person doing that checking sitting behind there.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Okay. Thank you.

To the parties, Federal Aviation Administration?

BY MR. STREETER:

Q Captain Gentile, if I could, I'd like to clarify a few of the basic items you covered at the beginning because I think for the audience, some of this, we might want to straighten out for -- for later clarification.

In the one video where we showed the static position of the elevator on the ground with the gust lock off, and you said due to mass balance, the elevator was trailing edge up at the point. I believe it also showed the control tab trailing edge up in that video, is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. Would that be the same situation that we would see if the elevator was commanded trailing edge up in flight?

A No, it would not.

Q Okay. So, the control tab at that point would actually be trailing edge down, is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q Okay.

A That's correct.

Q Would you please explain the purpose of the geared tabs?

A Okay. The -- the geared tabs are, if you would, bussed to the control system and moving the elevator, and -- and they are attached to the -- to the rear of the stabilizer, and -- and as the -- as the elevator moves, the geared tab moves in conjunction with the elevator tab to give it assistance, and it's on both sides, so that as you get inputs from the elevator tabs, as the elevator begins its movement, then it -- it mechanically moves the geared tabs and they also assist in moving the elevator in flight.

Q Okay. Now, when you say they assist, do the geared tabs always move opposite or with the control tabs?

A They move with the control tabs.

Q The control tabs.

A It is, yes.

Q Okay. And the reason I bring that up is because in the relaxed position shown in the video, it is correct that the geared tabs would oppose the control tabs?

A Correct.

Q Okay. In the Service Bulletin that Boeing issued in 1975, this would be the original service -- I believe it was 27-254. This was the original Service Bulletin calling for the -- the EPI installation, and then we see it's three years before the AD note is issued.

Do you have any background at all as to why the three-year difference there?

A Actually, what -- what I am aware of today is that there was a lack of enthusiasm on the part of the operators at the time for the EPI and -- and only a few were installed between '75 and '77, and then -- and then it was determined that it needed to be done, and it was -- it was -- the AD was issued in '78, after the Philippines accident.

Q Okay. And then, so then, when -- when Boeing issued the second Service Bulletin, I believe it was 27-264, you -- you took that opportunity to also urge the operators to put the EPI in?

A Correct.

Q Okay.

A Correct.

Q Now, regardless of the operators' reactions at that point, is it correct that the EPI was available for installation after 1975?

A Yes, it was.

Q Okay. And -- and they would have had the option of putting it in; they didn't have to wait for the AD note, is that correct?

A Correct.

Q Moving on to the -- the 80 knot check, and we talk about the -- the -- the dip, the visual effect of the dip. Is that a significant dip? Is it a subtle thing? Is it something the crew can easily spot?

A It -- it's -- it's easily spotted by the crew in a normal reaction.

Q Okay. Mr. Hilldrup, in his opening information that he provided, indicated that on the accident flight, the elevator never did go nose down on take-off.

Can you assess in any way what effect that would have had on the visual dip? Could you have still generated a visual dip, even though the -- the elevator didn't go to a trailing edge down?

A I -- I would have to make an assumption at this time, and the fact that I was on the Cockpit Voice Recording Committee and did hear --

Q Hm-hmm.

A -- that the 80 knot check was satisfactory, which indicated that there was a dip, and there was some movement at that time, maybe not to the nose-down position but there was -- there was some movement of the elevator.

Q Okay. And from your understanding of the basic aerodynamics of the airplane, does that seem feasible?

A It -- it -- it does.

Q Okay. Now, understanding that -- that Douglas or Boeing did not recommend the use of the EPI on the 80 knot check, would this same elevator limitation, the elevator not going to a nose-down position, do you -- do you think that would have had any effect on the EPI indication?

A If -- if they got a -- and they reported a good control roll-out check, then the EPI went below or went to -- to the neutral area at that time, I don't think that -- that anything else was -- was a requirement since they had a good control roll-out check prior to the beginning of this take-off.

Q Okay. Very good, sir. And then, just one last item again of clarification.

During the video showing the walk-around check by the flight engineer, because we had some shots there both -- I think there was at least one from ground level, but some of them appeared to be taken from an apparatus up so that you were actually looking at the trailing position of the elevator, can -- can the flight engineer on the walk-around from the ground, can he readily determine the elevator and tab positions both with the gust lock in and out?

A Yes, I believe so.

Q Okay.

A On the walk-arounds that I've been on, on this and other airplanes, I always step back and -- and take a look at the entire empennage for my own edification and that was part of my walk-around.

Q All right. And you've never experienced difficulty then determining whether you had trailing edge up or --

A No.

Q -- trailing position?

A No.

Q Okay.

A None at all.

MR. STREETER: That's all I have, sir. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Okay. Thank you.

I was remiss in jumping to the parties without finishing the Technical Panel.

So, Mr. Hilldrup, do we have any other comments from the Technical Panel?

MR. HILLDRUP: Yes, sir. Just a couple questions.

BY MR. HILLDRUP:

Q To follow up with Mr. Streeter's question about the walk-around and what you could see, could you characterize what somebody might be able to see at night, which is when we're talking about most of the time? Would it require flashlights or -- or ramp lighting of some kind? Could you characterize what they might see and how difficult that might be?

