The use of a team approach is generally recognized to enhance the productivity and improve the resultant quality of process hazard analysis. Indeed, many experienced hazard analysts regard team member selection to be at least as important as technique selection in the success of the analysis. In the second edition of "Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures," CCPS notes that "...most high quality hazard evaluation studies require the combined efforts of a multidisciplinary team," and provides guidance on how such a team should be constituted. The first part of this paper elaborates upon these concepts, discussing the importance of a varied mix of educational background, work experience, area of expertise, etc., among the various team members.
However, in addition to the "technical" aspects of team selection, there is a second aspect that is less well recognized (or, at least, less frequently addressed). This is the recognition that all team members bring a unique set of personality traits, behavioral patterns, and biases along with them to the process hazard analysis meetings, all of which affect the quality and efficiency of the safety study. This presents a real challenge to the review Leader, who must take this group of individuals and meld them into a cohesive team. The second part of this paper describes some of the more challenging types of individuals that may be encountered in process hazard analysis meetings and suggests ways of responding to them.
The American colloquialism "Two heads are better than one" can be appropriately generalized as "Multiple heads are better than one" when discussing process hazard analysis. It has been widely recognized that a team approach brings many advantages to the process hazard analysis task, and most safety study methodologies have been specifically designed to use such an approach.
The intent behind a team-based approach is to bring to the study an appropriate mix of knowledge, backgrounds, and expertise to ensure that the study is conducted in a comprehensive, yet cost-effective manner. While the size and constitution of the team will vary depending upon a number of factors, e.g., the analysis technique used and the nature and objectives of the study, the underlying team concept remains the same.
The importance of team makeup was discussed in "Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, 2nd Edition" ("HEP Guidelines"), a CCPS publication to which the authors of this paper were fortunate to have had the opportunity to contribute (Ref. 1) . In the first part of this paper, we will elaborate on some of the concepts discussed in "HEP Guidelines" with regard to team makeup and the roles of the various participants. For example:
Like any committee, the process hazard analysis team is a group of individuals that must be melded into a cohesive working unit to ensure optimum effectiveness. Occasionally, this task of team building can be almost as daunting as the task of completing the analysis itself. In the second part of this paper, we describe some of the personalities and behavioral traits that may be encountered in the course of a process hazard analysis and attempt to provide guidance on how the interpersonal aspects of the hazard evaluation task can be addressed.
Typically, there are four roles that should be represented on a process hazard analysis team, the:
The Responsible Party is just what the title implies, i.e., the individual who has been chartered by management to ensure that a thorough, accurate analysis of the process is conducted. Often, this will be a member of the line organization of the facility under study. In other circumstances, this might be a senior individual from outside the facility who has been brought in to ensure objectivity or, perhaps, to bring a fresh perspective to the analysis. In any event, this individual will typically provide input as to the makeup of the team, will likely be responsible for coordination (including scheduling of the meetings and, ultimately, issuing of the study report) and will have consulted with management on the scope of the analysis (i.e., what portion of the facility is to be studied and what are the purpose and goals of the study).
As expected, the Leader has the responsibility for the actual leading of the meeting. As such, the Leader must be both knowledgeable and experienced in the application of the technique(s) to be used during the study. Herein lies a potential pitfall that can seriously limit the value of a process hazard analysis; i.e., the lack of an experienced Leader. Recent Federal regulatory initiatives have created a new industryóthe training of process hazard analysis meeting Leaders. While such training can be a valuable first step in the development of a Leader, it is the "on-the-job" training, where leaders become practiced in applying the various techniques, that ultimately determines their effectiveness. For this reason, many organizations, if of sufficient size, will designate individuals to train and regularly perform as process hazard analysis Leaders, sometimes full-time and sometimes as an adjunct role to their day-to-day responsibilities.
Finally, but just as importantly, the Leader must be a good "people-person." The reasons for this will be made clear in the second part of this paper.
The discussions involved in a process hazard analysis can be lengthy, detailed, and often somewhat circuitous. To achieve the goals of the analysis, it is imperative that a clear, concise record of the results of the study be documented at its completion. This report must often be distilled from the content of many days of deliberations. While the responsibility for the preparation of the final report might be assigned to any of a number of different parties, its preparation will be made more difficult and its accuracy and utility will likely be diminished unless concise "real-time" records are maintained throughout the course of the analysis.
