In the middle days of August, 1949, the United States apparently received intelligence data which indicated that the Russians had either exploded, or were about to explode, an atomic bomb. While no specific documentation confirming the above statement is available from the HQ USAF level, supporting circumstantial evidence for this assumption may be found in the 375th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron History for the third quarter of 1949, and in the Alaskan Air Command History for 1949.

In the former, the 375th, then based at Eielson AFB, Fairbanks, Alaska, reports that on August 18th the Air Weather Service Operations Center ordered the Squadron to fly a Loon Special mission covering the Aleutian Chain and the Bering Sea north of the Chain.

The purpose of the mission was described in the History as "air mass filtering". In the same orders the 375th was concurrently alerted for a "maximum effort" on August 20th. The execution of the "maximum effort" was to be dependent upon results obtained from analysis of the filter papers exposed on the 18 August flight.

The Loon Special mission was actually flown on August 19th. The flight plan called for a clockwise flight plan from Eielson to Skwentna to Atka Island in the central Aleutians to Nunivak Island and back to Eielson. The entire mission to be flown at the 500 millibar level, or approximately 18,000 feet.

The alert was cancelled after the 19 August flight, and there was no "maximum effort" flown on August 20th or 21st. The obvious conclusion is that the filter papers exposed on the 19 August Special did not reveal any airborne nuclear debris.

The Alaskan Air Command 1949 History contains the following paragraph on page 50: "In response to a request by Hq USAF, a report was submitted concerning unusual radar, barometric, light, sound, and earth shock incidents observed through the period 21-22 August. Although only conjecture, it was believed that this was to amplify reports of the explosion of an atomic bomb by the Russians."

Note the difference in dates. The 375th was alerted to prepare for a maximum effort on 20 August "dependent on the results obtained from analysis of the filter papers exposed on the 18 August flight." This indicates that a possibly contaminated air mass was expected to be encountered over the northern Pacific by 18 August and, therefore, that the possible explosion itself took place approximately five days earlier, in the period 13-14 August. Yet the Alaskan Air Command was evidently instructed to look for several indicators of a bomb blast on August 21st or 22nd whose physical natures would allow manifestations to reach Alaska in a period of time ranging from instantaneous (light) to hours (sound) after the explosion.

The obvious explanation is that the Alaskan Air Command was alerted to watch for geophysical manifestations of an atomic explosion on the second of two potential explosion dates (see below). The evidence is circumstancially strong that intelligence received first designated 13-14 August as a scheduled test date. When that did not occur, the 21-22nd was targeted. Given this scenario, it can be assumed that the intelligence predicting the test dates had very little lead time to the actual event, thus explaining why Alaskan Air Command was not alerted to be looking for evidence of a 13-14 August explosion. The word was received too late for effective action by AAC, but not by the 375th. Allowing for whiplash in the USAF communications system, the intelligence input must thus have become available to HQ USAF between 15 and 17 August.

A second entry in the 375th History also suggests that the United States had some reason to believe that the Russians were going to explode a nuclear device on 13-14 August. When evidence of this did not materialize in the 19 August filter papers, the 21st or 22nd were pinpointed as possible test days. The event cited in the 375th History stated that the Chief of the Air Weather Service, on 23 August, directed a maximum effort to perform without fail all Loon Charlie flights on August 24th and 25th Zulu, and all Ptarmigan missions on August 24th, 25th, 26th, and 27th Zulu.

All Loon missions were to be flown under then-current operating procedures. All Ptarmigan missions were to be flown at the 700 millibar pressure level to the North Pole, and at the 500 millibar level returning to Eielson. Particular emphasis was placed on the performance of all missions, and they were flown as directed. Specifically, these were Loon Charlie 51 and 52; and Ptarmigans 251, 252, 253, and 254.

