Debate on Dropping the Atomic Bomb
On
1. Unanimous resolution of the League of Nations
Assembly, Protection of Civilian Populations Against Bombing From
the Air in Case of War, League of Nations, September 30, 1938
Considering that on numerous occasions public
opinion has expressed through the most authoritative channels its horror of the
bombing of civilian populations;…
I. Recognizes the following principles as a
necessary basis for any subsequent regulations:
1) The intentional
bombing of civilian populations is illegal;
2) Objectives aimed at from the air must be legitimate military objectives and
must be identifiable;
3) Any attack on legitimate military objectives must be carried out in such a
way that civilian populations in the neighbourhood
are not bombed through negligence.
….If resort is had to this form of inhuman
barbarism [The ruthless bombing from the air of civilians in unfortified
centers of population] during the period of the tragic conflagration with which
the world is now confronted, hundreds of thousands of innocent human beings who
have no responsibility for, and who are not even remotely participating in, the
hostilities which have now broken out, will lose their lives. I am therefore
addressing this urgent appeal to every government which may be engaged in
hostilities publicly to affirm its determination that its armed forces shall in
no event, and under no circumstances, undertake the bombardment from the air of
civilian populations or of unfortified cities,….
3.
"We met at
"The weapon is to be used against
"He [Stimson]
and I are in accord. The target will be a purely military one and we will issue
a warning statement [known as the
4.
(1) We-The President of the United States,
the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the
Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our
countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity
to end this war.
(2) The prodigious land, sea and air forces
of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by
their armies and air fleets from the west, are poised to strike the final blows
upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination
of all the Allied Nations to prosecute the war against
(4)
The time has come for
(5) Following are our terms. We will not
deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.
(6) There must be eliminated for all time the
authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of
(7) Until such a new order is established and
until there is convincing proof that
(9)
The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be
permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and
productive lives.
(10) We do not intend that the Japanese shall
be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be
meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon
our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the
revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom
of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental
human rights shall be established.
(11)
(12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall
be withdrawn from
(13) We call upon the government of
5. (MEMORANDUM ON THE USE OF S-1 BOMB,
Harrison-Bundy Files, RG 77, microfilm publication M1108, folder 77, National
Archives,
On
However, the constitutional monarchy line was
not included in the surrender demand, known as the Potsdam Proclamation,
that was broadcast on July 26th, in spite of Stimson's
eleventh hour protestations that it be left in (Diary of Henry L. Stimson, 7/24/45, Yale Univ. Library, New Haven, Conn).
"I have always felt that if, in our
ultimatum to the Japanese government issued from
McCloy quoted in James Reston, Deadline, pg. 500.
MacArthur biographer William Manchester has described MacArthur's reaction to the issuance by the Allies of the
Potsdam Proclamation to
William Manchester, American Caesar:
Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964, pg. 512.
After Germany surrendered, Szilard attempted to meet with President Truman. Instead,
he was given an appointment with Truman's Sec. of State to be, James Byrnes. In
that meeting of May 28, 1945, Szilard told Byrnes
that the atomic bomb should not be used on Japan. Szilard
recommended, instead, coming to an international agreement on the control of
atomic weapons before shocking other nations by their use:
"I thought that it would be a mistake to
disclose the existence of the bomb to the world before the government had made
up its mind about how to handle the situation after the war. Using the bomb
certainly would disclose that the bomb existed." According to Szilard, Byrnes was not interested in international
control: "Byrnes... was concerned about Russia's postwar behavior. Russian
troops had moved into Hungary and Rumania, and Byrnes thought it would be very
difficult to persuade Russia to withdraw her troops from these countries, that
Russia might be more manageable if impressed by American military might, and
that a demonstration of the bomb might impress Russia." Szilard could see that he wasn't getting though to Byrnes;
"I was concerned at this point that by demonstrating the bomb and using it
in the war against Japan, we might start an atomic arms race between America
and Russia which might end with the destruction of both countries.".
9. A PETITION TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES, July 3, 1945
…. We, the undersigned scientists, have been
working in the field of atomic power for a number of years. Until recently we
have had to reckon with the possibility that the United States might be
attacked by atomic bombs during this war and that her only defense might lie in
a counterattack by the same means. Today with this danger averted we feel
impelled to say what follows:
The war has to be brought speedily to a
successful conclusion and the destruction of Japanese cities by means of atomic
bombs may very well be an effective method of warfare. We feel, however, that
such an attack on Japan could not be justified in the present circumstances. We
believe that the United States ought not to resort to the use of atomic bombs
in the present phase of the war, at least not unless the terms which will be
imposed upon Japan after the war are publicly announced and subsequently Japan
is given an opportunity to surrender.