A The pilots are required to carry flashlights as part of their equipment, and the flashlight is required for walk-around at night, and -- and they should -- the -- the elevator tabs and the elevator and the stabilizer need to be checked at night just the same as in the day time. It may take a little bit more time and a little bit more attention with -- with the view the flashlight it gives you, but it -- it is a requirement that it be accomplished and be accomplished with a flashlight.

Q Just one more question. To follow up on some of the issues about the AD and the Service Bulletin, could you comment at all about what is in the AD for the installation of the EPI? Could you talk about what's in there regarding the operational use of the EPI? Are you familiar with that?

A It -- it -- it described for the operators the use of the EPI, and in that, if I recall correctly, in that first AD, it asks the operators to explain the control roll-out check using the EPI and then further stated that -- which is where we're going back to, that the EPI should go below the neutral zone at that time.

Q And with regard to the 80 knot check, as far as you know, there is no instructional use for -- for the use of the EPI during the 80 knot check in the AD?

A Correct. It was never recommended by either Douglas or Boeing.

Q Right.

MR. HILLDRUP: Thank you. That's all I have, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: All right. Thank you.

Back to the parties now. Well, why don't -- Mr. Streeter from the FAA, anything additional?

MR. STREETER: No.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Okay. And Emery Worldwide, Captain Hagquist.

BY CAPTAIN HAGQUIST:

Q Good morning, Captain Gentile.

A Good morning.

Q I have a few questions for you. The CG conference that you described, the DC-8 CG conference, --

A Yes.

Q -- was Emery present at that?

A Yes, they were.

Q And they participated in that?

A Yes, they were. And I'd like to comment that Emery allowed us the use of their simulator for tests that we ran previous to the conference, and we thank you.

Q You're welcome, sir.

During the course of the investigation, have you become familiar with Emery's operating procedures as they were contained in the DC-8 Aircraft Operating Manual, Volume 1?

A Somewhat.

Q You mentioned that operators did either one or two walk-around checks of the elevator, one with a gust lock engaged, one with it disengaged.

Can you tell us what -- do you remember what Emery's procedure was?

A Yeah. Emery's was a very thorough walk-around procedure with both the gust lock engaged firs and then with the gust lock disengaged and describing the requirements for the gust lock disengaged and -- and engaged for the flight engineer or second officer to check.

Q The situation of being able to tell whether the tabs are symmetrical or asymmetrical on the walk-around check, in the video, it showed fairly clearly that the two tabs we're talking about being symmetrical are on opposite elevators.

A Correct.

Q So, if I look at the left elevator, I expect to see asymmetric tabs with the flight -- with the gust lock removed and the aircraft static, is that correct, sir?

If I look at the control tab and gear tab on -- on the left elevator, will they be symmetrical?

A With the gust lock removed?

Q Yes, sir.

A On the left elevator, no.

Q They will not?

A No.

Q Thank you.

The tabs that I would be interested in looking at to check for the -- the symmetry are going to be the outboard tabs on the left and the right elevator, the inboard tabs on the left and the right elevator, is that correct, sir?

A Correct.

Q In your -- in your video, you can see that the tail cone and the nav tail light assembly protrudes between the two elevators for what appears to be maybe two feet?

A Correct.

Q If I were trying to do that at night with a flashlight, do you suppose that I could get far enough back to be able to illuminate both of those tabs and -- and still have enough light to see an asymmetric situation with those tabs?

A I -- I really would have difficulty, I think, depending on the power of the flashlight and how big a flashlight the second officer's carrying and what the capabilities are of the equipment he's using.

Q Sure.

A It would -- it would require that.

Q All right. Again, on your video presentation of the walk-around, typically as you testified, you've done walk-arounds on a DC-8. Typically, my experience is that the walk-around on a DC-8 is generally conducted sort of within the shadow of the airplane, not getting very far in front of very far behind the airplane. You mentioned that in your walk-arounds, you typically stood back and -- and did that kind of an overall view.

About how far back would you have to go to do that, sir?

A Oh, probably 10 feet.

Q Okay. Again in the video, I know it's been said a number of times already, but the video really didn't depict a flight engineer's walk-around because of the elevation of the camera?

A Correct.

Q About how high above the ground is the elevator?

A Oh, I would guess 30 feet.

Q Thank you, sir.

If we look at the current Flight Operations Bulletin, the June 2001 bulletin, in your testimony, you stated a number of times that that's a reinforcement, a reiteration or restatement of guidance that Boeing Douglas had put out earlier.

A Correct.

Q But in your presentation, you pointed out what I -- what I felt were two rather great differences in those two presentations. My recollection is that the Letter 53-A was the letter that was current at the time of the accident.

A I believe that's correct.

Q That would have been the May of 1977 letter. The two differences that you spoke to and that I'd like to bring to everyone's attention again is that until the 2001 letter, there was never any guidance to the operator that the needle of the EPI would go below the white band that I'm aware of.