As no directly relatable documentation on these alerts has been obtainable from either the Air Weather Service or the Air Force Historical Research Center, one may only conjecture as to what was happening. In summary, based on the sequence of events, the author feels comfortable with the theory that the United States had become aware, through intelligence sources inside the Soviet Union, that there was a possibility of a Russian nuclear test, first on August 13-14, and then on August 21-22.

It also seems logical to assume that this intelligence did not reach the U.S. until after the 14th of August, as the Alaskan Air Command was not required to report light, sound, seismic, etc., evidence for the period 13-14 August. As these indicators would reach Alaska the same day of the test, the intelligence warning of the possible detonation seemingly reached the U.S. too late to monitor these specific parameters. This would indicate very little lead time in the receipt of the initiating intelligence.

Another burning question, for which again there seems to be no (unclassified/available) documentation, is why these alerts were discontinued after 27 August. If the reports were creditable enough to justify the Special flights and the alerting of the Alaskan Air Command to monitor a variety of physical parameters, prudence would dictate continuing the flights and alerts for at least another week. The answer is probably still lying in a Pentagon safe with TOP SECRET stamped all over it. If the answer does concern intelligence sources, do not look for it to be declassified and released in the near future.

30 AUGUST - 3 SEPTEMBER 1949

The Loon Charlie flights from Alaska, and the Vulture Charlie flights from Guam to Japan, had a popularity with squadron personnel far beyond what could be expected for a sixteen hour flight in a cold and cramped airplane. There was never a shortage of people asking to go, and the ground crews always exercised their perogative as the true owners of the airplanes, sending a couple of people along as Crew Chiefs.

The reason for this popularity was both the destination and the scheduling. Charlies were normally flown every other day. With the requirement to have a second aircraft available in Japan to act as a standby for the departing mission ship,it meant that the crews were forced(?) to spend four to six glorious days in Japan. It is not known what the 375th people thought of this extreme hardship, but it is the author's personal knowledge that on Guam the troops would have killed to get aboard a Charlie.

It is probably safe, therefore, to assume that at least part of the 375th's Crew 5A, consisting of the following officers and airmen:

First Lieutenant Robert C. Johnson - Aircraft Commander
First Lieutenant Lawrence E. Parl - Pilot
First Lieutenant Charles E. Massey - Navigator
First Lieutenant Gene A. Culbertson - Navigator
First Lieutenant Robert L. Lulofs - Weather Observor
M/Sgt James K. Bosgood - Flight Engineer
M/Sgt Thomas R. Richardson - Radar Operator
S/Sgt Richard D. Boyce - Crew Chief
S/Sgt Steve T. Yapuncich - Radio Operator
Cpl Lauren G. Gackstetter - Dropsonde
Operator Pfc William H. Kelly - Radio Operator

were not overwhelmed, on that morning of August 30th, 1949, with the idea of leaving Japan for Alaska on the eastbound Loon Charlie 55. For the single men it was bad enough to be facing the letdown that came with leaving Japan after party time. When you added to that the prospect of the long, uncomfortable return flight to Alaska, the faces were not too cheerful. If they had known the flight home was going to take four days, the ground crew would probably have had to push them into the airplane.

Loon Charlie 55 took off from Yokota as scheduled in aircraft 44-62232. Shortly after takeoff, an hour or so outbound, Lt. Johnson experienced a power loss in number two engine, forcing him to shut down the engine, feather the propeller and return to Yokota. After transferring themselves, baggage and equipment to the standby aircraft, S/N 44-62202, Crew 5A had lightning strike in almost the same place, this time losing number one engine.

When Yokota received word from 2202 that they intended to return once again to Yokota, Approach Control informed Lt. Johnson that not only had the Yokota weather deteriorated since his second departure, but the GCA (Ground Controlled Approach) system had gone inoperative. It would be best if 2202 went somewhere else. Lt. Johnson thereupon headed his limping airplane north and west and landed at Misawa Air Base, located near the northern end of Honshu.

