SPEECH By His Majesty Michael I, King of Romania to the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies
- London, 26 March 1997 -

Your Royal Highness,
Mr. Chairman,
My Lords,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

During my long period of exile - which happily came to an end recently - the United Kingdom was to me and my family almost a second home. Today, I cannot begin this speech without expressing my heartfelt thanks to your Sovereign and all her people, to all those who helped us during that horrible period, and to the small but active Romanian community in this country who have fought to maintain the hope of democracy in Romania throughout the decades. A country like Romania needs now to look to the future, but I hope that you will permit me to engage in a few reminiscences which, I think, are relevant to our topic today.

Among my various official visits to this country, two have stuck in my mind. The first such event is when I arrived in 1938 with my father for a state visit. The clouds of the Second World War were already gathering and Romania, as always, was in a difficult situation, sandwiched between a Third Reich which was preparing to devour the continent, and Stalin's Soviet Union, which was getting ready to share in the spoils. Perhaps we were naive, but we did hope for British assistance, and for the revival of the League of Nations. We got all the diplomatic assurances from the government, including security guarantees which, as we subsequently learnt, were never meant to be used. Less than three years after that visit, Romania was predictably carved up between the two dictators. Another memorable visit to London was in 1947, at the wedding of Princess Elizabeth, your Sovereign. Yet again, I tried to talk to Britain's politicians about the fate of my country. And yet again, I got nice expressions of solidarity but, otherwise, a deafening silence. Although I knew in the autumn of 1947 that Romania's democracy and independence were already lost causes, I decided to reject any offers of asylum and returned to my country, to be with my people for as long as possible. It took the communist rulers not more than one month to abolish the Monarchy and complete their seizure of power.

The past, as they say, is history. I bear no ill feeling towards the various Western governments of that time, and I am accusing nobody. Britain was clearly in no position to help us at the start of the Second World War, and even less able to help us thereafter. Nor do I believe that it is up to the West to come to Romania's assistance at all times. The communist dictatorship was ultimately pulled down by our own people, as the West watched in amazement. The price for the economic changes now undertaken will have to be borne by ourselves, first and foremost. And the process of our European integration must and will start with us, with reforms that are necessary for our own existence. But I think you will agree with me that if we do not learn from history, we are condemned to repeating it. My lessons from the major tragedies of my country, all of which I have witnessed, are two-fold. First, that Romania's security will not come through military guarantees offered in haste and then studiously avoided at leisure. Secondly, that any calamity which may come down upon Romania will, in the end, affect an entire continent.

Put simply:
Romania's security is inseparable from that of the rest of Europe, and the solution lies in exactly the same institutions and structures which now ensure stability throughout this continent.

Ladies and Gentlemen,
I know that many leaders have addressed this audience from the same platform, and usually with a similar message. Every nation claims to be unique; everyone assumes that they have a right to a special hearing and a status of supreme importance. It may surprise you, therefore, to discover that I have come here today to demand nothing which I do not believe is ours already. I do not expect a reaffirmation of Romania's European identity, because I believe that this is self-evident. Nor am I begging for Romania's admission into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I would like, however, to tell you today that my country's membership in NATO is a necessity not only for the stability of Romania and its neighbours but, for your security as well. I hope you will permit me to be as blunt as possible; I know that the British admire diplomacy, but also prefer straight talk.

The process of NATO's enlargement has not been undertaken as an exercise in Western charity towards the poor Central Europeans, or as an attempt to pay for previous mistakes. No durable strategic policy can ultimately be built on such emotional arguments. In reality, the process of NATO's enlargement is a highly complex attempt to reform Europe's security policies, to make them relevant for the continent we have today. I completely disagree with those who suggest that, faced with the inevitable difficulties, we should postpone this attempt for a bit longer. We have already postponed providing answers for Central Europe's security for a long time. Does anyone assume that if, for instance, Poland was independent at the end of the Second World War it would have been kept outside these structures? And can anyone seriously argue that, in order not to create new division lines in Europe we should keep the old divisions going? The choice is not between accepting the Central Europeans or rejecting their application for membership but, rather, between having a NATO which meets Europe's current security problems or an Alliance that remains frozen in the days of the Cold War and which ultimately is consigned to the dustbin of history, just as the Iron Curtain was. The options facing us are between an enlargement that actually strengthens the Alliance, and one which is truncated, and therefore raises more problems than it seeks to solve. I believe that an enlargement that does not include Romania in the first wave will be precisely that missed opportunity, for you, as well as for us.

