by Bud Farrell - 19th Bomb Group

 
After the disastrous B-29 vs. MiG-15 air battle of October 23, 1951, which later became known as Black Thursday, with the loss of several 307th B-29's to MiG-15's over Namsi, North Korea, the 3 B-29 Groups (the 19th Bomb Group, and 98th and 307th Bomb Wings) had to revert to night missions and rely on the cover and protection of darkness, with very few

daylight raid exceptions for the balance of the war which ended on July 27, 1953. The MiG-15 had made the B-29 obsolete, and there was no immediate replacement aircraft yet available or appropriate for the type of missions required. B-29's had flown everything from frontline support, dropping on enemy troop concentrations, bombing of rail lines, road supply truck routes, bridges, refineries, factories and last, but NOT least, North Korean airfields.

The vulnerability of the B-29s, even under cover of darkness, was further proven on the night of June 10, 1952. Over the relatively innocuous railway bridge targets of Kwaksan, MiG-15's destroyed 3 and badly damaged several others of the 19th Bomb Group out of Kadena Air Force Base on Okinawa. All were caught in searchlights and then jumped by MiGS!

Our crew arrived in the 19 Bomb Group on June 21 1952 -- 10 days later

The apprehension from recent losses was very great and very unsettling to us "rookies". There was a great deal of gallows humor about "you won't need this or that very long". I, of course, was, and shall forever more be, commonly imposed on the new kids on the block! We had our turn six months later as we were getting ready to go home! But now it was " our turn in the barrel".


Joe Whisman (radio op) and Bud (left gunner)

 After several orientation flights and related sessions with the Group Flight Surgeons Office on how to give in-flight blood transfusions etc, with the blood plasma kits we carried aboard the aircraft, we were ready for our first combat mission as a full crew. One of the first and most shocking briefing instructions to the Gunners, (including the Bombardier/Nose Gunner) was that we were "absolutely NOT to fire unless we were clearly fired upon"!. This went against the grain of everything we had been trained to do - a year and a half of intense Gung Ho "slug -it -out" simulated attacks with gun camera passes by F-51 Mustangs and F-80 Shooting Star Jets over Colorado, Wyoming, Texas and Louisiana. What the hell is this.... " DON'T SHOOT-"
We were initiated on the night of July 3/4th. On our first mission, a MiG-15 appeared just off our left wing flying formation with us, very close in! The more senior gunner on the crew we were replacing, Brownie, said "Watch this", and he took an Aldis lamp ( similar to the current Q-Beam Sport Type plug- in Spot Light) which was used for visual checks in the darkness for wing and control surface damage, engine checks, etc., and he held it in front of his face and under his chin . like we did as kids playing "flashlight'. He clicked it on, damn near blinding us in the gunners' compartment, and was making faces and giving the MiG the FINGER!

"What the hell ......"

With that, the cockpit light of the MiG comes on. The MiG drops its landing gear to slow down, is flying superb formation with us at our left wing tip and now HE is giving US the finger! My heart is in my throat and these two are playing an early version of "road rage" I On the way back to Okinawa (about a 4 hour trip) I got a REAL briefing and the following was what was going on.

Earlier fighter aircraft, prop or jet propelled, had to fly what is called a "pursuit curve" - the manuever so frequently illustrated in pictures - of a pilot's two hands making a pass at each other, with one having to make constant adjustment to the movement and changes in direction of the other. This "leading", or pointing of the nose of the attacking aircraft then required some distance from the target in order to make the adjustments while spotting, sighting, and making a firing pass. If the guy in close attempted to point his nose at you, he was past you before he could even bring the fighter's gun platform to bear! Too CLOSE to the target and he was past the target before firing. Too FAR out in the dark and he had NO target, due to loss of visual sighting. There were then, in 1952, no air-to-air heat seeking or guided missiles, only ballistic missiles which went directly where they were pointed until they burned out and fell to the ground if missing the target - another aircraft.

Pulling props through

 Thus if the target, a bomber, had a fighter find it in the darkness by chance, following a slightly visible exhaust stack torch, spotted in a bright moonlight, or whatever, the fighter could stay with the bomber, fly close in and attempt to draw fire as another Bogey sat off a little ways getting vectored in with altitude, airspeed, heading, from the "Decoy". He could then make a pass - a pursuit curve -firing at the flashes from the multiple 50's of the bombers turrets, as the decoy dropped or dashed away to safety. No fire, no flashes. No damage, no losses!
The value of a B-29, and its 11 or 12 man crew, was far greater than the possible reward of a single MiG-15 with a relatively inexperienced North Korean or Chinese Pilot. In 1952 some Russian, Czech, and Polish Pilots were flying MiG's in combat over the Yalu. Nicknamed the "HONCHOS", they were experienced World War II pilots polishing new jet skills and tactics, as were many of our fighter pilots, including many WW II Reservists recalled to active duty for Korea!

Tracking of bombers by fighters following up on vapor trails in cold weather, and in the brightness of moonlight, was another matter; and climatic conditions were well considered in the timing and altitude of bomb runs in order to preclude the creation of vapor trails whenever possible. But many aircraft were still lost or damaged under such unanticipated and changing conditions from briefing time to time over target, 4 or 5 hours later! We experienced many similar incidents of non-firing passes in the darkness on our



Waiting for engine to start

next 24 missions, and of course we had some of our other 'friendlies" up there too - B-29's and fighters, another good reason for strict fire control.

But the air battles included a great deal more. With Radar Directed AAA (anti Aircraft Artillery) fire of 88s, 90s, 105s, and supposedly up to 120 MM heavy guns putting up a box barrage in front of and at the altitude known for the bomber stream (through recon aircraft, radar etc.), flying in single trail, a SHORAN RADAR ( Short Range Radar Navigation) Arc, each plane flying the same arc, 30 to 60 seconds horizontal and 500 foot vertical separation, of up to as many as 66 B?2'9s on a max effort target up along the Yalu River. If flak, searchlights, enemy aircraft dropping illuminating parachute flares above us, and MiGS, aren't a part of an air battle, then we weren't in many!