This is the role of the Scribe. As such, it should be apparent that the Scribe would require good communications skills, both oral and written. For example, the Scribe must be able to focus on the current discussion, distilling from it the key points that need to be recorded. This requires good concentration and the ability to paraphrase and condense. The Scribe must also have the confidence to speak up and seek clarification when required.
A variety of recording media is available for use by the Scribe. If handwritten notes are taken, e.g., on an easel, a printing white board, or a chart pad, the Scribe should be capable of writing rapidly yet legibly. Electronic media (such as specialized programs run on lap-top computers) are sometimes used for recording the minutes of hazard analysis meetings. If such are used, the Scribe should be a capable typist who is computer literate. Some of the issues associated with hazard analysis documentation and the use of hazard analysis computer software are discussed in References 2 and 3.
The bulk of the membership of the team will typically be comprised of the Experts. These are the persons that the Responsible Party counts upon to provide the process knowledge necessary to ensure an adequately detailed, accurate analysis. Generally, the Experts will represent the following functions:
It has been suggested that the appropriately sized process hazard analysis team is the "smallest group of people that knows everything about the process" (Ref. 4). Unfortunately, most organizations are graced neither with omniscience nor with unlimited personnel resources. Consequently, the staffing of the team results from careful deliberations intended to provide the best mix of process information within the constraints imposed by the availability of personnel. While there may be some overlap in the contributions made by the various participants, the input expected from the functional groups listed above would be as follows.
The Operations representatives should be intimately familiar with the process equipment and would be the authorities on operating procedures, past operating incidents, etc. Operations is typically the "owner" of the physical plant and represents a custodial interest in the process hazard analysis proceedings.
Those representing the technical side of the organization would be familiar with the bases for operating limits, would be familiar with the process flow sheet and would be in the best position to research the answers to "What If?" questions that extend beyond the experience of the analysis committee.
Representatives of the engineering organization should be familiar with the design bases for the process equipment and should be conversant on applicable industry and national consensus standards and codes. Maintenance (both mechanical and instrument/electrical) personnel are normally more familiar with maintenance histories, test and inspection programs, specifications and procedures.
The input provided within this category could be as broad in scope as the name implies. At the minimum, it would include familiarity with site and corporate policies, practices and procedures in the HSE area, as well as any applicable state or federal regulations. Also included under this category could be specialized process hazard analysis support such as consequence analysis.
The majority of the team members would be expected to represent the above organizational groups. Typically, a core group of meeting participants would be formed, representing a cross section of these functions. These team members would be expected to attend all process hazard analysis meetings. In the event of an unavoidable absence, a team member should be represented by a replacement. However, absences should be discouraged, because it is important that team members know what has already been covered as well as what has not been covered.
Specialists provide more detailed knowledge of areas of technology relevant to all or part of a hazard analysis. Specialists might participate in a complete analysis, or may be called in to serve as ad hoc members of the team on an as-needed basis. Drawing on such resources in this manner allows the most efficient use of the time and talents of valuable human resources, keeps the meeting attendance to a more manageable size, and keeps the interest level high among the Experts that might otherwise become bored and feel that their time is being wasted by attendance in the analysis meetings when their contribution is not required.
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Table 1 shows some typical backgrounds and functional responsibilities that would be represented in either the team core group or ad hoc members. As alluded to previously, the underlying intent in team formulation is to provide the proper mix of expertise and experience to ensure a thorough, adequate analysis of the safety of the process. The nature of this mix of expertise and experience will be dependent upon the nature of the process and the goal of the analysis. This can be illustrated with a few examples:
The team, as assembled, will typically represent a mixture of both technically degreed and nondegreed personnel. While recent federal regulatory initiatives have made the issue of "employee involvement" a cause célèbre, many organizations have long recognized the substantive role that can, and should, be provided through the participation of operators and mechanics in the process hazard analysis meetings. In the final analysis, these employees, and their first-line supervisors, are the most familiar with the way that the process is actually operated and maintained at 2:00 AM on a Sunday morning.