After Poland, my country is the second largest state in Central Europe, both in terms of size, population and military capabilities. Once prosperity returns - as it surely will - it could become a powerhouse in that part of the continent, in the same way as it was one of the most prosperous Central European states earlier this century. We are not newcomers to this world: independent Romania is actually older than many other European states. And, finally, we did not discover democracy yesterday: my country's parliamentary system was the last one to collapse in Central Europe before the Second World War. All our neighbours further South are experiencing immense difficulties; some of them are actually embroiled in a war. But there has been no sustained violence in Romania since the collapse of the communist dictatorship and last year, in a democratic and peaceful elections, my people changed the government. A radical economic reform plan was adopted by parliament recently and, although we all know that matters will get worse before they become better, a coherent strategy for the rebirth of my country is now finally in place.

Much of the discussion about NATO's enlargement has been dominated by the criteria which states have to meet before they can be considered for membership. So, let me enumerate them one by one. First: democracy. Romania passed this test last November with flying colours. True, much more needs to be done, but improving on democratic institutions is the task of every state and, indeed, is one of the preoccupations for all political parties in this country during the current electoral campaign.

Another condition is civilian control over the military. Again, we have passed this test very well: there is no question that the government is firmly in control of the military and that it is not the military which decides politics in Romania. Again, we need to do more to impose democratic control over the internal security services, and transparency in the operation of our defence budget. But, as anyone who has tried to calculate defence expenditure in many Western countries will know, transparency on such issues is always a question of degree. We have welcomed the assistance given by the Ministry of Defence in this country to the overhaul of our military management procedures, and will implement their recommendations. May I also remind you that Romania is the only former communist state whose defence staff is now commanded by a general educated in this country. Yours efforts, therefore, have been put to good use, and this will continue to be the case.

Third, in admitting new members, NATO also requires that a country should be ready and able to assume all the collective security obligations. We are ready, and most emphatically so: over 90 per cent of our people support NATO membership, and the figures are rising with every opinion poll that is conducted. We also have a large military, perhaps a bloated one that needs a shake-up. But the government has started to reform the military industrial sector with the help of Western defence manufactures, and we are pledged to increase our defence expenditure in the near future, something which I think cannot be said for many of the existing NATO member states.

Probably the most important criterion for membership is the requirement that a member state should enjoy good relations with its neighbors. There is a certain historic irony in this condition, for one of the original reasons for the establishment of the Alliance was precisely to solve problems between its members inside NATO rather than outside the Alliance. Never mind, for NATO is right to demand that the process should be reversed now; as was often said from this very platform, you must not import new problems, together with new members. But on this issue as well, Romania now scores very well.

A few years ago it seemed that relations between the majority of our population and our Hungarian minority could only get worse. There was the potential for clashes in Transylvania, and the government of that day relied for its parliamentary support on a strange collection of former communists, turned into fervent nationalists. But a new friendship treaty has been signed between Romania and Hungary. It includes everything the West expected and, more importantly, everything the two countries need. Ethnic problems do not have instant solutions. But we have made a durable start, and this was more than just declarations. The border between our states is now guaranteed by both of us. Specific rights are guaranteed to the minorities in our country. And, crucially, both states have moved fast to consolidate these gains. The government in Bucharest now includes the Hungarian party in its coalition. The extreme nationalists in my country can now see that a Romanian citizen of Hungarian descent can be a good and loyal government minister. And an extreme nationalist in Hungary has concrete evidence that we mean what we say. I know that there are people in the West who believe that this honeymoon cannot last. But is anyone suggesting that there is another way apart from negotiations and compromise? I wish to congratulate from this platform the Hungarian government for its positive attitude, and for the very determined way by which they supported Romania's efforts. Delicate negotiations are continuing, and some differences remain. But the ice has not only been broken: it has melted completely!

I wish I could be equally positive about our relations with Ukraine, and I must admit, quite frankly, that I was taken aback by the negative position adopted by the Ukrainian foreign minister in Brussels last week. So, I hope you will allow me to be frank in what I have to say about this relationship. An independent and prosperous Ukraine is a vital interest for Romania, much more than it is for any other European country. We border on Ukrainian territory and will always be affected by whatever happens in that state. Both Ukraine and Romania are victims of cruel historic injustices, and territorial changes imposed by force. Our government has offered Ukraine many opportunities for a new basic treaty, and is ready for international mediation about any disputes which may exist over the territorial sea and continental shelf. These offers have been made honestly, and at some considerable political cost for the government in Romania. I am sure that we will be able to conclude an agreement. But ask yourselves today the following. What will make such a treaty with Ukraine more likely: Romania's entry into Alliance, or Romania's exclusion from NATO?

