General George
McClellan by Toan Tran-Phu
George Brinton McClellan would definitely be the landslide victor of the worst general of the American Civil War. George Brinton McClellan was always a success starting from his early years as a young child. Everyone expected for him to become a great success when he matured. As McClellan received the great honor of being appointed as general in chief, high optimism surrounded him. His great mistakes from his appointment as general in chief to the Peninsular Campaign ultimately led to the greatest mistake of the civil war: the Seven Days’ battle.
On December 3, 1826, George Brinton McClellan was born in Philadelphia to a prominent Philadelphia surgeon. He was always successful in whatever he did. At the remarkable age of 13, McClellan entered the University of Pennsylvania. Finding life too dull, McClellan transferred to West Point at the age of 15. During the Antebellum period, West Point was primarily an engineering school. Consequently, McClellan learned to become an engineer. McClellan also studied the “Art of War”. This “Art of War” primarily consisted of the works and tactics of Napoleon. West Point had not adapted to the study of tactics with weapons of the day. Tactics were still focused on the smoothbore musket as opposed to era’s rifle. McClellan excelled at West Point. He graduated 2nd of his class of 59 students. Upon graduation, he was immediately taken to Mexico to fight the Mexican War.
In Mexico, McClellan started to make a name for himself as a second lieutenant of engineers. He impressed his superiors with his attractive personality, his charm, and his intelligence. At Cerro Gordo, McClellan impressed everyone with his map of the area and helped Winfield Scott win the impossible battle. McClellan earned the brevets of a first lieutenant shortly afterwards. In 1857, McClellan was awarded the rank of captain for bravery under fire.
Once the Mexican War ended, McClellan also contributed to the army. He was taken to Europe among several other old, distinguished officers to observe the Crimean War in Sevastopol, Russia. This was considered a great honor since all of the other officers were much older soldiers who had already distinguished themselves. During this time, European tactics emphasized light infantry. In order to with the battle or skirmish, “freedom of movement”[1] needed to take place. From his observations, McClellan developed several things. The McClellan Saddle was a hybrid of American and European saddles. The shelter tent, which became known as the Pup Tent, was also developed. McClellan also wrote a new bayonet drill book based of the French drill book. From its officers’ observations, several new changes occurred in the Army. Uniforms went from fancy, elaborate dress suits to practical, manageable articles of clothing. The drills of the army also drastically changed. Since it took much time to be promoted in peacetime, McClellan became exasperated with the army and retired.
Once McClellan retired from the army, McClellan saw his golden years. McClellan was appointed chief engineer of the Illinois Central Railroad. Soon afterwards, McClellan was appointed vice president of the Illinois Central. In May 1860, he married Ellen “Nellie” Marcy. Marcy was the daughter of Captain Randolph B. Marcy, the leader of one of the westward expeditions in which McClellan had participated. Four months after the marriage, McClellan was appointed president of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad’s Eastern Division.
On April 23, 1861, McClellan accepted a commission to become Major General of the Ohio Volunteers. Soon the War Department gave him command of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. In June, McClellan’s first victory came. He sent 20,000 troops over the Ohio River. He did this to prevent Confederate sabotage of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. His move also preserved the Anti-secessionist section of Virginia. The area would soon apply to become West Virginia. His victory was almost mandatory. He had over threefold the number of resistance. It was a smashing victory. It was around this time that he earned the nickname of “Young Napoleon”. However, his staff and subordinates had already started to complain about his reluctance to go into battle.
While McClellan was campaigning in the West, the Eastern Theater was in a complete rout. The Battle of First Bull Run had left the Union shell-shocked. High command was in a constant fear of Washington, D.C. being captured. The army was completely demoralized and unorganized. Drunken soldiers ravaged in the streets of the capital city, looting anything in sight. It became dangerous to walk the streets of the nation’s capital after the sun had set.
Amidst these problems, McClellan took office. In order to get them in control, he ordered veteran soldiers into divisions that would serve somewhat like Military Police. Deserters were rounded and punished. Drill sergeants cracked down on military discipline. During this era, command would not only be awarded ability, but also by political influence. The states’ governors, often without any basis on military ability appointed many of the new volunteer regiments’ commanders. McClellan immediately saw this problem and dealt with many of them. Purely political commanders were sent home. Commanders with true leadership abilities were promoted. McClellan finally set up a defense around Washington, D.C. He organized 48 forts ringed around the capital. At this time, Brigadier General Joseph E. Johnston had occupied Fairfax Court House approximately 15 miles from the capital. This maneuver had McClellan worried even more intensely about the safety of the capital. Like the beginning of a broken record, it is now that McClellan first overestimated the enemy strength. McClellan will continually do this during his time in the military. McClellan estimated Johnston had about three or fourfold his actual force of 40,000, while McClellan had over 70,000 troops. McClellan also reorganized and renumbered the corps under his command. He realized that soldiers were suffering in his camps. To raise morale, McClellan increased soldiers’ pay and continually requested for better conditions by applying for more food and clothing.
