18 through 28 Apr 45 - Our attacks during this period put the B-29 into tactical operations. Direct support of the Okinawa Campaign, a tactical role, established our versatility. Flying in direct support of the Navy we frustrated Jap attempts to alleviate the situation on Okinawa. Our raids were concentrated on southern Kyushu airfields. With relatively small forces, we attacked the airfield at Kokubu the 18th; Kanoya East Airfield and again Kokubu Airfield the 21st; Kanoya Airfield and Kushira Airfield on 22 April. It was on Kushira that we dropped all our bombs within 1,000 feet of the briefed aiming point. Miyazaki Airfield was the target on 26 April; Kokubu Airfield being again twice blasted on 27 and 28 Apr. Our heaviest enemy opposition was received on the 28th, when we claimed 2 destroyed, 2 probables and 6 damaged. On this mission, Lt. Brown and his crew, were forced to bail out. Except for the navigator, the entire crew was rescued. We received a commendation from the 5th. Fleet Commander for our share in this vital task.


 

Aerial Mines
13 thru 28 May 45 Our Group assumed entire responsibility for the mining of the Japanese Home Waters throughout this period. Flying nearly 3400 combat hours, we~ dropped over 1300 mines, totaling approximately 1200 Tons. Our main efforts were directed chiefly against the Shimonoseki Straits Area, continually replenishing these major fields. In addition, we established new fields in Niigata Harbor on 13 May; in Maizuru Bay on 16 May; in Tsuruga Bay on 18 May; in Miyazu and Maizuru Bay on

20 May, and replenishing the Shimonoseki Straits 23 May; Fushiki Bay and Narao Bay and again Niigata Harbor 24 May; in Karatsu Bay, Fukuoka Bay and again Fushiki Bay on 26 May; Moji Harbor and also Karatsu Bay~ on 27 May. The strangulation of Japan was all but complete with the closing of these ports. In her hour of need she was deprived of essential supplies from China, Manchuria and her other ill-gotten possessions. Approximately 12% of all Jap shipping losses were attributed to the concentrated aerial mining offensive indicating the exacting toll paid by the Japanese.

The success of these missions was not without a price. On 20 May, Lt. Caldwell and crew crashed while attempting take-off, killing 10 members of the crew. Then on the 22nd Lt Lewis and his crew were forced to bail out South of the Empire. On our final mining mission, Lt Black and his crew were lost to flak in the Shimonoseki Straits.

8 through 11 May 45 - We were again called upon to bomb airfields. Carrying 1,000 and 2,000 pound demolition bombs we attacked Oita and Miyazaki Airfields and Miyakonojo on Kyushu. On 8 and 10 May we hit Matsuyama Airfield on Shikoku. Enemy opposition was extremely slight. As a direct result of these strikes, the numerous suicide attacks on our fleet at Okinawa declined materially. Headquarters, XXI Bomber Command relayed the following paraphrased message from the Fifth Fleet Commander:

"REQUEST EXPRESSION OF MY APPRECIATION FOR HIGHLY EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE TO BOMCOM 21s FORCE AGAINST CONCENTRATIONS IN KYUSHU."

22 June 45 - Today we started after the Mitsubishi Air craft works at Nagoya. Capt. Rogan, Capt. Curry and Capt. Visinert led our formations. Weather was not as favorable as we had hoped. As a result, Capt Curry's formation went to the secondary target, the Utsube Oil Refinery. They did an excellent job of bombing, but encountered exceptionally accurate anti-aircraft fire. Every ship in the formation received some battle damage.

26 June 45 - Continuing our blows against the Japanese Aircraft Industry, we attacked the Aichi Aircraft Works in Nagoya from 20,000 feet. The unpredictable Empire weather precluded good bombing. Capt Scheaffer, leading the 3rd. Air Squadron, took the only formation over the target. The rest were either not able to assemble or broke up in the clouds. The nose frosted over on most ships so that bombing had to be done by radar. Nevertheless, some damage was inflicted on the plant. We now entered the final phase of our offensive against the Japanese Empire. We had survived the days of frustration,of trial and error, of discovery and of revolution in our tactics. We had seen our B-29s, with their tremendous load capacity, and stable bombing platform, used for mass area bombing, for tactical strikes at fighter fields and to drop mines from medium altitude by instrument, much more than for their original purpose of the strategic, pinpoint bombing of Japanese war industry.

