The Second Battle of Bull Run
After skirmishes at Cedar Mountain and Groveton, the armies of Robert E. Lee and John Pope clashed on an old battlefield in Virginia. Attempting to hold off Lee so that General George McClellan could attack Richmond, Pope’s defeat here was a crushing blow to the nearly hopeless Union. For the South, Second Bull Run was yet another victory, adding to the continuous Confederate wins of 1862.
Very likely the greatest general of the Civil War, the success of the Confederate battles were largely due to the intelligence of General Robert Edward Lee. Lee was a true southerner, born and bred in Virginia. After graduating second in his class at West Point and never earning a single demerit, he won many military titles, such as superintendent of the US Military Academy and colonel of the cavalry. Lee had experience from the Mexican War and at Harper’s Ferry. Lincoln offered him command of the Union forces, but when Lee’s home state of Virginia seceded, the young man declined, and switched to the Confederate side. Respected and revered by soldiers and other southerners, Lee’s war strategies were way ahead of his time. Before the battle, he had been trying to protect Richmond from McClellan, winning the Seven Days Battle.
Lieutenant General James Longstreet, General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson, and James Ewell Brown “Jeb” Stuart helped Lee at Second Bull Run. All three Confederate generals had graduated from West Point and had fought in the Mexican War. Together with Lee, the three generals had been at Cedar Mountain and Groveton shortly before the battle. Longstreet, a South Carolinian, wasn’t good at managing military maneuvers by himself, but was important to Lee throughout the war. “Stonewall” Jackson, nicknamed at the First Battle of Bull Run for leading his brigade like a “stone wall”, is considered one of the greatest Confederate leaders of the Civil War. Though a great war hero for the south, Jackson had many peculiarities, such as sucking lemons, refusing to consume pepper since he claimed it hurt his leg, and believing that one of his arms was heavier than the other. His superstitiousness earned him the nicknames “Tom Fool Jackson” and “Old Blue Light” as a professor at West Point. Jackson’s lonely childhood and the deaths of most of his family members could have caused his extreme religiousness and eccentricities. As Lee called Jackson his “right arm”, he called Jeb Stuart “the eyes of the army”. Stuart was very helpful to the Confederacy in the war, and a red-lined cape and a plumed cavalier’s hat were his symbols.
The Union leader at Second Bull Run was John Pope. His appointment by Lincoln is considered one of Lincoln’s greatest mistakes during the war. Treating soldiers and prisoners harshly, he wasn’t popular with either the North or the South. Pope didn’t like to listen to others, making and carrying out only his own plans, which were not particularly great. He made several preventable military mistakes throughout the war.
Preceding the Second Battle of Bull Run, the army of Virginia was formed, under the command of Pope. Pope had to protect Washington and the Shenandoah Valley as well as divert Lee’s attention so that McClellan could win Richmond in the Seven Day’s Battle. After the Union defeat, McClellan started and the army of the Potomac started to march northward to join with Pope’s amy. A conflict at Cedar Mountain ended in a draw, but Lee didn’t give up his goal to decisively defeat the Union army.
Hoping to acquire Union plans, Lee sent Stuart to raid the Union camp. A few days before, Stuart had lost his famous plumed hat in a small dispute with Union soldiers, and was happy to raid the enemy camp. Stuart walked out of Pope’s headquarters with Pope’s dress coat, three hundred fifty thousand dollars, and the Union general’s book containing the positions of his men. Taking this information back, Lee used the book to formulate his plans.
Lee knew that in order to defeat Pope, the Confederates had to get to the army of Virginia before McClellan came to reinforce the Federal army. Taking a huge risk, the Confederate general decided to split his army, sending Jackson with one half of it on a 62 mile march until the Confederates were behind the Union army, cutting off supply lines as they went. This would force Pope onto the old Manassas battlefield. The other half of the army, led by Longstreet would join in the fighting later. Though Pope’s army of 75,000 men far outnumbered Lee’s 55,000 men, Lee was aware of the fact that the Union generals were untalented leaders and had made many mistakes since the beginning of the war.
Lee’s plan was carried out, and Jackson soon led a long march to the left, ending up behind the Union army. The Union was cut off from the northern supply center at Manassas Junction and from the Orange & Alexandria Railroad nearby. A day later, Longstreet followed Jackson.
On August 28, Jackson took his position by a flank of the Union army near Stoney Ridge. Although Pope had a much larger force, he couldn’t do much against the Confederates since the Rebels were under the cover of an unfinished railroad. While this body of Confederate soldiers fought Pope, another group moved to Centreville. When Jackson’s men disappeared, Pope received news of Confederates in Centreville. Wrongfully assuming that this was Jackson’s whole army, Pope sent his army to Centreville where it was fired upon at Groveton. Again making a fallacious conclusion, the Union general believed that the Union soldiers had caught the Confederates retreating to the valley. Ordering his men to set up around Groveton, Pope planned to finish off Jackson the next day.
Although the Union soldiers had an advantage of 42,000 more men, Jackson’s position behind the unfinished railroad made it difficult for them to gain any ground on August 29. Later in the day, Longstreet and his half of the army came on the Union’s left flank, but to Lee’s annoyance, chose not to fight that day, fussing with placing and alignment all day. Had he attacked that day, the Confederates may have won the battle much sooner. Strangely, Union soldiers did take notice of the Confederates, but Pope either took no notice or refused to believe in Longstreet’s presence. Neither organized nor commanded well, the Yankees didn’t “destroy” the Rebels as they had expected, and the fighting ended in a draw.
The next day, August 30, was even worse for the Union soldiers. Pope, apparently, still didn’t notice or believe that Longstreet was at the Union army’s left flank. The Union general evidently concentrated on getting rid of Jackson, rather than all of the Confederates, which made it easier for Lee to outsmart the Yankees. Letting the Union army attack the left flank of his own army, Lee overtook the Union’s left flank, which had less strength. Through the work of Lee, Jackson, Longstreet, and Stuart, the Union army was defeated once again on the old Manassas battlefield.
The 14,500 Union casualties of the Second Battle of Bull Run caused despair in the north. After the battle, Pope retreated back to Washington. Lincoln, waiting for a victory for him to issue the new Emancipation Proclamation, replaced Pope with McClellan a second time, hoping that somehow General McClellan would do better. Unable to stop Lee, the Union would later on fight the Battle of Antietam in Maryland.
The Confederate victory at Second Bull Run proved the superiority and intelligence of the southern generals. The fact that the outnumbered Confederates had 5,000 less casualties again shows the sharp distinction between the generals of both sides. The victorious Rebel army was later going to march northward, which would lead to the battles of Antietam, Chancellorsville, and Fredericksburg.
Just like the year before, the Union army had been defeated by the Confederate army on the Manassas battlefield. Lee’s genius had once again helped the Rebel army to a decisive victory. Sadly, the Union wouldn’t decisively win any major battles until nearly a year later at the battles of Vicksburg and Gettysburg. Named for the creek running alongside it, Bull Run was to become a historical monument, a reminder of the lives given for both the Union and Confederate causes.