Whereas McClellan was enhancing his soldiers’ lives, he was not pleasing his immediate superior, Winfield Scott. When McClellan’s position was vacant, Scott had strongly vouched for another general. Personal relationships between Scott and McClellan were not good. When Lincoln nominated McClellan to be Head of the Army of the Potomac, Scott had strongly protested. He tried to retire. However, Lincoln considered Scott to be invaluable, and convinced Scott to remain. McClellan further complicated conflicts. Just to spite Scott, McClellan began to circumvent Scott. He went communicated directly to Lincoln and his Cabinet, instead of seeing Scott first.
While McClellan was reorganizing, General Joseph E. Johnston started to doubt the security in many of his positions around Washington, D.C. On September 27, 1861, Johnston retreated from Munson’s Hill to Fairfax Court House. On October 17, Johnston withdrew from Fairfax Court House. McClellan’s men easily occupied these abandoned positions. Eager to gain more territory, McClellan decided to occupy Leesburg, Virginia, about 35 miles up the Potomac River. McClellan was convinced that he only needed to fight a few skirmishes and demonstrate the fighting ability of his army before the Rebels would withdraw from Leesburg.
Once the plans were drawn up, McClellan began to execute it on October 19, 1861. First, General George A. McCall would use his 13,000 strong division to probe the area. Next, McClellan telegraphed General Stone to watch Leesburg for a Confederate retreat in a very vague manner. Equally as vague was the next suggestion to put a slight demonstration. With a force 10,000 strong, Stone executed the order. After briefly shelling the enemy territory across the river, Stone sent out a small team consisting of three boats of 35 men. Once completing the second part of the order, Stone set out to finish the first part. He sent out a patrol of 20 men to capture Harrison’s Island, a narrow island about three miles upstream from Edwards Ferry. On October 20, this patrol under the command of Captain Charles Philbrick paddled across the Potomac to the Virginia side. This team landed at Ball’s Bluff. This was a steep bank about 100 feet high, covered in rocks and undergrowth. By the time Philbrick navigated into the woods, night had fallen. After hiking for ¾ of a mile, there seemed to be a Confederate encampment on a nearby ridge. This encampment seemed to consist of 30 unguarded tents. Philbrick quickly went back to camp. He mentioned about this camp to his superiors. Stone interpreted this unguarded camp as a sign of retreat from Leesburg. He sent several companies across. Simultaneously, Stone sent Colonel Charles Devens across with the 15th Massachusetts. Devens was ordered to find and destroy this enemy encampment, and then immediately return to Harrison’s Island. On October 21, 1861, Devens crossed in search of the camp. After finding the correct ridge, Devens realized that the camp had never been real—it was merely the hazy moon through the treetops. Not seeing any Confederate troops around, Philbrick believed that he was alone. In reality, there was an entire brigade of 2,000 men stationed around them. A Confederate detachment 40 strong would stumble into Philbrick, causing what would become to be known as the Battle of Ball’s Bluff.
At the beginning of the battle, reinforcements poured in from both sides. During midday, the Confederates under Colonel Nathan G. Evans started winning the upper hand in the battle. A new Union officer, Colonel Edward D. Baker, along with reinforcements, joined Devens on the ridge. Even with superior firepower and manpower, the Union continually gets weaker and weaker. As Baker took command of the field, he organized the Union line. The line would have a relatively long centerline and diagonally projecting upwards left and right flanks. Should the centerline surge forward, this formation made it impossible for the wings to fire. Baker had managed to bring three artillery pieces across. However, insufficient infantry support caused the gunners to give way to musket fire. The Union line drew restless. There was only one escape route left. Then a decisive turning point happened, “Out of the woods rode a man on a gray horse. He raced in front of the Federal attack column on the left, waved his hat and shout, ‘Come on, boys!’”[2]. The column, mistaking the mysterious horseman for their leader, surged forward. In reality, the rider was actually Confederate staff officer Lieutenant Charles B. Wildman. The column was mowed down by musket fire. This event sealed the fate of the Federal line. The Federal officers were sounding the retreat. Colonel Baker had failed to give word to General Stone. Stone had assumed that things were going well at Ball’s Bluff. When Stone finally got word about Baker’s position, he quickly telegraphed McClellan for help. The Federal line had retreated to the edge of the river. The Confederate line was advancing. The only escape route was to jump the bluff and swim the river. Hundreds of Union soldiers met their fate by drowning or getting killed in the jump. Official federal losses included 529 captured, 49 KIA [Killed in Action], 198 wounded, and over 100 drowned. The Confederates only suffered 36 KIA, 117 wounded, and 2 MIA [Missing in Action].
