Here is a copy of the opinion.
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SUPERIOR FARM MANAGEMENT, L.L.C., et al.
v.
MONTGOMERY et al.
No. S98A1403.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
March 8, 1999.

 Residential property owners sought injunctive relief to halt construction
of hog breeding facility following their complaint for abatement of a
nuisance. The Superior Court, Taylor County, Robert G. Johnston, J.,
granted interlocutory injunction, and appeal was taken. The Supreme Court, Hines,
J., held that: (1) finding that construction and operation of proposed
facility would constitute a nuisance was supported by evidence; (2)
testimony of two individuals living near hog farm facilities was
admissible; and (3) real estate development firm and real estate company involved in
site sale were appropriate parties.
 Affirmed.
 

Superior Farm Management, L.L.C. v. Montgomery

[1] KeyCite this headnote
279 NUISANCE
279I Private Nuisances
279I(A) Nature of Injury, and Liability Therefor
279k3 What Constitutes Nuisance in General

279k3(10) k. Keeping and slaughter of animals.
Ga.,1999.
Finding that construction and operation of proposed hog breeding facility
would, with reasonable certainty, constitute a nuisance causing nearby
residential property owners irreparable harm, thus warranting injunction
halting its construction, was supported by testimony of general manager of
proposed facility that on a daily basis, people within a half mile of the
facility would smell the odors from facility and that several times a year
the stench would extend to two to three miles away, and by expert testimony
that waste from facility would infiltrate and contaminate groundwater at
and around site. O.C.G.A. § 41-2-4.
 
 

Superior Farm Management, L.L.C. v. Montgomery
[1] KeyCite this headnote
279 NUISANCE
279I Private Nuisances
279I(C) Abatement and Injunction
279k22 Grounds for Injunction
279k23 In General

279k23(1) k. In general.
Ga.,1999.
Finding that construction and operation of proposed hog breeding facility
would, with reasonable certainty, constitute a nuisance causing nearby
residential property owners irreparable harm, thus warranting injunction
halting its construction, was supported by testimony of general manager of
proposed facility that on a daily basis, people within a half mile of the
facility would smell the odors from facility and that several times a year
the stench would extend to two to three miles away, and by expert testimony
that waste from facility would infiltrate and contaminate groundwater at
and around site. O.C.G.A. § 41-2-4.
 

Superior Farm Management, L.L.C. v. Montgomery
[1] KeyCite this headnote
405 WATERS AND WATER COURSES
405III Subterranean and Percolating Waters
405k107 Actions

405k107(2) k. Injunction.
Ga.,1999.
Finding that construction and operation of proposed hog breeding facility
would, with reasonable certainty, constitute a nuisance causing nearby
residential property owners irreparable harm, thus warranting injunction
halting its construction, was supported by testimony of general manager of
proposed facility that on a daily basis, people within a half mile of the
facility would smell the odors from facility and that several times a year
the stench would extend to two to three miles away, and by expert testimony
that waste from facility would infiltrate and contaminate groundwater at
and around site. O.C.G.A. § 41-2-4.
 
 

Superior Farm Management, L.L.C. v. Montgomery
[2] KeyCite this headnote
279 NUISANCE
279I Private Nuisances
279I(C) Abatement and Injunction
279k22 Grounds for Injunction
279k23 In General

279k23(1) k. In general.
Ga.,1999.
While mere apprehension of injury and damage is insufficient, where it is
made to appear with reasonable certainty that irreparable harm and damage
will occur from the operation of an otherwise lawful business amounting to
a continuing nuisance, equity will restrain the construction, maintenance or
operation of such lawful business.
 

Superior Farm Management, L.L.C. v. Montgomery
[3] KeyCite this headnote
279 NUISANCE
279I Private Nuisances
279I(C) Abatement and Injunction

279k18 k. Nature of remedy.
Ga.,1999.
Environmental laws do not attempt to alter general rules of law with regard
to private nuisances and will not aid or impede a private individual in an
action to enjoin a nuisance.
 

Superior Farm Management, L.L.C. v. Montgomery
[4] KeyCite this headnote
279 NUISANCE
279I Private Nuisances
279I(A) Nature of Injury, and Liability Therefor
279k3 What Constitutes Nuisance in General

279k3(1) k. In general.
Ga.,1999.
Thing that is lawful and proper in one locality may be a nuisance in
another; in other words, a nuisance may consist merely of the right thing
in the wrong place, regardless of other circumstances.
 
 

Superior Farm Management, L.L.C. v. Montgomery
[5] KeyCite this headnote
279 NUISANCE
279I Private Nuisances
279I(A) Nature of Injury, and Liability Therefor

279k4 k. Nature and extent of injury or danger.
Ga.,1999.
To constitute a nuisance, it is not necessary that the noxious trade or
business should endanger the health of the neighborhood; it is sufficient
if it produces that which is offensive to the senses, and which renders the
enjoyment of life and property uncomfortable.
 