Another criterion that should be considered in addition to type of work experience, is the length and quality of work experience. Certainly, the team must have a sound foundation of experienced personnel intimately familiar with the process. It is they who bring the detailed process knowledge necessary to ensure a sufficiently detailed and productive analysis. However, a judicious addition of some relatively less experienced personnel can serve several purposes. First, some of these will become the "experienced" hazard analysis team members (perhaps, even Leaders) of the future, and their participation serves as a form of apprenticeship training. Additionally, and more to the purpose at hand, it is often advantageous to have a relatively uninitiated, unbiased viewpoint represented at the meeting. Relatively new personnel may bring fresh insights into the hazards of the process to which more experienced personnel may have become inured. It is vital that the Leader encourage these people to contribute and ensure that they are not intimidated by the presence of their more experienced colleagues.
One mistake that is often made and should be avoided, is putting the recently hired college graduate in charge of the hazard analysis. In an organization that does not appreciate the value of process hazard analysis, this task can be perceived as "busy work" to occupy someone that "doesn't know enough yet to be of much value in the day-to-day operations."
The size of teams can vary significantly, depending upon factors such as the complexity of the study, the goals of the study, and the available personnel resources, as influenced by the size of the organization. At one extreme, a two-member team may assemble to review the advisability of some equipment modifications. Alternatively, a team of seven or eight may be assembled for a "front-door-to-back-door" review of an entire facility. It is important to keep teams to a manageable size to facilitate the Leader keeping the meetings on track.
It should be noted that we have described the four principal roles as if they were staffed by different individuals. This will not always be true, particularly in the case of small teams where, for example, the Leader may have to assume the role of the Scribe, or the Responsible Party may be one of the most Knowledgeable Experts.
Finally, we would be remiss if we did not cite the rather specific hazard analysis team requirements now contained in OSHA's Process Safety Management regulations:
"The process hazard analysis shall be performed by a team with expertise in engineering and process operations, and the team shall include at least one employee who has experience and knowledge specific to the process being evaluated. Also, one member of the team must be knowledgeable in the specific process hazard analysis methodology being used." (Ref. 5) (3)
The various considerations discussed in this section of the paper define a hazard analysis team that would meet all of the requirements of the OSHA rule.
It must be remembered that any team is, at least initially, just a group of individuals. One of the challenges (and this can often be a significant challenge) posed for the Leader is that of taking these individuals and melding them into a smoothly functioning unit.
This goal should not be misconstrued to mean that all sources of dissent must be ferreted out and removed from the proceedings. Quite the contrary; well-intentioned differences of opinion are essential to the critical review required during a process hazard analysis. What we do wish to achieve, however, is a forum in which all participants feel comfortable to, and actually do, contribute freely and on an equal basis to the deliberations.
It is up to the Leader to foster such an environment. As such, the leader must be capable of recognizing and responding to the various personalities, behavioral traits, and biases that the individuals bring to the meetings. The balance of this section contains some "tongue-in-cheek" characterizations of some of the more notable types of personalities who may be encountered on a hazard analysis team and suggests some ways in which the Leader can respond to ensure that these individuals contribute positively to the team effort.
The Dictator is a higher level manager responsible for the facility, for whom a number of the participants in the hazard analysis work. You can immediately tell that all of the subordinates are afraid to say anything until they know what the Dictator thinks, so they won't find themselves on the wrong side of an issue. The hazard analysis deteriorates into a one or two participant meeting, with a large number of people in the meeting unwilling to make any original contributions.
Suggestions. The Dictator is best dealt with before the hazard analysis starts, if the potential problem is recognized. It may be possible to convince the Dictator to spend valuable time on other projects and leave the hazard analysis to subordinates, who will then be more willing to voice their own opinions. If the Dictator's participation is considered essential to a good analysis because of a unique knowledge and understanding of the process, consider bringing in some outsiders who are knowledgeable in the plant and/or process -- people who don't work for the Dictator and would not be afraid to speak their mind. The Leader can also attempt to allow others to express an opinion by establishing a specific order for contributions. Also, the Dictator may not even realize that the subordinates feel too inhibited to participate openly. Discuss the problem -- the Dictator may be more than willing to try to reassure the others that their own contributions are essential to a good analysis, and that they can disagree without fear of reprisal.
DLs want to do the hazard analysis to a much greater level of resolution than the rest of the team. They can spend hours reviewing a single feedback control loop, so that it would take years to review a complete process. This slows down the entire analysis, and also results in the rest of the team losing interest in the hazard analysis, getting into side conversations about other subjects or going to sleep.
