11-12 Mar 45 - Continuing the hitherto unprecedented, almost unbelievable low-level use of the B-29, Nagoya, 3rd largest city in Japan was the next victim. Unfortunately, results proved disappointing after the spectacular Tokyo raid with 2.05 square miles being destroyed. Undaunted, we played a return engagement 18-19 Mar, and after the smoke had cleared away, a gratifying total of 5 square miles lay in ruin. We dropped a total of 370 Tons of incendiaries in the 2 raids, enemy opposition slight on both occasions.

No attempt has been made here to tell about these raids in exact order. Some are not mentioned. Some are grouped for ease of illustration, or for contrast, etc. A complete chronology does appear in the back of this journal.

24-25 Mar 45 - After a short break in which to recover from the enormous wear of the Blitz on men and planes we resumed the high altitude, precision bombing tactics, for which we had been trained, but with the important modification that we returned, by individual aircraft, under the protection of darkness. Enemy night fighters had indicated their scarcity and impotence. Illuminating our target with photo flash bombs, we hit the Mitsubishi Aircraft Factory at Nagoya. As expected, enemy fighter reaction was weak. However, Flak was intense. Not only was it the most accurate that our crews had experienced, it was the best coordinated with the greatest number of Searchlights. Nagoya became "Flak Alley". Lt. Hardgrave and his crew, survivors of an earlier ditching, became our second crew lost.

-28 and 30-31 Mar 45 - On these nights we flew our first mining missions, participating in the maiden attempt to establish mine fields in the home waters of Japan. This new assault was in direct tactical support of the imminent Okinawa invasion, though it had a broader, strategic significance. Submarines and surface units of the U.S. Fleet operating south and east of the main islands, had sunk or driven her shipping and most of her remaining fleet, into ,the false safety of her harbors and the shallow Inland Sea transportation artery for all of central Japan. Already, the bulk of her imports and exports had to funnel through the vulnerable bottleneck of the Shimoneseki Straits, but beyond the broad strategy of slow strangulation, was the immediate necessity of barring her fleet from interference with the campaign at hand.

We placed our mines in the Shimonoseki Straits and in the approaches to the Kure Naval Base, Japan's greatest. In all, we had 51 effective aircraft. Very little enemy opposition was encountered. We approached at low altitude mined by instrument, and disappeared into the night before the Jap could effectively intercept. At this time we had the advantage of surprise. The enemy had not yet arranged his defenses to meet this new threat. Admiral Nimitz congratulated all units taking part, on their achievements. Ours was not without cost. Capt. White and ten members of his crew were killed when they crashed after being forced by mechanical difficulty to make an early return to base.


Typical Kyushu airfield strike
 1-2 April 45 - Anticipating formidable defenses in the Kure Area, we mined from high altitude for the only time. However flak was nil and only one enemy fighter was seen. Ground crews readied the planes and briefings were prepared, the Tenth Army was going ashore on Okinawa. 3-4 April 45 - Our second and last attempted to do night precision bombing. With 22 aircraft we attacked the Nakajima Koizumi Plant at Ota, through solid undercast. Later reconnaissance showed that we destroyed 10% of the target.

12 April 45 - Candidly, we should have stayed "in the sack". While five of our aircraft re-mined the Shimonoseki approaches, our main force in good bombing weather, dropped their bombs over 2,000 feet short of the target at Ota. Enemy resistance was practically nonexistent.

13-14 April 45 - With today's effort we resumed our incendiary attacks against Japan's major cities. Our target was the Tokyo Arsenal Area. Vie had another perfect score, with 28 aircraft scheduled, 28 airborne, 28 striking the primary and 28 returning safely to base. Sixteen fighter aircraft fire was moderate to intense. This mission was one of our most successful and resulted in the destruction of approximately 11 sq. miles, slightly over 10% of the city.

15-16 April 45 - Swiftly we followed up our second big raid on Tokyo, with a maximum blow the next night, at the adjoining city of Kawasaki. This was our toughest as well as our costliest mission. Over 50 enemy aircraft were encountered. Anti-aircraft fire was both accurate and intense. We were in it longer too. "Thermals", one of the serious perils on these fire raids, were unusually severe. Approximately a dozen "Balls of Fire" were sighted by our crews. With over 300 aircraft going over the target, the danger of midair collision was ever present. In short this mission had everything. There were 13 aircraft lost in the Bomber Command Four of them were ours: Lt. Carver, Lt. Jones, Lt. Sullivan and Lt. Malo. There was some satisfaction in knowing that 9.6 square miles were burned out of the center of the city; a crippling blow.

1 June 45 - We started June with a daylight incendiary attack on Osaka. With 31 aircraft, we joined in a maximum Bomber Command effort that put 458 aircraft out of 4 wings over the target, dropping 2,788 tons of incendiaries. By the time we arrived, Osaka was burning so heavily that we were forced to bomb slightly to the left of our briefed aiming point. We met 9 enemy aircraft and destroyed one of them. 11 of our aircraft suffered damage from flak, the damage done had been added to that of the "Blitz", the total was over 11 square miles destroyed.

5 June 45 - Our daylight incendiary raid on Kobe marked the high point of enemy air opposition. Despite 75 attacks at least 15 of which were coordinated attacks by 2 or more aircraft, our formations, led by Lt. Col. Huglin, and Lt. Col. Luschen riding with Capt. McClintock and Lt. Bearden, with Capt. Rogan leading the 3rd. air squadron and Capt. Bertagnoli leading the 4th. air squadron, put 225 tons of fire bombs on the target. We destroyed 16 enemy aircraft, probably destroyed 6 more and damaged 7. When the smoke had cleared away we learned that the area of damage within this city of one million people, now stood at 56%.

15 June 45 - Returning to the Osaka Area we dropped 255 tons of incendiaries on Amagasaki, midway between Kobe and Osaka. The stricken city put up no opposition. This was our greatest load so far. 2.5 sq. miles were destroyed.


7 April 45- Mitsubishi's Aircraft Engine Works, Nagoya was two thirds ruined today, bringing total destruction to 94%. Anti-aircraft fire was intense and accurate, enemy fighter defense vicious. We claimed our first fighter kill and probably destroyed one more and damaged five.

9 June 45 - The Aichi Atsuta Aircraft Plant in Nagoya was our main target one of the multiple attacks on various Empire targets. Dropping 184 Tons of high explosive bombs, the target was practically wiped out. 95% of the aircraft works and over 50% of the engine works were destroyed. We met slight fighter opposition while anti-aircraft fire was generally meager.

The following message from General LeMay was passed on to the CO 9th Bombardment Group on 11 June by the Commanding General 313th Bombardment Wing:

"CONGRATULATIONS FOR CROSSING TARGETS 198 AND 2010 OFF OUR LIST OF ENGINE PRIORITY TARGETS. IN SPITE OF SHORT NOTICE AFFORDED YOUR CREWS THE RESULTS OF THIS MISSION SHOW CAREFUL PLANNING AND COMPETENT EXECUTION."