If such public announcement gave assurance to
the Japanese that they could look forward to a life devoted to peaceful
pursuits in their homeland and if Japan still refused to surrender, our nation
would then be faced with a situation which might require a re-examination of
her position with respect to the use of atomic bombs in the war.
Atomic bombs are primarily a means for the
ruthless annihilation of cities. Once they were introduced as an instrument of
war it would be difficult to resist for long the temptation of putting them to
such use.
The last few years show a marked tendency
toward increasing ruthlessness. At present our Air Forces, striking at the
Japanese cities, are using the same methods of warfare which were condemned by
American public opinion only a few years ago when applied by the Germans to the
cities of England. Our use of atomic bombs in this war would carry the world a
long way further on this path of ruthlessness.
Atomic power will provide the nations with
new means of destruction. The atomic bombs at our disposal represent only the
first step in this direction and there is almost no limit to the destructive
power which will become available in the course of this development. Thus a
nation which sets the precedent of using these newly liberated forces of nature
for purposes of destruction may have to bear the responsibility of opening the
door to an era of devastation on an unimaginable scale.
In view of the foregoing, we, the
undersigned, respectfully petition that you exercise your power as
Commander-in-Chief to rule that the United States shall not, in the present
phase of the war, resort to the use of atomic bombs.
Leo Szilard and 58
co-signers (Dr. Leo Szilard, 62, is a Hungarian-born physicist who helped
persuade President Roosevelt to launch the A-bomb project and who had a major
share in it. In 1945, however, he was a key figure among the scientists
opposing use of the bomb.)
Q In what way? [did the bombing
boomerang?]
A I think it made it very difficult for us to take the position
after the war that we wanted to get rid of atomic bombs because it would be
immoral to use them against the civilian population. We lost the moral argument
with which, right after the war, we might have perhaps gotten rid of the bomb.
Let me say only this much to the moral issue
involved: Suppose Germany had developed two bombs before we had any bombs. And
suppose Germany had dropped one bomb, say, on Rochester and the other on
Buffalo, and then having run out of bombs she would have lost the war. Can
anyone doubt that we would then have defined the dropping of atomic bombs on
cities as a war crime, and that we would have sentenced the Germans who were
guilty of this crime to death at Nuremberg and hanged them?
But, again, don't misunderstand me. The only
conclusion we can draw is that governments acting in a crisis are guided by
questions of expediency, and moral considerations are given very little weight,
and that America is no different from any other nation in this respect.
11. Dwight Eisenhower, Mandate For
Change, pg. 380
"...in [July] 1945... Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me
that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of
those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the
wisdom of such an act. ...
"During his recitation of the relevant
facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him
my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already
defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly
because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the
use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a
measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very
moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of 'face'. The
Secretary was deeply perturbed by my attitude..."
"It is my opinion that the use of this
barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our
war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender
because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with
conventional weapons.
"The lethal possibilities of atomic
warfare in the future are frightening. My own feeling was that in being the
first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of
the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be
won by destroying women and children."
- William Leahy, I Was There, pg. 441.
· Intercepted cables showed Japan responding positively
to a U.S. offer of a surrender based on the "Atlantic Charter" as put
forward in an official July 21, 1945 American radio broadcast. The key clause
of the Charter promised that every nation could choose its own form of
government (which would have allowed Japan to keep its Emperor).
· On July 25 (reported in MAGIC on July 26), an
intercepted message from Japanese Foreign Minister Togo to Ambassador Sato in
Moscow cited the radio broadcast--and stated without reservation:
The fact that the Americans alluded to the Atlantic
Charter is particularly worthy of attention at this time. It is impossible for
us to accept unconditional surrender, no matter in what guise, but it is our
idea to inform them by some appropriate means that there is no objection to the
restoration of peace on the basis of the Atlantic Charter. (See p. 399, Chapter
31)
· Rear Admiral L. Lewis Strauss, special assistant to
the Secretary of the Navy from 1944 to 1945 (and later chairman of the Atomic
Energy Commission….recalled:
“I proposed to Secretary Forrestal
at that time that the weapon should be demonstrated. . . . Primarily, it was
because it was clear to a number of people, myself among them, that the war was
very nearly over. The Japanese were nearly ready to capitulate. . . . My
proposal to the Secretary was that the weapon should be demonstrated over some
area accessible to the Japanese observers, and where its effects would be
dramatic. I remember suggesting that a good place--satisfactory place for such
a demonstration would be a large forest of cryptomaria
[sic] trees not far from Tokyo. The cryptomaria tree
is the Japanese version of our redwood. . . . I anticipated that a bomb
detonated at a suitable height above such a forest . . . would [have] laid the
trees out in windrows from the center of the explosion in all directions as
though they had been matchsticks, and of course set them afire in the center.