Suggestions. DLs can actually be useful in an analysis if kept under control. Details can be important. Abraham Lincoln once observed that one cannot equate a horse chestnut with a chestnut horse (Ref. 6). But DLs cannot be allowed to drown the entire review in a morass of detail and turn off the entire team. It is important to agree to ground rules at the beginning of the meeting as to the scope and level of resolution of the analysis. Agree to record concerns that will require a great deal of time to resolve fully and arrange to have them reviewed in greater detail outside the meeting, and make sure that the DLs are involved in these meetings. It is important for the Leader to maintain control, realize when further discussions are not productive, and stop the discussion by recording any concerns or questions that will need further investigation off-line.
NP is often a process design engineer who knows that the process is safe if properly operated, so all you have to do is hire people who will always run it the right way. If asked "What would be the consequence of leaving manual valve 123-456 open during start-up?", NP's response is "Why would anybody ever do that? It says right in the instructions to make sure the valve is closed, and everybody knows that it would be dangerous to leave it open."
Suggestions. NP needs a better understanding of human error. If we all did everything the right way every time without fail, we would never need any kind of safety devices, alarms, interlocks, etc. NP has undoubtedly included a number of these safety features in the design -- if everybody would do everything correctly every time, why are they there? It is up to the Leader and the rest of the team to insist that human error be addressed and followed up, and to remind NP of the many examples of things that people have done that don't make sense. The penalty for making a mistake must not be a serious injury, because people will eventually make mistakes.
QB is not involved in the hazard analysis, but reads the report in great detail after the meeting looking for things that were left out. Of course, there will always be something to find because no hazard analysis is ever complete or perfect, and the hazards identified are dependent on the background and experience of the participants in the analysis. If it is a good analysis with a good team with an appropriate level of knowledge of the process and dedication to the hazard evaluation process, QB's additional findings will probably be minor. If the team is missing some important area of knowledge, QB may identify important hazards that were not identified.
Suggestions. QB may be annoying, but actually should be regarded as useful. In effect, QB is a quality-control inspector for the hazard analysis. All team members must always remember that the purpose of a hazard analysis is to make the plant safer and identify and evaluate all hazards, regardless of who identifies them. If QB identifies something that the original team missed, the team should be contacted and the findings added to the report. It may even be necessary to reconvene the team to discuss the new issues. If QB identifies an important issue that the team missed, this may be an indication that an important area of expertise was missing from the original team. QB or somebody with similar knowledge and background should have been a part of the team! It is essential in forming teams to make sure that all relevant expertise and experience is represented. If the QBs are repeatedly finding issues that have been missed in hazard studies, the team selection process needs to be reviewed and improved.
Tom and Jerry just don't get along; they argue with each other automatically. If Tom says it's red, Jerry says it's green, perhaps without even thinking about it. If Tom had said it is green, Jerry would have been just as happy to say it is red. These two can totally disrupt any meeting, causing it to degenerate into arguments and shouting matches. They can be particularly damaging to the team effort if they differ on a design or operations issue and seek to steer the results of the hazard analysis to support their own points of view. Other team members may either take sides and get into the fight, or just drop out, sit back, and watch the action.
Suggestions. Avoid putting people with serious incompatibilities on the same team, if at all possible. It is usually possible to identify more than one person with the required knowledge and expertise, and eliminate serious personal conflicts. It is up to the person organizing the team to be aware of any such potential problems and select a team that avoids them. If Tom and Jerry wind up on the same team, the Leader must be strong enough to maintain control of the meeting and handle disagreements and arguments. Meeting ground rules must be established, and the Leader must remind participants of them when necessary.
Neo is a young engineer or scientist, right out of school, who is assigned to a hazard analysis because the responsible manager has more important jobs for the experienced engineers. Neo may be a brilliant engineer, eager and interested in the hazard evaluation, but just does not have the experience and background to be an effective contributor to the hazard evaluation process. If Neo is supposed to represent an important aspect of the facility operation, the team will not be adequately represented in that area, and important hazards may be missed.