Ladies and Gentlemen,
I hope that I have not painted too rosy a picture. We do have many problems in Romania, and will encounter even more in the years to come. The problem for the entire continent is rather different however. If we are all pledged to solving these problems together, the task will be easier with Romania inside NATO, rather than outside it. I do not agree with those in my country who suggest that if our application is refused this time, we will start creating problems in our region. No - we need stability and good relations for our own sake, not in order to impress the West with our good behaviour. The problem is that, almost regardless of how moderate and understanding the government in Bucharest is, certain consequences follow from any exclusion, and they are outside the control of most politicians. The treaty with Ukraine is one such consequence, as I have tried to hint before. The same could apply to our relationship with Hungary as well. It is obvious that countries which are included in NATO will also offer better investment opportunities than those who are outside. Hungary is already richer than us, and the gap may widen further. Given these circumstances, it is not inconceivable that ethnic problems may be rekindled in our country. I am convinced that Hungary will be a loyal member in NATO: the government in Budapest has given plenty of evidence of its maturity and responsibility. But if any difficulty does arise in the future, it is possible that a Hungarian government would be under pressure from its own public opinion to urge NATO to intervene in such a conflict. I have often heard it said that to include Romania and Hungary into the Alliance will paralyse the Alliance from within. NO, Ladies and Gentlemen! To include one country but exclude another is the surest guarantee of unending trouble. The issue of the Hungarian minority in Romania and the much smaller Romanian minority in Hungary will always be there. But, safely within the Alliance, the issue will be permanently defused: both countries have an interest in a NATO that is effective, for their security interests are ultimately very similar. It is the policy of exclusion which creates trouble, not the strategy of inclusion!

And, since we are on the subject of inclusion strategies, please allow me to extend the discussion to Romania's other neighbours, beyond those who have a common border with us. No Romanian government can forget the long and very often troubled relationship between us and Russia. But no Romanian government can ignore the fact that, for the first time in our country's existence, we are both at peace with Russia and do not have a joint border with that country. Like the Poles, who have had an equally painful experience, we stand ready to establish good relations with the government in Moscow. The fear that Romania as a NATO member state will somehow push the Alliance into an anti-Russian position is misplaced. Whether we like it or not, we will have to live with the Russians for many centuries to come. The biggest losers in an East-West confrontation are always the Romanians. Thus, far from seeking confrontation or rekindling old historic animosities, we want a relationship based on mutual trust and confidence. But there must be trust on both sides. The time has arrived to ask the authorities in Moscow - who claim that the West is supposedly destabilising the security of Europe with NATO's enlargement - what they are proposing to do for the stability of the continent. I suggest that the Kremlin should start by implementing the treaty which it has signed for the withdrawal of all military formations from Moldova, a treaty whose ratification was one of the original conditions for Russia's admission into the Council of Europe. We want nothing more, but nothing less and I do not think that the West could consider our position as anything but constructive.