It seemed to me that a demonstration of this sort would prove to the Japanese
that we could destroy any of their cities, their fortifications at will. . . .
“(See p. 333, Chapter 26)
· In his "third person" autobiography
(co-authored with Walter Muir Whitehill) the
commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet and chief of Naval Operations, Ernest J.
King, stated:
The President in giving his approval for these
[atomic] attacks appeared to believe that many thousands of American troops
would be killed in invading Japan, and in this he was entirely correct; but
King felt, as he had pointed out many times, that the dilemma was an
unnecessary one, for had we been willing to wait, the effective naval blockade
would, in the course of time, have starved the Japanese into submission through
lack of oil, rice, medicines, and other essential materials. (See p. 327,
Chapter 26)
14. Grayford C.
Payne, Bataan Death March survivor
In the latter part of June
1945, a note was posted in our camp. It was signed by Hideki Tojo. And it said, 'The moment the first American soldier
sets foot on the Japanese mainland, all prisoners of war will be shot.' And
they meant it. I hadn't been a prisoner for fifteen minutes before they
bayoneted a fifteen-year-old Filipino kid right next to me - a kid so innocent
he scraped together this little dirt dam with his last bit of energy so he
wouldn't bleed on my uniform while he died. That is why all of us who were
prisoners in Japan, or were headed for it to probably die in the invasion,
revere the Enola Gay. It saved our lives.
quoted in the September 26, 1994, Washington Post
15. The Great Atomic Bomb
Debate by Bryan McNulty
General of the Army George C.
Marshall worried that even with the two atomic bombings, an invasion might be
necessary. He had earlier observed that in a raid with conventional bombs five
months before, "we had 100,000 people killed in Tokyo in one night and it
had seemingly no effect whatsoever." In fact, it took another six days
after the second atomic bombing - and the foiling of an attempted coup by
military diehards who wanted the nation to fight to the end - before Emperor Hirohito, in an unprecedented personal radio broadcast to
his nation, cited the "new and most cruel bomb" in announcing the
surrender.
"The U.S. knew that the Japanese had given no indication that they were
going to surrender," says Ohio University World War II historian Marvin
Fletcher. "The use of the bomb to convince the Japanese of what was
obvious - that they had lost the war - was a necessary choice. Truman would
have been derelict if he had done otherwise. The number of Americans and
Japanese who would have died if the invasions had gone as planned would have
been, in my mind, higher than the number of Japanese who died at
Hiroshima."….
While the atomic deaths were
horrific, Ohio University Professor of History Donald Jordan says the horror
was not unrivaled. The 1937 Rape of Nanjing, in which
Japanese troops took the Nationalist Army headquarters city and then spent
seven weeks killing up to 300,000 men, women, and children, by hand, is
arguably at least as horrific. If rational plans at high levels are the
determinant of "evil barbarism," Jordan points out that the deaths
from the two atomic bombs are pale shadows to the deaths resulting from the
Japanese military's systematic abuse and killings of prisoners of war and slave
laborers from Korea, China, and Southeast Asia. And Japan was the first country
in any of the theaters of war to create a deliberate firestorm in an undefended
city when it bombed Shanghai in 1932, says Jordan, the author of Chinese
Boycotts Versus Japanese Bombs…
Hamby [author of Man of
the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman] says the historical record shows
this: The Japanese had instructed their envoy in Moscow, Naotake
Sato, to seek Soviet mediation for a negotiated settlement, not the
unconditional surrender demanded by the United States and Britain at the July 16
Potsdam Conference. Truman knew of this from coded messages broken by the
American military and from the Soviets themselves. Sato's intercepted cables
from Tokyo left the impression of a Japan unwilling to surrender and preparing
to wage a bitter, suicidal resistance that might last for months if the nation
was unable to get the terms it wanted.
"A distraught Sato on July 12 vainly urged an apparently gridlocked
government in Tokyo to be specific and embrace unconditional surrender,"
Hamby says. "But the curt Japanese rejection of the Potsdam ultimatum on
July 28 reinforced the worst American expectations."