Major mechanical repairs would be required on 2202 before it flew again, and Crew 5A was thus unable to make the scheduled Loon Charlie flight back to Eielson AFB on 30 August.

When informed of this situation, the 375th dispatched aircraft 44-62214 as the westbound Loon Charlie 56 to Japan one day early. It departed Eielson at nine o'clock in the evening of 31 August, Alaska time.

Reaching Misawa on 2 September (remember, the International Date Line was crossed on all Loon Charlie flights and you gained a day westbound), 2214 was postflighted, serviced and prepped by the long-suffering maintenance people of the 2079th Composite Group for an immediate return flight the next morning. (The 2079th was charged with the maintenance of Vulture Charlie and Loon Charlie airplanes at Yokota and Misawa. It was composed of people drawn from the 514th Reconnaissance Squadron and the 375th in Alaska.)

Crew 5A departed Misawa in 2214 eastbound as Loon Charlie 55 to Eielson as planned on September 3rd, reaching that base at 0800 hours, local time, September 3rd.

No official procedures pertaining to the changing sequence of the filter papers has been uncovered by the author. However, questioning of a Weather Technician (Dropsonde Operator) assigned to the 514th Recon Squadron in this same time period indicates that the filter pairs were changed every three hours or at a change of course or altitude.

In Alaska, the bagged filter pairs were removed from the Loon Charlie aircraft and taken to the Air Weather Service Special Projects Lab for disintegration counts. The AWS/SP lab technician, identified as Corporal (Sergeant in secondary references) Eugene W. Tews, ran the preliminary radioactivity count on the first filter of each exposed pair. How many pairs were checked before the companion filter to #0338 was analyzed is not known, but this filter broke the routine.

This particular set of filters had been exposed for three hours at 18,000 feet over the North Pacific, indicating the position of exposure to be on the long leg of the eastbound track. The radioactivity count came in at 85 per minute, thirty-five above the established level of significance of 50 per minute. As this was 70% above the Alert level, a message was sent to AFOAT-1 no later than 1000 Hours Saturday, September 3rd. This report did not immediately cause a great deal of excitement at AFOAT-1. Many of the previous one hundred and eleven Alerts recorded prior to September 3rd had shown counts in the same range, and all had been demonstrated to be the results of natural phenomena.

But then word was received from Alaska that the companion filter, number 0338, had been processed and had shown an initial decay rate of 153 counts per minute. This filter was ordered to be immediately packaged and sent on its way to the Tracerlab west coast facility at Berkeley, California, for radiochemical analysis by 1000 hours, 3 September, Anchorage time (2000Z). More about of this transmittal below.

As was stated in Part I, in the Spring of 1949 one of the many problems requiring work within the Interim Surveillance Research Net was communications. From the various time fixes available, it seems that communications were still a problem six months later. Aircraft 2214 landed at Eielson at 0800 local time. This is known from the Zulu takeoff time and flight time reported in the 375th history. Corporal Tews had measured at least two filters, initiated the message to AFOAT-1, and had sent the second filter to Berkeley. The time of this last event in the sequence is precisely documented in a classified teletype conference transcript that occurred between 0600 and 0823 Zulu on 6 September. The time of transmittal of the second filter is precisely stated as being 2000 Zulu, 3 September, or 1000 Hours local.

Thus, with the five hour time difference between Alaska and the east coast, the initial report was sent no later than 1500 hours, Washington time. Yet the Air Force Detection Report says that the initial message from Alaska was received "..shortly after dinner.", placing receipt in the 1800-2000 hour time frame and showing an in-process message duration of three to five hours!

4 SEPTEMBER 1949

Successive measurements of the first filter paper at two hour intervals were being made in Alaska by Corporal Tews. As each count was completed, the information was transmitted to the AFOAT-1 Data Analysis Center, where it was plotted by Doctors William B. Urry and Donald H. Rock. As the plots mounted up, the conclusion became firmer and firmer that this radioactivity was the result of fresh fission products being introduced into the atmosphere. The tension around Alert 112 was starting to build that fall Sunday afternoon in the "G" Street headquarters.