I am often surprised by the distinction which is made here between the so-called Central European states and the Balkan countries. There is, no doubt, a geographic distinction. But it is often assumed in the West that this division means something more: while Central Europe is stable and relatively prosperous, the Balkans are a disease which must be contained. It is not for me to comment on developments in other countries, although we all share an anxiety about the current events in Albania and the still tragic situation in the former Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, I am obliged to point out that Romania not only kept out of this violence, but also contributed loyally to every Western attempt to contain the troubles of the region even when, it must be frankly admitted, we did not agree with all the policies. We always had excellent relations with all our Balkan neighbours, yet this did not prevent us from respecting the UN-imposed embargo on Yugoslavia, at a considerable cost to our own economy. We also cherish our close relations with Greece and Turkey; uniquely in the region, we have very warm contacts with both countries and hope to see them both cooperating within the Alliance, as the loyal allies they have always been. But here, yet again, Romania's membership in NATO could actually contribute to the stability of the Balkans a great deal. Everyone in NATO readily admits that the real security threats to Europe are on the continent's peripheries, in the Baltics and the Balkans. But NATO's enlargement, as currently discussed, remains a Central European affair. Without Romania in the Alliance, what exactly will NATO's enlargement be offering the Greeks and the Turks? Another indication that the West is only interested in the security of Central but not Southern Europe? We ought to think carefully about the internal situation in Turkey at the moment, and about the sense of isolation which the Turks now perceive from the rest of Europe. We may yet discover that the ratification of NATO's enlargement could encounter difficulties in the parliament in Ankara, and perhaps Athens as well. If Romania were included in the first wave of enlargement, however, the message to our Greek and Turkish allies would be clear and very acceptable. NATO is not only already engaged in South-Eastern Europe, but is also accepting that it should remain engaged in the region for many years to come. I know that many in the West frankly to not cherish this prospect. But one of the reasons why the relationship between Turkey and Greece has been difficult and has cast such a shadow on the Alliance's southern flank has been precisely because Turkey and Greece were the only NATO members in that part of the continent. With Romania and, perhaps, Slovenia as well inside the Alliance, the discussion will shift to wider security concerns. The Greeks and the Turks need to solve their disputes between themselves. All I can say is that we are proud of their support for Romania's cause, they understood, perhaps, quicker than many others in Europe, that a Romania anchored within the Alliance is in their own interest.

Ladies and Gentlemen,
I know that, by now, you may be asking yourselves why I argue so strongly for Romania's membership in NATO. After all, our claim to membership has not been denied by any state and, according to the official position from Brussels, the question is one of pure timing: if Romania does not get into NATO at the summit in Madrid this July, it will surely get in when the next round of NATO enlargement takes place. I would like to believe this argument, but thousands of my people will not. Of course, I am fully aware of why NATO's enlargement must be part of a process, and why it is impossible to suggest that this enlargement will be the last. We all agree that no permanent division lines must exist in Europe. But let us be very honest about what we are actually saying. The policy that NATO will continue with various stages of enlargement is dependent on the assumption that, meanwhile, everything will remain in Europe as it is now, that the transformation of Russia into a peaceful and prosperous state will continue, and that the necessary commitment from the West will remain unchanged. I hope that I have given you plenty of arguments as to why these assumptions may prove to be wrong. Are we to assume that, having fought very hard to ratify this round of enlargement in sixteen parliaments, the Alliance will then begin another round, in probably twenty parliaments, for another enlargement early next century? Does anyone believe that each American president will go before Congress every four years and ask for more countries to be admitted into NATO? And, having heard the questions now asked in Washington about the need to admit a few countries into the Alliance, do we seriously believe that there will be an American president ready to argue Romania's case in a few years from now? Finally, do you think it is a good policy that every few years the American president meets his Russian counterpart in Helsinki to tell him that we are proposing to enlarge the Alliance yet again, and that Moscow should have nothing to fear from this process?

I ask these questions in the full knowledge that nobody is prepared to give me an answer. But unless answers are given, the promise of further rounds of NATO enlargement remains just that: a promise, intended to sweeten a bitter pill offered for those who cannot and probably will never enter. NATO's Partnership for Peace programme has been highly successful, and it will continue. But it was successful precisely because it has been seen as preparation for full membership. Once it becomes a substitute for membership, however, matters will change, regardless of whether you call the programme "improved", "intensified" or any other kind of nice euphemism.

Please allow me to devote some words to other, so-called "technical" arguments why Romania's application should be postponed. It is often suggested, particularly in this country, that the way to make the promise of further enlargement more real is to accept only a few countries into the Alliance now. Taken to its logical conclusion, this could mean accepting only Poland, for example, at this stage. But we all know that this is not what is going to happen, and that the question is, therefore, whether we will have three of four countries joining at this stage. This enlargement can therefore not be called "small" or "restricted". To suggest that Romania should stay out in order to persuade other countries that remain outside the Alliance that they still have a sporting chance strikes me as a curious argument. Each country has unique circumstances and I do not believe for one moment that, even if Romania's application is postponed, other countries waiting for membership will be reassured.