When news of the stunning defeat reached Lincoln, he was literally nearly to tears. McClellan was embarrassed and saddened. Congress was furious with McClellan. However, McClellan diverted the onus to his superior, Scott. Congress convinced Lincoln to accept Scott’s offer for resignation. At this point, McClellan was promoted to the rank of general in chief. The public was getting restless. They called for immediate action. At this point, McClellan began to develop his Urbanna Plan. The Urbanna plan would use ships to transport troops to do a Yorktown Peninsula invasion. From there the main objective would be Richmond. Lincoln’s cabinet was starting to turn against McClellan. Instead of hitting directly at McClellan, they struck at his subordinates. In particular, they examined Stone. Lincoln had just removed Simon Cameron as Secretary of War and replaced him with Edwin McMasters Stanton. Lincoln, for the first of many times, got exasperated with McClellan for waiting around. On January 27, he proclaimed that there would be some movement of the troops. Four days later, Lincoln issued an order telling McClellan exactly what to do. McClellan was to attack a point on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad. McClellan followed with a 22-page response comparing his Urbanna Plan and Lincoln’s plan. Faced with increasing pressure from the public, McClellan finally made a move. He would clear two Confederate batteries near Washington. McClellan proposed a two-prong campaign to capture the batteries. The troops would cross at Harpers Ferry via a pontoon boat, while artillery and baggage would cross on a more sturdy boat of lashed boats. When the boats arrived at the canal to be transported up, the boats were found to be 6 inches too wide. No one had made sure and measured the boats. Since the bridge could not be built, McClellan called off the whole attack. Congress was absolutely furious.
While the North was fuming at the two canceled attacks, Confederate general Johnson was making his own plans. With the weather getting nicer, he feared that a Federal invasion was imminent in the Manassas Junction area. He methodically transferred all of his supplies and men further South. By March 9, 1862, all of the troops had retreated from Manassas. The troops burned what remained of their stores. McClellan happily took Manassas without bloodshed. He hastily organized a force to pursue the Confederates. Amid this pursuit, McClellan found out that he had been demoted from general-in-chief. The manner in which McClellan found this out was also saddening. The demotion had been published in Washington newspapers before an official dispatch reached McClellan. Friends had telegraphed McClellan after reading the newspapers before the courier arrived. Lincoln claimed to have demoted McClellan since he was about to execute the Urbanna Plan and could not manage the whole army successfully. Hitchcock replaced McClellan’s empty position. Amidst this replacement, McClellan would have to execute the Urbanna Plan. With Johnston’s retreat, McClellan needed to revise his Urbanna Plan.
The revised Urbanna Plan would be an amphibious assault. The army would sail down and land at the tip of the Virginia Peninsula. Fort Monroe would be their landing point. From Fort Monroe, it was 70 miles to Richmond. However, McClellan was counting on the navy’s support.
On March 17, the Urbanna Plan was executed. It took over 400 ships to ferry: 121,500 troops, 14,592 horses, 1,150 wagons, 44 batteries, and 74 ambulances. McClellan had counted heavily on the navy’s cooperation. Through a great blunder of miscommunication, the navy had not even heard about the need for gunboats. On April 5, McClellan’s faulty maps took their toll. They did not show the numerous creeks that hampered troops’ progress. On the map, the Warwick River was not supposed to hamper the Federals. However, the Warwick River directly crossed the path. Also, the Confederates’ dams down-river caused the river to be much swollen. The only feasible way of crossing the river was to cross at one of the six dams. Early reconnaissance showed that each dam was heavily defended. However, with the overwhelming odds of 58,000 men to 15,000 men, it still would have been possible to break through the lines of the Confederates. Instead, McClellan delayed, asking for more men and preparing for a siege. General Magruder, the Confederate general facing McClellan, roused up his men. He acted like he had many troops and was constantly receiving more. He did this by making much more troop movement and clamor. Taking from what he had learned from Sevastopol, Russia, McClellan prepared to put siege to Yorktown. On April 16th, a reconnaissance force captured a dam on the Warwick. Several companies had splashed across. The Confederate line had been broken. Had McClellan, who had arrived on site to observe, sent much of his army across, he would have captured a safe crossing place. However, McClellan was content with merely a nice position for his artillery and did not press the attack. The companies soon withdrew once the Confederates hosted a counterattack. By now, the Confederate line was receiving reinforcements daily. The Confederate count was now at 50,000. A siege seemed unavoidable. McClellan labored endlessly to bring huge siege guns to siege Yorktown. By May 3, 114 huge siege guns were in place. Before most of the guns could fire a single shot, Johnston had decided to withdraw from Yorktown. Since this retreat was done in great stealth, the Union cavalry did not give chase until midday. The cavalry was soon driven back by Confederate cavalry and artillery. Johnston retreated to redoubts and trenches built by Magruder some months before. These redoubts had some obstacles to slow down attackers. Neither side had chosen this site as the field of the Battle of Williamsburg.