A Okay. In the -- in the original letter, when the EPI was installed in that -- and I think that number is 254 rather than 264, in the original letter, it did in fact talk about the control roll-out going below the -- the neutral. After that, in -- in later letters, it only spoke to going to the neutral zone.

Q All right, sir. Can you tell us what the range of that neutral zone is? What -- what does the white band depict?

A It's about a 5-degree -- it's about a 5-degree range in -- in the neutral area.

Q Hm-hmm. And does it go from zero to minus five or zero to plus five?

A I don't recall.

Q All right, sir. In 2-Q, in the exhibit, there is a graphic of the EPI. It's on Page 1.

A Right. It's zero to five.

Q Five up?

A Yeah.

Q Okay. Thank you.

Is that -- is that graphic indicative of the size of that indicator?

A No. The indicator is one inch.

Q If we -- if we took that one inch and said it's the size of something that we can all relate to relatively quickly, is it -- can I use a quarter?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Thanks.

You had two different airplanes depicted in your presentation. The airplane that was depicted in the still photos, that appeared to be a sister ship of 79 Uniform.

A Correct.

Q And I noticed the EPI in that airplane was located below the flap indicator.

A That's correct.

Q If you were sitting in the first officer's seat on an airplane configured as 79 Uniform was configured, where would that EPI have been in relation to your -- your line of sight?

A It would be off to the left and down.

Q How far down would it be, do you think?

A Well, it's down on the skirt above the panel, just above the skirt of the panel.

Q Basically say knee-level?

A Well, --

Q When you're sitting, it's down about your -- about your left knee?

A Correct.

Q Sure. Okay. In the -- in the design of the -- of the elevator position indicator, which is what the EPI stands for, if I'm not mistaken, --

A Correct.

Q -- does it -- was it ever in the design that this was going to give any indication of where the tabs were?

A No. No, it never was.

Q And when you read the guidance that was developed by Douglas at the time that first recommended and then through an AD, an FAA AD, mandated the installation of the EPI, I always see that the EPI was developed to address the situation of a jammed elevator.

A Correct.

Q And maybe I'm not on track here, but to my mind, a jammed elevator means one that will not move. Is that a fair assessment of what a jammed elevator is?

A I -- I think, you know, the term "jammed" means that, but it also -- there could also be restrictions to the movement of the elevator.

Q All right. That was going to be my point. Was in -- in the case of 79 Uniform, was the elevator jammed or was the elevator restricted from full motion in both directions?

A On the accident aircraft?

Q Yes, sir.

A It -- it -- the elevator was free to move.

Q Okay. A lot of discussion on the 80 knot check. Boeing, when they came out with the check, advised that the check should be done between 60 and 80 knots, if I'm not mistaken.

A Correct.

Q You and I and other people that operate -- have operated the DC-8 always call it an 80 knot check.

Are you aware of operators -- you said you knew that some freight operators, of course, were still using this check. Do you know any operators that are doing it at 60 knots?

A Well, I -- I've never really looked at -- at all the operators, and so I'm not aware at the speeds. We still recommend at the end that it be over at 80 knots.

Q Would -- would Boeing or Douglas have had any technical objection to an operator moving the speed of that check to a minimum of 80 knots and a maximum of a hundred knots?

A I think had we been requested, we -- we would probably have had a technical objection because it was not something that I think that can go beyond the 80 knots. It -- it gets -- it gets pretty -- it gets pretty quick up in those areas, especially if somebody is questioning whether -- what it feels like, although, you know, we would acknowledge that you get better response between 80 and a hundred than you would between 60 and 80.

Q I certainly would agree with you that those first few seconds of the take-off roll, the crew is tasked with -- with -- heavily tasked.

At what -- at what speed does Boeing still recommend that take-off thrust be set and stabilized on the take-off roll?

A At 80 knots.

Q So, in your description of all the activity that's going on in the cockpit, a lot of which was driven towards management of the engines, at 80 knots, those tasks should go away?

A Correct.

Q All right. I noticed that as far as exhibits that you were tasked with, and I know this has been a fluid situation in this -- in this hearing, but you were tasked with observing -- with reviewing some of the print-outs from the digital flight data recorder?

A Correct.

Q Can you go to the -- to the data from that and identify both the control roll-out checks and the 80 knot check? Would you be comfortable in doing that?

A I'll need to find that. Could you identify the exhibit, please?

Q I can -- I can steer you to them, if you would like. The first exhibit would be Exhibit 10-F, and it would be Page 2, sir.

A I don't have a 10-F. I have a 10-E. Thank you. What page, please?

Q If you go to Page 2, sir.

A Hm-hmm.

Q And you're familiar with this tabular kind -- this -- this type of tabular read-out?

A Yeah. Actually, I was not tasked with this, but -- but I -- I did have it in -- in a linear read-out, but we'll work through it.

Q The very first column on the left-hand side is Pacific Standard Time.

A Okay.

Q All right. If we come down that column into the time frame of about 19:42:29, --

A Okay.

Q -- and we begin to read left to right, we're going to go through a number of columns, one of which is CCP, and I believe that's control column position.

A Okay.

Q If you'll notice, starting at about 19:42:29, I noticed the control column position in fact goes from a minus 17 to a minus 3.9 and then comes back up.