Superior Farm Management, L.L.C. v. Montgomery
[6] KeyCite this headnote
279 NUISANCE
279I Private Nuisances
279I(C) Abatement and Injunction

279k33 k. Evidence.
Ga.,1999.
Testimony of two individuals living near hog farm facilities was relevant to
demonstrate impact of large scale hog farming on enjoyment and quality of
life of nearby residents and, thus, was admissible, in residential property
owners' action for interlocutory injunction to halt construction of hog
breeding facility following their complaint for abatement of a nuisance;
any size, structural, or operational variations between other facilities and
proposed facility went to weight to be accorded evidence, not to its
admissibility.
 

Superior Farm Management, L.L.C. v. Montgomery
[7] KeyCite this headnote
388 TRIAL
388X Trial by Court
388X(A) Hearing and Determination of Cause
388k376 Reception of Evidence
388k377 In General

388k377(1) k. In general.
Ga.,1999.
In a nonjury setting, a court may exercise broader discretion in admitting
evidence than it would when a jury is involved.
 
 

Superior Farm Management, L.L.C. v. Montgomery
[8] KeyCite this headnote
279 NUISANCE
279I Private Nuisances
279I(C) Abatement and Injunction

279k27 k. Persons against whom proceedings may be brought.
Ga.,1999.
Real estate development firm participating in site location of hog breeding
facility, and real estate company involved in site sale, were appropriate
parties to residential property owners' action for interlocutory injunction
to halt construction of hog breeding facility following their complaint for
abatement of a nuisance; their conduct was integral in the proposed sale
and preparation of the site for construction and operation of the hog facility.
 

**216
*619
Lovick P. Anthony, Jr., Butler, Denmark Groover, Jr., Groover & Childs,
Macon, Charles W. Byrd, Walker, Hulbert, Gray & Byrd, Perry, Hugh B.
McNatt,
McNatt, **217
Greene & Thompson, Vidalia, for Superior Farm Management, L.L.C., et al.
 Mitchell McKinley Shook, Salter, Shook & Craig, Tommy Joe Smith, Vidalia,
for N. Judson Montgomery, et al.
 

 *615
HINES, Justice.
 This is an appeal from the grant of an interlocutory injunction halting
the construction of a 1345-acre commercial hog breeding facility in Taylor
County. Temporary and permanent injunctive relief was sought by nearby
residential property owners following their complaint for abatement of a
nuisance pursuant to OCGA § 41-2-4. [FN1] For the reasons which follow, we
affirm.

FN1. OCGA § 41-2-4 provides:

Where the consequence of a nuisance about to be erected or commenced will
be irreparable damage and such consequence is not merely possible but to a
reasonable degree certain, an injunction may be issued to restrain the
nuisance before it is completed.
 
 
 
 

 Plaintiff property owners, Montgomery et al., filed this action against
N.G. Purvis Farms, Inc., which owns and operates several *616
large hog farms in North Carolina; Superior Farm Management L.L.C., an
entity owned by members of the Purvis family, and which would own and
operate the proposed Taylor County facility; J. Morey and Associates, a
real estate development firm participating in site location; and B & B
Properties and its co-owners, Barrow and Byrd, involved in the site sale. Plaintiffs,
whose properties are within one-half mile of the proposed site, alleged
that operation of the hog facility would result in groundwater and aquifer
contamination as well as impairment of air quality.

 The Superior Court of Taylor County found, after stating it had considered
the admissible evidence, that plaintiffs proved to a reasonable degree of
certainty that there was a substantial threat that they would be
irreparably damaged, hurt, inconvenienced, or injured by defendants' construction of
the proposed swine facility, and that it was a clear and urgent case in which
plaintiffs had no adequate remedy at law. The court further found that the
admissible evidence formed a reasonable basis for believing that plaintiffs
would prevail on the merits. It enjoined Superior Farm Management and the
other defendants from taking any further action with regard to the physical
construction of the proposed facility, including the sale of any property
from or to any defendant for the purpose of constructing the project. However, the injunction did
not prohibit defendants from continuing in the planning of the facility or from
seeking a permit from the Environmental Protection Division of the Georgia
Department of Natural Resources.

 The court also refused to dismiss defendants B & B Properties, Barrow,
Byrd, and J. Morey and Associates, based on the claim that their
participation does not directly result in the alleged nuisance.
 [1] 1. Appellants contend that the issuance of the interlocutory
injunction was unwarranted because the hog farm is not constructed but merely
proposed, and there can be no nuisance when there is no farm. However, OCGA § 41-2-4
expressly provides for the issuance of an injunction to restrain a nuisance
before completion, in order to avert what is shown to be irreparable
damage.