On May 5, 1862, the first real battle of the Peninsular Campaign began. Brigadier General Joseph Hooker had needed a fight for his troops since the siege of Yorktown. He sent a line of skirmishers to Fort Magruder. A battery was supposed to soften resistance at Fort Magruder. However, artillery fire killed two of its officers, sending them into confusion. Major Charles H. Wainwright came to the aid of the artillery by sending another battery in. Its troops also manned the other battery’s guns. Under cover of the artillery, the skirmish line surged forward. However, the Confederate line was receiving reinforcements. Major General James Longstreet arrived on the scene. He counterattacked and drove Hooker back. The Union line was in panic. Sensing a complete rout, Brigadier General J.E.B. Stuart ordered his cavalry to ride among the wake. The Union line was about to collapse. However, at the crucial moment, Brigadier General Philip Kearny’s division arrived. Kearny’s troops finally drove the Confederates back. At this time, Brigadier General Winfield Scott Hancock had captured two vacant redoubts. Hancock was in a good position to seal off Longstreet’s retreat route had he been able to receive more men from General Sumner. Sumner, seeing Hancock’s deteriorating position, ordered Hancock to retreat. Hancock had stalled on the order, and was about to retreat when there suddenly was activity in front. Major General Daniel Harvey Hill and Brigadier General Jubal A. Early had attacked Hancock. When Hancock regrouped behind a crest, the Confederate line mistook it for a retreat and surged forward. Hancock’s line mowed the line down. Hancock then ordered a charge, which resulted in a complete Confederate rout. Confederate casualties numbered at 1,603 wounded, killed, or missing and 2,239 casualties for the Union. The Federal army now remained merely 50 miles away from Richmond, but the hardest fight was yet to come.
Richmond was in a state of panic. With an overwhelming force so near the city, it was natural to be worried about her capture. In the typical McClellan manner, McClellan was advancing very slowly. However, McClellan was finally granted 40,000 troops for reinforcement. However, these troops would have to come over by land. Consequently, McClellan needed to revise his plan. His revision was to put three corps North of the Chickahominy River and two corps South. When the corps finally were in position, McClellan received word that his promised troops would not arrive. To avoid a disaster of communication, McClellan ordered 11 bridges to be put up across the Chickahominy. When McDowell’s troops [in the North] and McClellan’s troops [in the South] seemed to be joining up, Johnston finally went into action. He realized he needed to prevent the union of these two armies. Johnston sent out a few reconnaissance teams. Now knowing the position of McClellan’s troops, Johnston planned his attack. This attack would go down in history as the Battle of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines.
On the eve of the planned attack a huge rainstorm belched torrents onto the soldiers. The rain caused several of McClellan’s bridges to swamp. Johnston’s plan was a sound one. Longstreet would strike east at Seven Pines. Major General Benjamin Huger would take Charles City Road. Major General Gustavus W. Smith would hold two divisions northeast of Richmond to prevent crossing. Major General Daniel Harvey Hill would take Williamsburg Road. Huger would control the timing. The plan was technically feasible. Whether it would work or not depended on the generals and a little luck.
On the morning of May 31, Johnston began the march eastward. However, the attack was delayed. Longstreet, who had been given verbal commands and no written orders, either did not hear or did not understand. He ended up taking the wrong road. DH Hill launched the first attack against Silas Casey. Casey’s troops were all new troops. Plus, the Confederates outnumbered the Federals 2 to 1. Inevitably, Casey’s line broke and ran. Two divisions had been sent to slow down the advancement of the Confederates. Philip Kearny’s division had raced to the battle scene. He launched a flanking counterattack that regained almost all of the lost ground. Rodes bore the grunt of Kearny’s counterattack. Longstreet had sent up Colonel James L. Kemper to aid Rodes in Kearny’s attack. However, Kemper failed to provide much help and ended up being trapped in a crossfire between Kearny and his artillery. During this time, however, Brigadier General Richard H. Anderson managed to break through Couch’s division at the Federal Center. Kearny, whose flank was threatened by the move, had to retreat.