The April 1945 U.S. invasion of Okinawa spelled the collapse of Premier General
Hideki Tojo's government. His replacement, Admiral Kantaro Suzuki, told the Japanese Cabinet in June 1945 that
thousands of kamikaze pilots would fly against enemy ships even in training
planes, that millions of soldiers would fight what was called the
"Decisive Battle" by suicide banzai charges, and that civilians would
strap on explosives and throw themselves under enemy tanks.
To secure the approval of senior Army officials to his accession to premier,
Suzuki affirmed that Japan's only course was to "fight to the very
end" even if it meant the death of 100 million Japanese..
"…. if you go across to
the Asian mainland, the Chinese and Koreans say, 'The rest of Asia were the
victims, and the Japanese better get over that and quit looking at themselves
as victims or we won't trust them.' There are museums all over China about the
Japanese atrocities. The Chinese and Koreans have a very different view of who
were the victims."
By contrast, Hamby says the Germans, particularly West Germans, "have
practically wallowed in war guilt for two generations. There is a big contrast
with the Japanese."
According to a report to
President Roosevelt from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in September 1943, escaped
prisoners had been providing accounts as early as April 1943 of malnutrition,
cruel workloads, widespread torture, and murder of U.S. and other Allied
prisoners of the Japanese. War planners worried about the fate of POWs in the
event of a prolonged war or an invasion of the Japanese home islands. After the
war, their fears proved well-founded: Of the 132,134 Americans, British, and
Australians taken prisoner by the Japanese, 27 percent - 35,756 -died in
captivity.
According to a 1995 book on the planned invasion, Code-Name Downfall, by
Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polmar, Soviet troops who
liberated a POW camp in Mukden, Manchuria, found
3,000 prisoners who, like prisoners in Japan, had thought they were about to be
murdered as the Soviets approached their camp. A Japanese directive described
how prisoners were to be killed: "mass bombing, or poisonous smoke,
poisons, decapitation... . In any case, it is the aim not to allow the escape
of a single one, to annihilate them all, and not to leave any traces."
When Red Army troops in Manchuria approached the headquarters of Japan's
infamous Unit 731, where POWs were subjected to germ warfare and other
experiments, the lieutenant general in charge, Shiro
Ishii, ordered all buildings, equipment, and the hundreds of human test
subjects destroyed and burned.
Although there were isolated reports of prisoners of war being executed even
after the surrender was announced, many believed the abrupt end to the war
without invasion was their salvation.
16. Tony Alessandro, former president of
the U.S.S. Missouri Association, who joined the Navy in the middle of
the war at the age of 17 and "as a 19 year old kid" was present when
the Japanese surrendered aboard the U.S.S. Missouri on September 2, 1945.
"All we wanted to do wanted to was to get home. A
lot of us missed our childhood - those things kids like to do at 17 and 18.
When I left the Navy in 1946 I seem to go back to my childhood and I began to
play sports - baseball, football, basketball for longer than kids do today. We
were trying to pick up that lost time.
"Then, I got married when I was 24 years
old. It was hard to find work between 1946-1950. I finally got a good job in
1950, when the economy began to pick up after the war. It was still tough
times.
"Regarding the Atom bomb that was
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki - that caused a lot of loss of life at the
time - but those bombs SAVED many, many, many more. The United States already
had plans to invade Japan and had we done that, after we fought in Okinawa,
where we faced Japanese suicide planes, it would have been much tougher if we
had invaded Japan.
"If we had not dropped the Atom bombs,
the Japanese people would have lost 3 million people and the Allies would have
lost 1 million people. You are talking about 4 million people! We saved a lot
of lives by dropping them."
In Hiroshima, 70,000 people died. In
Nagasaki, 36,000 people died. However, in the German attacks on England during
World War II, 62,000 people died. In the conventional bombing of Tokyo in 1945,
83,000 people died. And, in the Allied bombing of Dresdon,
Germany, 100,000 people died.
18. FDR AND TRUMAN : CONTINUITY AND CONTEXT IN THE A-BOMB
DECISION by HERMAN S. WOLK AND RICHARD P. HALLION
….When Truman called his military chiefs to the White
House on 18 June 1945, uppermost in his mind were the mounting American
casualties in the Pacific island campaigns. Most revealing of Truman’s
mindset—and frequently neglected by historians—was Adm
William Leahy’s memorandum of 14 June calling the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
to this meeting. Leahy in-formed the JCS that Truman wanted
an estimate of the time required and an estimate of the losses in killed
and wounded that will result from an invasion of Japan proper.
He wants an estimate of the time and the losses that will result from an
effort to defeat Japan by isolation, blockade, and bombardment by sea and air
forces. . . .
It is his
intention to make his decisions on the campaign with the purpose of economizing
to the maximum extent possible in the loss of American lives.