A Okay.

Q The far right-hand column is the elevator position in degrees. In that same time, the elevator position in fact does show a range there, but it gets into the 2.8 and 3.8 range.

A Correct.

Q Would that be in the white band, sir?

A It could be in the white band because you've got a 5-degree range. Sure.

Q And again going back to Letter 53-A, that would have been an acceptable control roll-out check under the existing guidance?

A Correct.

Q All right. The 80 knot check that most operators do, --

A Hm-hmm.

Q -- that involves pushing the stick forward as one of the checks to see if the nose will in fact go down.

Could you put a quantitative number on how far the nose can go down and the airplane's still solidly on the ground?

A No.

Q Can't go down very far, though, can it?

A No.

Q Okay. If we go to Exhibit 10-J, sir, -- do you have it, sir?

A Hm-hmm.

Q The -- the handwritten page number would be Page 1, the typed page number is II-9.

A Okay.

Q This would be the 80 knot check on the accident flight. If we look again in the far left-hand column at time 19:48:50, and we go three columns to the right, we have pitch attitude in degrees. You'll notice that the pitch in that particular -- from there to the next plot, which is at 19:48:51, the pitch went from a positive .2 degrees to a negative .6 degrees.

A Correct.

Q That's a nose-down pitch?

A Correct.

Q Is that a pitch that, in your experience on the airplane, that would be noticeable to the crew?

A Yes.

Q Would that be an acceptable 80 knot check if -- if an operator required an 80 knot check?

A Yes.

Q Okay. In the case of the accident flight, sir, where the determination is made that the control tab was disconnected, would the crew have had any indication in this particular take-off, either during the control roll-out check or the 80 knot check, that something was wrong?

A I don't --

Q Simply using the EPI now.

A Using the EPI, I don't believe so. If -- when the controls hit the control tab stops and they moved the elevator, the EPI moved.

Q Thank you, sir.

CAPTAIN HAGQUIST: I have nothing more.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Okay. Thank you, Captain Hagquist.

Airline Pilots Association?

MR. GUNTHER: Thank you, Member Goglia.

Todd Gunther from the Airline Pilots Association.

BY MR. GUNTHER:

Q Captain Gentile, if your associate, Mr. Steelhammer, could go ahead and bring up that slide show for me again, I would appreciate it.

A Okay. The request is that we go back to the slide show?

Q Yeah. If you could go ahead and bring up Slide Number 8 for me, please?

Okay. Previously, during your testimony, you were talking about the position of the EPI, and I do realize that the video tape that Boeing provided was for demonstration purposes only for -- so that the folks here in the room and the Technical Panel would be able to go ahead and see the exact movements of the EPI and how it worked.

A Correct.

Q The one that you currently are showing is a sister ship to the accident aircraft, is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. The wheel that we see on the right side in the panel is the first officer's position, is that correct?

A That is the first officer's position.

Q Okay. The captain, of course, would be sitting to the left side of the center quadrant which has the thrust levers, the FMS, etc., over there.

Do you know whether or not that that gauge would be fairly visible from that position where it's located right now?

A Yeah. It would take the captain actually leaning to the right to -- to visualize that gauge from his seat.

Q Okay. And Boeing, which used to be Douglas, the previous recommendations for use of the EPI, you said the EPI was used for control roll-out check only, it's not for the 80 knot check, is that correct?

A That's correct.

MR. GUNTHER: Okay. Could I go ahead and have you go to the next slide, Bill, please?

BY MR. GUNTHER:

Q You'll notice that it's labeled one inch in diameter, and the rub mark that you see just to the left over there is basically a lot of times where pilots and crews will put their feet. You can go ahead and put your feet up there at that point. So, it's very low down on the panel. As we heard before, it's down near the knee of -- of the first officer.

If you take a look at where that's at, if the first officer sitting, it's very difficult for them to see that gauge if they're manipulating the controls during the take-off roll.

Would you agree with that?

A That's -- that's correct. It was never intended to be used for take-off motion.

Q Okay. And in this instance, Mr. Hilldrup, the investigator-in-charge, stated that during his initial statement, that the first officer was the flying pilot, is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. If you could go ahead -- and I don't know if you have your exhibits up there, but if you could look at Exhibit 2-I for me? It's handwritten Page Number 17, and do you have it, Captain Gentile?

A Yes, I do.

Q Okay. Could you go ahead and read the last paragraph for me?

A The last paragraph?

Q Yes, please.

A "Between" -- it starts with the word "Between 80 and a hundred knots, the pilot flying shall exert a forward pressure on the elevator to the stop and then release the yoke to slightly forward of neutral. The crew should confirm a nose-down response. Depending on weight and loading, the pilot flying may need to apply the nose-down elevator more than once to get a satisfactory response. Once the check is complete, the flying pilot, the pilot flying, should state elevator checks. The first officer looks for the EPI to respond to yoke movement when the elevator check is made. The captain must know the elevator's working properly early in a take-off. If he is in doubt, he should consider aborting the take-off."

Q Okay. And can you tell me what manual that page you're reading came out of?

A It came out of the DC-8 Aircraft Operating Manual for Emery Worldwide.