Japan's situation was desperate. The "Blitz" had gutted 32 square miles in the cores of her four greatest cities and three main industrial complexes. Quick follow-up blows seized upon the disclosed mortal weakness of extreme congestion and high inflammability, to increase these desolated areas to 107 square miles. This mounting catastrophe virtually paralyzed those huge population centers and the bulk of her industry which was located there. Precision bombing was reducing those key targets existing outside the big urban areas. Now the mining program was bringing all shipping to a standstill.

Blockaded, burned, bombed, with defenses deteriorating, Japan resorted to wild, suicidal tactics; suicide planes against the invaders of Okinawa, suicidal mine sweeping, suicidal attempts to ram enemy aircraft. All were futile. Kamikaze concentrations were decimated on the airfields of Kyushu. Some got through but most of these fell to navy fighters or disappeared in naval gunfire.

On 21 June 45 organized resistance ceased on Okinawa, though the enemy continued his attacks with the dwindling Kamikaze Corps. Suicidal mine sweeping merely added to the toll of shipping sunk, as mines mysteriously came to life in freshly-swept channels. Ramming tactics against our planes failed to the point of suspicion.

With every major city and industrial area except Yawata and the Shrine City of Kyoto sub-stantially "burned out", we were now assigned


Typical Bomb run

assigned the job of reducing Japan's secondary cities. Industrially significant in their own right, their importance had increased with the destruction of earlier plants and housing areas.

17-18 June 45 - We commenced with Yokkaichi, dropping 230 Tons of incendiaries, at night, from medium altitude. More than halt the city, 1.23 square miles, was consumed. Simultaneously, other wings in the Bomber Command fired Kagoshima, Omuta and Hamamatsu.

19-20 June 45 - While we dropped 200 Tons of incendiary bombs on Fukuoka, with the help of the 73rd. Wing, other wigs hit Toyohashi and Shizuoka. Most of the secondary cities were assigned to only one or two wings. When the war ended, we had almost worked down to group targets.

28-29 June 45 - In our final June attack, we destroyed 28.8% of Moji. As in the last two incendiaries and in the others to follow, we came at night, using medium altitude.

1-2 July 45 - Ube was routine. We left it one quarter destroyed. Only one ship received any battle damage.

3-4 July 45 - Himeji burned so intensely, that violent thermo conditions developed, causing major damage to one B-29 and injuring 3 members of its crew. The thermal provided the only serious opposition. Anti-aircraft fire was meager. Night fighters made one ineffective attack. Damage was high, with 70% of the 2 sq. mile urban area destroyed.

6-7 July 45 - Next we turned to Shimizu. With 34 aircraft and 300 Tons of bombs, we effaced half of the city.

9-10 July 45 - Wakayama was high lighted for us by the designation of "Goin' Jesse" to carry the Army Air Forces' 2,000,000th ton of bombs dropped on the Axis in World War II. Destruction of 50% of the city ensued

. 12-13 July 45 - Tsuruga, on the North Honshu coast, was our next victim. It was one of the three important parts on the Sea of Japan. As in the last seven raids, enemy defenses were meager to nil. 6% was obliterated.

16-17 July 45 - The 84% of Kuwana that we wiped out was the highest percentage of ruin that we accomplished. Again the Nip was unwilling or unable to offer any serious opposition. Not one of our ships was damaged. We wound up July with night incendiary strikes against Choshi, Tokuyama and Uji-yamada on 19, 26 and 27 July. On none of these was enemy resistance effectual.

1-2 August 45 - We celebrated Air Force Day by putting the greatest number of aircraft into the air and over the target in the history of the Group. 47 aircraft delivered 350 Tons of jellied fire to Nagaoka. We were joined in the XX Air Force's maximum effort. Five wings hit four urban areas and one oil refinery. In this massive effort, more than 750 B-29s released 6260 Tons of destruction on the Empire, traveling approximately 3,000 miles round trip. In comparison, the 8th Air Force, in it's maximum effort on 11 October 44, against Cologne, dropped 2923 Tons of bombs and flaw 650 miles round trip.

8 Aug 45 - Yawata remained as the only major industrial area in Japan that we had not devastated. China based 29s attacked it in August, 1944, but were given a rough reception. Unmolested since then, legend had magnified its formidable defenses. We found it tough, but no worse than any other major city, Lt, Keller's crew, in Capt Nash's squadron, was hit by flak and forced to bail out. All survived except Lt. Keller and have since been repatriated.

With the exception of a 3 plane attack on Kumagaya, our last of the war, Yawata concluded our incendiary missions.


14 August 45 Appropriately, our last major effort was a daylight, precision raid, from high altitude. Our formations, led by Colonel Huglin, struck the Marifu R.R.Yards dropping 264 tons of bombs with excellent results.