Economy in the
use of time and in money cost is comparatively unimportant.4
In the middle of June 1945, Okinawa was the one
campaign that Truman had foremost in his mind. It had been a staggeringly
bloody campaign that killed or wounded about 49,000 Americans. The ferocity of
the Japanese defenders and the stunningly successful Japanese use of kamikaze
suicide planes gave Truman and the military leadership pause concerning
potential American casualties in an invasion of Kyushu (Operation Olympic),
which Truman approved on 18 June for 1 November 1945. Based on the American
casualty rate of 35 percent for Okinawa—emphasized to Truman during the meeting
of 18 June 1945—the US could suffer approximately 268,000 casualties in a
Kyushu invasion, given the size of the invading forces.5
Also foreboding to Truman were the facts that some
6,000 to 8,000 kamikaze planes would be available to oppose a Kyushu landing
and that the Japanese could count on more than 2 million troops to defend the
home islands with great ferocity. Throughout World War II, the US Navy had 34
ships sunk, 368 damaged, 4,907 sailors killed, and 4,824 wounded from kamikaze
at-tacks. For approximately every seven kamikazes en-countered, the Navy had a
ship sunk or damaged. The fact was that Japanese hard-liners in the military
and the government were insisting on a fight to the finish, with the objective
of forcing a negotiated peace that would modify or destroy the surrender policy
of the Truman administration. They emphasized the losses that the Americans had
suffered on Okinawa. The US Army’s medical plan for Operation Olympic estimated
that total battle and nonbattle casualties (not
including dead) could be 394,859.
….Had
the atomic bombs not been used, would Japan have surrendered prior to the
invasion of Kyushu, scheduled for 1 November 1945? This answer, of course,
cannot be determined. However, had the B-29 campaign continued for several more
months, more Japanese would have been killed than at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any other means whereby Japan could have
surrendered with casualties equivalent to or less than those experienced at
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japan had been defeated but was not willing to
surrender. The Japanese military and government were, in effect, holding their
own people hostage.
Both Hiroshima and Nagasaki were, under the principles
of international law, legitimate military targets for attack. Both had
extensive armament factories as well as war-related industries, and both
contributed significantly to Japanese military transportation networks.
Further, both had robust military establishments. Hiroshima, for example, was
the headquarters of the Japanese Second Army—virtually destroyed in the atomic
bombing of the city. Beyond this rationale, the decision to drop the atomic
bomb on both of these tar-gets did not constitute an act of aggression against
a foe already reduced to impotence by Allied attack. Indeed, in August 1945,
fighting still raged across Asia: an invasion of Malaya was planned for later
in the year. In particular, hundreds of thousands of Allied prisoners were in
mortal danger. By this time, 43 percent of the prisoners in Japanese hands
(almost 400,000 captives) had died—a clear measure of the brutality of Japanese
rule overall. (The toll of Japanese rule is approximately 20 million dead.) As
recent scholarship has shown, clear evidence exists that, had the Allies
invaded, the Japanese would have slaughtered these prisoners of war.7 Also
worthy of note is the fact that Japan had under way a vigorous program to
develop an atomic bomb.8
19. President Harry S. Truman
and the atomic bomb, History Today, August 1995, by Alonzo Hamby
History Today, August, 1995, by Alonzo
Hamby
On June 18th, the president met with his top
military officials to discuss the possible scenarios for ending the war against
Japan. They recommended an invasion of Kyushu no later than November 1st. The
operation would be enormous: 766,000 American assault troops engaging an
estimated 350,000 Japanese defenders. It would be followed in 1946 by a
decisive campaign near Tokyo on the main island of Honshu.
Would the Kyushu operation, Truman asked, be
'another Okinawa closer to Japan'? With questionable optimism, the military
chiefs of staff predicted the casualties would be somewhat lighter. Still their
estimate for the first thirty days was 31,000 casualties. Truman gave his reluctant
approval, but not without saying he hoped 'there was a possibility of
preventing an Okinawa from one end of Japan to another'.
In fact, Pentagon planners were at work on
estimates that projected 132,000 casualties (killed, wounded, missing) for
Kyushu, another 90,000 or so for Honshu. Of these, probably a quarter would be
fatalities. The figures were not wholly worked out by the June 18th, meeting
but they would be given to Truman in due course and would constitute the
estimates upon which he acted. In later years, he exaggerated them, but they
required no magnification to make the atomic bomb a compelling option.