Q Okay. Can you go to the next page for me, please? There's a table that's labeled 2-3-1.

A Correct.

Q Okay. And under "Pilot Non-Flying", if you go down to the column that says, "At 80 knots indicated airspeed", K-I-A-S, in the left-hand column, --

A Right.

Q Okay. Could you read what the first officer is supposed to be doing, which is right next to the PNF? It'll say "F/O" on the top of the column which is first officer.

A Okay. It says, "Watch the EPI during the elevator check."

Q Then I believe the Douglas in the recommendation, did you not say that that EPI is set up for the roll-out check only and is not for checking during the 80 knot check?

A That's correct. It was developed for -- for control roll-out checks to check the freedom of the elevator.

Q Okay. I have sitting on my table, I've got three DC-8 qualified crew members here. Myself, I'm a pilot. Captain Gentile's a pilot who's also flown a DC-8.

I'd like to ask, Captain Gentile, would you find it difficult if you were the flying pilot sitting in the first officer's position to look at that EPI while you're steering the aircraft down the runway for take-off using those procedures?

A That -- that was a procedure never recommended by Boeing because of the distraction to the crew. On this aircraft, it might be more difficult to view that instrument because of the location. On others, the location is in different -- different positions but still not recommended for anything but static-type control roll-out checks.

Q Okay. The other thing I'd like to ask you, also, the non-flying pilot, his call-out is 80 knots. Where would he be referencing that from in this case, the captain?

A Captain's air speed indicator.

Q And where would that be located on this particular configuration of the aircraft?

A It'd be on the -- on the left side of the -- of the captain's panel and would not be in this picture.

Q Okay. So, that would be off the left side, so the EPI would be located approximately how many feet from the area that he would be looking at at that time?

A Halfway across the cockpit, however long that is.

Q Okay. Where does EPI physically pick up its information? Do you know where it's attached to, where it's feeding off of?

A No, I really don't have that -- I really don't have that information.

Q Now, you've flown the 8 before, and you'll normally get a nose-dip. If you were to forward CG, would you get as pronounced a dip as you would normally? Do you know if it would be visible if you were forward CG at the 80 knot check?

A At a forward CG, would you get a -- as pronounced as you would with an aft CG?

Q Yes.

A Probably not as pronounced, but there always is room in the nose gear to -- to move.

Q How's the EPI calibrated?

A Other than what the gauge shows, I'm not -- I'm not aware of how the EPI is calibrated.

Q So, you're not aware if there's any follow-on calibration of that after installation?

A No, I'm not.

Q Is the scale on the EPI graduated at all?

A From the -- graduated in -- in what --

Q Are there any other indications, other than up, down and neutral?

A No, not -- not on the -- not on the indicator.

Q Would it be possible for the EPI, for installations on different aircraft, to give different readings for the same control column movement in normal service?

A I think -- I think it would be, based on the wind conditions and the stretch of the cable and -- and all for the same control column movements, conditions would differ.

Q Okay. One of the other things that you talked about was the walk-around. Some operators do a single walk-around and others do twice walk-arounds.

Could you expand on that a little bit?

A The -- the flight engineer for most of the airlines are tasked to do a walk-around prior to entering the cockpit to check the general condition of the airplane, especially the elevator, and then after their procedures, in preparing the cockpit to release the gust locks and do a second walk-around to specifically check the flight controls but that's generally when a more thorough walk-around is done, also, for the rest of the aircraft.

Q Have you ever known nose gear servicing to affect the indication of the dip during the 80 knot check? In other words, under-servicing or over-servicing of the nose gear?

A I haven't been involved in maintenance. I do know that different loads and different -- different nose gears react differently as during taxi.

MR. GUNTHER: No further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Gentile.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Thank you, Mr. Gunther, and Tennessee Technical Services, Mr. Hoffstetter?

MR. HOFFSTETTER: Yes.

BY MR. HOFFSTETTER:

Q Could you go through one more time when you talk about pushing forward on the yoke, the -- which position is that? What are we achieving when we do the 80 knot check or the elevator position check? We push forward. That's going to a --

A That's going to a nose-down condition checking the ability of the elevator to be -- to be free.

Q Would there normally be an abort response if you didn't get a positive 80 knot check? Is -- is -- we know what the normal response is from -- from everybody.

Is there a different response if you don't get an acceptable 80 knot check?

A I would assume that most carriers would have it in their instructions to consider aborting as did -- as did Emery on an unsatisfactory 80 knot check.

Q When you -- when the engineer that would first approach the aircraft and look at the tabs with the gust lock on, if the tabs were not in a faired position, he would consider that reason to contact maintenance or -- or write some discrepancy. Is that -- is that your understanding?

A That -- that is my understanding. That would be an unsatisfactory condition.

MR. HOFFSTETTER: That's all I have. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Thank you, Mr. Hoffstetter.

And finally, the Boeing Company, Mr. Breuhaus?

MR. BREUHAUS: Thank you.

BY MR. BREUHAUS:

Q Just to go back for a further point of clarification on the point of view, if you will, on the video, two things, and you might check with Bill on this.