Suggestions. It is essential that a hazard study team include a high level of experience and expertise in all relevant areas. If a commitment is made to do a hazard evaluation, that commitment must include an agreement to provide the appropriate level of personnel resources to do the job right. A hazard study represents a significant allocation of time and effort. If the team membership is not appropriate, the product will be inadequate, and the analysis may have to be repeated. It is more efficient to devote appropriate resources to the analysis to begin with and do it right the first time. If it becomes apparent during the analysis that someone's experience or background is inadequate, the Leader should be willing to ask management to add another member to the team to fill in the gap. Neos are often aware of their lack of adequate background and would welcome help. A hazard analysis can be an excellent training tool for new personnel; they will examine the process in great detail and come away with a much better understanding of the plant and process. However, such a team member should be considered to be a secondary contributor and cannot replace an experienced person in a key role. Often a Neo can be very effective in the role of recorder or secretary, removing the documentation responsibility from other team members and allowing them to concentrate completely on the hazard evaluation study.
Beeper is "essential to the operation of the plant" and cannot be out of touch for even a few minutes, much less for a series of several hour-long hazard evaluation meetings. Beeper is frequently paged, and disrupts the meeting by making long phone calls from the meeting room, leaving the room to make phone calls, or visiting the plant to preside over the latest crisis. (4) Beeper is often the last to arrive for the start of a meeting, extends lunch breaks, seeks early adjournment, and is not available to provide input when needed. Sometimes Beeper will send a substitute to the meeting because "something came up." Of course, the substitute has not participated in the analysis to date, and walks in cold without knowing what is going on or what has been discussed previously.
Suggestions. Before the start of the hazard analysis, all participants must make a commitment that the analysis meetings will be their top priority during the meetings. Schedules should be worked out ahead of time to allow key personnel to participate fully without interruption. Meetings could be scheduled for part days to allow participants to have the remainder of the day free for other necessary activities. Coverage by others to relieve key personnel of their normal responsibilities should be set up well ahead of time. Consider the hazard evaluation participants to be "on vacation," and make the same arrangements you would make for those circumstances. In many cases it is best to arrange to have the hazard evaluation meetings off-site to reduce interruptions. The off-site location should be near enough to the plant so that it is still easy to visit the plant for tours, to confirm information about the facility, to obtain information from plant records, and to have suitable access to process experts who are not team members but may be needed for consultation on certain aspects of the process operations.
The Judge has a very high self-regard when it comes to his opinions and has relatively less respect for those of others. The standard reply is "I'm not convinced yet," as if the Judge is the final arbiter for the team. The impact on the team may be somewhat similar to that of the Dictator even though the Judge may not have the same level of managerial authority.
Suggestions. Some of the approaches used for the Dictator may also work for the Judge. The task becomes somewhat easier if the Judge lacks the high-level managerial authority that the Dictator has, in which case there is no need for other team members to fear reprisals for disagreeing. Emphasize early in the meetings the equality of each participant's opinions and that the final report of the team must represent consensus. Remember that a strong Leader can "take the floor" and steer the nature of the discussion away from dominant participants and towards less open participants, thus allowing a mixture of opinions to be heard.
This individual has been with the facility since Day One (or before) and knows "every detail" of its equipment and operation. This is the individual that everyone comes to on a daily basis for any arcane bit of process information, so it is natural that most will defer to OC's opinion within the process hazard analysis meeting. As far as most are concerned, the day OC retires is the day the company will have to sell the business.
Suggestions. By all means, tap into and take full advantage of the years of experience and breadth of knowledge that such senior employees bring to the meetings. At the same time, it is important to emphasize that each hazard analysis is a fresh opportunity to reevaluate the process for new hazards or for old hazards that may have been tolerated previously but can no longer be accepted in the current regulatory and social climate. In other words, not all of the old answers may still apply. Here, again, is where the fresh insight of relatively recently hired employees may be of particular value. In the final analysis, many senior employees, such as OC, are quite willing to accept a mentoring role in helping younger personnel "find" the right answers rather than providing them a priori.
Wallflowers are just too timid to open up and offer an opinion. However, if they have important contributions to make, they must not be left off the team. Their reticence may just be a manifestation of personality, or they may be intimidated by longer service or more senior team members, as discussed previously. They may be afraid of embarrassing themselves by suggesting something that they fear would sound ludicrous to the rest of the team.
Suggestions. Process hazard analysis meetings are, regardless of the technique used, "brainstorming" sessions, and one of the basic rules of brainstorming is that "There are no dumb ideas." The Leader, when laying out ground rules at the start of the study, should emphasize to all that any concern should be brought forth for discussion. The skilled Leader should be able to deal with trivialities (and there won't be that many) graciously so as not to embarrass or "turn off" the suggester. The Leader can also draw out the truly shy individuals by directly asking for their opinions when the discussion touches on their area of expertise. Eventually, most Wallflowers will gain sufficient self-assurance to contribute more freely.