….The Japanese surrender offer put before
Truman on August 10th, still insisted on retention of the emperor. Only
Secretary of State Byrnes was reluctant to accept it. Truman opted for a
response asserting that the Japanese message met American terms with the
understanding that the emperor would be subject to the Allied supreme
commander. At a Cabinet meeting, he declared there would be no more atomic
bombings. Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace recorded his attitude: 'He said
the thought of wiping out another 100,000 people was too horrible. He didn't
like the idea of killing, as he said, "all those kids"'.
….At the August 10th cabinet meeting, Truman
declared ('most fiercely', according to Wallace) that he expected the Russians
to stall on the surrender in order to grab as much of Manchuria as possible,
and that if China and Britain agreed to the American terms, he would not wait
for the Russians. Scholars of the Left invoke such bits and pieces of
anti-Soviet rhetoric as proof that the bombs were dropped not to compel a
Japanese surrender but to intimidate the USSR. Yet there is no credible
evidence in Truman's personal contemporary writings or his later accounts that
he saw the use of the bomb as a way of making a point to the Russians --
although he clearly thought its existence would strengthen the hand of the
United States.
20. Martin J. Sherwin, Dartmouth College, Oxford
Companion to World War II
Until they were used, until the power of the
atomic bomb had been demonstrated, the nuclear option precluded all other
options - modifying unconditional surrender - because it promised dividends.
The shock of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki would not only be felt
in Tokyo, American leaders calculated, they also would be noted in Moscow. The
military use of atomic weapons was expected not only to end the war; it was
assumed it would help to organize an American peace. While these expectations
and decisions may be understandable in the context of four years of scientific
secrecy and brutal war, they were not inevitable. They were avoidable. In the
end, that is the most important lesson of Hiroshima for the nuclear age.
21. Minutes of the second meeting of the
Target Committee Los Alamos, May 10-11, 1945
…7. Psychological Factors in Target
Selection
A. It was agreed that psychological factors
in the target selection were of great importance. Two aspects of this are (1)
obtaining the greatest psychological effect against Japan and (2) making the
initial use sufficiently spectacular for the importance of the weapon to be
internationally recognized when publicity on it is released.
B. In this respect Kyoto has the advantage of
the people being more highly intelligent and hence better able to appreciate
the significance of the weapon. Hiroshima has the advantage of being such a
size and with possible focussing from nearby
mountains that a large fraction of the city may be destroyed. The Emperor's palace
in Tokyo has a greater fame than any other target but is of least strategic
value.
22.
Leaflets dropped on cities in Japan warning civilians about the atomic bomb,
dropped c. August 6, 1945
TO THE JAPANESE PEOPLE:
America asks that you take immediate heed of what we say on this leaflet.
We are in possession of the most
destructive explosive ever devised by man. A single one of our newly
developed atomic bombs is actually the equivalent in explosive power to what
2000 of our giant B-29s can carry on a single mission. This awful fact is one
for you to ponder and we solemnly assure you it is grimly accurate.
We have just begun to use this weapon against
your homeland. If you still have any doubt, make inquiry as to what happened to
Hiroshima when just one atomic bomb fell on that city.
Before using this bomb to destroy every resource
of the military by which they are prolonging this useless war, we ask that you
now petition the Emperor to end the war. Our president has outlined for you the
thirteen consequences of an honorable surrender. We urge that you accept these
consequences and begin the work of building a new, better and peace-loving
Japan.
You should take steps now to cease military
resistance. Otherwise, we shall resolutely employ this bomb and all our other
superior weapons to promptly and forcefully end the war.
EVACUATE YOUR CITIES.
Source: Harry S. Truman Library, Miscellaneous historical
document file, no. 258.
23. Recommendations on the Immediate Use
of Nuclear Weapons, by the Scientific Panel of the Interim Committee on Nuclear
Power, June 16, 1945.
You have asked us to comment on the initial
use of the new weapon. This use, in our opinion, should be such as to promote a
satisfactory adjustment of our international relations. At the same time, we
recognize our obligation to our nation to use the weapons to help save American
lives in the Japanese war….
(2) The opinions of our scientific colleagues
on the initial use of these weapons are not unanimous: they range from the
proposal of a purely technical demonstration to that of the military
application best designed to induce surrender. Those who advocate a purely
technical demonstration would wish to outlaw the use of atomic weapons, and
have feared that if we use the weapons now our position in future negotiations
will be prejudiced. Others emphasize the opportunity of saving American lives
by immediate military use, and believe that such use will improve the
international prospects, in that they are more concerned with the prevention of
war than with the elimination of this specific weapon. We find ourselves closer
to these latter views; we can propose no technical demonstration likely to
bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military
use
The world will note that the first atomic
bomb was dropped on
25. Excerpt from public statement by
President Truman. This was the first time he publicly gave a reason for using
the atomic bomb on
"The Japanese began the war from the air
at
"If they do not now accept our terms
they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been
seen on this earth." (Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry S. Truman,
1945, pg. 197, 199).