Did the video show both point of view from the flight engineer vantage point, i.e. on the ground, as well as the elevated view?

A Yes. The response is yes, both -- both views were --

Q And perhaps --

A It was done in that fashion, just as an education.

Q And perhaps you could go to, I believe it is, Slide 5?

A Is my company supposed to be asking me questions? Is that allowed?

Q Are -- are the upper -- are these all points of view from a person standing on the ground?

A The photographer says yes.

Q Yes. So, -- so, just for clarification, here are -- here are viewpoints from a person stationed on the ground looking up, is that correct?

A That is correct.

MR. BREUHAUS: Thank you. No more questions.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Okay. To the Board of Inquiry and then Mr. DeLisi.

MR. STREETER: Thank you.

BY MR. DeLISI:

Q Good morning. Captain Gentile, the gust lock, can you describe where in the cockpit the control for that device is?

A It is mounted on the co-pilot side of the cockpit, and it is adjacent to his left knee, and it would be close to the center console. When the gust lock is on, it is down, and when it is off and released, it is in the up with a big yellow handle on it.

Q In the DC-8 fleet history, are you aware of any incidents in which an operator attempted to start their take-off roll with the gust lock still engaged?

A I am aware that there was a partial engagement of a gust lock years ago and which created an abort.

Q It became immediately apparent to the flight crew during roll-out perhaps that there was a jam?

A Correct.

Q A couple of questions about the EPI. The gauge itself has a slash mark with the word "up", a slash mark with the word "down".

What do those slashes indicate?

A That the elevator is in the nose-up or the nose-down position.

Q Is that intended to be the limit of nose-up and nose-down travel?

A It is. It is the limit that -- that they could possibly travel.

Q Because during the video of some of the ground tests, it appeared as if the indicator was beyond the extent of the slash marks for up and down, for up, is that possible?

A If -- if it were -- as it was, it looked like it got to the full-up position, but it could be, depending on the rigging of the EPI gauge and the elevator.

Q Is it -- I know there is not a procedure now for the EPI to be an instrument used in flight, but is it possible that the EPI could be referenced by a flight crew in the air?

A I don't know to what extent it would be of value to the flight crew, but I believe it can always look down and be possible.

Q I guess I -- I'd like your opinion if you think that the response of a flight crew may be different if they understand that the problem they're encountering in flight is a restriction in the flight controls versus a shift of their CG.

A If -- if they could understand the difference, I -- and we are studying that at this time, we think that the maneuvers that we are developing for an escape maneuver, that pilots' reaction would probably be close to the same.

Q Okay. One final line of questioning. The Service Bulletin that came out in 1975 for the installation of the EPI, can you again characterize what the operator's response was to that Service Bulletin?

A There was some resistance in 1975 to the incorporation of that Service Bulletin. I believe only a few of the operators made the installations early on.

Q And then, you talked about a 1977 RTO accident that involved a jammed elevator. Do you recall which operator that was?

A I believe that was Philippine Airlines.

Q Do you have any idea whether they had installed an EPI prior to their accident?

A No, I do not.

Q The -- the FAA then in 1978 mandated the installation of the EPI.

Had Douglas previously lobbied the FAA for mandating that installation after the '75 Service Bulletin?

A I'm not aware of any lobbying efforts back in 1978, but I do know in '77, that we did publish a second AOL, Number 264, in which we were encouraging the operators to in fact install the EPI gauge.

Q And finally, do you believe that the 1977 accident spurred the industry response, including the FAA, in mandating the EPI?

A In -- in the search going back, it would -- based on the dates and times, it would indicate that.

MR. DeLISI: Thank you. No -- no further questions.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Okay. Dr. Kushner?

DR. KUSHNER: Thank you.

BY DR. KUSHNER:

Q Just curious. When a pilot believes he has a CG problem, is there a procedure that he can follow to determine if it's that or something else?

A No, there is not.

Q So, there's no way for him to really --

A There probably isn't time.

DR. KUSHNER: Okay. Everything else has been covered.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Okay. I have no questions.

Mr. Hilldrup, any follow-on questions for this witness? To the parties, does anybody have a clarification or follow-on?

MR. STREETER: Member Goglia, with your permission and with Captain Gentile's permission, I -- I believe he mentioned that he was on the CFR Group. I know the CVR transcript is not one of the exhibits for him, but if it's acceptable, I'd like to ask one question.

Have you read the transcript?

THE WITNESS: I was in the hearing.

MR. STREETER: I can affirm two pages specifically.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Would you like -- Captain Gentile, would you like some time to refresh your memory? Because it's lunch time. Why don't we do that? Why don't we break for lunch and come back at -- at 1:30?

THE WITNESS: I can digest lunch better if we finish now.

MR. STREETER: Well, this will be a simple one, sir.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Okay. Try.

BY MR. STREETER:

Q Okay, sir. Captain Gentile, if you could look, first of all, at Page 9 of the transcript? The question will actually come two pages later, but I believe Page 9, I need to know if it's related. About mid-page there, 19:24:48, --

A I'm sorry, I still don't have it.

Q Still don't have it. I'm sorry, sir. Hold on.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: It's not that simple.