The Air Weather Service Operations Center, relaying direction from AFOAT-1, alerted the 375th for a single maximum range flight at the 500 millibar level of altitude. The initial alert was followed by a second message directing that an "excursive" track be flown from Eielson south to Hickam AFB in Hawaii.

5 SEPTEMBER 1949

The question now plaguing AFOAT-1 was whether the apparent fission products picked up in the atmosphere were bomb debris, or were they the byproduct of a laboratory or reactor accident? There was no way of telling until sufficient samples were available to perform radiochemical analyses.

The only physical evidence actually in AFOAT-1's hands on Labor Day morning were the decay measurements being made on the first Alert 112 filter. In Alaska, Corporal Tews, working under the direction of Captain Carroll L. Hasselltine of the Air Weather Service, continued his exhausting pace of a disintegration measurement every two hours for forty-eight hours. The second filter paper, dispatched from Fairbanks on September 3rd, had not yet reached the Tracerlab facility in Berkeley, California, a fact that was causing administrative earth tremors strong enough to be picked up on Berkeley's seismograph .

With only the decay measurements from a single filter in hand, AFOAT-1 had to have many, many more samples for identification and confirmation of the fission products. But before they could order out Special flights to collect airborne samples, they had the basic problem of where to send the planes. The geographic location and distribution of the contaminated air mass, two days after the initial detection, had not yet been established. Was the pickup in the North Pacific the leading edge of the air mass? The trailing edge? Somewhere in the middle? AFOAT-1 had to find out as quickly as possible.

To start the definition process, a 375th aircraft took off from Eielson on September 5th to fly the Special authorized by Air Weather Service Operations Center the previous day. The plane would fly a Loon Victor Special, destination: Hickam AFB, Hawaii. The Loon Victor would be flown all the way at the 500 millibar level and would follow a essentially direct route to Hawaii. The exact course specified by the Air Weather Service was:

Eielson AFB to 45o North Lat., 150o West Long.
45o North, 150o West to 37o North, 158o West
37o North, 158o West to Hickam AFB

The Loon Victor departed as scheduled, with an inflated crew. Neither the size of the crew nor the on-time departure should evoke comment: Specials to desirable places such as Hawaii or Japan or , in the case of the 514th, ther Philippines, were never allowed to be delayed by minor mechanical problems, and always carried a larger crew than necessary.

Only something REALLY serious, say an engine falling off on pre-flight inspection, would prevent that plane from getting off on schedule. The prevailing philosophy for these fat-cat trips was, "Let's get up and away before they change their minds and cancel the trip." The flight crew had not been briefed as to the real purpose of the mission; the TDY orders simply said the flight was "... for weather reconnaissance". There was no reason for the crew not to think the flight was just another weather mission, this time to exotic Hawaii.

Meanwhile, thousands of miles to the west on the evening of September 5th (4 September, local time, in Washington), a set of filter papers were being routinely turned in at Yokota Air Force Base in Japan that would really jar AFOAT-1.

It started out as just another routine Vulture Charlie flight from Anderson Air Force Base on Guam to Yokota, one more scheduled mission in the every-other-day sequence normally flown by the 514th Reconnaissance Squadron (VLR) Weather. The airplane and crew departed Guam with smiles on their faces and cartons of cheap, ration-free cigarettes in their B-4 bags, looking forward to a little profitable trading in Tachikawa's Black Market Alley. Unrationed Guam cigarettes could turn a $0.70 per carton investment into four dollars worth of Yen, and finance a memorable stay in Japan.

They had no idea, when Sergeant Gaylen Carnehl, the Weather Technician, picked his way through the bodies strewn all over the aft compartment and out through the rear pressure hatch to change the filters once again way up there north and east of Japan, that his journey was anything more than one more irritant on the long, uncomfortable flight. At least this time, at an altitude of only 10,500 feet, the airplane did not have to be depressurized with the attendent hassle of having to go on oxygen.

