"...if our corps had been properly handled, and had been in a position to have received the enemy, I don't believe that they would have driven us an inch."
Orderly Sergeant William Dauchey - May 1863
Killed July 1, 1863 at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania
Part Two
Pistol of Captain William Lacey, Co. D
The Seventeenth at Chancellorsville - Part 2
The morning of May 2nd dawned bright and chilly. At about 8 AM General Hooker made an inspection of the lines of the XI Corps. Private Silliman wrote that he "made a fine appearance." As the day progressed, troops of the XI Corps began to report large numbers of troops to the south moving in a westerly direction. Private Silliman stated:
"...we could see by the continual glistening of the muskets in the sun that nearly all day there was a line of men passing that point to the west."
Gen. Hooker, now also aware of the line of troops passing to the south, determined that Lee was attempting to flank his own army. At 9:30 AM he issued an order to Generals Howard and Slocum (commanding the XII Corps) to be aware of the possibility of such an attack. Having just returned from his inspection of the lines of the XI Corps, the order stated in part:
"The right of your line does not appear strong enough. No artificial defences worth naming have been thrown up, and there appears a scarcity of troops at that point, and not, in the General's opinion, as favorably posted as might be..."
Hooker further added that the Confederate force s were moving to the right of the army, and that pickets should be advanced as far in advance as possible to warn of their approach. Even before receiving this, General Howard reported to General Hooker what the troops of the Seventeenth had been seeing all morning, and advised that he was "taking measures" to resist an attack from his the west.
What General Hooker couldn't know was that these measures were no more than the posting of some artillery behind the rifle pits of the 2nd Division's 2nd Brigade, and placing a signal station beyond the right flank. In any event, by noon General Hooker had altered his thinking, and now believed that Lee was retreating, adding one more piece to the impending disaster about to occur.
Approving a plan by General Dan Sickles to attack the "retreating" army to the south, General Hooker gradually added so many troops as to isolate the XI Corps completely. Unfortunately for General Hooker, and especially unfortunate for the men of the XI Corps, was the steadfast refusal of any ranking commander in the XI Corps to believe the reports that were beginning to come in from the regiments in the field.
The Surgeon of the Seventeenth, Dr. Robert Hubbard, was present at the Talley House(HQ of General Devens) when Colonel John C. Lee reported to General Devens that the Confederate's were massing for an attack. As Colonel Lee recalled, and Dr. Hubbard confirmed, General Devens response was "You are frightened, sir!". At that time Devens was laying on a couch in the house, due to an injured leg incurred on May 1st, when his horse rode into a tree. By noon, the division's officer-of-the-day, Lt. Colonel Charles Friend, advised Devens of the same to no avail. When Lt. Colonel Friend tried to inform General Howard of the sightings, he was accused by that officer of "cowardice".
Captain Wilcoxson wrote:
"...for some time, troops were seen passing to the south-west, along the crest of a distant hill; in regard to whom conjectures were various. Gen. McLean thought them to be rebels; but Gen. Devens was confident it was another corps of our own army...At one o'clock information came to Gen. Devens that the rebel batteries were moving around our right flank..."
Several more warnings were received at Division HQ that morning and afternoon. The successive warnings made the already irritable (and reportedly intoxicated) Devens angrier. Not until nearly 5PM did Devens even attempt to make a reconnaissance, and when the report was that the Confederate infantry blocked the way he refused to credit it. At Howard's HQ just down the Turnpike, a warning received at 2:45 PM from the Colonel of the 153rd Pennsylvania to Colonel Leopold von Gilsa advising that the Confederate infantry was massing to his front was outright rejected, as were repeated warnings from skirmishers on the right flank. Now, fully deceived as to the intentions of the oft-sighted column to the south, General Hooker ordered General Howard to send the only reserve he had, Barlow's brigade, to assist in the "pursuit" of the Confederate army. Howard, despite every warning received, accompanied the brigade south, further depleting his strength.
Wrote Captain Wilcoxson, whose company I was sent on picket at 3PM:
"...why a stronger force was not sent out as skirmishers and the line of battle changed to front the foe, is more than I am able to understand."
By this time, late on the afternoon of May 2nd, the high command of the XI Corps, with the sole exception of General Schurz of the 3rd Division, had virtually sealed the fate of the corps. General Schurz, heeding the warnings he had been hearing at Corps HQ all morning, changed front on his reserve regiments. His advise to change the front of Devens division was ignored. The regimental commanders of the 1st Division, whose warnings were all but ignored, made ready as best as possible for what they knew would come. The men of the Seventeenth, in their ninth month of service, would finally get their chance "to see the elephant".