DDE has been working evenings and weekends for months to ensure that the project comes in on schedule and under budget. Now, an already too-full schedule is made even busier because DDE is forced to sit in meetings with a "bunch of non-contributors who still recognize their spouses and children and are nit-picking the design and running up the cost with their silly criticisms."
Suggestion. This situation represents one of the true tests of a Leader's skill. Tempers can get short when people are under pressure and feeling under-appreciated. Extreme levels of tact are called for in dealing with DDE. Emphasize that the process hazard analysis is meant to be a constructive exercise to maximize the success and safety of the project. Steer the discussions away from any judgmental tones. Spend some time acknowledging the success stories inherent in the project effort thus far, but without detracting from the emphasis on the importance of a comprehensive, rigorous review.
Tower is a brilliant but rebellious Research and Development scientist who thinks safety studies should be staffed by persons of lesser importance. Tower tries to convince the rest of the team that they are wasting their time and often falls asleep during the study.
Suggestion. If at all possible, find a replacement and make sure Tower doesn't get assigned to any future safety study teams (after all, that's what Tower wanted, wasn't it?). If a replacement cannot be made, keep Tower awake during periods when R&D input is needed.
DBM is careful not to participate in the study except when an R&D question comes up, and then answers with a complicated response that leaves the team wondering what the answer really is. DBM spends a lot of time reading the Wall Street Journal during the meetings.
Suggestion. During the pre-study team-building, it's important to stress that all members of the team are encouraged to participate fully in the study, not just in their areas of expertise, and that breaks will be set aside for reading newspapers, making telephone calls, etc. An effective Leader will keep all members of the team challenged to participate at all times during work sessions.
Talkathons love to talk more than anything, even if only to hear the sound of their own voices. Nothing is too inconsequential to argue about. In spite of the Leader's repeated admonitions, this incessant talking results in safety studies extending to the wee hours of the morning, the extended sessions becoming necessary to complete the task in time to meet other schedule constraints such as pre-arranged return flights from foreign countries.
Suggestion. The Leader needs to ensure that all team members understand "up front" that adherence to the agreed-upon schedule depends upon everybody sticking to the subject, and that excessive rabbit-chasing, war stories, or filibusters will be done "indirectly" on unpaid overtime after normal working hours. Additionally, a skilled Leader can steer the discussion away from unduly loquacious participants and towards other team members by repeatedly using "cut-off" techniques such as "Yes, I hear what you're saying, but let's see what opinions others have on this matter..." Sooner or later, most people will start to get the message. Peer pressure also helps, especially after midnight.
You can't hear what SVs say most of the time, because they speak at such a low volume. But after straining to hear a few times, you learn to quiet the rest of the team in order to hear them. Value of contribution does not correlate directly with volume of expression.
Suggestion. Accommodate soft-spoken and hard-of-hearing people, as well as those with vision problems, by requesting seating to minimize difficulties. For example, tactfully arrange for those who are soft-spoken to sit where their voices will project better, e.g., at the end of a rectangular table, and for those with hearing problems to sit where they can be near the center of the group yet see most of the team members (people with hearing problems usually read lips, either consciously or unconsciously). Sit close to SVs and repeat, paraphrase, or play back their gems so the rest of the team can benefit.
Know-It-Alls are simultaneously the most intelligent and obnoxious persons you ever met. There is no subject on which they are not instant experts, including safety study methodologies never encountered before. Just ask them how to do it, because they divine their knowledge intuitively. The infuriating truth is that they are often right. But then, the Know-It-Alls are always right by definition, irregardless. They'll even inform you that irregardless is not a word. Their biggest problem is that they alienate the entire team.
Suggestion. A Leader needs the highest degree of skill, patience, tact, and forbearance to deal with the Know-It-All. But it can be done. Show them the respect their intelligence and knowledge deserve; paraphrase their less-than-tactful statements with more tactful language; resist the temptation to shut them up, put them down, or tell them off. Call on your best interpersonal skills to deal with the Know-It-Alls, and most of your team members will take your cue and look for ways to facilitate their contributions rather than figure out ways to give them their comeuppance.