When the Vulture Charlie finally arrived at Yokota, the filter papers were turned in per procedure to the Air Weather Service's Special Projects Detachment. That organization, the next morning, started the routine decay rate measurements performed on each and every set of filters.

It is probably safe to assume that the measurement procedure was run through two or three times before the results were accepted. The decay rate count on the first filter of the pair exposed northeast of Japan the evening before was 1000 per minute, twenty times that necessary to call an Alert! Once accepting that the measurements were indeed valid, a message detailing the count was flashed out to AFOAT-1. AFOAT-1 responded with an urgent directive that the filter papers be sent post-haste to Tracerlab. A special courier plane would be laid on to carry the filter and, presumably, couriers, directly to the west coast.

The Air Force Detection Report6 states that word of the high decay rate reached Washington "...Monday evening" (September 5th). Assuming this to mean 8:00 PM local time, the message must have left Japan about noon on the 6th, local time (fourteen hours clock difference plus an hour on each end for message processing).

There are no specifics on takeoff times in the 514th history, but, if one can trust the author's memory, Charlie flights were normally scheduled to leave Guam between 0600 and 0800 hours. A fifteen hour flight and an hour time difference would put arrival at Yokota somewhere between 10:00 PM and midnight. Even if a switch to a standby aircraft were required, it would be off the ground at Guam by 1100 at the latest. As demonstrated in Alaska, the initial count on the filters could be done in two hours, making the information ready for transmittal to AFOAT-1 no later than 0600 IF THE FILTERS WERE PROCESSED ON ARRIVAL.

Thus it would seem apparent that, despite AFOAT-1's increasingly necessary requirement for additional air mass filter samples, Special Weapons Labs, Yokota being an example, were not specifically instructed to process filters on arrival. The hot filters from the Vulture Charlie flight appear to have sat for several hours before the day shift came on duty and started the disintegration counts.

AFOAT-1 authorized two additional Specials on September 5th, designed to more precisely locate what appeared to be the leading edge of the contaminated air mass. Two RB-29's of the 374th Recon Squadron, stationed at Fairfield-Suisun (Travis) Air Force Base in California, were directed to fly simultaneous missions to Eielson AFB. These two crews were going to cover a lot of miles in the next few days.

One aircraft was to follow an offshore course between the coast and the Loon Victor Special track. It seems likely that this plane flew a track approximating the Lark Dog track, a standard operational run from Fairfield to Alaska assigned to the 374th.

The second plane was to head for Alaska flying over the U.S. and Canada some unstated distance inland from the coastline. Analysis of the filters from these flights, filters supposedly exposed in the same general time frame, and correlated with the data obtained from the Loon Victor Special flight, would hopefully locate the leading edge of the contaminated air mass with some accuracy.

This ends the particulars of the detection from the aspect of sample collection. The events in the political arena are the subject of another article.

- Robert A. Mann

April 1999 - How the Revisionist Grinches Stole the 50th Anniversary of the End of World War II by Andy Doty.

May 1999 - The tale of our 16th mission . . . by Joseph Majeski

We did not have a guest columnist in June 1999.

July 1999 - Col. Patrick J. Ryan - The REAL Bombardier by Fred Byars

We did not have a columnist in August.

September 1999 - The Take Off in a Loaded B-29 by Earl L. Johnson, Maj. Gen. (Retired)

October 1999 - The first B29 to Bomb Japan - by Terrence Lindell

November 1999 - Ford Speaks Out

December 1999 - Memories of Genie, Tinian 1945 by Nate Hicks

January 2000 - Looking Back . . . by James Reifenschneider

February 2000 - No column

March 2000 - The Air Force Today and Yesterday by George Runkle

April 2000- The B-29 in Weather Reconnaissance by Tom Robison