THE WITNESS: Okay. Page 9 of 66.

BY MR. STREETER:

Q Page 9 of 66, --

A Correct.

Q -- time 19:24:48, you can see a discussion starts there on the stabilizer trim setting, and what was that stab at 1.9, 1.6, and then you hear the stabilizer in motion.

For the rest of that page, the next page, Page 10, it appears that it's just routine conversation, and then when we reach Page 11, at 19:25:51 or about one minute after the stabilizer trim was set, there's the statement, "Something's not right. It appears -- I swear, must be mistaken, unintelligible, and finally swap positions here."

My question is, whether or not you recall this, and whether or not the CVR Group -- understanding that a transcript is rather dry, was the CVR Group able to determine what the crew was talking about during that period where they said "something's not right"?

A No. We paid a lot of attention in this area and were not able to determine who made the statements and what -- what the discussion was about or even if it was a crew member at that point.

MR. STREETER: Okay. That's all I need. Thank you, sir.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Okay. Does that open up any other thoughts or questions from any of the parties?

(No response)

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Okay. Captain Gentile, this concludes this portion of your testimony. I am not releasing you nor will I release any of the other witnesses at this time. So, I request that you stick around and enjoy the proceedings.

THE WITNESS: If I may, I'd like on behalf of Boeing and myself to offer my condolences to the members of the -- family members of the crew who in our estimation did a professional job, and also thank the Chairman and the NTSB for allowing us to participate in not only this hearing but in other activities that Boeing participates in.

Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, the witness was excused.)

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Okay. We also share those feelings, and I would like to acknowledge before we break for lunch that we have two former Board Members present, Dr. John Lauver, and I saw the former Vice Chairman Robert Francis, and I would like to welcome them here today.

With that, we will break for lunch until 1:30, and I get to bang my gavel.

(Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene this same day, Thursday, May 9th, 2002, at 1:30 p.m.)

A F T E R N O O N S E S S I O N

1:39 p.m.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Okay. We can go back on the record now, and Mr. Hilldrup, will you call your next witness, please?

MR. HILLDRUP: Yes, sir. The next witness is Captain Hagquist from Emery Worldwide Airlines.

Whereupon,

CAPTAIN RICHARD HAGQUIST

having been first duly sworn, was called as a witness herein and was examined and testified as follows:

MR. HILLDRUP: Please be seated.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. HILLDRUP:

Q Captain Hagquist, would you give us your full name and address, current employer and title, please?

A I would, sir, but if I could just take a moment before we begin.

I would like to express my personal condolences and those of Emery Worldwide Airlines to the families and our appreciation to the NTSB for the opportunity to participate in the investigation and these proceedings.

My name is Richard Hagquist. I am the Director of Flight Operations for Emery Worldwide Airlines, 1 Emery Plaza, Vandalia, Ohio 45477.

My background. I'm an airline transport-rated pilot. I have -- I'm type rated on 11 different aircraft, including the DC-8, certified flight instructor, ground instructor, flight engineer.

Emery is the fourth airline that I've worked for that operates the DC-8 airplanes. I've got approximately 14,000 hours total time with about 4,000 hours of that in DC-8. Also for a great part of my career in the DC-8, I was also a check airman and instructor, and I do have nearly the same amount of time, 4,000 hours, of simulator time for the DC-8.

Q Thank you very much.

MR. HILLDRUP: Mr. Chairman, Captain Egge will be questioning Captain Hagquist.

BY MR. EGGE:

Q Okay. Good afternoon, Captain Hagquist.

I'd like to thank you very much for your participation in these proceedings.

I'd like to discuss Emery Worldwide Airlines' DC-8 elevator-operating and checking procedures that were in existence up to and at the time of the accident and also any changes that have been made since that time. Let me start with the elevator-checking procedures on the DC-8 that existed at the time of the accident.

Could you begin with the pre-flight inspection? I know we've -- we've talked about that a bit this morning and from Boeing's perspective, but from Emery's perspective and -- and basically what you're training the pilots and -- and what Emery's procedures are, if we could start with the pre-flight inspection, and if you could describe that for us, please?

A The pre-flight was accomplished by the flight engineer and second officer. It was done in two phases. The first phase was called the initial pre-flight and that involved the flight engineer making certain that the area around the airplane was clear. He did a preliminary cockpit check. The gust lock at this point is engaged. He notes that the elevator and stabilizer and tabs are all faired or in trail. He goes through a few procedures in the airplane and then goes back outside and does a more detailed walk-around inspection.

At this point, the gust lock is released and our guidance to the -- to the crews was exactly as Captain Gentile described. We gave them the same criteria for the elevator and tabs with the gust lock removed in a balanced position, balanced condition.

Q I'd like to refer to Exhibit 2-I, Page 4. This is an excerpt from Emery Worldwide Airlines Normal Operations, Volume 1, DC-8 Aircraft Operating Manual. At the top of the page is Initial Pilot Station Pre-Flight.

First of all, is the flight engineer the one who is actually doing this -- this pre-flight, this part of the check?

A Yes, sir.