As you well know, a man in my position does not become actively involved in politics. But I feel compelled to speak up, and I have decided to be an advocate of Romania's position because on this subject I know there is a unanimity among all Romanians. The issue is truly one of a national consensus, a real question for our own security. My main concern is to protect and advance the democratic transformations in my country. As I have already pointed out, a new government has come to power democratically and with the support of a majority of our people. I know many people in this audience did not expect this electoral outcome, but Romania always had a tradition of surprising you! Nevertheless, the economic situation in my country is bound to get worse, before it gets better. If we stick to the programme currently approved by parliament, I am confident that we will have good results pretty soon. But, as the politicians in this country already know, even good economic results do not guarantee re-election, although a poor economy certainly guarantees defeat. It is our responsibility to suffer the pain of reform but the government must also show some results. A refusal to admit Romania into the Alliance will be seen as a rejection of our entire nation, and consequences are bound to follow. If, having exerted all efforts to meet the criteria, new reasons are found to exclude Romania, the West will have little credibility not only in my country but, as I have tried to argue, in the entire region. Those who say back home that we must pay no attention to what the West expects from us will appear to be vindicated, and all the gloom and doom scenarios feared by the West could become self-fulfilling prophecies. No doubt, we will soldier on, as best we can. But you may get bigger surprises, and this time in the negative sense of the word.

Let me also say that we view NATO's enlargement as only part of a process of integration into the continent's structures. Romania has an association treaty with the European Union, and hopes to become a EU member as well. We view these two institutions as complementing each other and we do not regard membership in one structure as a compensation for not belonging to the other. Even the British government accept a connection between the European Union and NATO, although London may argue about what this connection should be. Romania is perfectly aware that membership of the Union depends on meeting very specific economic and administrative criteria, which we cannot meet at this moment. To suggest, therefore, that Romania should forget about NATO and look to the Union for support is neither very helpful, nor practical. My belief is that NATO membership for our country will help in meeting the tough demands of European Union membership as well: it will give confidence to Western investors, and will erase the artificial distinction that exists between the Central and so- called Southern Europeans. I know that a similar problem exists concerning certain countries which were occupied by the Soviet Union in Northern Europe. But these countries have a better chance of joining the Union even if they do not join NATO, while in Romania's case, a refusal for admission in NATO could be followed by a quick refusal, or another polite postponement, from the European Union as well.

Ladies and Gentlemen,
I think that by now you have been exposed to all arguments that my country can marshal. I also hope that my case has not been narrow, and that I have succeeded in arguing for the security of an entire continent, rather than simply for the case of one country. As I said at the start, we are not asking or expecting favours, but we offer our help, in return for your solidarity.

I would like to salute from this platform the principled policy of France in support of our position. I am perfectly aware that various interpretations of this support exist in London. My explanation for the French position remains, however, that France has realised, earlier than other countries, not only that it has cultural and historic ties with our nation, but that Romania's membership in the Alliance is part and parcel of the wider process of reform which such institutions must undertake. Canada, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Turkey and Greece have also expressed their support for our membership recently. I must tell you openly today that I wish to see Britain among the countries supporting us as well.

We remember that Britain supported our association agreement with the European Union, and has been very attentive to our internal developments. We also welcome Britain's military assistance to my country, for which I am happy to pay tribute for the second time today. But I am frankly disappointed that, when it comes to NATO, London's position remains one of a guarded reserve. Please think again. If Romania is admitted into NATO this summer, I would like most of my people to perceive that this was the result of an agreement with all members, an agreement in which the British and the French played a leading part. All the communication lines are open for this purpose, invitations for bilateral visits at the highest level exist, you have a highly efficient Embassy in Bucharest and you possess a famous diplomatic service. What may be required is a leap of imagination, a realisation that, if NATO's enlargement is to make sense and if the Alliance is serious about projecting stability further East, Romania is an indispensable instrument in this process.

Your Royal Highness,
My Lords,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
As I told you earlier in my presentation, I left London in 1947 fully aware that, whatever I did, my country was lost under the iron blanket of the Soviet Union. This year, five decades later almost to the day, I shall have the privilege of coming again, to congratulate The Queen, your Sovereign, for her golden anniversary of the wedding I attended then. You, her people, have been very fortunate. We, on the other half of the continent, have been less so. For me, personally, the return to London this year represents the completion of a cycle full of trauma and shattered hopes. I would like to think that, when I leave the celebrations of your Sovereign's anniversary this year, I shall go home with exactly the opposite message: that, unlike 1947, my people are about to be integrated in a continent which is truly whole and free and that Romania has now truly returned to its original European vocation. No stronger act of historic justice can exist, and nobody is better placed to provide it than Britain.

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