Federalist
No. 10
James
Madison
AMONG
the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to
be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the
violence of faction. The friend of popular governments never finds himself so
much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their
propensity to this dangerous vice…. Complaints are everywhere heard from our
most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private
faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too
unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival
parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of
justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an
interested and overbearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these
complaints had no foundation, the evidence, of known facts will not permit us
to deny that they are in some degree true….
By a
faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or
a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of
passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the
permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
There
are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction:
the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.
There
are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying
the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every
citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.
It
could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than
the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without
which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty,
which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it
would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life,
because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.
The
second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as
the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it,
different opinions will be formed….
The
latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them
everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the
different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions
concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of
speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously
contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions
whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn,
divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered
them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for
their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual
animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most
frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their
unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most
common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal
distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property
have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and
those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a
manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many
lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them
into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The
regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task
of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the
necessary and ordinary operations of the government.
…..It
is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these
clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good.
Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in many cases, can
such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view indirect and remote
considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one
party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole.
The
inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES
of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means
of controlling its EFFECTS.
If a
faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican
principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular
vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will
be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction,
the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to
its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other
citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of
such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of
popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are
directed….
By
what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two
only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority
at the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent
passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation,
unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression….
From
this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I
mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and
administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in
almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole…and there is nothing to
check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual.
Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and
contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the
rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they
have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized
this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind
to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time,
be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions,
and their passions.
A
republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation
takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are
seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and
we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must
derive from the Union.
The
two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first,
the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens
elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere
of country, over which the latter may be extended.
The
effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the
public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens,
whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose
patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to
temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well
happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people,
will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people
themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be
inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs,
may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages,
and then betray the interests, of the people. The question resulting is,
whether small or extensive republics are more favorable to the election of
proper guardians of the public weal….
It
must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on
both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much
the number of electors, you render the representatives too little acquainted
with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too
much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too
little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal
Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate
interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State
legislatures.
The
other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of
territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic
government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious
combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter. The smaller
the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests
composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently
will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of
individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they
are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of
oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and
interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a
common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common
motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their
own strength, and to act in unison with each other….
Hence,
it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a
republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is
enjoyed by a large over a small republic,--is enjoyed by the
The
influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular
States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other
States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of
the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it
must secure the national councils against any danger from that source. A rage
for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property,
or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the
whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion
as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than
an entire State.
In
the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican
remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. And according
to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being republicans, ought to be
our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists.
PUBLIUS.
Federalist
No. 51
James
Madison
TO WHAT expedient,
then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary
partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the
Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior
provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so
contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several
constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each
other in their proper places….
But the great security
against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each
department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist
encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all
other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be
made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the
constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature,
that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But
what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern
men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.
In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.
A dependence on the
people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has
taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. This policy of
supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might
be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public.
We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power,
where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a
manner as that each may be a check on the other that the private interest of
every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of
prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of
the State. But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of
self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily
predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature
into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and
different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the
nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society
will admit. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments
by still further precautions. As the weight of the legislative authority
requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may
require, on the other hand, that it should be
fortified.
An absolute negative on
the legislature appears, at first view, to be the natural defense with which
the executive magistrate should be armed….
There are, moreover,
two considerations particularly applicable to the federal system of America,
which place that system in a very interesting point of view. First.
In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to
the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded
against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments.
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is
first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted
to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double
security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will
control each other, at the same time that each will be
controlled by itself. Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only
to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one
part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different
interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be
united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.
There are but two
methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the
community independent of the majority that is, of the society itself; the
other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of
citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very
improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments
possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority.
This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the
society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful
interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties.
The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United
States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the
society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and
classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will
be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority….
PUBLIUS.