Q Okay. We talked about this a little bit this morning as well, but with -- with the gust lock on, according to Emery's procedures, what -- what indications should there be on the EPI?

A The EPI will be somewhere in the neutral range, in the white band.

Q Okay. And is this a part of Emery's procedures to check that as a part of this pre-flight inspection?

A No, sir, I don't believe so. I believe this part of the inspection, the grading criteria was the actual position of the tabs and elevator in relation to the stabilizer on his initial walk-around.

Q Okay. On the same page at the bottom, where it states, "Gust lock off", when the flight engineer does the exterior pre-flight, is -- is this statement

-- is this something that the -- I believe this is the first officer now or -- or correct me, or is this the flight engineer doing this at this point with the gust lock off?

A The flight engineer does the pre-flight.

Q Okay. So, that's part of this. So, he would be releasing the gust lock at this point?

A Yes.

Q Okay. On Page 7, the same exhibit, 2-I, about two-thirds of the way down the page, after Position B, where it starts, "Left-hand and right-hand elevators tab alignment and condition", hypothetical case, what if both of the control tabs were up, looking at this, but one was up more than the other? Would that be acceptable during the pre-flight?

A In your hypothetical, I would have to tell you that it would be extremely difficult to see any amount of symmetry between those two tabs in my opinion. We do, I believe, in another one of our documents, and I'd have to do a little research to get back on that one, but I believe we do talk to some -- some symmetry.

Q You talk about symmetry between control tabs, left and right elevator?

A That's right. It would be not in this particular volume but in the volume that's the Systems Description Manual. I believe we had some language that did talk to that.

Q Okay. How about the geared tabs? Is that the same? Is there anything in here on -- about symmetry about that?

A Not in this document, no.

Q Okay. Is there any difference between doing a pre-flight inspection whenever it's -- like an -- we refer to it as an originating flight as opposed to a through flight?

A We did have -- we did have an abbreviated checklist for through flights.

Q Okay. On the accident flight, we had the flight engineer come in from Reno, stayed with the airplane and then departed.

Is that considered a through flight, then?

A Well, actually, if there was a crew change, I would expect that they did an originating check, but regardless of which one of the checks they did, either the through flight or the originating flight, the requirement for a walk-around exists in both.

Q It's the same? Is it the same?

A It is. Yes, that walk-around's required.

Q Okay. I believe you touched on it a little bit earlier actually in your questioning, but could you describe how easy or difficult it would be for the flight engineer to -- to see the elevator and the tabs and so on during the pre-flight at night?

A Well, you can certainly see them. My point in the questioning was that where you're making a comparison from one tab to the other, that they're not side-by-side. There -- there's -- in the case of the tabs in question, the control tabs, the tail cone of the airplane is between the two. So, you're going to have to make a judgment of symmetry that's very difficult in my opinion to make.

Q Are you familiar with the ramp layout and so on at Mather Field near Sacramento and where the airplane was parked that night?

A Only -- only on diagram, sir. I'm not --

Q Okay.

A -- familiar with the physical layout, no.

Q Okay. That's fine. And I'm not sure if we brought it out earlier, but is it Emery's procedure after the flight engineer does the walk-around to go back into the cockpit and then reengage the gust lock?

A Typically, that's what he would do, yes.

Q Okay. On the after-start checklist, there's a gust lock off, and who actually does that at that point? Who disengages the gust lock?

A The first officer.

Q Okay. And -- and then, whenever it says gust lock off, is -- is the first officer actually disengaging it at that point or is he just verifying that it's off?

A No. The first officer will manually move the gust lock lever.

Q Okay. The next check after doing the initial walk-around and so on as the airplane taxis out, and we've covered some of this before again, but I'd like to know just from Emery's procedures and what you're training the pilots and -- and what the Emery procedures are, of course, in doing the -- what's called the roll-out check or the taxi check of the elevator, if you care to, you can refer to Exhibit 2-I, Page 11, where it says, "Controls EPI checked".

A Yes, sir, I have it.

Q Okay. Thank you.

The last sentence under that heading states that "the first officer should call out EPI checks".

First of all, what is Emery's procedure for -- for doing this check?

A It's exactly as it was described by Captain Gentile. You need to check the controls around all three axes. The ailerons are checked, the elevator's checked, and the rudders are checked, and the EPI check that we're discussing here today, the guidance that was provided to the crew was exactly what was in the Boeing Letter 53-A.

What he was looking for on the EPI when he -- when he did the elevator check was he was looking for that needle to come down into the white band.

Q Okay. When the -- excuse me. Where it says, "Controls EPI checked", -- I'm sorry. I think we've already covered that.

If I may then turn to Page 15 in that same exhibit?

A Yes, sir, I have it.

Q Okay. The middle paragraph there, the taxi procedure calls for first pushing the yoke to the forward stop and then followed by the aft stop, and again we've touched on this earlier, but was there any reason for Emery's procedure to be in that sequence?

A No, sir, there wasn't.

Q Okay. And just to be perfectly clear, again we saw in the Boeing presentation the position of the EPI gauge in two different locations.

Again for Emery's DC-8s, the EPI was located where?

A It was below the flap indicator. In a sitting -- in a seated position,