26. Why Truman Dropped the
Bomb by Richard B.
Frank, author of Downfall: The End of the Imperial
Japanese Empire.
In
complete secrecy, the Big Six agreed on an approach to the Soviet Union in June
1945. This was not to ask the Soviets to deliver a "We surrender"
note; rather, it aimed to enlist the Soviets as mediators to negotiate an end
to the war satisfactory to the Big Six--in other words, a peace on terms
satisfactory to the dominant militarists. Their minimal goal was not confined
to guaranteed retention of the Imperial Institution; they also insisted on
preservation of the old militaristic order in Japan, the one in which they
ruled.
The
conduit for this initiative was Japan's ambassador in Moscow, Naotake Sato. He communicated with Foreign Minister
Togo--and, thanks to code breaking, with American policymakers. Ambassador Sato
emerges in the intercepts as a devastating cross-examiner ruthlessly unmasking
for history the feebleness of the whole enterprise. Sato immediately told Togo
that the Soviets would never bestir themselves on behalf of Japan. The foreign
minister could only insist that Sato follow his instructions. Sato demanded to
know whether the government and the military supported the overture and what
its legal basis was--after all, the official Japanese position, adopted in an
Imperial Conference in June 1945 with the emperor's sanction, was a fight to
the finish. The ambassador also demanded that Japan state concrete terms to end
the war, otherwise the effort could not be taken seriously. Togo responded
evasively that the "directing powers" and the government had
authorized the effort--he did not and could not claim that the military in
general supported it or that the fight-to-the-end policy had been replaced.
Indeed, Togo added: "Please bear particularly in mind, however, that we
are not seeking the Russians' mediation for anything like an unconditional
surrender."
This
last comment triggered a fateful exchange. Critics have pointed out correctly
that both Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew (the former U.S. ambassador to
Japan and the leading expert on that nation within the government) and
Secretary of War Henry Stimson advised Truman that a
guarantee that the Imperial Institution would not be eliminated could prove
essential to obtaining Japan's surrender. The critics further have argued that
if only the United States had made such a guarantee, Japan would have
surrendered. But when Foreign Minister Togo informed Ambassador Sato that Japan
was not looking for anything like unconditional surrender, Sato promptly wired
back a cable that the editors of the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary made
clear to American policymakers "advocate[s] unconditional surrender
provided the Imperial House is preserved." Togo's reply, quoted in the
"Magic" Diplomatic Summary of
27. Surviving the Atomic Attack on
Dr. Michihiko Hachiya
lived thorough that day and kept a diary of his experience. He served as
Director of the
Suddenly,
a strong flash of light...
….Moving
instinctively, I tried to escape, but rubble and fallen timbers barred the way.
By picking my way cautiously I managed to reach the roka (an outside hallway)and
stepped down into my garden. A profound weakness overcame me, so I stopped to
regain my strength. To my surprise I discovered that I was completely naked How
odd! Where were my drawers and undershirt?
What had happened?
All over the right side of my
body I was cut and bleeding. A large splinter was protruding from a mangled
wound in my thigh, and something warm trickled into my mouth. My check was
torn, I discovered as I felt it gingerly, with the lower lip laid wide open.
Embedded in my neck was a sizable fragment of glass which I matter-of-factly
dislodged, and with the detachment of one stunned and shocked I studied it and
my blood-stained hand.
Seven hundred and fifty meters from ground zero, these are the testimonies of the passengers
who were on the same streetcar in a Hatchobori area
when the atomic bomb fell. A little after eight in the morning on August 6, the
streetcar for Koi left Hiroshima Station. And at 8:15
it approached Hatchobori Station, 780 meters from the
hypocenter and an intense flash and blast engulfed the car, instantly setting
it on fire. It is said that seventy cars were running in the city at the same
time. They were an important means of transportation for the citizens, and all
the trains were packed with people since it was the morning rush hour. Nearly
100 passengers are said to have been on board on the streetcar which was near Hatchobori. But the survival of only ten have been
confirmed to date. Seven out of ten have recorded their testimonies on this
video tape.
Tomiko
Sasaki, 17 on that day, was on her way to her friend's house in Funairi with two classmates as it was their holiday from
student mobilization labor. Approximately two weeks after the bombing, her two
classmates died.