Johnston, meanwhile, had decided to send Whiting down to Fair Oaks—only to find it abandoned. When Couch’s division had been split, the northern section had retreated to the outskirts of Fair Oaks. Couch had set up defenses at Adams House. Whiting sent a several charges—each one only to be mowed down. On the third and final charge, Whiting would have overwhelmed Couch had Couch not suddenly receive reinforcements. McClellan, out with malaria, had sent a dispatch to General Sumner “merely warned Sumner’s troops to be ready to move across the river toward Seven Pines”[3]. However, Sumner moved his troops down and crossed on an unsteady makeshift bridge that was ready to collapse. When the end of the day neared, Johnston took a hit in his chest. Major General Gustavus W. Smith replaced him. Towards nightfall, the Union line began to show some of the favor of the battle. Smith spent a sleepless night hastily organizing plans for the next day.
Longstreet, unhappy with the plan Smith came up with, used his own. DH Hill, under orders from Longstreet, sent William Mahone to the railroad. At 6:30 a.m., Mahone’s troops met Brigadier General William H. French’s troops. Brigadier General Oliver Otis Howard came and helped French defend from Mahone. Howard sent Miller across the railroad to prevent a flank attack. One of Miller’s subordinates mistook the Confederates in front of them for friends. Colonel Francis Channing Barlow pushed forward, coming very near to Mahone’s brigade. Mahone had retreated. Colonel J. H. Hobart Ward had advanced straight into the Confederate’s unprotected flank. From the cover of the railroad cut, Ward soon called for a charge. Through bad teamwork, the whole Confederate line eventually had to retreat. Casualties were numerous: Confederates 6,134; Federal 5,031. However, with Johnston’s wound, a new officer had to be appointed: Robert E. Lee. McClellan was now as close to Richmond as ever. However, McClellan lost the glowing opportunity in the Seven Days’ Battle.
It would take an extraordinary number of failed relations to equal the relation between Lincoln and McClellan. One of the major reasons why McClellan would ultimately fail was his relationship with Lincoln. At first, Lincoln saw potential in this energetic man. Lincoln was determined to keep him in charge, in hopes of discovering a “fighting machine”. In several instances, McClellan strained the patience of Lincoln. In one famed example, Lincoln wanted to talk to McClellan. A servant told Lincoln and his staff that McClellan would soon be coming. When McClellan got home, McClellan went straight to bed. Lincoln waited half an hour more. After that, Lincoln calmly asked the servant to tell McClellan that Lincoln was there. The servant soon came back only to say that McClellan had gone to bed. After Ball’s Bluff, McClellan was exasperated with Lincoln’s failure to provide more reinforcements and his intervention. McClellan did not inform Lincoln about the Urbanna Plan for several months. Lincoln and his cabinet were always scared about the safety of Washington, DC.
It was mostly McClellan’s fault that the Union did not win easily within the first two years. He was always too cautious. From the moment he took office to the moment Lincoln relieved him, McClellan was too cautious. During the advance, McClellan moved slower than a snail’s pace, averaging about three miles per day. Every time McClellan was on the move, he would do this. He continually trusted faulty information from Allan Pinkerton. During the months of rest around Washington, DC, McClellan believed that there were 150,000 Confederates instead of the 74,000 troops they actually had. McClellan was constantly bickering with Lincoln. McClellan’s failure to inform Lincoln of the Urbanna Plan demonstrated the strained relations between the two. A loosely organized army was particularly damaging at Ball’s Bluff. Miscommunication was continually present, especially at Ball’s Bluff and the Urbanna Plan. Faulty maps wreaked havoc during the Urbanna Plan. McClellan’s influence from Sevastopol, Russia, made McClellan always want to use siege tactics instead of an all-out frontal assault.
Throughout the rest of McClellan’s military career, McClellan would always fail. At one point, McClellan would be only five miles away from Richmond. Then, in one battle, retreat to over fifteen miles from Richmond. McClellan would also blunder badly at Antietam. Eventually, McClellan would be relieved by Lincoln to wait for future orders. After two years of military disasters and blunders, Lincoln did a great deed to the Union by finally relieving itself from the era’s worst general-in-chief.