 In this case, the plaintiff property owners elicited testimony from
Superior Farm Management's general manager that the proposed facility could
house approximately 22,800 hogs at any one time; that the consequent
massive volume of feces and urine and other waste would drain into a concrete pit
under each building, then into anaerobic and aerobic lagoons where the
waste would be broken down, and finally the liquified mixture would be pumped to
and distributed over various spray fields; that the lagoons would attract
some insects; that the structures housing the hogs, the holding pits under
the houses, the lagoons, and the animals themselves have unpleasant odors;
that on a daily basis, people within a half mile of *617
the facility would smell the odors; and that several times a year the
stench would extend to two to three miles away. The manager acknowledged that
Superior Farm Management and its owner, Purvis, wanted to locate the
proposed swine operation in North Carolina but could not because **218
of Purvis' track record in managing certain of his eleven hog facilities in
North Carolina; the manager knew that one of the North Carolina farms had
been closed because of certain environmental incidents, namely fecal and
urine sludge being washed by rain into a creek and polluting it, allowing
an impermissibly high level of effluent in the holding lagoon, and losing
through a hole in a pipe from 3,000 to 4,000 gallons of effluent which
polluted a creek, killing fish. In this regard, plaintiffs introduced
evidence of litigation between the State of North Carolina and N.G. Purvis
Farms, Inc. Earlier, the manager had opined that the Taylor County farm
would be operated along guidelines similar to those utilized by Purvis at
the North Carolina facilities.
 
Plaintiffs also presented the testimony of an expert environmental
engineer and geochemist, who works with organic waste disposal, that certain
irritant and foul smelling gasses would be produced by the lagoons, and that, to a
reasonable degree of scientific certainty, waste from the facility would
infiltrate and contaminate groundwater at and around the site. [FN2]
 
 

FN2. Contrary to appellants' contention that the expert based his opinion
solely on "old plans" for the facility, the hearing transcript reveals that
the expert was aware of the proposed modifications.
 

 [2] The evidence was sufficient to authorize the superior court, sitting
as the arbiter of fact, to find that the construction and operation of the
proposed hog breeding facility would, with reasonable certainty, constitute
a nuisance causing the plaintiffs irreparable harm. This is in contrast to
the situations in Powell v. Garmany, 208 Ga. 550, 67 S.E.2d 781 (1951) and
Collins v. Lanier, 201 Ga. 527, 40 S.E.2d 424 (1946), cited by appellants;
in those cases, the perceived injuries were so speculative as to constitute
the mere apprehension of damage. "While mere apprehension of injury and
damage is insufficient, where it is made to appear with reasonable
certainty that irreparable harm and damage will occur from the operation of an
otherwise lawful business amounting to a continuing nuisance, equity will
restrain the construction, maintenance or operation of such lawful
business.
[Cits.]" Camp v. Warrington, 227 Ga. 674(2), 182 S.E.2d 419 (1971).
 [3][4][5] Appellants counter that equity is not needed to protect the
property *618
owners because of the protection of state environmental laws. But, such
laws do not attempt to alter general rules of law with regard to private
nuisances and will not aid or impede a private individual in an action
 

to enjoin a nuisance. Galaxy Carpet Mills v. Massengill, 255 Ga. 360,
361(2), 338 S.E.2d 428 (1986). "[A] thing that is lawful and proper in one
locality may be a nuisance in another. In other words, a nuisance may
consist merely of the right thing in the wrong place, regardless of other
circumstances.... 'To constitute a nuisance, it is not necessary that the
noxious trade or business should endanger the health of the neighborhood.
It is sufficient if it produces that which is offensive to the senses, and
which renders the enjoyment of life and property uncomfortable.' " May v.
Brueshaber, 265 Ga. 889, 466 S.E.2d 196 (1995), quoting Benton v. Pittard,
197 Ga. 843, 845-846, 31 S.E.2d 6 (1944).
 [6][7] 2. Appellants are likewise unsuccessful with the claim that the
superior court erred in considering irrelevant and prejudicial evidence
when it allowed the testimony of two individuals living near large hog farm
facilities. In a non-jury setting, a court may exercise broader discretion
in admitting evidence than it would when a jury is involved. See Davis v.
State, 189 Ga.App. 412, 376 S.E.2d 421 (1988); Dowling v. Jones-Logan Co.,
123 Ga.App. 380, 382(3), 181 S.E.2d 75 (1971). More significantly, that
these other facilities may have some size, structural or operational
variations from the one proposed for Taylor County was known to the
superior court and goes to the weight to be accorded the evidence. Any such
differences did not negate the relevance of the first-hand accounts of the
impact from a large scale hog

farm on the enjoyment and quality of life of nearby residents.
 [8] 3. Lastly, it was not error for the superior court to deny the motion
to dismiss **219
the real estate defendants. Their conduct was integral in the proposed sale
and preparation of the site for construction and operation of the hog
facility. What is more, the interlocutory injunction is tailored to
prohibit defendants from taking action on the property only with regard to the
physical construction of the facility in question, and therefore, is not
subject to the charge of being overbroad. See Essex Group, Inc. v.
Southwire Co., 269 Ga. 553, 557(2), 501 S.E.2d 501 (1998). There is no bar to other
dealings involving the property. [FN3]

FN3. At oral argument before this Court, it was disclosed that there had
been a conveyance of the real property subsequent to issuance of the
interlocutory injunction.
 

 Judgment affirmed.

 All the Justices concur.
END OF DOCUMENT