INTERVIEWER:
Were three of you on the same part of the car?
SASAKI:
Yes. I was standing in front here and the others were next to me. There was the
flash and darkness. I think I was unconscious for a while. We came to and
called each other's names. My friends complained of the heat and terrible pain.
I saw that one side of her body had been badly burned. There was a water tank
for fire prevention, but the water wasn't clear due to all the dust. I put my
handkerchief in the water and I put it over her burns, but she went on crying
in pain. Both of my friends were burned. As for myself, flesh was hanging from
my whole face was bloody. Fortunately I escaped from being burnt. I think it
made a big difference that I was not burned. In fact, I think that saved my
life.
Eiko
Taoka, then 21, was heading for Funairi
with her one year old son to secure wagon in preparation for her move out of
the building which was to be evacuated. Her son died of radiation sickness on
August 28.
TAOKA:
When we were near in Hatchobori and since I had been
holding my son in my arms, the young woman in front of me said, "I will be
getting off here. Please take this seat." We were just changing places
when there was a strange smell and sound. It suddenly became dark and before I
knew it, I had jumped outside.
INTERVIEWER:
What about your son?
TAOKA:
I held him firmly and looked down on him. He had been standing by the window
and I think fragments of glass had pierced his head. His face was a mess
because of the blood flowing from his head. But he looked at my face and
smiled. His smile has remained glued in my memory. He did not comprehend what
had happened. And so he looked at me and smiled at my face which was all
bloody. I had plenty of milk which he drank all throughout that day. I think my
child sucked the poison right out of my body. And soon after that he died. Yes,
I think that he died for me.
Shizuno Tochiki, 23 at that time, was on her way to
her office in Kogo. Immediately after the bombing,
she had a high fever which lasted for ten days. She's suffered the symptoms of
radiation sickness, the purple spots appeared all over her body and her hair
fell out. It was only after one month that she was finally able to get up.
TOCHIKI:
I think the air-raid warning had been lifted, so I left for Hatchobori
without worrying. Then, there was a flash and a big sound which is known as ``Pika-don''. The train shock and it seemed to me as if a
flash had directly entered my eyes. It was extremely hot. Because of the jolt,
people fell right on top of each other. I think I was at a very bottom. I
thought I would be crashed to death in a little while because I was so small
and had the weight of all those people on top of me. But one by the people on
top finally left the car. They ran with all their might along the railroad
tracks. I could hear someone shout, ``Another hit and we're finished.'' But I
could only see people's shadows. When I gained consciousness, I was in a bed. I
don't remember how many days it took until I could walk again. One day I asked
for a cane, but I couldn't walk straight since my legs were so thin and so
shaky. I staggered towards a mirror and I fell utterly, completely miserable as
I had no hair, all my hair was gone. But just being able to walk to the next
room made me so happy.
Keiko Matsuda, then 14, on her way to Miyajima
with two friends since they had no mobilized labor on that day. One of her
friends who had been closest to the front and received the worst burns died in
the first-aid station in Nukushina.
MATSUDA:
It was very, very hot. I touched my skin and it just peeled right off. The
driver of the streetcar was not in sight. I thought he had been quick to run
away but now I think that he was probably hurled outside in the blast. It was
around August 25 that a pile of my hair just fell off all at once. I had a high
fever and maggots infested in my eyes.
INTERVIEWER:
In your eyes?
MATSUDA:
Yes. I was afflicted with erysipelas as well. I had two children, but I had not
told them about this experience. And I don't want to talk about it. But this
time many people are testifying together and since I've been asked, I will
talk. But I have tried to avoid it until now.
Akira Ishida, then a 17 year old junior air man in the army, had the day
off and was going to Miyajima with his elder brother to pray for good luck in
the war. His elder brother died in September 1945 of radiation sickness.
ISHIDA:
Several months later, I can remember, I remember a cold morning, I don't know
why but my mother always kept a round hand mirror by my pillow, which I picked
up without thinking. I looked at my face and I saw something so shiny on the
corner of my head. Using all my energy, I called out to my mother who was in
the kitchen, and I said, ``Mother! My hair is growing back!'' She was so happy
that she held me and she cried. I'll never forget that day and the feel of the
tears that my mother shed for me while she held me in her arms. It still comes
back to me even though the people here are of different ages, we are also all
of the same age. On August 6th, 1945, all of us died once and then, we were
brought back to life. We were all born again. And we're in our second life now.
Everyone gathered here today is now 41 years old if you count the number the
years from the bombing. It's like a class reunion. I feel that we must testify
in the hope that our experience will help to keep mankind from perishing.