Because of a past reputation as an agitator and consensus splitter, Turn was initially avoided as a potential team member. Turn had arguments and difficulty getting along with almost everyone in the organization. But because of a very narrow and specialized field of expertise, no suitable replacement could be found. However, Turn had recently retired from the company and came back as a "contractor." Imagine the team's surprise to discover what a mellowing influence the "retired status" had upon Turn. The entire team had difficulty believing the cooperation and actual consensus-building Turn facilitated. Finally, someone had found a way to tap this genius -- retire, then rehire.
Moral. Don't always judge team members' potential contributions based totally on their past performances. There is room for improvement, especially if their motivation has changed, as Turn-around's did.
Whiz's one year as a Process Engineer didn't come even close to the 5-year experience requirement the Leader had stipulated for team membership. However, the unit manager was confident that Whiz was very accomplished and a quick study. As it turned out, Whiz proved to be the best contributor on the team and knew the operating unit better than the Production Engineer knew it. The new Plant Manager was incredulous that the team had found so many Major Concerns with the unit, about five times the average. Whiz made the whole team look good.
Moral. Don't get stuck on your guidelines; remember they are guidelines, not immutable commandments. All safety studies should have detailed and specific guidelines on how to execute the studies, but there should be a door for good judgment to enter through.
The study occurred in a foreign country that is one of the cigarette-smoking capitals of the world, and The Addict was an inveterate smoker, determined to smoke in the safety-study conference room, poorly ventilated though it was. The Leader was equally determined no one was going to smoke in there. The Leader won the battle, but lost the war. The Addict later convinced the Director of the Eastern Region to put on the Leader's evaluation that the Leader needed to cultivate a "sense of humor."
Moral. The Leader's inability to handle all situations with supreme tact and finesse will eventually follow the adage "What goes around, comes around."
Although the Leader had heard rumors about this takeover artist, in short time the Bulldozer was, in practice, the actual Leader, usurping all the decisions on scope, protocol, and technical content. Everything the rest of the team said was disputed. Bulldozer was always right, snickering every time the Leader or anyone made a mistake. This sort typically serves on a team just once and is never invited back.
Suggestion. Find other, more challenging work for the Bulldozer. The importance of team-building is just too great to tolerate a disruptive influence such as this.
The study took place in a country where the culture dictated that alcoholic beverages would be served at lunch. After the fourth round, the worried Leader started hinting broadly that it was time to resume the safety study. But the Imbiber could no longer follow the fault tree branches after lunch. Since several on the team were having trouble, though not asleep on the table like the Imbiber, the team adjourned until the following day. After all, what's another day in a foreign capital?
Answer. About $1,000 U.S. (An expensive lesson that justifies a no-alcohol-during-meeting-time rule!)
Two chemical engineers in Production in the same unit on the same safety study team -- why were they getting along so well? Why did he always agree so completely with her, and she with him? The answers soon became obvious. They were married before the final report was issued.
Moral. Never let safety studies get in the way of true love!
1. Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, Second Edition
with Worked Examples, American Institute of Chemical Engineers,
1992.
2. Hendershot, D.C., "Documentation and Utilization of the
Results of Hazard Evaluation Studies," Plant/Operations
Progress, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 256-263, October 1992.
3. Freeman, R. A., "Documentation of Hazard and Operability
Studies," Plant/Operations Progress, Vol. 10, No.
3, pp. 155-158, July 1991.
4. Mr. Thomas H. Pratt, Personal Communication.
5. 29 CFR Part 1910.119, "Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals; Explosives and Blasting Agents; Final Rule," Federal Register, February 24, 1992.
6. Wills, Garry, Lincoln at Gettysburg, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1992, p. 163.
1. Arendt, J.S., Frank, W.L., Giffin, J.E., "A Survey of
Hazard Evaluation Techniques (with Guidance on the Application),"
Chemical Process Safety Report, Tab 400, Thompson Publishing Co.,
March 1992.
(1) This paper was originally presented at the International Process Safety Management Conference and Workshop, San Francisco, CA, September 22-24, 1993 and was published in the Conference Proceedings. Footnotes have been added to update the paper.
(2) Now retired.
(3) The EPA RMP Rule (40 CFR Part 68) now contains this same requirement.
(4) Thanks to technological advances, we could now add cellular phones to the list of distracting personal communications devices that might disrupt a PHA meeting.